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DIPLOMATIC TRANSACTIONS 


IN 

CENTRAL ASIA, 

FROM 1834 TO 1839. 


I r\) (\at i_ £>__ 






“ The Olynthians could mention many Things now, which, 
had they known in Time, their State 
had not perished.” 



PRINTED BY THOMAS BRETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET. 


MDCCCXLI. 













. 1 ) 3 ! & 

THUi 































i 















TO DAVID URQUHART, ESQ. 



&c. &c. &c. 


Glasgoiv , 20 th August , 1839- 

Sir, 

From your intimate acquaintance with the affairs of Turkey and the East, 
we would feel greatly obliged by your giving us your opinion on our commercial and 
political relations in that quarter of the world, and particularly on the correspondence 
laid before Parliament relative to Affghanistan and Persia. 

We make this request from the impossibility of attaining elsewhere this knowledge, 
and from a consideration of the importance to the commercial communities of being 
possessed of this information, derived from one so eminently qualified for so laborious 
and intricate an investigation. 

We are, Sir, your most obedient humble Servants, 

(Signed) James Finlay and Co. 

Buchanan, Hamilton, and Co. 

Hy. Monteith and Co. 

and forty-seven other Commercial Houses. 




b 


VI 


To JAMES FINLAY and Co., &e., Glasgow. 


Bittern Manor, October 1(>, 1839. 

Gentlemen, 

It was my intention to have transmitted to you my reply to the letter you 
have done me the honour of addressing me, together with an exposition of the diplomatic 
transactions between Great Britain, Persia, and Russia. 

In the execution of this task I have unfortunately been delayed by other occupa¬ 
tions, as also by the weak state of my health. 

I therefore address to you the present letter, fearful lest this delay might in any way 
be misunderstood, and anxious to convey to you my sense of the responsibility which 
you have imposed upon me by the request which you have addressed to me. 

As some time must still elapse before I am enabled to transmit to you my opinions 
upon this matter in an extended shape, you will perhaps allow me to offer you a few 
considerations upon the subject. 

The conclusion to which I have come, after a minute investigation of these 
documents, is this—that the policy and alliances of the Indian Government previously 
to the invasion of Afghanistan, have been exactly the reverse of what they ought to 
have been, and exactly such as Russia would have desired—that the previous policy of 
the British Government, in regard to Persia, was exactly the reverse of that which 
should have been adopted, and exactly such as Russia would have desired—that the 
defence of the Afghans against the injustice of the Seiks was the only policy of the 
Indian Government—that the defence of Persia against the violence of Russia was the 
only policy of the Government of Great Britain—that the alliance of the Indian 
Government with the Seiks—that the alliance of the English Government with the 
Russians—imposed on us the duty of arresting their encroachments, or of separating 
ourselves from their alliance ; that remaining the ally of the aggressive Seik, and of 
the aggressive Russian, England became a party to the aggressions of both, and thereby 
the enemy of Afghanistan and of Persia. That the only object of England in Central 
Asia was the elevation of barriers against the encroachments of any European power, 


Vll 


and consisted in the strengthening of the power and the maintenance of the indepen¬ 
dence of the Persians and of the Affghans, and the binding of those people to herself— 
that her alliance with the Seiks and with the Russians has introduced a de facto policy, 
the very reverse of the nominal policy assumed in England to be pursued—that the 
de facto policy pursued in the East, and not the nominal policy assumed in England, 
has been that which has produced results—that the results are, hostility of the 
Affghans and of the Persians to Great Britain—the combination of those two nations 
against us, and ultimately the placing of the resources of those two nations at the 
disposal of Russia, for the purpose of dismembering our Indian Empire. 

On the consequent defection of Persia and Affghanistan, the Indian Government is 
alarmed, and proceeds to take measures to avert the danger. 

These measures, so adopted, were unjust, and had they been just, they were the 
most inexpedient that could have been devised. The attack of Affghanistan was warranted 
by no act of aggression. The setting up of a Pretender would have been unjust had 
the war been legitimate. The ruler they undertook to overthrow was the best instru¬ 
ment they could have found. Having, by the alliance with the Seiks, brought the 
influence of Russia to the banks of the Indus, the war which they undertook as a 
means of arresting that Russian influence had only the effect of uniting the spirit of 
Affghanistan with that of Persia, and of bringing the power of England so near to the 
Russian frontiers as to give Russia means of striking it a deadly blow with so much the 
less trouble and so much the more effect. 

The diplomatic correspondence between England and Persia, and the subsequent 
explanations between England and the Court of St. Petersburgh, lead me to the 
following conclusions: 

That England, having admitted from the year 1834 a unity of intentions and a 
concert of policy with Russia in regard to Persia, had at once transferred her power to 
Russia, and deprived Persia of every shadow of independence—that the subsequent 
action of England upon Persia of necessity became conducive to the ends of Russia— 
that the present King of Persia felt that he owed to Russia the support of England 
for his establishment on the throne—that the Foreign Minister not merely tacitly 
sanctioned, but directly encouraged, the prosecution by Persia of Eastern projects of 
conquest under the impulse of Russia—that he further confirmed Persia in that line by 


• • • 

Vlll 

breaking with her on the grounds of her connection with Russia—that he counteracted 
the effect of the remonstrances of the British Envoy in Persia, by not acting upon the 
representations and the proofs sent home by that Envoy respecting the avowed hostility 
of Russia to Great Britain—that he disguised this collusion from the British Parliament 
and nation by an ostensible reproduction of the statements of the British Envoy in 
Persia, as by an apparent demand of satisfaction from the Russian Cabinet, that he 
neutralized the effect of this step on Russia by accepting, as a reply to it, an anterior 
communication from the Russian Government—that he admitted, as a satisfactory 
reply, a document which contained no refutation of the alleged facts, and no reparation 
for the established injuries—consequently, that the Foreign Minister, throughout this 
transaction, acted collusively with Russia to establish her supremacy in Persia, and to 
misrepresent the facts to the British nation. 

But the power of Russia to assail India, as of England to defend India against 
Russia, is to be estimated and found in relative strength of both in Europe. 

If the Foreign Minister has criminally sought to destroy the influence of England 
in Persia for the gain of Russia, he must have sought to attain the same end by the 
other means equally at his disposal; he must have laboured to destroy the influence of 
England in Europe, to make states and nations her enemies: this was more important 
towards the subjugation of India than the placing of Persia at the disposal of Russia. 

The Foreign Minister has equally lent his support to Russia in Turkey as in Persia, 
and thereby Russia approaches to the possession of that empire—he has created grounds 
of hostility in regard to the boundary question between the United States and Great 
Britain, opening up the chances of war with the United States, and increasing the 
internal commotions of our American possessions; thereby weakening England as 
against the world, and drawing away resources from the defence of India by the dangers 
in North America. Prussia has been allowed to establish commercial controul over 
Germany, which gives her a future interest of a commercial character in the exclusion, 
by Russia, of British commerce from the East. France has been suffered to proceed in 
a policy of aggression, which prepares her for future hostility with England, and has 
been supported in this scheme by the Foreign Minister. 

Pretexts have been afforded by the Foreign Minister for naval armaments by other 
powers. Fleets have been commissioned in profound peace, and have been suffered by 


IX 


the Foreign Minister without remonstrance, or with remonstrances which, having been 
made without effect, have only served to confirm what the Minister pretended to oppose. 

The result, I anticipate, unless another spirit is awakened in this country, and 
another policy pursued, is the loss of India; and with it the general dismemberment of 
empire, and the fall of Britain. 

I have the honour to be, 

Gentlemen, 

Your obedient humble servant, 

DAVID URQUHART. 














































































































P R E F ACE. 


Paris , October 1840. 

This analysis, written in October 1839, was partly published in the Glasgow 
Herald , between December 1839, and April 1840. It has been reprinted, during 
my absence from England, and without my knowledge; and the latter parts, which had 
not appeared, I have had to furnish nearly as originally sketched—not having the 
opportunity of reference either to documents or to notes. 

The interval of twelve months has now been given to judge of the events, and for 
the production of other expositions of the subject. In revising my own conclusions 
with the benefit of these lights, I find that I have nothing to alter and nothing to reply 
to. The only objection to my knowledge that has been made to any of the statements 
in this volume has reference to the letter of condolence sent by the Russian Minister in 
Persia to the Shah, on the death of Abbas Meerza. It has been denied that that letter 
contained any allusion to Mahmoud Meerza’s successor*, on the authority of 
the English Envoy, who had obtained a sight of the original, and did not find in it 
any such allusion. My statement with respect to the contents of the letter was made, of 
course, on hearsay, and it is only given as such; and that hearsay is as important as the 
fact in its bearing upon the argument. I may add, that my information was from a 
Russian source. 

I have hazarded the supposition that the expedition for the establishment of Shah 
Shooja upon the throne of Cabul, was brought about by the direct influence of the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs. I was led to that supposition by knowledge of the 
repugnance of the Indian Government, so late as April 1837, to that expedition, and by 
the conviction, then entertained and expressed by the Indian Government, that its 
discouragement of the projects of Shah Shooja would operate in favour of British 


* See page 38. 


• • 

Xll 

interests : and I therefore felt that Lord Palmerston must have intervened to bring 
it about in a manner too direct for his influence to have escaped observation. I have 
since learnt that this is the case, and that the instructions which determined the 
expedition had been sent at the suggestion of the Foreign Office, direct from the Board 
of Control to the Governor-General, without communicating them to the Board 
of Directors, in violation, consequently (if this report is grounded), of the authority 
under which, by Act of Parliament, the Board of Control is constituted, and the 
Governor-General holds his post. 

In Parliament, nothing has taken glace hearing on these transactions . The vote 
of thanks to the Commander-in-Chief and the Army which crossed the Indus, led 
to no discussion beyond that of precedents as to the mode of conveying public 
acknowledgments for military service ! The leader of the Opposition declared, indeed, 
that he reserved his opinion upon the political merits of the transaction—until he had an 
opportunity of seeing the accounts ! 

In France and in Germany some valuable papers have appeared on Indian affairs, 
and in the latter country even some attempts to analyse the Parliamentary papers. 
From the Indian press two valuable pamphlets have issued from the pen of Colonel 
Caulfield. They bear exclusively upon the Seik and Affghan portion of the question, 
and corroborate the view here given on these matters. 

In the periodical literature of our own country two essays alone have appeared, 
both of them currently reported to be from the pen of Sir John M c Neill. The first 
appeared in the Quarterly Review , of June 1839; the latter has appeared in the 
Edinburgh Review for July 1840. Both articles are formal defences of the conduct of 
the Government, and justify the assault upon Affghanistan, and the abandonment of and 
subsequent rupture with Persia on the necessity of resisting the hostile progress of 
Russia. Persia is stated as being incapable of resistance to Russia; Central Asia 
is represented as having fallen under her sway, and the expeditionary movements into 
Cabul and Kandahar are represented as triumphs, because they had displaced the 
influence of Russia, and arrested her practical progress in these regions, and the extension 
of her disorganizing power into the centre of Hindostan. In the first of these articles 
Russia is represented as a Power whom no foreign Government can trust; and vet it is 
stated that Lord Palmerston does trust in Russia. That article, moreover, appeared at 


Xlll 


the time that Lord Palmerston assumed a French alliance as against Russia, and 
exhibited strong personal antipathy to Russia. The article of the Edinburgh Review , of 
1840, allows no shadow of reproach to rest upon Lord Palmerston, and still represents 
all his acts as dictated by the necessity of opposing Russia, admits no trust in her on his 
part, and justifies the policy pursued on the grounds of its mistrustfulness of Russia. 
A fortnight after the article appeared, the Treaty of the 15th July was signed, and 
the grounds of Lord Palmerston’s defence, supposing it had been a defence, became by 
that act grounds of condemnation. 

The readers of that article have been, no doubt, satisfied that the ambition of Russia 
explained the invasion of Cabul. The same readers, when it has been explained to 
them that the reason of the Alliance of the 15th July is the absence of ambition in 
Russia, and the presence of ambition in France, have been equally satisfied; and those 
same readers, six months ago, approved of the submission of England to the blockades 
oi Mexico and Buenos Ayres, because they were told that the friendship of France was 
too valuable to be endangered by any minor differences. Thus, by accumulating upon a 
nation events which are incomprehensible to it, does its mind become unfit for the 
performance of any public duty, or the comprehension of any fact. 

To-day that there is a public alliance of England and Russia against France, the 
reader, influenced unconsciously by the new position in which things are placed, has lost 
the consciousness of the intention of deception which must have come home to him on 
discovering collusion between the British Minister and a power to whom we were 
publicly opposed. Wherever, therefore, the words “ union with Russia” occur, they 
conveyed, at the time when written, a very different sense from that which they convey 
subsequently to the Treaty of the 15th July. The growing suspicions with respect 
to the Foreign Minister rendered it necessary, to bring about an ostensible alliance 
between England and Russia, because, while a simulated disunion between the two 
countries existed, the support which Lord Palmerston received from Russia became 
dangerous. But when the nation is as it were suddenly turned round, and the habit 
comes of talking of Russia as an ally, and danger imposes upon us the necessity of 
looking to her as a protector, then vanishes at once the idea of guilt in regard to the 
secret collusion with her of the Foreign Minister, and then comes the support which she 
affords to him to be given as it were to England, and received by him, not as against 
England, but for the public benefit. 

c 


XIV 


I may take this opportunity of replying to some objections which I find constantly 
reproduced. It is said, “ You seek to prove too much in showing Russia’s hand every 
where, and you do harm and not good in charging the Foreign Minister with treason; 
if you charged him with incapacity and ignorance, you would get more to believe you, 
and might sooner bring about a change.” It is not in my power to alter my conclusions ; 
and conclusions such as mine, it is not in my power to withhold. If I saw only 
that which others see, it would be needless for me to speak. If the hand of Russia 
were not wherever there is a British interest to frustrate, and a Russian interest to 
advance—and that is everywhere —there would be no danger to England, because 
there would be no system in Russia. To charge Lord Palmerston with incapacity, 
where I am convinced that there is crime, would be to screen that crime, and to 
become a sharer in the guilt. 

It is then objected, “ You serve Russia by exhibiting her in a light which is 
extravagant—you strengthen Lord Palmerston by an accusation which is incredible; by 
spreading visionary alarms, you render men heedless of real dangers, and by accusing of 
atrocious crime, they become careless of real offences.” 

Such reasoning amounts to this, “ We are unable to say whether you are right or 
wrong, and we wish to be spared the trouble of inquiring; we care not that charges 
and statements remain uninvestigated, since they refer to weighty and important matters. 
If you told us what we already believe, or repeated things by no means alarming, then 
should we be attentive and pleased.” 

It is doubtless true, that amongst the men where such objections can be made— 
revelation of danger may not bring security—exposure of guilt may only strengthen 
crime. Is it he who asserts that which is alarming—or those who neglect to ascertain 
whether the alarm or the crime be visionary or real, that are worthy of reproach ? 
Whoever, being unable to refute, is negligent in investigating such a charge, is a 
dishonest man and a bad citizen—whoever suppresses his conviction, or shrinks from any 
labour or any responsibility in rendering those convictions effective, is an accomplice. 



XV 


In the “ Preliminary Observations,” written in the month of October 1839, I 
have exhibited France as engaged in schemes of Indian conquest in common with 
Russia. The recent rupture between Russia and France will appear at first sight to be in 
contradiction with such an opinion. I have stated that schemes of Indian conquest 
animated the French Cabinet—not that they were known to the French nation. If 
such was the case, it will be asked, “ How is it that Russia now unites with England 
against France?” I shall endeavour to answer that question. 

Russia seeks, as she can only attain supremacy in Europe and in Asia, by the 
separation of France and England, by mutual wrong and by common suspicions 
she seeks to render them both progressively hostile to each other, and prepares for 
herself the power of uniting with each against the other, so as to be able to coalesce with 
either, and to be opposed to either; and if now she enters upon an alliance against France 
with England, from the moment that France is humbled and broken you will see her 
again join France against England—to comeback again and join an English alliance. 
This process will be continued, first in peace and then in war, till Europe is tamed and 
exhausted. 

In 1823, the policy of the French Cabinet (see “ the Congress of Verona,” of M. 
Chateaubriand,) was constituted upon the basis of union with Russia against England, 
with the ultimate end of destroying the Treaties of 1815, and concurring with Russia in 
her projects of partition of the Ottoman Empire. In 1828, it was through France that 
Austria was prevented from gaining the co-operation of England in resisting the 
aggressions of Russia upon Turkey. In 1830, Russia made the formal proposition 
to France of a secret alliance for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, by which France 
was to have a portion of that empire, and also the frontiers of the Rhine, together 
with Belgium. The Revolution of July alone destroyed that compact after it had been 
adjusted. 

At the very time that the preliminary observations to this work were written, had 
Russia obtained from a French Minister, devoted to her interests (Count Mole), a 
proposition to her of a similar nature, which she did not reply to, intending to make use 
of that proposition to support Lord Palmerston in prosecuting the Treaty of the 15th 


XVI 


of July, by which England should herself be made a party to the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire, and to the Eastern ambition of Russia. The proposition of France was 
furnished to Lord Palmerston as secret and authoritative documents, to show to two' or 
three leading men in his own country, enabling him thereby to justify his union to 
Russia, and that therefore it was a patriotic and not a traitorous proposition on his part 
to unite with that same power. 

Shortly afterwards, however, a Minister favourable to an alliance with England 
came to the possession of power in France. He took office on the express condition of 
such an alliance, and committed himself in face of his nation against Russia and to 
England. That, therefore, was the moment chosen for a rupture between England and 
France, to make England the instrument for the destruction of her friends and for 
their conversion into foes*. 

Count Mole’s propositions to Russia were not, of course, a project standing by 
itself. It must have arisen out of general considerations of policy, and out of a common 
tendency and common objects in the two Cabinets. Must not these projects and these 
designs have borne upon India ? and must they not have been of the character which is 
sketched in the introductory chapter, and which I need not again repeat ? 

In furtherance of the same projects was a splendid Embassy sent from France 
to Persia, an Embassy recalling that former Embassy of France to Persia in 1807, which 
was equally founded on the common design of Russia and France to subjugate India. 
You now hear of that Embassy’s failure, and of its retreat. The French Government, 
having furnished to Russia the pretext she wanted against England, then had to be 
beaten back; and England, after being awakened to alarms for France, was now to be 
warmed into gratitude for Russia. Thus by the same blow turning each against the 
other, and bringing both round to herself. 

* “ England, it seems, has the habit of mistaking friends for foes, and the faculty of converting the 
former into the latter.”— Words of the Minister of another State—a friend to England , and persecuted by her . 



CONTENTS. 


♦- 


Page 

Preliminary Observations on the Dispositions and Policy of the Powers of Europe towards 

India . 1 

List of Documents presented to Parliament on the Relations of Great Britain with Persia, 

Cabool, and Russia . 11 

PART I. 

Great Britain and Russia declare their interests to be the same in Persia, and agree that their 

Policy shall be concerted . 14 

PART II. 

Tabular View of the Relations of Great Britain and Russia. 24 

TART III. 

Elevation of Mahmoud Meerza to the throne of Persia. Event unnoticed in the Papers 

presented to Parliament . 32 

PART IV. 

Persian Invasion of Affghanistan . 40 

PART V. 

Mission of Mr. M c Neill, instructed, apparently, to oppose Russia—in reality to co-operate 

with her. 62 

PART VI. 

Second Expedition against Herat.—Contradictory Instructions from the Foreign Secretary 

and the Indian Government to the Envoy in Persia.—1836-7-8. 81 

PART VII. 

Rupture between England and Persia—1838. 93 

c 












XV111 


PART VIII. 

Page 

British Officers in Persia . 101 

PART IX. 

Relations of the Indian Government with Runjeet Singh . 107 

PART X. 

Relations of the Indian Government with Dost Mahommed.—1836-1838 . 117 

PART XI. 

Treaty between Runjeet Singh, Shah Shooja, and the Governor-General of India . 132 

PART XII. 

Declaration of the Governor-General of India, against Dost Mahommed.—Oct. 1, 1838 . 143 

PART XIII. 

Change in the Relative Positions of Russia and England in Central Asia, from 1834 

to 1839 . 154 

PART XIV. 

Concurrent Union and Opposition of the Governments of Great Britain and Russia in regard 
to Persia. Induction therefrom of Treasonable Concert. Characters of Evidence 
required for the Proof, and presented by the Subject . 172 

PART XV. 

Remonstrances addressed in 1837, by the British Cabinet to that of Russia, respecting the 

Conduct of the latter in Central Asia . 181 

PART XVI. 

Rupture between England and Persia, because of the preponderance of Russia in Persia . 196 

PART XVII. 

Exposure by the Cabinet of St. James’s of the perfidy of that of St. Petersburg!]. 214 












XIX 


PART XVIII. 

Counter Statements and Menaces of the Russian Government 


Page 

240 


PART XIX. 

Mutual Satisfaction of the Two Governments with the Events that had occurred, and with 
the Explanations that had taken place . 


PART XX. 

Future Policy of Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia 

PART XXI. 

Characters of the Crime . 


PART XXII. 

Character of the Age, and of Russia, which render Her dangerous 

PART XXIII. 

Interest of Foreign Powers in the Treason of the British Minister 


The “ Exposition of the Boundary Differences between Great Britain and the United States?' 
will be found a useful Introduction to this Analysis. 

A copy of the “ Correspondence relative to Persia and Afghanistan? presented by the Foreign 
Office, is necessary for reference in perusing this volume. 

































































































. 
















































PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 


ON THE 


DISPOSITIONS AND POLICY OF THE POWERS OF EUROPE 

TOWARDS INDIA. 


We are informed that Peter the First directed his eyes towards India 

%/ 

with the view of securing to Russia the transit commerce of Asia; but while 
looking to the commerce of the East, he did not neglect higher, and more 
valuable, and more easy acquisitions. The fact and mode of his assault upon 
Persia—the alliances which (while Moscow was his capital, and his subjects 
did not number 20,000,000,) he formed in Central Asia, and more especially 
with the Affghans, and the means conceived, employed, and perfected at that 
early period to mislead the Cabinets of Europe, and through them to paralyze 
the action of Turkey—reveal thoughts as much beyond the grasp of the present 
age as of that in which he lived. Such men have no interpreters, and the 
history of Russia will only be written when a greater than Peter becomes its 
historian. Then only will be given to the admiration of Europe the picture 
of the early germ of those conceptions by which be made his people great. It 
will only be when its mighty destinies are accomplished—when Calcutta and 
Constantinople, when Alexandria and Delhi, and other cities scarcely less 
famed than these, become the eyries of the Imperial Eagle, that will be 
understood what bourne the genius of Peter gave to his empire, and what 
toils he bequeathed to the devotion of his successors. 

But a Turkish slave arose in Central Asia, with a mind not unequally 
matched to his. The spirit of Russia overawed—for once retreated—Persia 
revived—the Caucasus became the barrier once more to the teeming North— 

B 


9 


Turkey was saved from co-operation in an Eastern partition, and the balance 
of the European and the Asiatic world was restored. But Nadir Shah, while 
he repelled Russia westward, and saved Delhi from a European spoiler, 
himself seized that gorgeous plunder; but unable to retain his conquest, he 
departed and left behind him an empire broken and prostrate, the government 
powerless to reign, the people incapable of revolt. Hindostan deplored the 
“ avenger’s” retreat rather than his approach. 

The maritime nations of the West had already found a footing on its 
coasts. They now ventured encroachment upon its territories. These 
European merchants asserted rival dominions, and struggled for divided 
sovereignty in the patrimony of Baber, Akber, and Arungzebe, and after 
carrying the animosities and the struggles of Europe to the Coast of 
Coromandel, and to the plains of Arcot, carried back the animosities of their 
Indian strife, to agitate not only the Councils of Europe, but to call forth 
against their brothers the tomahawk of the Indian, and to startle with 
the sounds of discord the banks of the Mississippi and the St. Lawrence. 

In modern Europe, Russia was the first to conceive the project of a 
conquest of India. One hundred and twenty years ago, mistress of one-half 
of Persia, and bound in a bond of common injustice with the Affghans 
and the Ottoman empire, she felt that conquest almost within her grasp. 
A sudden development of national spirit in Persia, arrested her design. 
France then succeeded to her ambitious thoughts, and in the cabinet of 
Versailles, while at peace with England and at peace with the Mogul 
empire, was planned the project of the expulsion of the English from Hindostan, 
and an invasion of the Mogul territories. England then, and only then, 
aroused by the attempt of the French to tax the orchard and the fields of the 
English merchants, entered upon a competition for the Indian empire. 
Mistress then at sea, she of course triumphed ; and succeeding to the power 
and the authority of her rivals, she was surprised to find herself an Eastern 
sovereign. For twenty years she struggled to resist the belief, and to 
repudiate the designation of the power she had won unconsciously and 
unwillingly, by accident and by insubordination. 

Such and so different in character are the three nations who then 
stood, and who now stand, in a position to aim at, or to defend the 
sovereignty of India. 


3 


Nations have oft times been unjust—they have at intervals waged aggressive 
wars, and at others assumed the mask of delusive peace. To Russia, acquisi¬ 
tion is an occupation as continuous and familiar as to the labourer the gain of 
his daily bread. For this end, systematic deception practised on the 
Powers of Europe and of Asia was the strength on which she could rely; 
but powerful aggressive means were requisite even for the purposes of 
that deception. The creation of a maritime force far beyond any necessities 
arising out of her own state, placed her in a position of rivalry with Great 
Britain, with whom collision was the inevitable result of extension eastward. 
Friendly as has been the bearing of England to Russia, every object which 
the latter has aimed at has been sought and attained in opposition to the 
interests, and most of them to the intentions, of Great Britain. In the 
wide circle of affairs controlled by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgli, in the 
large sphere of interests of which the centre is the British Crown, there is no 
point at which the two systems meet where they are not opposed—there is no 
case of opposition that does not spring from the desire of Russia to gain 
what is unjust, and from her consciousness that England will not oppose her; 
thus has England remained ignorant of this position of hostility of Russia to 
herself; because Russia has advanced cautiously, and step by step, in 
proportion to the progressing demoralization of the English people, who, 
ceasing to understand their own rights, or to defend their own property, 
are necessarily ignorant alike of the fact of trespass, and of the intention 
of injury. 

But these Powers could not stand in this position of permanent and 
universal hostility, without their relative means of coercion becoming an 
object of profound consideration to every foreign Government and people;— 
and it has been generally felt, and universally admitted, that effective means 
of coercion were possessed by Great Britain over Russia. England, by a 
single commercial regulation, being able to convulse the whole internal state 
of Russia. The indication, therefore, of an intention on the part of Great 
Britain to use this power, necessarily rendered the policy ol the Russian 
Government subservient to that of Great Britain. 

It has been supposed by some of those who are best acquainted with the 
relative positions of the two countries, that the real source ol the designs 
of Russia against India, as of the efforts she has recently made to approach 


4 


that country, is her dread of this commercial control possessed over her by 
Great Britain; and that she, therefore, seeks, and has sought, to place 
herself in an attitude of menace in India, as a counter-check over the 
Government of England, so that if England should say to Russia, “ your 
tf finances and internal existence are in my hands,” Russia might be able to 
reply, “ you hold India on my sufferance.” It is not my belief that such 
is the object of Russia in her Eastern policy. If she dreaded that England 
might awake to the sense of her dignity or the consciousness of her power, 
she would be careful not to provoke her. Russia has formed a more accurate 
estimate of the British character—she does not apprehend any use that 
can be made of power by the weak mind against the strong. She aims 
at India for itself—she aims at India for the European and the Asiatic 
influence she acquires by the very revelation of such an intention. The 
attitude of menace against India leads France to hope and beg for a share of 
the spoils, and this disposition places France (in Europe) in opposition to 
England, and in subserviency to Russia. The power of pointing to the 
plunder of Agra and Delhi becomes the means of securing to Russia 
ascendance and control over the warlike populations of Central Asia. She 
does not seek these ends as means of controlling England, since she is 
only enabled to obtain them through England’s co-operation. She does 
not require to be able to threaten India to disarm the hostility of England; 
it is through England that she can alone hope to be Mistress of India. 
There is no contest of will, skill, strength ; no interchange of injury, not 
even a balancing of chances or of faults. On one hand there is policy, on the 
other—nothing. When I consider the objects and the actions of Russia, and 
when I look around on the mighty resources of this dormant empire, I cannot 
compare their struggle to one of similar things ; it is neither that of matter 
against matter, or of man against man. The faculties of the one act upon the 
substance of the other as disease upon its victim. 

It required, however, no particular penetration to observe in England 
one remarkable and distinctive character, and one on which a power, aiming 
at the possession of any British dependency, could not fail to reckon as 
a certain means of ultimate and tranquil success—that character is the 
ignorance of every individual throughout this whole people of International 
Rights. 


I w 

i> 

The strength of such a country, however great, may be gradually 
undermined through the violation of its rights, and the Government which 
has conceived and commenced the execution of such a project, can, by the 
prospect of advantage, lead other Governments to take the same line, 
and thereby can place the remaining Powers of the world in a position 
of hostility to it, through the fact of the injury it has led them to inflict. 

Hardly had the treaty of Vienna been signed when Russia violated, 
by an Imperial order, the commercial rights of Great Britain in Poland 
secured by that treaty—secured as an inalienable right of every British 
subject—secured also as a portion and as a guarantee of the independence 
of Poland. There does not appear to have been a single man speaking 
the English language aware of there being any British right involved in 
the Regulations of the Polish Kingdom, and not one of them consequently 
knew that the British nation had been injured by any act of the Emperor of 
Russia. Russia, thus encouraged, went on imposing restrictions upon the 
commerce of Great Britain in her own territories—she transferred again, 
in violation of British rights, her own tariff to the provinces and countries 
which she had acquired (through the concurrence and support of England), 
she then cut off the transit trade from England to the regions Eastward, to 
which a passage had been formerly open through her territories. She 
thus inflicted upon England loss, injury, and degradation, and England 
has been all the while every where the ally of Russia, and a co-operator with 
her in all her projects. Thus has Russia shewn to other nations how to gain 
by England’s friendship, and by what means that friendship was to be 
secured. 

Since the conclusion of the last war, the principal ally of Russia has been 
Prussia. Russia, in anticipation of the use she could make of that kingdom, 
insisted, when it was reduced to a third-rate power, on raising it to the 
station of a first-rate power, and threatened Europe and her allies with 
a renewal of the war unless this proposition were carried into effect. Prince 
Talleyrand endeavoured to awaken the other Cabinets to the danger thus 
prepared for them. “ Prussia,” he said, “ and Russia will henceforth be 
“ combined for the purpose of carrying out distinct objects of aggression. 
“ In such a concert they will be possessed of means sufficient to baffle the 
“ penetration or to overrule the resistance of the other Cabinets. Prussia 


6 


“ will seek to extend her influence over the smaller states of Germany. 
“ Russia to expand towards the East, and they will lend their hands mutually 
“ to each other to effect these purposes.” And such has been the history of 
the events of the last twenty-five years, Prussia having made use of a Union, 
nominally commercial, to take into her own hands a portion of the administra¬ 
tive and financial functions, and consequently of the sovereignty of the 
small independent states around her, has placed a barrier between the 
commercial interchange of the German population and England—she has 
been supported in doing so by Russia in the interest of their common objects 
of aggression. Prussia is as yet shut out from the North and East by 
the Custom-house barriers of Russia—which will not be thrown down until 
the utmost advantages realisable from the concession are ripe. In the 
meantime, staticians, politicians, Ministers of State, point out to Germany that 
these barriers must fall, because, as soon as the influence of Russia is 
predominant in Asia, she must admit the manufactures of Germany, if only 
for the purpose of excluding those of England, her enemy. Russia thus 
acquires a new source of influence over Prussia, and of popularity in central 
Europe. She augments the existing ill-will and contempt of Germany for 
England ; and she teaches Germany to regard the successes of Russia 
“ as triumphs of industry, progress, and civilization.” 

Thus another link and tie has grown out of the “ German Customs’ 
“ Union,” giving to Prussia and to the German population an interest and a 
longing for more intimate union with Russia, an interest in and a desire 
for the extension of the commercial and political control of Russia through 
central Asia and India. This alliance of Prussia with Russia, though it 
continues to receive fresh impulse from these new commercial and Eastern 
objects, had already been sufficiently strong on other grounds to place 
the whole diplomatic and moral resources of Prussia, for the last twenty 
years, at the disposal of Russia, for the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire, 
and for the establishment of her supremacy in every Cabinet of Europe*. 

Let any one picture to himself for a moment the intense interest 

* Prussian officers have fortified the Dardanelles against England. Prussian officers were 
substituted for the English officers requested by the late Sultan from England to discipline the 
Turkish troops. Through these Russia secured the defeat of Nezib and the triumph of Mehemet 
Ali.—See Portfolio , vol. 11, under the head of “ Prussian Officers.” 

I 


7 


associated with the objects presented to the ambition of the two or three 
individuals who, in each of these Cabinets, direct its movements, and who 
thereby feel a consciousness of the possession of power over the present 
relations of states, and over the future destinies of mankind—a power 
which no man or system ever possessed without the desire of using. To 
carry back again the mastery of affairs from the ocean to the land— 
to overthrow the so-termed commercial despotism of Great Britain, and 
to shiver in the hands of Albion her long-famed trident, are purposes, 
independently of all the feelings and interests summed up in the word 
“ India,” sufficient to enlist all the sympathies, and to incite all the energies, 
of the Cabinets of the North—are the purposes to which the power they 
possess must naturally be turned, and with an effect proportioned to the 
secrecy of the design. It is not within the limits of Great Britain that these 
objects can be felt—it is not looking from our shores that these dangers 
appear menacing or near—it is from the shores of the Bosphorus, and placed 
as a middle term between Europe and Asia, between the North and the 
South, where the influences of the land come to meet and to mingle with 
the influences of the ocean, that the full bearings of these questions are 
brought within the range of the human eye, and the feelings that actuate, 
and the interests that sway, the millions in the East and in the West, express 
themselves in language too simple and too natural to be misunderstood. 
It was on the shores of the Bosphorus that was expressed, in the following 
words, the consequences to Europe and to Asia of the concert of Russia and 
Prussia:— 

« You begin to perceive in England the connivance between Russia and Prussia, do they 
appreciate all the effects of that connivance, with respect to the plans of Russia here ? the first taking 
into her hands the supremacy of the East!—the second concentrating in herself the supremacy of 
Germany. Where is the counterpoise ? especially, when Egypt shall be brought forcibly into this 
formidable alliance. The three great bodies will have in their possession all the rivers, all the 
watercourses which maintain the communications of the world. Let a signal from St. Petersburgh 
be answered from Constantinople, Berlin, and Alexandria, and at the same moment, all Northern 
Europe, Central Europe, European and Asiatic Turkey, all the commercial part of Africa, Arabia, 
Persia, will be closed against England and France, without its being possible to find the slenderest 
fissure by which to evade the padlocks, the keys of which will be at St. Petersburgh. What is 
necessary for the realization of this gigantic combination of despotism ? The taking of Constan¬ 
tinople—and in three days, the northerly winds which prevail during nine months of the year, 
bring thirty thousand Russians to the Dardanelles, and in twenty-eight days they are supported by 


8 


a hundred thousand more from Bessarabia, and the right bank of the Danube. And Europe is 
quietly sleeping in the midst of such danger ! Cursed be her blindness. We must not, therefore, 
cease to tell that powerful, but ignorant and indifferent public of Europe what we know, but 
what they do not, and to show them still suspended above their heads that frozen avalanche which 
at once will close every issue of liberty, fortune, and thought, when allowed to roll down on Con¬ 
stantinople*. - ” 

But there is another Power far more important than Prussia as a friend and 
as a foe—far more capable of influencing the balance of power upon the seas, 
the opinion of the European world, and the mind of England itself—a Power 
interested only less than England herself in the past events and in the future 
destinies of Asia, Africa, and America. It is to France that England has suc¬ 
ceeded in the possession of those North American territories which are the chief 
nurseries of her naval power ; it is with France that England had to struggle in 
endeavouring to avert the independence of the United States ; it was from 
France, and not from the Mogul, that England wrested the supremacy of 
India; it was from France she first derived her scheme of Indian administra¬ 
tion, the first idea of the discipline of the native troops, and the first thought 
of an Indian sovereignty. The gain of England throughout the world has 
always been effected by loss to France, and it surely is needless to show that 
France cannot be unmindful of her loss, or less desirous than heretofore for 
the extension of colonial possessions at your expense. France is, moreover, 
your neighbour in India; she has frontiers there opposed to yours ; her flag 
flies in Hindostan ; her escutcheon is there chiselled, and her Indian press 
chronicles the signs of British decay, the progress of assault from without, of 
insurrection from within ; and warns the French people of the obligation 
imposed upon them by events of considering “ what is to be done with India.’’ 

France, with possessions in India, cannot see another nation aim at 
projects of Indian conquest without feeling herself directly interested in that 
matter ; she cannot see a Power preparing to invade your territories without 
deciding to resist that Power in self-defence, or to unite with that Power for 
mutual benefit. France has coalesced with the United States to drive you 
from your own fisheries ; she has coalesced with Russia for the dismember- 

* Letter from Mr. Blacque, formerly editor of the Moniteur Ottoman , and having reference 
to an article of mine on the Prussian Customs’ Union, which appeared in the Second Number of the 
British and Foreign Beview, and to which I would direct the attention of those who are anxious to 
understand their country’s position. 


9 


ment of the Ottoman Empire—she may have acted without system, but 
aggression will not the less in the end become systematic. She has been 
recently assailing your commerce with the most undisguised violence—and has 
been suffered to do so—nay, encouraged and invited—and this by calculation 
and on system; so that the friends of peace are sacrificed in France by 
England’s adoption of that injustice against herself which they have denounced, 
and would have prevented. 

Your ally, the Chief of Lahore, protected by England, and on terms of 
the closest intimacy—an intimacy extending to the formal expression of 
a desire for his aggrandizement—employed Frenchmen in disciplining his 
formidable native force, while he sedulously excluded Englishmen; and 
a circumstance so remarkable has only served, by the process of reasoning of 
the times, to increase our confidence in the absence of all Indian ambition in 
the councils of France*, and of entire devotion to us in the breast of Runjeet 
Singh. 

Thus has Russia secured the co-operation of Prussia, and at least 
the neutrality of France, in her progress to Indian dominion, and by 
laying the foundation of future hostility between England and France, she 
has made a wonderful stride towards the overthrow of the British Sovereignty 
in the Eastf. 

These results have been obtained through twenty-five years of unheeded 
and unresisted aggression upon English commerce, that is on the rights of 
citizens, and by violating which the citizen is destroyed; consequently it 


* Some months ago an article in the Pondicherry Gazette appeared in the London press, on the 
downfall of the British power in India—concluding with the opinion, that though Russia might 
convulse India, and drive out the English, she could only expect to obtain a real footing in that 
country by co-operation with some maritime state of Europe. The very next day the London press 
o-ave an article from the French official journal on the British and French navies, declaring the latter 
to be now superior to the former. 

+ It is superfluous to remark that the national spirit, intentions, and sympathies of Prussia and 
France are hostile to Russia. But national opinions, sympathies, interests, or intentions, have nothing 
to do with events—as the map of Russia will show. In every age of great movement it has been the 
secret will and thoughts of one or two men, unsuspected either in their tendency or power, that have 
done and undone; and that by using those “ opinions’'’ that men think their own. 

C 


10 


is to the neglect, in the first instance, of their own interests by the commercial 
communities that is to be attributed—the precariousness of our present 
existence, and the ultimate downfall of Great Britain, if this criminal apathy 
cannot be removed. 


f 



11 


LIST OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT ON THE 
RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN WITH PERSIA, CABOOL, AND RUSSIA. 


t 


TEN PAPERS PRESENTED BY THE INDIA BOARD. 


No. 1.—Presented on the 8th February, 1839, contains the treaty with Runjeet Singh, for the 
re-establishment of Shah Shooja, and for the cession to Runjeet Singh of a large portion of the Affghan 
territory ; and the “ Declaration” of the Governor-General of the 1st October, 1838. This Decla¬ 
ration (of war) and the treaty for carrying it into effect, constitute the first information, and for more 
than a month the only information given to Parliament to enable it to judge of the policy of an 
invasion of Central Asia, and of the justice of a national war. 

No. 2.—On the 8th of the following March another set of papers is presented, containing the 
treaties connected with the navigation of the Indus. It also contains treaties which have specific 
connection with Persia, Runjeet Singh, or Cabool, but none of these are later than 1828. 

No. 3.—On the 20th March were presented a third set of papers, containing seventy-two 
despatches, extracts and documents, relative to the expedition of Shah Shooja into Affghanistan in 
1833-34. The most recent date in these documents is March 1835. They contain nothing which 
lias any natural connection with the present war. 

No. 4.—It is after five weeks delay from the first announcement of the war, after the first 
interest and curiosity excited by these events had subsided—after the leading men had been 
committed, and that their minds had been led astray by the previous supplied correspondence 
connected with the expedition of 1833-34, that the correspondence of Lord Auckland with the 
Secret Committee is published, exposing the grounds of the decision he had taken, namely, his alarm 
at the progress of Russia eastward. 

Nos. 5 and 6* contain sixty-five despatches or extracts, and thirty-five enclosures connected 
with the mission of Sir Alexander Burnes to Cabool, commencing with a letter of Dost Mahommed to 
Lord Auckland, on the 31st May, 1836, begging the support of the Indian Government against the 
Seiks, and offering on his part unconditional obedience to its wishes. The correspondence in No. 5, 
commencing from May 1836, goes down to April 1838, including the correspondence between Sir 
Alexander Burnes and Lord Auckland. No. 6 commences in September 1837, and goes down to 

* It is impossible to understand how the papers are classed, as there are double numbers which 
do not coincide. 



12 


January 1839, being part of the same correspondence between Sir Alexander Burnes and the 
Governor-General. No reason is assigned for this separation of the correspondence, and no intelligible 
motive for the separation appears. 

The effect of this separation is, however, to render the subject unintelligible. For instance, a 
letter of Dost Mahommed’s to Lord Auckland, dated 21st May, 1838, is given in papers No. 5, and in 
the middle of papers No. 6 are given extracts from Sir Alexander Burnes’s letter enclosing it, as also 
from despatches of four days before, detailing circumstances essential to the understanding of the 
position of Dost Mahommed at the time of writing that letter. The more immediate object of this 
separation seems to have been to present in the one set the matters connected with the Seiks, and 
in the other those connected with Russia, so as to prevent the reader from perceiving that the 
connections of the Affghans with Russia (the subsequent justification of the invasion of their 
country), was the necessary result of the connection of England with their enemies the Seiks. 

No. 7 is entitled “ Occupation of Karrack.” It appears that it had occurred to the Governor- 
General “ that cruisers with troops in the Persian Gulph might essentially aid the negociations in 
Persia.” Towards the middle of the papers we find that these troops “ are being landed (at Karrack) 
with the consent of the authorities of the place.” No other reasons for the operation are assigned— 
no instructions appear. No. 7 is composed of two-and-thirty extracts. 

No. 8.—This part is not numbered. It is a single despatch from the Court of Directors to the 
Governor-General, which is a reply to eighteen specifically quoted despatches, commencing from July 
1832, which thus had remained unanswered five years and two months. The object of this despatch 
is to convey the approbation of the Court of Directors to the Governor-General, in avoiding all 
political connection with any State west of the Indus, and in taking no part in their quarrels! 

No. 9-—Two months later, on the 28th May, is presented, “ Correspondence relating to Aden.” 
The first document in this set, dated 31st July, 1837, calls the Sultan of Aden “ a barbarous robber.” 
One hundred and fifty-two extracts, letters, and documents, are given, and it concludes with a Map, 
colouring Aden as British territory! 

No. 10 is a repetition of the two treaties with Persia of 1809 and 1814, already given with all 
the treaties in Number 2—but which were defective. 


ONE DOCUMENT FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE, ENTITLED “ CORRESPON¬ 
DENCE RELATIVE TO PERSIA AND AFFGHANISTAN.” 

Five weeks had been allowed to elapse from the publication of the declaration of war, before any 
of the correspondence between the Indian Government and the Affghans had been made public.— 
Before that had been given, the anterior events connected with the expedition of Shah Shooja, in 
1833-34, had come to divert attention from the subject matter. When the correspondence connected 
with Affghanistan is published, it is separated into two parts, so as to be rendered unintelligible. 
But the war was presumed to be justified by the position of hostility assumed by Russia in Central 
Asia, and by the connection between Persia and Russia; consequently none of the circumstances of 
Affghanistan could be understood, without a knowledge of the previous events which had taken place 



13 


in Persia; nor could these again be understood, without a knowledge of the anterior intercourse 
between England and Russia. All these papers had been supplied in an inverse order, and the last 
documents that are published are the first in order of time—the first in order of proximity—the first 
in order of inquiry. The anterior relations of England and Russia with regard to Persia were the 
first points to ascertain, and yet they are published the last. 

18th February, firstly appear—The acts of the Indian Government, of the dates of July and 
October 1838. 

8th March, secondly—General treaties not bearing on the subject. 

20th March, thirdly—Transactions in 1833-4 not bearing on the subject. 

26th March, fourthly—Diplomatic intercourse with Cabool, from May 1837, downwards. 

Fifthly—Diplomatic intercourse with Russia and Persia, from January 1834, downwards. 

The fifth and last publication (had it been intelligible) was necessary to the understanding of 
the fourth ; and without a perfect knowledge of the subjects which these two publications profess 
to expose, the nature and objects of the war announced in the first set of papers could not be 
understood. 

The volume presented by the Foreign Office has no date, is not numbered as connected with the 
Indian papers. It comprises the transactions with Persia and Russia during four years and a half. 


COMMUNICATION WITH ST. PETERSBURGH. 

1834— During this year there are three despatches from Lord Palmerston to St. Petersburgh, 

amounting to less than one page of the printed documents. 

1835— No communication. 

1836— No communication. 

1837— One despatch, half a page. 

1838— One despatch, five pages*. 

INTERCOURSE WITH PERSIA. 

1834— No communication. 

1835— One despatch (four lines). 

1836— Two despatches (twenty-one lines). 

1837*f*—Three despatches (sixteen lines). 

1838—Nine despatches (two pages and a quarter). 


Two of the despatches merely enclose Russian despatches—two of them are merely to state that 
no instructions were sent. Previously to the rupture with Persia the total despatches from the 
Foreign Office to Russia and Persia, amounted to two pages and a half. 

* The disasters had then taken place, and discussion was too late. 

j- In July 1837, Persia had declared her bonds with England dissolved, and the treaties 
abrogated. This is unnoticed by England, consequently no despatches could be of use. 


\ 


v 





14 


On the event of war, the first duty of the Power proclaiming it is to prove its justice, the second 
to make its expediency or necessity clear. If a duty so solemn could be rendered more than 
ordinarily imperative, it would be when the war is proclaimed by a stronger against a weaker Power, 
and is one of agression and invasion. If one circumstance more than another could render it 
obligatory on a people to examine into the justice and the expediency of a war, it would be when 
that war is proclaimed by a delegated authority. The invasion of Affghanistan is the first British 
war unannounced to Parliament by a Ministry, and unquestioned by an opposition ! 


PART I. 

NEGOCIATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, RELATIVE TO 

THEIR POLICY IN PERSIA—1834. 

The transactions detailed in the papers presented to Parliament by 
the Foreign Office, commence with a correspondence between Great Britain 
and Russia respecting the selection of an heir to the Crown of Persia. The 
importance of such a measure can only be justly estimated by making the 
case our own ; what would be the dependence of this country on the Power 
that could settle the succession of the Crown—what would be the relative 
attitude of two Foreign Powers who could settle or dispute between 
themselves the succession of the British Crown for the advancement of 
separate and hostile purposes ? 

To select an heir to the Persian throne was to exercise a greater and 
more solemn influence than has ever been exercised by Great Britain 
over any independent State. It was the exercise of an influence incompatible 
with its independence—it was to overthrow, in conjunction with Russia, that 
independence which England had laboured to maintain—Russia to subvert. 
It was in opposition to every anterior dogma and practice of the British 
State to assist in putting down national rights, instead, as heretofore, of 
interposing to defend them. The step involved, therefore, no less respon¬ 
sibility as to the direction given to the policy of England, than as to the 
effects produced upon the condition of Persia. The Power with whom 




15 


this influence was to be disputed or exerted was one whose hostility to 
England was the sole ground of British connexion with Persia—whose 
hostility to Persia was the sole ground of British influence over that State. 

The concurrence (if such could exist) of Russia with England, in regard 
to the Eastern interests of the two Courts, would have averted all danger 
from India and from Persia—all anxiety and alarm from Europe and from 
Asia. But concurrence of England with Russia rendered the policy of 
England subject to that of Russia, and gave to the latter, for the furtherance 
of her designs, the assistance of the Government against which they were 
planned, and by which they had hitherto been resisted. 

In opening this correspondence we look for a clear and able exposition 
of the “ policy and views of the Government during the whole of that 
“ long and important transaction*” — we look for anxious and suspicious 
watchfulness of every movement, word, or act of Russia ; and, above all, 
for proof that the Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg^, as at Teheran, 
had counteracted the policy and frustrated the intrigues of our adversary. 
That this correspondence should not present necessary information would 
indeed be a matter of surprise—that it should not exhibit watchfulness 
and foresight would be matter of culpability. This correspondence does 
not present either the one or the other—and the point from which it starts is 
the assertion that our interests are identical with those of our antagonist! 

The first document is an extract from a despatch (Jan. 3, 1834) of 
the Secretary of the British Embassy at St. Petersburgh to Lord Palmerston, 
re-echoing the report of intelligence received there, “ that expectations were 
“ entertained that the Shah of Persia would nominate Mahommed Meerza 
“ successor to his throne and he adds, “ I have reason to believe the 
“ above-mentioned appointment is considered satisfactory by the Russian 
“ Government.” 

On the 28th of January the same functionary states, “ that Count 
“ Nesselrode considers the interests of Great Britain and Russia so very 
“ similar in Persia, and expresses his anxiety that His Majesty’s Government 
“ should have a good understanding with the Russian Government respecting 
“ that country.” 


* Speech of Lord Palmerston when in opposition. 


16 


If this doctrine was an old and admitted one, it was useless to present it. 
If it was a new proposal, it required to be supported by evidence, and could 
not be admitted without proof; it involved discussion, and it necessitated 
formal communication between the two Courts. Without proof, without 
discussion, without formal communication, was this new doctrine put forth. 

Lord Palmerston does not reject it, he does not investigate it, he 
does not admit it, but he remains silent; acquiescence is yielded by the same 
process to the proposition for the joint selection by the two Courts of 
Mahommed Meerza to fill the throne of Persia. Supposing the proposition 
for this union accepted, does it follow that England is from that hour to 
abstain from inquiring into the motives, or understanding the object of 
any measure she is to adopt ? Yet the Russian Minister gives, and the 
British Minister accepts, as the ground for the adoption by England of 
the proposal of Russia—that union did exist between the two Courts. 

No shadow of reason is offered to support the proposition that union did 
exist between the interests of the two Courts—no shadow of a motive 
is advanced for the selection of Mahommed Meerza as expedient for the two 
Courts—yet Russia could not have advanced the principle of union unless 
certain that it should be adopted, nor aimed at the elevation of Mahommed 
Meerza, unless certain of the co-operation of England—yet this proposition 
was energetically announced in Persia, by Russia, without awaiting for that 
co-operation of the British Government which was the object of the proposal, 
and without any regard as to whether or not her act should render Persia that 
“ scene of civil discord/' which she affected to apprehend from any 
independent action of the British Government. 

Before proceeding to examine Lord Palmerston’s reply, I must direct 
attention to the fact, that these communications were not made by the 
one Government to the other—and that they appear solely as the opinions of 
a British functionary respecting the views of Russia. Russia could therefore 
retire from the proposition, if necessary, without disgrace; and, if successful, 
she left no clue by which, in subsequent publication of the documents, 
the British public could trace her motives or follow her action. She imposed 
on the Foreign Minister of Great Britain the necessity of assuming the 
defence of her policy as if it had been his—giving to her triumphs over 
England the appearance of a triumph of England over her, and supporting 


17 


the Foreign Minister at one and the same time, by that diplomatic strength 
which he gained in exchange for his sacrifice of British interests, and by 
the confidence of his sovereign, his colleagues, his party, the parliament, 
and the nation at large, derived from the opposition which all this while 
he publicly avowed to Russia—and from his simulated success in com¬ 
pelling Russia to support the policy of Great Britain. 

The first communication from Lord Palmerston (16th June, 1834) is 
given in extract. Diplomatic papers refer to one exclusive subject. It 
is to he presumed, therefore, if extracts are given instead of entire docu¬ 
ments (unless when insignificance combined with prolixity might account 
for omission), that there is an intention of concealment. 

That this despatch containing the germ of the future events of the 
East, indicating the line and policy adopted by the British Cabinet 
with regard to Russia, announcing a total alteration of its policy and 
objects in Persia, and being the only document in which are to be found 
any statements whatever of the views and policy of the British Government 
on any of these subjects—that this should be presented or assumed to be 
presented as a fragment, is a circumstance which may well furnish food 
for reflection*. 

The first passage is as follows:— 

“ I had to-day a conversation with Prince Lieven upon the affairs of Persia, with the substance 
of which it is right that you should be made acquainted !” 

Most strange terms for such a subject! Lord Palmerston proceeds :— 

“ The Prince having called at this office at my request, I said, that I wished to have some 
conversation with him upon the state of Persia.” 

Thus the Russian Government, which had not committed itself by any 
formal communication in leading England into this monstrous predicament, 
did not even suffer its Minister in London to invite to discussion the British 
Minister. The allusions dropped to the British Secretary of Embassy at 
St. Petersburgh, and transmitted in four lines to Downing Street, are 
apparently the only means employed to effect every purpose of Russia— 
to obtain the admission of her doctrines, and the adoption of her proposals. 

* From the context, it would appear that the document, though given as an extract, is in reality 
an entire document. It may be given as an extract to prevent readers from thinking that they had 
the whole case before them, so that they might abstain from forming any opinion. 

D 


18 


It is then Lord Palmerston who requests the Russian Ambassador to “ call at 
“ the office”—then, “ he says to him that he wished to have some conversa- 
“ tion with him upon the state of Persia.” But this assumed conversation, 
is no conversation at all—it is a statement made by Lord Palmerston, the 
result of previous concurrence, but he selects a term implying discussion, 
and consequently casting over the transaction a shade of opposition. 

The assertion of the Russian Government, that the interests of Russia 
and Great Britain in Persia were identical, was what Lord Palmerston 
had hitherto avoided to notice. He now formally, after four months’ silence, 
approaches the question. He neither admits nor denies it, but he advances a 
similar proposition of his own. He says :— 

“ England and Russia are both too deeply interested in maintaining the internal tranquillity of 
Persia, to allow either Power to be indifferent to complications which might tend to throw that 
country into a state of confusion and civil war; and that as each would necessarily be applied to 
by the rival parties, it would be a fortunate circumstance , if the ivishes and good offices of botli 
could be united in support of one and the same candidate.” 

Russia’s proposition had been, “ Our interests are identical, take my 
“ candidate.” Lord Palmerston replies, “ Our interests are not identical, but 
“ they are the same ; I hope, therefore, we may have one and the same 
“ candidate.” Russia says, “ Mahommed Meerza is my candidate.” Lord 
Palmerston replies, “ he is mine.” If both have fixed on the same man, why 
the discussion ?—If there is no practical difference, why the abstract 
proposition ? 

Lord Palmerston continues : 

“ The latest accounts from Persia led us to suppose that the Russian Envoy at Teheran had 
expressed the inclination of his Government in favour of the pretensions of Mahommed Meerza.” 

After the communication from St. Petersburgh, reference to news 
from Persia would have been in a bona fide conversation impossible—equally 
so that Lord Palmerston should tell this to the Russian Ambassador. It was 
Lord Palmerston’s part to demand from him the intentions of Russia, not to 
inform him of them. Even then how refer to the views of the Russian Envoy 
at Teheran, when he was in possession of those of the Minister at St. 
Petersburgh ? He continues :— 

“ That some time ago Count Nesselrode had mentioned this subject to you, and had expressed 
the ivillingness of the Russian Government to come to an understanding with that of His Majesty 
as to a joint exertion of the influence of the two Powers in Persia in favour of some one candidate .” 


19 


This passage is placed as if the original communication from Russia was 
an abstract proposition which had left the English Government fruitlessly 
to guess who the individual was who should be selected. But Russia had 
named Mahommed Meerza! had named him twenty-five days before emitting 
the general proposition regarding the union of the two Courts. He 
continues :— 

“ That at that time His Majesty's Government were not in possession of the information 
necessary to enable them to form a clear opinion upon the subject .” 

Respecting a contingency of such moment—so long anticipated—in 
a country where England possessed authoritative control over its political, 
financial, and military departments—in a country where she employed a far 
more efficient diplomatic system than she possessed elsewhere, or even 
than that which was employed by Russia herself—we are told that England 
was unprepared to have an opinion ! The English Minister too volunteers 
the declaration!—Comment is here superfluous. Had the Minister been 
conscious of ignorance it would have been carefully concealed. Had Lord 
Palmerston’s avowal of inability on the 15th of January to decide, been 
an honest avowal, the information would have been furnished on which he 
did decide on the 16th of June. Without necessity ignorance is avowed 
as the grounds for enaction by which England is committed, and information 
necessary to account for a change from one inexplicable course to another 
is suppressed. The assumption of ignorance, as the suppression of knowledge, 
has not been without a necessity—the necessity of masking secret concurrence 
by an appearance of investigation. 

Lord Palmerston then proceeds to state that the English Government 
would take suitable measures for maintaining the pretensions of Mahommed 
Meerza, and this so-termed “ conversation” concludes with the expression to 
Prince Lieven of a wish that he should “ communicate this intention to his 
“ own Government, and express the satisfaction, &c.” 

The Prince was sure (and his part of the conversation is limited to 
this assurance) that Lord Palmerston’s statement would be received at 
St. Petersburgh with satisfaction. 

By the next communication from Mr. Bligh, it appears that the foregoing 
despatch of Lord Palmerston’s—a despatch on which hinged the future 


20 


position of England in Asia, and consequently in Europe, was sent by the 
post! This fact reveals the perfect understanding of the two governments. 
This despatch must have been a startling revelation to the statesmen of 
observant Europe, since it even seems to have surpassed the expectations of 
Count Nesselrode himself. Mr. Bligh observes, “that the satisfaction of 
“ that minister was increased —observe the ‘ increase of satisfaction ’—on 
learning the contents of a despatch that had come by the post! “ when I 
“ read to his Excellency that part of the despatch which testified in your 
“ Lordship’s own words, that Prince Lieven had rightly interpreted the view 
“ taken of this matter by His Majesty’s Government.” 

The Crown Prince, Abbas Meerza, dies—Russia instantaneously proposes 
as Crown Prince in his stead, his son, the young Governor of Azerbijan, the 
district over which her influence had already extensively been spread, and was 
wholly predominant—she proposes that successor in opposition to (according 
to Eastern opinion) the, at least equally legitimate heir, the eldest surviving 
brother of Abbas Meerza, who was ruler of the district particularly under the 
influence of Great Britain. England is unprepared in Persia to offer any 
opinion on the subject, not even to neutralize the influence of Russia, by 
immediate co-operation. Russia then insinuates in London that the interests 
of the two countries are one, and that consequently they must co-operate in 
Persia. England accepts the insinuation, but remains four months, as she 
herself says, too ignorant to act. She then decides on active co-operation 
with Russia in the elevation of i( some one candidate but before the news of 
her decision could reach the capital of Persia, information is sent from 
St. Petersburgh (England seems only capable of receiving information from 
St. Petersburgh) that the Shah had already yielded to the suggestions of 
Russia, and appointed Mahommed Meerza his heir. 

Lord Palmerston had not been ready in January to understand whether 
it was desirable or not that Mahommed Meerza should be nominated to the 
Crown of Persia—it was not till the 16th of June that he had grounds for 
uniting with Russia ; it was only on that date, that “ suitable steps” were 
taken by England for effecting her purpose, consequently, no doubt could be 
left upon the mind of Mahommed Meerza, that he owed the support of 
England to the patronage of Russia. Lord Palmerston’s first service was to 


21 


adopt Russia’s candidate—his second, to leave Russia ample time to secure 
the credit of the initiative—his third, as we shall presently see, that of 
imposing upon England the full cost of the execution. 

The next document is an entire despatch (5th September) from Lord 
Palmerston to Mr. Bligh, expressing his satisfaction at the receipt of the 
intelligence (from St. Petersburgh) of the nomination of Mahommed Meerza, 
reiterating the gratification of the English Government, to find “ the two 
“ governments equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain not only the 
“ internal tranquillity but also the integrity and independence of Persia.” 

Hitherto the communications had been limited to “ internal tranquillity.” 
Count Nesselrode had asserted a general identity of interests. Lord Pal¬ 
merston had admitted that identity, with a limitation of it to the “ internal 
“ tranquillity of Persia.” He now adds to “ internal tranquillity,” the words 
“ independence and integrity*.” What are the motives for these additions ? 
There had been no question whatever mooted regarding the integrity of 
Persia ; and the transaction in which both Courts were immediately engaged 
shewed that they considered that its independence had ceased to exist. 
These expressions are not, therefore, to be understood from any thing that 
had then transpired, and the motive for introducing them is to be so sought 
in the sequel. 

But previously to the date of this despatch (of the 5th September), 
we have a despatch from Count Nesselrode, communicated by the Russian 
ambassador in London, on the 22nd August. The Russian Minister says:— 

“ We expect to see the Representatives of Russia and England in Persia, authorised to act in 
concert in a spirit of peace and union, as the despatch from my office of the 30th of June has 
already expressed the desire should be the case. 

“ The importance of providing, with this view, the two Representatives with corresponding 
instructions is no wise diminished by the mere fact of the nomination of the hereditary Prince. 


* The importance of such terms can of course be only understood among nations, whose political 
existence is not visibly in danger, by special study of diplomacy. The following incident may lead 
to useful reflection on their value. At the discussion of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, one of the 
Turkish Ministers endeavoured to introduce the word “ integrity, 11 in lieu of “ independence,” in a 
proposed emendation to the effect, that Russia recognised “ the independence (integrity) of the 
Ottoman Empire.” It was upon this occasion, and as addressed to this Minister, that was used the 
expression, “ the vengeance of the EmperorT 


To this communication there is no ostensible reply, but it had been 
received before Lord Palmerston’s despatch of the 5th September, which 
in these papers stand first—that displaced despatch is then the reply to 
the Russian note and the adoption of the proposal! but the documents 
are so placed as to render the transactions which they record, and the 
diplomatic relations they establish, incomprehensible to the reader. 

The concert thus established is henceforward to regard ulterior objects, 
and Count Nesselrode leaves to Lord Palmerston the duty of first asserting 
that “ independence of Persia,” which four years later Russia was to defend 
against England, and of first announcing that “ integrity of Persia,” 
under the sanction of which two years afterwards she was to point the 
cannon of the Shah against Herat. 

In the explanation given to the British Parliament of proceedings 
so extraordinary, there is no statement whatever upon any one of the 
questions in debate ; there are no grounds assigned by Lord Palmerston 
for any opinion which he had expressed, or any decision which he has 
taken. If these papers were presented to Parliament in order that Members 
of Parliament might form their opinions upon the subject, they do not fulfil 
that intention. The questions to be decided before any step could be 
taken, were whether or not it was true that the interests of Russia and 
England coincided in Persia ; whether or not England should interfere in the 
election of a Prince to the throne of Persia; whether or not it should 
prevent Russia from so interfering. Then came, and only then, the question 
of the selection of a Prince ; the adoption of means by which his rights 
should be ascertained; his claims recognized, and his nomination secured ? 
Upon each and all of these points there is not a syllable of information in 
the papers submitted to Parliament; papers scarcely less extraordinary 
in that which they dare to withhold than in that which they reveal. In 
the absence of all the information that these documents were required to 
give-—in the absence of every conviction which the English Government 
had been, or could be, supposed to entertain, these documents present in the 
very first page the full view of the abyss which had at once been opened 
before this country’s steps and concealed from its view— co-operation with its 
enemy. 

This co-operation, constituting the master-key of the policy of this land, 


23 


is all along concealed even from the very service to which its representation 
is confided. It is now made public when interest in the subject is lost— 
when the individuals capable of understanding its import are sacrificed or 
committed—when the results of that co-operation have been brought about, 
and when England, bewildered by complications which she cannot unravel, 
and stunned by blows self-dealt, which she deems irresistible, is reduced—to 
use the words of Count Pozzo di Borgo, to the “ necessity of submitting to 
“ what (she is taught to believe) she can no longer prevent.” 

The Foreign Minister avows opposition to Russia—he is commended for 
nationality ; he reveals co-operation with her—he is applauded for prudence ; 
he advances Russia’s protege to the throne of Persia—England exults in the 
national triumph ; he denounces Persia as Russian, and spurns her away— 
the persevering applauses of the English nation still pursuing in his tortuous 
course, now extol his decision and his courage. Can such a nation expect 
honesty from its servants, or find safety in its strength ? 

In concluding the first part of this analysis, I am unable to repress the 
avowal of the inability which I feel of rendering clear and intelligible even 
such portions of this scheme as I myself am able distinctly to perceive. 
The difficulty must be evident, of unravelling a web which has taken so many 
years to weave in secret. There is not a phrase or a term employed by Lord 
Palmerston which does not appear calculated for the purpose of misleading 
the person for whose guidance it is transmitted, or the public for whose 
information it is put in print. Two Governments have united to misrepresent 
the truth in regard to transactions conducted in secret between themselves, 
sole depositaries of national power and representation, whose words are 
events and bonds. The evidence by which the policy of England is to be 
judged, thus consists of such documents, or fragments of documents, only, as 
a hostile Government and a faithless Minister think fit to produce, considering 
them useful to mislead opinion, or necessary to prevent detection. 




24 


PART II. 

RELATIVE POSITION OF THE DIPLOMACY OF GREAT BRITAIN 

AND RUSSIA. 

If Russia in any one state is found to aim at acquisition, her designs are 
dangerous in all; if England in any one attempts to preserve, she must use 
those means which will enable her every where to protect the weak and to 
resist the strong. England and Russia could not be opposed at any one 
point without being opposed at every point, nor united in one if not in all. 
But it is the assault of Russia upon each and all of these states which has 
alone called forth the interest and the interference of England in the East, 
and the sole object of that interference is to oppose her. It is the assault of 
Russia, by endangering nations and violating rights, which has given that 
influence and power to Great Britain by which Russia may be restrained. 
Unless England is opposed to Russia, she is powerless to protect any ally, or 
to assert any right, because she herself is allied to violence and a sharer in 
injustice. Hitherto English Ministers have done that which she desired 
they should do ; but they have always thought that they were acting in 
opposition to her. But it is impossible that an English Minister could act 
with and against Russia in regard to the same country, or that he should 
co-operate with Russia in one country and oppose her in another—by mistake. 
These contradictions are, however, in evidence. We have seen Lord Pal¬ 
merston asserting in 1834 union of Great Britain and Russia in regard to 
Persia. In the course of the following year (1835) we shall see him acting 
ostensibly against her at Teheran. In the same year, month, and week in 
which he united England with Russia in regard to Persia, was he, in another 
country, taking against her steps apparently the most hostile, and holding to 
other Courts, respecting her, language the most insulting. 


25 


In Greece a Regency with Sovereign character and powers had been 
established. Lord Palmerston instructed the British Agent in Greece to 
support with all his influence one member of that Regency, thus breaking it 
into two factions. He then declared the majority of that Regency to be 
Russian, and on that ground took measures to have it ejected from Greece. 
The expelled members published a statement declaring the British Resident 
member to have acted in collusion with the Resident of Russia—to deceive 
(for they saw not farther) the British Secretary of State ; they substantiated 
the denunciation by documentary evidence, and their words as their proof 
stand—the first unrefuted, the second unquestioned. It is on the 16th June, 
1834, that the co-operation is concerted with Russia in regard to Persia; and 
on the 19th June of the same year, does the Bavarian Minister at London 
report the declarations of Lord Palmerston, not only that he did not co¬ 
operate with Russia in Greece, where that co-operation between England and 
Russia was established by two treaties and an Act of Parliament, but that he 
did oppose her—that he had triumphed over her. 

The document that follows is a despatch published in the work of M. V. 
Maurer, Member of the Royal Regency of Greece. The despatch of the 
Bavarian Minister is dated London, June 19th, three days subsequently to 
the despatch of Lord Palmerston to St. Petersburgh, establishing the union 
of England and Russia. 


“ In deploring the discord which has manifested itself lately in the Councils of the Regency, 
Lord Palmerston has told Count Jenison (the Bavarian Minister) that, according to letters which 
he had received from Greece, this discord was only due to the preponderating influence of the 
Russian Cabinet, as also to the proceedings of M. Catachasi (the Russian Envoy), who has managed, 
by dint of intrigues, to gain an ascendancy over a portion of the Regency. According to him, 
M. de Maurer and General Heydech had become the dupes of the Russian Envoy, and M. d’Abel had 
been the instrument which M. Catachasi had made use of in order to accomplish his intrigues; that 
the English Cabinet, whilst agreeing that there had been reciprocal wrongs in the Regency, was 
decided in supporting Count Armensperg with all the weight of its power, if necessary , inasmuch 
as it had always had a high opinion of his qualities and his political views; and that with a view to 
neutralize or to equalize the action of the two fractions of the Regency, it had thought to have 
found the means in the removal from Greece of M. d’Abel, not because it thought him the author 
of this deplorable dissension ; but because it had, he said, certain knowledge that the Russian agent 
made use of him, as a docile instrument, to foment a dissension which would end in overthrowing 
the whole edifice which they had with such difficulty constructed. Lord Palmerston particularly 
insisted that Count Jenison should make the King of Bavaria understand, that in expressing this 


E 


26 


wish relative to the removal of M. d’Abel, he was inclined to consider it the most efficacious remedy, 
and the one most adapted to prevent much mischief*. 11 

This document has only to be placed by the side of Lord Palmerston’s 
despatch to Mr. Bligh, of the 16th June, 1831, to establish the existence of 
two lines of policy, pursued and declared at the same period, and probably 
on the same day, the one destructive of the other. The one Union with 
Russia—the other Hostility to her! But in these contradictions a common 
feature is to be detected in these divergencies—a common end attained. The 
Union of the two Courts in Persia raises to the Throne the candidate of 
Russia. The appearance of hostility in Greece enables them to co-operate 
in overthrowing a sovereign body which had detected collusion between the 
diplomacy of Russia and England, and which had taken steps to acquaint 
therewith the British Cabinet. Lord Palmerston instantly denounces these 
men as Russians, and declares his policy in Greece to be opposed to Russia. 
He is then enabled to join his influence to that of Russia to drive them from 
Greece, and he and Russia unite to represent that event as a triumph of 
England over Russia. 

If Lord Palmerston had opposed Russia in Greece, must not Russia 
have turned round to counteract the policy of England in Persia, if indeed 
co-operation of the two courts in that country had been advantageous to 
England ? But if the co-operation of the two courts in Persia was not 
advantageous to England, then could there be nowhere opposition of England 
to Russia.—It is therefore clear that as co-operation in Persia was assumed, 
to disguise the conflicting interests of the two states :—so in Greece, was 
hostility devised to disguise the concert of the two Ministers. 

Faction, in Persia as in Greece, sprung solely from the assault of Russia 
upon their independence. Russia by corruption and by intimidation had 
created for herself in each, allies and partisans. The remainder of the nation 

* Subsequently Lord Palmerston, in violation of the treaty of May 1832, compelled the 
expulsion of the two members. The bearer of the instructions to that effect alighted at the Russian 
Mission, and the Russian Admiral was prepared, if necessary, to support the instructions by force. 
The members so expelled had appealed to Lord Palmerston against the British Resident, whom 
they accused of acting in collusion with Russia, and they are expelled by Lord Palmerston on the 
grounds of their being Russian—by the aid of Russian bayonets ! The Secretary of the British 
Legation was also expelled, having asserted his belief of the collusion of the British Resident with 
Russia. 


27 


looked abroad for support. It saw in England the only Power interested in 
defending their rights, because interested in defeating the designs of their 
enemy. It was the greatest of triumphs for Russia to designate these men 
as a party, and by styling it English she disguised the fraud of designating 
traitors as partisans—-and mitigated the infamy of the word “ Russian ’ by 
placing it in antithesis with “ English .” 

Lord Palmerston has completed the measure of this confusion by 
declaring a union of England with her enemy—the enemy of Persia. His 
knowledge of the character and constitution of the two parties into which 
that State was divided. His consciousness of the conflicting character of the 
interests of England and Russia, not merely in Persia and in Greece alone, 
but universally, are established in the following words:— 

“ England and Russia are both too deeply interested in maintaining the internal tranquillity of 
Persia, to allow either Power to be indifferent to complications which might tend to throw that 
country into a state of confusion and civil war; and that as each would be applied to by the rival 
parties, it would be a fortunate circumstance if the wishes and good offices of both (England and 
Russia) could be united in support of one and the same candidate*.'” 

He saw, therefore, that the union of England and Russia was to have 
accomplished the overthrow of one or other of the rival parties—that is, it 
was to annihilate either the national spirit or the Russian faction. 

In Greece there was less disguise in the mode, and bitterer exasperation 
in the language. She there reviled while she betrayed, and while betraying 
those who trusted in her, branded them as Russians. Those only who have 
consciously witnessed such deeds—who have shared in the afflicting scenes to 
which they have given rise—know what it is to blush for the name of English¬ 
man, and to feel the meaning of “ national degradation.” 

While sorrowing over the fate of a country that unconsciously adopts 
such deeds, and makes their guilt as their consequences her own—it is an 
increase and not a diminution of shame to reflect that the mere assertion by 
England of her own rights, annihilated at once all internal faction, and 
consequently all external danger for Persia, for Greece, and for each other 
country equally exposed—that the commonest intelligence—that the plainest 
sense of duty would have sufficed to put an end to all hostile acts, on the 
part of Russia, and to all fear of such, on the part of those whom she assails. 

* Despatch to Mr. Bligh, of the 16th June, 1834. 


28 


But presented to us, as this question is, in these and similar transactions, 
there is danger to the national judgment. All previous knowledge is 
excluded—all means of comparison shut out. The field of inquiry being thus 
narrowed, the mind of the observer is contracted, and his spirit sinks. While, 
horror-struck in contemplating this assassination of whole people and nations, 
he is surprised into a mis-estimate of his country by having to trace, 
laboriously, a struggle between Russia and England of duplicity and fraud, as 
if these were the weapons of England’s warfare, and Russia her equal; or as 
if Russia were more than her equal in all save dishonour. He shrinks from 
such an inquiry, and despairs of such a people, little suspecting the strength 
that lies in England’s breasts, dormant now but not extinct—strength derived 
from the absence of ambition in the character of her people, and from the 
power of maintaining the Right in the posture of her Isle. The breath of an 
honest and able Minister in the House of Commons may even yet, in an 
instant, break the mighty spell that has fascinated Europe and Asia—may 
arouse the drooping fortunes of this land and give to them a supremacy— 
bounded by no ocean tract—limited by no mountain course, but extending 
through every region, and having a hold upon every soil wdiere men have 
rights to assert or homesteads to defend. England’s interests are those of the 
World—her rights those of Man. To understand the first—to assert the 
second, is to render her will Law—because just. Then would the power of 
England be dear to other people—by the alarms it would avert from the 
weak, and useful to ourselves by the curb it would place upon the strong. 
Then, and only then, would be established the peace of the world— peace 
because right prevails, not because force has triumphed. 

In the very year 1836, in which the British Government pretended to feel 
these duties—to assert this policy—to enter on this high career—did the 
British Minister at St. Petersburgh declare that England and Russia were 
united to maintain the peace of the world. England required no consort in 
such an office—from the hour that she did assume it, becoming true to herself, 
she ceased to have a foe. There was one Power that threatened the inde¬ 
pendence of nations—that endangered the peace of the world. The union, 
therefore, of England with that Power was to crush the liberties of nations, 
and to extinguish the hopes of men. 



29 


TABULAR VIEW OF THE UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN 

AND RUSSIA. 

Since the last war, the following great international events have occurred, 
in all of which Russia has stood on the one side, acting or prompting, England 
on the other, complaining or resisting. 

The Holy Alliance. 

The occupation of Naples by Austria. 

Invasion of Spain by France. 

Insurrection of Greece. 

Treaty of the 6th July, 1827, for the dismemberment of Turkey. 

War of Russia against Persia. 

War of Russia against Turkey. 

War of Russia against Circassia. 

War of Russia against Poland. 

Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi offensive against England. 

England stood alone without, and opposed to the Holy Alliance. 

The Austrian occupation of Naples was prompted by Russia, England 
alone standing aloof. 

The invasion of Spain by France was prompted by Russia, who had 
recourse even to menaces*. Against this invasion, it was a question whether 
or not England should interfere by arms. 

The insurrection of Greece was conducted by Russia as a conspiracy 
chiefly alarming to England. 

The Treaty of the 6th July, 1837, England engaged in avowedly for the 
purpose of restraining Russia. 

The war of Russia against Persia was a direct assault against England, 
who was bound by treaty to protect Persia. 

The war of Russia against Turkey again placed England and Russia in 
direct opposition. 

So the war against Circassia. 

So the war with Poland. 

Finally, on the revelation of the secret Treaty imposed by Russia on 
Turkey, that of Unkiar Skelessi, England protested against Russia’s act. 

England stood as the sole opponent, in Europe as in Asia, at once of the 
objects which Russia pursued, and of the doctrines which she laboured to 
propagate. 

Hostility, more grave in its character, gigantic in its objects, inveterate 
in its activity (on one side at least), never was presented before between 
nation and nation. 


* Avowed by the Minister of France. 


30 


Such being the reciprocal position of the two Governments, namely, that 
of constant aggression of Russia, of constant resistance on the part of 
England, we discover, in the year 1838, by the publication of these diplomatic 
documents, that four years before , the two governments had secretly re¬ 
cognised to each other that the interests of the two countries were the same, 
and had agreed to concert their policy ! Nevertheless, the opposition between 
the two countries continues as before to the eyes of England, of Europe, 
and of the East. This secret concert is established at a time when a public 
protest is made by England against Russia in regard to Turkey. At the 
time when England publicly protests against Russia in Turkey, she concurs 
with Russia in regard to the destinies of Poland. At the time that England 
concurs with Russia regarding Poland, she sends instructions to counteract 
Russia’s intrigues in Greece. At the very time that England is counteracting 
her intrigues in Greece, is England paying to her the Russo-Dutch Loan, 
under a treaty which the legal authorities of the Crown declare to be no longer 
binding. In this same year a Quadruple Treaty is framed for the assumed 
purpose of arresting the influence of Russia in the Peninsula. In the same 
year the Sovereign of England accepts the appeal of the Circassians against 
Russia; and, in the same year, the Indian Government proceeded to take 
measures to arrest her designs for dismembering that portion of the British 
territory. Opposition is shown here, and union is declared there; now the 
one, now the other, appears secret, now patent, till the whole becomes an 
inextricable mass of confusion, where no one can see his way, yet, respecting 
which, every man is perpetually expressing opinions. Thus is reason per¬ 
verted, and honesty destroyed—a mist is spread, producing a mist over the 
senses of the nation, and the mechanism created for the conduct of public 
affairs is converted into an engine for the destruction of the state. 

Could Russia have suffered England to announce union between them, 
had England been pursuing objects of her own ? If so, this union would 
have given to England Russia’s influence, to be employed against herself. It 
was for the advancement of Russia’s ends, therefore, that this union was 
proclaimed. The union of England and Russia to maintain that peace which 
no one but Russia threatened, has, in four years, converted Europe into avast 
camp of permanent armaments, and spread war throughout Asia, from the 
Adriatic to the Yellow Sea. 



UNION OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE OF THE WORLD. 

^Declaration of the Ambassador of H. B. M. at St. Petersburgh — Mat, 1836.) 



PERSIA. 

AFFGHAN¬ 

ISTAN. 

TURKEY. 

EGYPT. 

GREECE. 

CIRCASSIA. 

POLAND. 

i 

CRACOW. 

HOLLAND 

AND 

BELGIUM. 

SPAIN. 

BRITISH EMPIRE. 

INDIAN 

GOVERNMENT 

(4). 

1833. 

Defensive 
Treaty between 
Great Britain 
and Persia 

AGAINST 

Russia. 

Defensive 
Treaty between 
England and the 
Affghans— 
Invasion by a 
Pretender from 
the British 
Territory. 

Refusal by Eng¬ 
land of succour 
to Turkey against 
Egypt, so as to 
compel her to 
accept Russian 
Succour. 

Revolt of Egypt 
prepared by 
Russia, suffered 
by England, 
brings Russian 
Intervention. 

Union of Russia 
and England to 
dismember Tur¬ 
key of Greece, 
rransfer to Russia 
>f property mort¬ 
gaged to British 
bondholders. 

Indepen¬ 
dence 
guaranteed 
against 
Russia by 
Treaty of 
July 1827. 

< 

hH 

02 

02 

Ch 

Hrl 

u-M 

H 

r—‘ 

£ 

K 

<3 

£ 

Submission 
to Incor¬ 
poration 
by Russia 
of a 

Kingdom, 
the Inde¬ 
pendence 
of which is 
guaranteed 

by 

England. 

Infraction 
by Russia 
of Treaty 
with 

England. 
(Decla¬ 
ration of 
the Law- 
Officers 
of the 
Crown 
that all 
Treaties 
between 
Russia and 
England 
have ceased 
to be 
binding.) 

Russia 
privately 
counteracts 
the proposals 
which she 
joins with 
England 
to sign. 
Declaration 
of the fact 
made to the 
Conference of 
London by 
Holland— 
Russia and 
Great Britain 
continue 
united— 
England 
continues to 
pay Interest 
on Russo- 
Dutch Loan, 
after violation 
by Russia of 
Treaties. 


NORTH 

AME¬ 

RICAN 

COLO¬ 

NIES. 

THE 

UNITED 

KINGDOM. 

INDIAN 

DOMI¬ 

NION. 

Alarmed at designs 
of Russia. 




Russia 

fomenting 

Dis¬ 

content 

within, 

and 

creating 

Hostility 

around, 

by 

secret and 
avowed 
Emis¬ 
saries. 

1834. 

Secret Union 
of Great 
Britain with 
Russia respecting 
Persia. 
(June 16th.) 


Protest of Eng¬ 
land against the 
Treaty between 
Russia and Tur¬ 
key ; the Price 
of that Succour. 


Majority of the 
Royal Regency 
expelled lrom 
Greece by Eng¬ 
land on the plea 
that they were 
Russian. 

4ppealof the 
Circassians 
against 
Russia ac¬ 
cepted by 
the King of 
England. 

Quadruple 
Treaty (2). 
—Assumed 
Policy of 
Opposition 
on the 
part of 
England to 
the Policy 
of Russia. 

N.B.—Boast 
that the 
Influence of 
Russia 
in the 
Peninsula 
was 

overthrown. 

Takes preventive 
measures to arrest 
Russian 
Influence. 

1835. 

• 

British Envoy 
instructed to 
warn Persia 
against Russia. 
(July 25th.) 

The Affghan 
Princes informed 
by Russia of the 
intention of the 
British Govern¬ 
ment to set up 
the same 
Pretender. 

Submission by 
England to exe¬ 
cution of a Treaty, 
declared by 
herself to be 
offensive against 
her. 

O 


Boast that 
England had 
overthrown 
the Influence 
of Russia in 
Greece. 


1836. 

British Envoy 
instructed to 
acquiesce in 
Persia’s assault 
on Herat. 

(*) 

The Indian 
Government 
opens Commu¬ 
nications with 
Cabool for mutual 
Defence against 
Persia and 
Russia. 

Measures adopted 
ostensibly by 
British Govern¬ 
ment to defend 
Turkey against 
Russia. 


Act of Parlia¬ 
ment to separate 
England from 
Russia, that Eng¬ 
land might pay 
the Loan which 
Russia refused 
to advance. 

Measures 
adopted by 
the British 
Government 
to maintain 
the Inde¬ 
pendence of 
Circassia. 

Negociations 
in Affghanistan 
to resist Persia 
and Russia. 

1837. 

British Envoy 
instructed from 
India to 
counteract the 
Assault upon 
Herat. 

The Indian 
Government dis¬ 
avows any 
Intention of 
setting up 
a Pretender. 

Sacrifice of 
those measures. 
Union of the 
two Courts. 


Russia 

predominant. 

Sacrifice of 
those 
measures. 

Insur¬ 
rection 
openly 
patro¬ 
nised by 
Russia. 



England annuls 

th.t> l'lfjpnsinp. 

The Indian Go¬ 
vernment invades 
Affghanistan 
without Decla¬ 
ration of War, 
and sets up the 
Pretender. 

Alteration of a 
Treaty, adopted 
to defend Turkey 
against Russia, 
into a means of 
convulsing and 
dismembering 
Turkey (1). 

Pacha of Egypt 
warned so as to 
be invited to 
declare his Inde¬ 
pendence, to 
afford the oppor¬ 
tunity for the 
Treaty of the 
15th July. 

Vehement, 
dissentions 
between 
England and 
Greece. 


Union 
of the 
two Courts 

Union 
of the 
two Courts 

Hi 

Union 
of the 
two Courts. 

Oppo¬ 
sition 
of the 
two Courts. 

Chartists 
organised 
by Russian 
agents. 

Makes W r 
in Ueniral VsTa 
against Russia’s 

Influence. 
Makes War on 
Persia. 

1838. 

Treaty between 
herself and 
Persia because 
Persia is united 
to Russia. 

Union 
of the 
two Courts 


Local 

Effects. 

Persia invading 
Affghanistan, 
and pondering 
over the 
Conquest 
of India. 

Hostile 
Occupation of 
Central Asia 
by England. 

Prostration 
of the 
Ottoman 
Empire. 

Egypt opens 
Commu¬ 
nications with 
Persia— 
Foments Insur¬ 
rection in 
the other 
Provinces of 
Turkey. 

Annihilation 
of internal 
Liberties, and 
of external 
Independence. 

This people 
assailed by 
Russia, cut 
off’from the 
rest of mankind 
through— 

Incorpo¬ 
rated with 
Russia. 




Great Britain an object 
of 

contempt to the powerful— 
of 

alarm to the weak. 

Indian 
Government 
acting against 
the Ally of 
the British 
Government. 

Conse¬ 

quence 

to 

Eng¬ 

land. 

Persia, the 
Defence 
of India, 
converted into 
a Source of 
Danger to 
India. 

England and 
Russia changing 
places in 
Central Asia. 

Decay of 
Turkey 
through union 
of England 
with her Foe. 

Success as 
elsewhere of 
England in 
ruining 
England’s 
Interests and 
Power. 

Sacrifice of 
Interests, 
Rights, and 
£.3,000,000. 
Fraudulent 
accounts pre¬ 
sented to 
Parliament. 

England’s 
submission to 
the piratical 
seizure of a 
British vessel 
on their 
Coast. 

Sacrifice of 
commercial 
Rights. 

Sacrifice 

of 

commercial 

Rights. 

Sacrifice 

of 

Money 

and 

Rights. 

Sacrifice 
of Blood, 
of Treasure, 
of Rights, 
of Name. 

England incomprehensible to 
Englishmen, therefore— 
Knowledge of Public Affairs, 
Sense of Justice, Affections of 
Patriotism, Rights of 
Citizenship—destroyed. 

Indian 
Government 
acting according 
to the secret 
Intentions of the 
British Minister. 

Gene¬ 

ral 

Re¬ 

sults. 

England successful against England by submission to Injustice—by employment of ships, troops, money, and influence, to 
inflict injustice. Loss of allies, ruin of character, sacrifice of interests (3). — Gradual darkening of the mind of England, and, 
thereby, of Europe and the world; gradual development of hatred between nations, and of passions among men. 

HOUSE—WHICH AN ENEMY HAS 
DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF. 

THEREFORE THE UNION OF ENGLAND TO RUSSIA HAS PRODUCED 


Union of 
Persia 
with 
Russia 
AGAINST 
England. 

The frontiers 
of the British 
power brought 
one thousand 

MILES NEARER 

to Russia. 
Natural 
frontiers 
of India 

OVERSTEPPED. 

By England’s 
act the 

Protectorate 
of Russia, 
established 
OVER 

THE ONLY 

ANTAGONIST OF 

Russian 

AMBITION ! 

Egypt 

prepared to be 
the pretext 
of a COALITION 
for the 
DISMEMBER¬ 
MENT OF THE 

Ottoman 

Empire. 

Greece had 
thrown 
herself on the 
protection of 
England— 
England 

THROWS 

Greece 

UNDER THE 

FEET OF 

Russia. 

Participation 
of England 
in Russia’s 
AGGRESSIVE 

WAR AGAINST 

Circassia. 

Annexa¬ 
tion to 
Russia 

OF A 

Kingdom. 

Admission 
of the right 
of Russia 

TO DO AS 

SHE 

PLEASES. 

Years of 

ALARM 

to Europe. 
Its press 
filled with 
millions of 
columns of 

VAIN 

DISCUSSION. 

• 

Division of 
Europe 
into two 

HOSTILE 

LEAGUES. 

Insurrection in Canada—Sedition in the United 
Kingdom—Insurrection in India 
—fomented by Russia. 

India openly 
—menaced by Russia. 

Interests and Power of Britain throughout the World 
—assailed by Russia, 

England and Russia being the while united, 

THROUGH 

THE TREASON OF A BRITISH MINISTER. 


T. IiKETTELL, PRINTER, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET, LONDON. 
















































































































































































































. 






% 






































































31 


NOTES TO TABLE. 

e \ ^ Appointments in these years, as Envoy to Persia, and as Secretary of Embassy in Turkey; 

ot Authors of H orks and Essays exposing the errors of the past policy of Great Britain; 
PT™ng. ^ c * an _g er t° Persia and to r Iurkey of the public policy and the secret machinations 
o Russia; proving^ the hostility of Russia to Great Britain; and showing that the sole danger 
or Persia and for lurkey, as for England, rested in the control which Russia possessed over the 
policy of Great Britain. Both these individuals were appointed out of the ordinary course. They 
accepted these situations solely in the belief of the change which they conceived they had been them¬ 
selves the instruments of effecting in the mind of the British Government. 

. (^°* JO The British Government had ostensibly adopted the project of a commercial treaty 

^ j lurkey. ihis instrument was framed to shield from Russia the internal prosperity of 
L urkey; also to counteract the designs of the Pacha of Egypt against his Sovereign. This 
Treaty, then proposed, was not carried into effect. Two years later it was concluded, but so altered 
as to become, in the hands of Russia, an instrument against England and against Turkey. 

(No. 2.) By the Quadruple ireaty (a measure proposed by the British Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs), Russia obtained, First , another diplomatic web spreading over these four countries; 
Second , Continuation of distraction in the Peninsula; Third , Patronage of, and influence with, 
the opposition in England, which resisted the measures into which she had led the Government; 
Fourth , i he occupying of attention—confusion of opinion—the exasperating of faction throughout 
the whole ot Europe. Having secured all these results, she further obtains, Fifths The formation 
fo a counter-league of Austria and Prussia with herself ,* controlling the Quadruple Alliance 
through the British Minister; placing France in opposition to England by the violation of its 
conditions; putting Austria and Prussia in opposition to England, by the fact of its existence. 
Thus has Europe been divided into two hostile leagues. At the head of the one is Russia , at the head 
of the other is England—the two Powers declaring themselves united to maintain the peace of the 
world! 

(No. 3.) T he actual loss of money in expenditure, sacrifice of mortgage, pecuniary advances, loss 
of revenue in India and Canada, &c., amounts to above <P.20,000,000; but the diminution of commerce, 
by the arrestation of its course abroad and the shaking of commercial confidence at home, has 
imposed a much heavier loss than this. I refer, of course, only to the few countries enumerated 
in this table. 

(No. 4.) I have placed in distinct columns India and the Indian Government. The first 
a State convulsed by Russia; the second, a Government paralysed in mind and action by the control 
possessed over it by England. Had the Indian Government been independent, it would have 
appealed to England against Russia; and had it found England united to Russia, it would have 
looked on it also as its foe, and must have ceased to be influenced by it. But unfortunately for 
England, the Governors of India are Englishmen. 


N.B.—In this table I have omitted the relations of England with the other great Powers— 
France, the United States, and Prussia; and further, those with Denmark, Sweden, Western and 
Southern Africa, and South America, in each of which our position is endangered by aggressions of 
the native authorities, or by interference of Foreign States, or by our own injustice. Violation 
of right, sacrifice of money and of commerce, we have endured in all. National contempt, and 
political hostility, is preparing to invite the strong and to compel the weak into enmity against 
this land—once the palladium of liberty, and the holder of the scales of power. 

In glancing at this general picture of our condition, it must not be forgotten that a transfer 
has taken place from England to other nations of that power upon which her existence depends. 
On entering the last war, England’s naval force was equal to that of the united naval force of the 
world. It now constitutes little more than a third. It must also be borne in mind that England 
depends on supremacy at sea for the maintenance of her colonial dominions—the protection of 
her coasts and territories, for the materials for naval architecture, and—for food. 



32 


PART III. 

ELEVATION OF MAHMOUD MEERZA TO THE THRONE OF PERSIA. EVENT 
UNNOTICED IN THE PAPERS PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT. 

The practical connection of England with Persia dates from the year 
1800, and commences with a transaction which shews that the good-will and 
services of the weaker were recognised by the stronger of these two Powders 
as of vital importance—and that the friendship of the stronger was felt by 
the weaker to be so valuable as to make it for Persia the first of objects to 
merit the favour, and to obtain the protection, of her powerful ally. Threat¬ 
ened in India by the Affghans, England appealed to Persia. Persia imme¬ 
diately assumed such an attitude as to compel the Affghans to relinquish all 
designs against Hindostan. A few years later, Persia, unable to cope single- 
handed with Russia, had in turn to appeal to the State whose gratitude she 
had merited, and to whom she had proved the value of her independence 
and her friendship, but—England was allied to her foe! She appealed to 
France, who, being at war with Russia, soon secured an entire ascendancy 
over Persia. England, now alarmed for India, attempted to regain her 
ground in Persia. The contest between England and France was thus 
carried to the Persian capital. France in the meantime was joined by 
Russia. This union restored the Eastern position of England, by snatching 
her from the control of Russia, and on the other hand barred against France 
the gates of India, and deprived her of all influence in the East. The influ¬ 
ence of each of these Governments has been successively effaced in the East 
from the moment that it allied itself with Russia. Persia was now supported 
by England, but England again allied herself to Russia. The disastrous 
effects of this alliance on the Eastern interests of Great Britain, and on the 
integrity and independence of Persia, soon appear. Russia was struggling 
for existence against Napoleon; she was also at war with Turkey and 
Persia. England compelled Turkey and Persia to a peace with Russia— 
without the slightest regard to their rights or interests—and Russia in each, 
through the use she was enabled to make of the co-operation of England 
and of the prostituted honour and faith of her representative, gained more 


33 


than she might have secured by a successful war. To Persia this co-opera¬ 
tion of England with Russia was peculiarly disastrous, for the definitive 
treaty between her and Russia was postponed till after the defeat of Napoleon, 
so that she presented to Persia her whole national force undistracted after the 
greatest of modern successes; and strong at once in the strength of the two 
Powers who now divided the world—strong in the fall of France—strong in the 
alliance of England. 

The treaty of Gulistan, mediated by England, was thus the Partition of 
Persia*. Persia by that treaty ceded the whole of the region lying south of 
the Caucasus, actually possessed by Russia—no less than twelve provinces 
or districts, equal together in extent to England. England no sooner brings 
about the Partition of Persia, than she bethinks herself of entering into a 
defensive alliance with that State—bound herself to defend it—and consti¬ 
tuted herself a party to the settlement of its frontiers. 

From the moment however of the signature of the treaty of Gulistan, 
Russia commenced to exhibit a determination to fulfil no engagement, and 
to spare no means of oppression, degradation, and menace to the Persian 
Government. The frontiers remained unsettled, and the object of incessant 
agitation and alarm, and thus at once was the Persian nation exasperated 
and the English Government degraded ; the English Government, always 
uncertain whether to keep with the hounds or run with the hare, had allied 
itself to Persia for her protection, after compelling her to desist from hostil¬ 
ities against Russia—had pledged the faith of its Minister in Persia for the 
sincerity of Russia—had exerted the influence of its Minister at St. Peters- 
burgh to mitigate the severity of her injustice. False position—useless 
efforts—broken pledge—violated faith ! 

After fourteen years of this continuous action upon Persia, and after the 
exasperation thus artfully roused had led to the catastrophe which befell the 
Russian Minister, the war of 1826 broke out, and England lent to Persia 
neither protection nor troops—withheld from her all political support, and 
refused to acquit her pecuniary obligations. 

The treaty of Turkmanchai, by which this war was ended (1828), en¬ 
forced a further partition of the kingdom, it imposed an enormous debt upon 


* Russia did indeed reject the formal mediation of England, while using the services and pros¬ 
tituting the faith of the English Envoy. 


F 


34 


the sovereign, and it pressed with such weight upon the northern provinces 
of the empire, which were the chief nurseries of its strength and the sources 
of its riches, as to occasion, with the famine and epidemic diseases which 
followed, a loss of two millions of souls. 

After such disasters, and bound as England was to Persia—looking to 
her as the defence of India—conceiving the support of her independence, 
and her integrity against Russia, as the first object of her eastern policy 
it was impossible in taking any decision to be content with less or to contem¬ 
plate any other save that which sufficed for securing to Persia the possession 
of her own territories—the observation of her own frontiers—and, above all, 
for giving to her confidence in the support of England against her implacable 
foe. Nothing of the kind is dreamt of: energetic measures, however, are 
taken with respect to Persia—treasure expended—blood shed. But this is 
not done to impose any check on Russian ambition—it is done to put a new 
monarch on the throne—that monarch the nominee of Russia ! 

The following passage from the pen of a Russian agent, and written at 
the period of the accession of Mahmoud Meerza, may prove of interest:— 

“ During the last reign the influence of the English was paramount in Persia; they had the 
entire confidence of the monarch, and were the objects of the affections of the people; they were 
entrusted with the full command of the military force, and were enabled to form a small but efficient 
regular army, capable, under the British commanders, to whom they were devoted, of meeting the 
best troops that Russia could bring against them. The Russians, on the contrary, were detested 
by the people, and the Shah could not bear their presence. On one occasion a Russian traveller 
happened to fall ill at Teheran ; the Shah sent repeated messages to the English Envoy at Teheran, 
where the invalid had obtained an asylum, to desire that he might be removed beyond the walls of 
the city. The inhabitants of the Mohulla, or quarter in which the British resided, having on 
another occasion learned that the gentlemen of the Russian mission were permanent guests of the 
British Ambassador, sent a deputation to the Envoy to entreat their removal.” 

Persian hatred of Russia constituted our strength—their confidence in 
us arose from our opposition to Russia. Concert of England with their foe 
was destruction to them. This position is clear and simple—they could only 
hope for defence against their enemy in the determination of England to 
protect herself. To be the friend of England, therefore, was to be the foe of 


* “ As long as Britain retains India, and Russia her present military force, so long must the 
integrity and independence of Persia be of vital importance to the one, and a formidable impediment 
to the exercise of the power of the other .”—Progress of Russia in the East , p. 61. 


35 


Russia, and the foe of England was necessarily the ally of Russia—the two 
camps stood entrenched in the face of each other. The highest authority of 
the State had proclaimed the cause of England to be the cause of national 
independence, and the expounders of the law and the faith had denounced 
the friend of Russia as a traitor and a renegade*. 

First-rate States, looking to no human power as greater than them¬ 
selves—dreading injury from none—calculating on the dispositions or cha¬ 
racter of no other Government for justice or for independence—cannot form 
to themselves any idea whatever of the mental state of weaker powers, of the 
dependence which they feel or the anxiety with which they watch the words, 
acts, and thoughts of the representatives, the statesmen, or even of indivi¬ 
duals, belonging to the leading nations. England, whilst thus observed, 
has had no design to carry out, and, therefore, has she been indifferent and 
ignorant; still, confidence in her integrity and in her power, is the sole in¬ 
ternational source of resistance to the assault of Russia, and her allies, on 
the liberties of mankind. How essential is it, then, for England, that, 
supplying her mental deficiencies, she should have a Foreign Minister alive 
to the human chords which are strung in the hearts of the minor States. 
But should a Foreign Minister alone in a land comprehend this power to 
use it against his country! 

The following extract is from a speech of Lord Palmerston’s, delivered 
when in opposition in 1829. It will apply to our subject—reading Persia 
for Portugal, Spain for Russia—with the difference that Spain is not quite 
Russia—and that if Spain did entertain designs against the possessions of 
England in India, or on the Ottoman Empire and Europe, the acquisition of 
Portugal would not materially assist her :— 

“ It has been the opinion of the wisest statesmen of Portugal, that the best security for Portu¬ 
guese independence must be found in the selfish interests of England, and that as it was worth while 
for England, for her own sake, to make great efforts to prevent Portugal from being annexed to 
Spain, England, therefore, was sure to be the most sincere and trusty ally to whom in the hour of 
need Portugal could turn for assistance. These reciprocal interests engendered connexion and alli¬ 
ance, mutual usefulness led to good offices on one side, and to confidence on the other—treaties 
imposed obligations and conferred corresponding rights, and hence it is that Portugal has always 
solicited and received the advice of England, as that of a friend whose interests were identified with 

*In the appendix will be given a very remarkable state paper, drawn up by the chief men of 
the law, assigning the reasons of their friendship for England, and their enmity to Russia. 


36 


her own, and hence it is also that England has been permitted to exercise an authority and possess 
an influence in the councils of Portugal which did not naturally belong to her, regarding her as an 
independent State.” 

The appreciation here evinced of the feelings engendered in weaker 
states by the necessities and the affections of protection, the terms in which 
the thoughts are conveyed, and the order in which they are placed, afford 
valuable means of estimating the powers of the actual Foreign Minister of 
this country. The ignorance, or the worse than ignorance, of great and 
small, of wise and simple—of all that concerns the public faith, honour, in¬ 
terests, and policy, have reduced every question connected with our national 
affairs—every question connected with the States whose independence and 
existence depend on the policy of Great Britain—to a knowledge of the 
ideas, or the will, or the caprice of a single man. A knowledge of this 
man’s character is therefore the first step in every international investigation ; 
and few passages among even the unfrequent sentences which at intervals 
escape his lips or flow from his pen, have revealed to me so much of his 
power, for evil or for good, as the passage above quoted. 

Upon the death of Abbas Meerza, the Prince Royal, his son, Mahmoud 
Meerza, succeeded to the command of his army, then employed in the expe¬ 
dition against Herat , and to the Governorship of Azerbijan—a province 
which had borne the chief penalties of the last war, and was now subdued to 
the influence of Russia. It was the source of projects of Eastern conquest 
in which the suggestions of Russia had prevailed, and to which her support 
was requisite. Mahmoud Meerza did not, however, succeed of right to the 
pretensions of his father on the Crown of Persia, as, according to the ideas 
of the East, the son of the Sovereign comes before his grandson—and this 
very uncertainty it was, in regard to his title, which gave to the pretensions 
of Mahmoud Meerza their chief merit in the eyes of Russia. 

The principal competitor of Mahmoud Meerza was his uncle, the eldest 
surviving brother of Abbas Meerza. He was almost the independent ruler 
of a strong and difficult country, inhabited by tribes attached to the British 
name, who from their southern position stood, in relation to England, in a 
light analogous to that in which Azerbijan stood in regard to Russia. He 
was known to entertain feelings equally strong of hostility to Russia, and of 
confidence in England. Each of these provinces was moreover influenced 


* 


37 


by the dangers which it had to apprehend—the advantages which it might 
derive from the hostility or the friendship of the power to which it ap¬ 
proached. This opposition of local interest was confirmed and augmented 
by corresponding opposition in the opinions of the Princes by whom they 
were ruled, and by the conflicting claims of these on the Persian Crown. 

In the eyes of Persia, the struggle between these two Princes became a 
contest between the hostile influence of England and of Russia, that is to 
say, between Persian nationality, vainly appealing to England, and— 
Russian aggression. 

Thus did the question present itself at the opening of these negotiations, 
when Russia asserted, and England admitted, that their interests were one, 
and that they should unite to advise the Shah to adopt “some one candi¬ 
date,” and when they did unite in supporting “one and the same candidate.” 

The papers presented to Parliament furnish no information whatever 
upon any of these subjects. While occupied with voluminous details upon 
all the subordinate and posterior transactions, there is not the remotest indi¬ 
cation given of the anterior position of England and Persia, or of the 
opinions of any individual connected with the British Service, and no expo¬ 
sition of the policy pursued or of the objects which the Government of Great 
Britain had in view ; and while no reason whatever is assigned for the selec¬ 
tion of Mahmoud Meerza, the very fact of his elevation to the throne—an 
event accomplished by British arms—is not so much as even mentioned. 
Mahmoud Meerza’s name seems only introduced as an unintelligible pre¬ 
tence for putting forward the union between Russia and. England; by 
involving the enquirer in details to drag him into an admission of the propo¬ 
sition with which they were connected. This union is all that the reader of 

«/ 

the Parliamentary Papers is to know. He is to commence with learning 
that England and Russia are united—no doubt is to exist in his mind as to 
this fact; and it was to be expected that he should enquire no farther. This 
expectation has been entirely realised—the nation and Parliament have 
adopted as their own the policy of Russia. Years have gone by, catas¬ 
trophes have overtaken them, but not reflexion. In prosecution of that 
union with Russia, which, had it been a union, must have rendered them all- 
powerful, they have lost in Persia all that they possessed, and all that they 
sought to obtain. But has the nation’s illusion thereby been dispelled? 
Has one man in this country been brought to draw the plain and simple 


4 


38 


inference that this union was a deception practised on his ignorance ? Has 
one man been brought to perceive that national dishonour is individual dis¬ 
grace ;—that national disaster must ultimately entail individual loss ? Has 
one man perceived that it is a solemn duty to himself, to the society to which 
he belongs, to the family of which he is a member, to understand those mat¬ 
ters in which are involved the national weal ? If not, experience has no 
wisdom in store for us. In vain is spread open the page of history before 
eyes that cannot see ; bootless the words of warning and of truth to ears that 
cannot hear. 

Russia waited not for the approval by England of her choice to 
announce to Persia the election which she had made, nor for the co-operation 
of England to declare that she had 40,000 men ready to support Mahmoud 
Meerza. The very moment that the Prince Royal expired, the Secretary to 
the Russian Mission was sent to the Shah with a letter of condolence, and 
also of congratulation on the promising character of the heir whom he had 
left to inherit the throne of Persia. England had no opinion to offer, and no 
line to take—but by the time of the death of the Shah the English Envoy 
was prepared instantaneously to stand forth as the advocate of the Russian 
protege, against the prince who was considered in Persia the champion of 
the interests of Great Britain. Mahmoud Meerza was proclaimed by the 
British Envoy, English money being disbursed to the troops, and English 
officers placed in command of the force commissioned to place him on the 
throne. 

The Governor of Teheran, an uncle of Mahmoud Meerza, had secured 
the treasure, and had assumed the royal title—the influence of the British 
Mission and the money of England were supplied to detach from him his 
supporters, and succeeded in compelling him to relinquish the diadem. 

The combined efforts of the new Shah and the English were then 
directed against the Prince of Schiraz, and by bold measures and rapid 
marches the English commander paralyzed his antagonists—entered suc¬ 
cessively Ispahan and Schiraz—secured the unfortunate Prince—carried him 
to Teheran—and delivered him up to an untimely fate* ! The Russian 

* These facts I state merely on the rumours of the time. I know of no account of these trans¬ 
actions available for reference. All notice of this period has been carefully excluded from the 
documents presented to Parliament. 


39 


Minister throughout these transactions remained a passive spectator of 
events, and had but to applaud the ability of English diplomacy, to extoll 
the valour of British arms, and to congratulate the Emperor upon entire 
success. It then became known to Persia that the support of Russia was 
necessary to obtain the friendship of England, and the Persians had already 
ascertained upon what condition the support of Russia was to be secured. 

England has applied herself with a remarkable intenseness of purpose 
and sequence of design to cultivate the favourable dispositions of the Persian 
people, and to bind its Government to herself. She has employed men for 
this service of distinguished ability—she has expended for this end more 
money than in peace she has expended upon all the other states of the world 
during the whole course of her existence. She has laboured successfully to 
overcome the prejudices of the Persians to military discipline*, and gave to 
Persia a respectable military force. 

The end to which her diplomatic labours tended was the maintenance 
of the nationality of Persia against Russia, and that end was apparently 
realised in the establishment of the new monarch securely on the throne, 
and by the union of the kingdom under a monarch apparently the choice of 
England, and indebted to her for his elevation:—he is no sooner on the 
throne than he avows the intention of attacking: India. 

The end of her military labours was to enable Persia to cope with the 
armies of Russia, and no sooner is that object realised than these troops are 
put in motion against her allies and herself. Are these the results of the 
union of England with Russia ? 

These facts are generally known throughout this country, they yet have 
led to no public indignation, they have prompted no enquiry—they have 
neither given rise to individual curiosity as to the process by which they 
have been effected, nor to Parliamentary investigation of the conduct of 
those through whose instrumentality they have been brought about. Con¬ 
sequently, England must fail in every enterprise; since, where there is no 
penalty for guilt, there can be no incentives to honour : where there is no 

* In this she only imitated France, whose Ambassador, General Gardanne, during the short 
space of French influence in Persia, had introduced European discipline as preparing Persia for an 
assault in India. England continued to improve the discipline of the Persian armies, while she 
sacrificed the independence of the Persian state, preparing thus a weapon against herself. 


40 


interest in public events, there can be neither intelligence nor honesty in 
public men. Equal calamities await the inaction as the activity of a heedless 
people, and the sole system of mismanaged affairs, is falsehood of statement, 
and error of act. 

The struggle in Persia, which succeeded to the death of the king, 
brought into effect the previously established concert of England and 
Russia, by the employment of the diplomatic influence, of the money, and 
the military means of England, to overthrow the rivals of Russia’s nominee. 
The English minister assumes this to be a British object—if an object it was 
a triumph; he was therefore entitled to applause, and he ought to have 
sought that legitimate support, from the public knowledge of his success, 
which an upright man, in the difficult station of Foreign Minister, must feel 
to be absolutely requisite to give him power, and to keep him honest; but, 
far from this, Lord Palmerston claims no merit—shews no pride—he rejects 
the laurels of victory—he hushes the trumpet of fame—the triumph of Great 
Britain in giving a Monarch to an independent kingdom is not thought worth 
communicating to a British senate, and no suspicion, no disposition to 
inquire, is awakened in that senate by so extraordinary a suppression. 


PART IV. 

PERSIAN INVASION OF AFFQHANISTAN. 

Russia no sooner effects the elevation of Mahmoud Meerza than she 
proceeds to inspire that monarch with ambitious projects against the British 
Possessions in India. 

Before applying ourselves to the analysis of the few dissevered lines in 
which we are to seek the solution of problems so involved, and the object 
of transactions so obscure, it may not be unprofitable to attempt to place 
ourselves in the relative positions of Russia and of Persia—the latter look- 



41 


ing to Russia and to England, weighing them against each other, balancing 
the language, capacity, and intentions of each. To the Envoy of Russia— 
urging a Persian expedition against Herat, the Shah would declare that he 
was neither able nor willing to adopt a course hostile to England. We 
may suppose the following reply :— 

Russian Envoy. —-You have already attacked Herat, and England has 
taken neither alarm nor offence. 

Shah. —Then my grandfather was alive, and his known friendship 
tranquillized the English Government; but in me a young, and, as she may 
think, ambitious Prince, she may be seriously indisposed, and take against 
me decisive and destructive measures. 

Russian Envoy. —Did not England’s alliance with you spring from the 
necessity of your assistance” to protect India against us ? England, then, 
only possesses India by our disunion ? You dread England. Look at 
facts : observe England how she has dwindled—Russia how she has grown. 
Have we not conquered your hostility, and made you our friend ? Have 
we not conquered Turkey ? Have we not conquered Poland ? And in 
doing so have we not acted in opposition to the will of Great Britain, and 
in defiance of her power ? She has protested against our treaty with the 
Porte, and what has been the benefit of her protest? Have we not captured 
a vessel of her own without a shadow of a pretext*—has she not submitted? 
At the treaty of Gulistan (Persia and Russia were then still foes) you relied 
on her protection and her power. Did she succeed in obtaining for you 
one point to which she had given her guarantee, or in compelling from us 
the fulfilment of any stipulation to which we were pledged ? When the 
war broke out in 1826, did England, after encouraging you to resistance by 
the confidence of protection and the promise of subsidies, afford you sup¬ 
port ? Did she pay you the money ? What advantage then is there in her 


* It may seem strange to put in the mouth of the Russian Ambassador the declaration of the 
injustice of the acts of Russia; at least this must appear strange to an English reader. He has to 
learn that the value to Russia of the act lay in its injustice—the greater the indignity offered to 
England, the clearer the proof of Russia’s power and of England’s weakness. There is also another 
object besides inspiring the Shah with awe for the power of Russia, and contempt for that of 
England; it was necessary to familiarize his mind with the idea of injustice, and ofeht injustice 
practised against England. 


G 




42 

friendship, or what danger in her enmity ? Russia, her foe, detesting her, 
detested by her, has grown, and triumphed, and prospered under the blasts 
of her hostility and the frowns of her hate. Persia, Turkey, Poland, Cir¬ 
cassia—every population or state which has looked to England with confi¬ 
dence, and has been fostered by her sympathy or upheld by her mighty 
arm—has been injured, broken, and betrayed. It is true that it is by the 
efforts and the money of England that you have been made the Monarch of 
Persia, but it is by the will of the Emperor that these efforts have been 
made, and this money has been expended—he it is who has chosen you for 
the throne of Persia—he it is who may also place you on the throne of 
Delhi. 

Shah. —But is Russia prepared at this moment to protect me against 
the consequences of the immediate hostility of England—against the conse¬ 
quences of the dissatisfaction of my own people in their attachment to 
England if this step should lead to an open rupture ? Is Russia, in 
fact, prepared to make common cause with Persia against England, or 
rather common cause with me against my own people, and against 
England ? 

Russian Envoy. —-The English Minister in London is the friend of 
the Emperor. Look at the diplomatic service of England. Does not the 
Emperor choose the men whom England shall employ, and displace those 
whom he dislikes? The leaders of that factious people are cowardly men, 
and have regard to private, not to public interests. What do they know of 
Asiatic affairs ? what do they care for them ? Like children, they are 
fighting for straws at home—strong alone in domestic hate, and rejoicing in 
national disgrace and disaster, if hurtful to their antagonists. But England, 
if she had men of ability and integrity to direct her councils, has not the 
power to injure you. She is involved in insurrection in America. You 
know what is preparing for her within her own dominions in India and— 
what around. An island constituting a third of her own kingdom is ripe for 
revolt, and her own people is divided into factions more bitter against each 
other than if they belonged to nations at war. This nation has no political 
sagacity or instinct, but it has political power, so that what it calls its 
liberty suffices to prevent union for any purpose—the state becomes inca¬ 
pable of action, and the Foreign Minister must rely for support from with- 


i 


43 


out, against the assaults of faction at home*. The military force of the 
Government is insignificant; it is perfectly contemptible against a foreign 
enemy, and is even insufficient to compress the disaffection growing up and 
spreading throughout the wide limits of this disconnected empire. That 
naval supremacy which has hitherto constituted its strength, and without 
which India cannot be held, is gone-)-. The naval power of Russia and of 
France have each separately risen to an equality with it, and these two 
nations are united. Their naval power has grown before the eyes of Eng¬ 
land, without their comprehending its object, or even being conscious of its 
existence, and as you see England united to Russia while engaged in work¬ 
ing her downfall, you may understand that a nation so stupid must give to 
every power with which it is in contact an interest in its overthrow. While 
convulsion is preparing and organizing in her own territories, a general 
“ union of crowns” is concerting against her, and it requires but moderate 
prudence to render her downfall no less safe than certain. 

Shah. —Since then you assert that England is powerless to oppose us, 
and since, moreover, you assert that the English Government is in reality 
your friend, it is easy for you to give me from the mouth of the English 
Ambassador, the proof of England’s union with you. 

Russian Envoy. —You cannot expect from the English Ambassador 
the declaration that his Court will concur with you in the invasion of its 
territories, but I will draw from the English Ambassador the avowal, that 
whatever may be the alarms that he may individually entertain regarding 
your projects upon India, these alarms are not shared by the Foreign 
Minister, who is the only person of importance in this matter. Moreover, 
England and Russia being united , whatever Russia counsels, Persia must 
receive as the will of the two States ; if England had any complaint to 
make it would be against Russia, and not against Persia, and the two 
Courts come to a perfect understanding at St. Petersburg!! and in London, 


* “ By an excessive jealousy of its liberty, the nation (Poland) has placed itself out of the power 
of acting, so that its councils are committed to the caprice or the treachery of a single minister.’’— 
Vattel, B. 1, cap. 3, sec. 24. 

f Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone relates in his work on Cabul, that on observing to anAffglian 
that England had the supremacy at sea, the Eastern remarked, “ How then had you to pay 25 
per cent, premium on insurance during the war ?” 


44 


before sending instructions. The Persian monarch cannot forget that his 
predecessor relied upon the support of England against Russia—that that 
support has not availed anything to Persia—that Persia has now lost it— 
and that England and Russia being united, Persia can have no will in this 
matter save that of the Emperor. 

Shah. —Bring from the English Ambassador confirmation of that 
which you have said—prove to me that the union of the two Courts extends 
to your present recommendations, and I am ready to adopt your counsels 
and to follow your advice. 

Russian Envoy. —I will bring from the English Ambassador the 
avowal of the actual knowledge of his chief of our projects against Affgha- 
nistan, of the continuance of England’s union with Russia notwithstanding 
that knowledge ; and, farther, I will put you in possession of England’s 
concurrence in our common views regarding the rights of Persia over 
Herat, Cabul, and Candahar ; and, morever, here is a draft of the instruc¬ 
tions which will be sent from London for the direction of this new Ambas¬ 
sador, and by which you will feel at once the strength and the delicacy of 
our position. 

Shah.—S o be it. 

Now let us examine the Documents. 

Mr. Ellis is sent out to congratulate the Shah, as Ambassador Extra¬ 
ordinary, with the following instructions :— 

44 You will especially warn the Persian Government against allowing 
44 themselves to be pushed on to make war against the Affghans. Whether 
44 Persia is successful or not, her resources will be wasted in these wars, 
44 and her future means of defence must be diminished.” 

This Instruction, which may appear to the reader insignificant common 
place, places the British Ambassador in the necessity of proving the case 
put to the Shah by the Envoy of Russia. 

We have first to enquire whether or not this instruction had been com¬ 
municated to Russia, and whether a corresponding instruction had been 
sent to the Russian Envoy at Teheran. 

Count Nesselrode had proposed that the two Cabinets, whose interests 
were so identical, should continue to act in concert in the 44 spirit of union 
44 and of peace,” and that 44 corresponding instructions should be sent to 


45 


“ their Envoys in Persia.” Lord Palmerston had admitted this proposal, 
and further by adding the words “ integrity and independence of Persia,” 
he had shown the determination of subjecting the whole of the internal 
affairs, and of the external relations of Persia to this irresistible despotism 
which by uniting with Russia he had established. 

Thus then had England and Russia bound themselves to act in concert 
—they were bound mutually to communicate the instructions to their repre¬ 
sentatives in Persia. Their language indicates communication in regard to 
secret measures of future policy. A perfect understanding, therefore, 
existed between the Foreign Ministers of the two Cabinets, as to the nature 
and the effects of this union, and as to the results with a view to which it 
had been established. Therefore community of objects no less than the 
terms of the compact imposed on the British Minister, the obligation to 
communicate to the Russian Cabinet the instructions to the British Ambas¬ 
sador in Persia. 

Had Russia objected to this instruction it could not (according to com¬ 
pact) have been sent. In like manner if sent, similar instructions must have 
been addressed to the Russian Envoy. Consequently this instruction be¬ 
came also an instruction from the Court of St. Petersburgh. This is a clear 
and simple case, it is a plain practical matter of business. The instructions 
to the two Courts were to correspond—no instructions could be sent by 
either, unless adopted by both. 

In this Anglo-Russian despatch, there is this passage—“ Whether 
“ Persia is successful or not her resources will be wasted in these wars, and 
“ her future means of defence must be diminished Defence implies 
danger, and danger the proximity of an enemy. England had by treaty 
given to Persia the right of claiming her protection, and had declared her 
own decision to stand forth in Persia’s defence. She was, therefore, not the 
enemy that Persia dreaded. Both recognized her helplessness and danger. 
England then compels Persia to relinquish that right, and abandons her in 
her helplessness to the enemy whose proximity had called their alliance into 
life. For England to warn her, after so casting her off, against injuring 
her means of defence, was to offer to her an unintelligible insult. 

Whence was the danger to proceed ? Who was the enemy ? Russia. 


46 


England was united to Russia— united —identified *! What means then 
interest in the defence of Persia, after perfidiously betraying her? What 
means anxiety to protect any one against the ally of your bosom ? 

If it were possible for England to have warned Persia against her ally 

-COULD THAT ALLY HAVE CO-OPERATED IN WARNING PERSIA AGAINST 

HERSELF. 

If not, then this instruction was kept secret from Russia. In that case 
Lord Palmerston violated his faith to Russia—he practised a fraud upon 
her, and at the same time upon the English nation, as the representative of 
whom he had the faculty of making a contract, and in whose name, there¬ 
fore, that contract was made. But what object could he have had in taking 
mis course — a course which was necessarily fatal to his ministerial existence. 
Was it to gain something for England at the expense of Russia. But what 
could be obtained by a secret instruction to act in opposition to the Govern¬ 
ment to whom he had voluntarily lent the enormous power that resulted 
from the union and co-operation of Great Britain ? But to seek to coun¬ 
teract secretly that policy which England avowedly supported, was to 
prove, that in the estimation of the Foreign Minister the ostensible policy 
which he pursued, was injurious to Great Britain. Consequently this sup¬ 
position falls to the ground. It could not have been the object of Lord 
Palmerston to oppose Russia, and no motive could exist for secretly opposing 
that Power which he openly and voluntarily supported. But the clear 
and evident object of the terms and tone of that dispatch, was to make it 
be believed that Lord Palmerston was acting in opposition to Russia. Then 
it must be that this despatch, bearing on its face opposition to Russia, and 
leading to the inference that it was concealed from her, was not in reality 
opposed to Russia nor concealed from her. If this despatch assumed to be 
written in opposition to her, w T as not in reality opposed to her, nor con¬ 
cealed from her.—then was this despatch of simulated opposition concerted 
with her—then must the British Minister have been placed in the power of 

* There is no instance on record of independent states concerting to give to their agents cor¬ 
responding instructions. Union of two Courts is not a diplomatic expression. When things are 
united they become one, and diplomatic relations would in the case of united Courts cease between 
them. The confusion of national as of individual sense of course must introduce confusion of terms, 
but the peculiar ability of Russia has resided in leading in that confusion by the introduction of 
false terms. 


47 


Russia—then must every act of that Minister have been performed under a 
similar control—then must every act be opposed to the interests of England 
—then must every statement be the reverse of the truth. 

Having thus dwelt upon the deductions from the pretence of opposition 
in a despatch concerted with Russia, I think it proper to add a few further 
considerations, proving that it was impossible that Russia should have been 
ignorant of this despatch, or that it should have been penned by Lord Pal¬ 
merston with any other view than that of communication to her. 

ist. Had Lord Palmerston intended by secret opposition to the joint 
policy of the two Courts to counteract Russia, he must have given the Bri¬ 
tish Ambassador decided and practical means for doing so. There is 
nothing of the kind—nothing but a vague warning and an indistinct insi¬ 
nuation, coupled with a careful destruction of the Ambassador s power, by 
assigning as the motive of the caution, not the interests of England, where 
he had the right to speak, but the interests of Persia, where he had no right 
to interfere. 

If the British Secretary of State had intended what he pretended to 
wish, he must have written somewhat in the following strain :—“ I have 
“ ascertained that Russia is about to urge the Persian Government to revive 
“ the ancient pretensions derived from the conquest of Nadir Shah, and 
“ that she seeks to inspire the young monarch and the Persian people with 
“ the desire of Indian plunder. You are instructed to oppose these pro- 
“ jects in the most decided manner. Should the Russian Envoy deviate 
“ in his bearing and language from the spirit of the union of the two 
“ Courts as stated in the despatch of Count Nesselrode, communicated to 
“ me by Count Medem on the 22nd August, 1834, you will immediately 
“ report such deviation ; and you are instructed to declare to the Persian 
“ Government that Russia is bound to act in concert with England—that 
“ the basis of their concert is peace and union. Language in an opposite 
“ sense, if addressed to them by the Russian Envoy, must not be considered 
“ as emanating from the Court of St. Petersburgh, but as being an act of 
“ disobedience on the part of the Envoy.” There were no words that could 
be set down with any purpose of prevention, or with any sense of honesty, 
less decided than these. But had there existed in the mind of the British 
Minister the intention to oppose Russia, such words would have been super- 


48 


fluous. It was in London, and not at Teheran, that Russia was to be 
opposed, and Russia could not be opposed without integrity and intelligence 
in the English Minister. 

2nd. This warning, such as it stands, had it been intended to be con¬ 
cealed, would have been transmitted in a private letter or in a secret 
despatch. Russia had obtained the right of inspection of the instructions of 
England. This despatch is the only document connected with Persia 
during thirty months—the whole question lay, therefore, in these four lines. 
On Russia’s requiring to be put in possession of the instructions to the 
British Ambassador—a demand which she must have made had she been 
kept in any way in the dark—there was nothing else to show. It is, there¬ 
fore, clear that Lord Palmerston could have put in this despatch nothing 
which it was an object for him to conceal from Russia. 

3rd. Under what circumstances does this document see the light ? 
When publishing correspondence in which he has called Russia to account 
for acts hostile to Great Britain, a British Secretary of State makes public 
a document which reveals that he had secretly violated his pledged faith, 
and broken the existing compact between the two States ;—the British 
Minister voluntarily publishes the fact—Russia carefully abstains from 
taking advantage of it. The first could not have been done, if Lord Pal¬ 
merston had had anything to conceal—the second could not have been 
neglected, if Russia had any discovery to make. 

4th. Supposing that the assumed opposition had been real, and that 
the British Ambassador in Persia had acted against Russia, must not 
Russia have at once come to the knowledge that he had received secret in¬ 
structions in opposition to the established concert of the two Courts ?—must 
she not have instantly denounced the perfidy and duplicity of such a trans¬ 
action to the British nation ?—must not she have obtained that very instant 
the power of removing the Secretary for Foreign Affairs from his office, or of 
marking him as her own ? 

Therefore, in each of these four additional grounds is the position esta¬ 
blished—that this despatch, assumed to be hostile to Russia, was not hostile 
to her—assumed to be concealed from her, was not concealed from her ; but, 
on the contrary, that it was written with her knowledge, with her concurrence, 
and for her ends. 


49 


That despatch could not have been withheld from Russia honestly—it 
is not honestly that it is assumed to be concealed from her; the Secretary 
of State could not honestly have desisted from requiring from Russia the 
transmission of a similar despatch. On the non-transmission by Russia of 
a similar despatch, he could not honestly have sent that despatch to Persia 
—he could not honestly have warned Persia against Russia; it is not 
honestly that he assumes to have done so—it is not honestly that he pre¬ 
tends interest in her defence, or apprehension for her being rendered weak; 
every thought in this despatch is dishonest, every insinuation perfidious, 
every word false, and every sentence a knot of falsehoods. 

Let us now examine the effects it was to produce on Persia, putting 
aside, for the moment, the question of the union of Great Britain and 
Russia, which, in fact, was the whole question—let us see what instruction 
the British Ambassador might expect to receive : “ You will inform the 
“ Persian Government that Great Britain cannot admit of the prosecution 
“ by Persia of schemes of conquest; that Great Britain is under the neces- 
“ sity of opposing such designs on the one hand by the duties attached to 
“ her Eastern Empire—on the other by the obligation to enforce respect 
“ for justice on the Government to whom she has lent, and still lends, mili- 
“ tary, pecuniary, and political support.” For a British Minister to say 
less than this was to render his views and the subject alike incomprehen¬ 
sible. To direct a diplomatic agent to counteract projects of conquest on 
other grounds than the national rights and interests of his Court, was to 
render him incomprehensible or contemptible. To transmit a despatch 
with instructions to counteract warlike measures, injurious and alarming, 
but without instructing what language was to be used, and what steps to be 
taken, would seem but an opportunity created for confusing the ambas¬ 
sador, lest uninstructed he might have acted right, and for ensuring from 
the Foreign Court that aggression on which, unencouraged, it might not 
have ventured. 

The pivot of Lord Palmerston’s instruction is the word “warn.” The 
experience of public disasters and the practice of ages have necessitated the 
use in diplomacy of terms having an exact and ascertained value—and, as 
in legal matters, the introduction of terms which have no ascertained and 
established value vitiates the document, and is referable to ignorance or 

H 


50 


dishonesty. “ Warn,” is not a diplomatic term. If the danger was to pro¬ 
ceed from the will of the nation speaking, it would threaten —if not, it had 
no grounds to interfere, and no right to speak. But in no way is the term 
warn here admissible. You warn those only who are exposed to danger, 
and who are ignorant of their being so exposed. On perceiving a man 
driven back, or pushed forward, you might deplore his case, but your sym¬ 
pathy could not be expressed by the word “ warn.” The sentence, “ espe- 
“ cially to w T arn the Persians against being pushed on,” is, moreover, ungram¬ 
matical. Warning has reference to danger—you warn of the danger, not 
against it. 

The word warn is thus improper and inadmissible in regard to the sub¬ 
ject-matter—it conveys no intelligible meaning as it stands—it is employed 
ungrammatically. It is, however, the verb which governs the sentence—the 
sentence composes the whole instruction. The despatch, therefore, is with¬ 
out meaning, and is a solecism. 

Lord Palmerston then proceeds to arrange, under two heads, the contin¬ 
gencies of the future. Persia will be successful, or she will not be suc¬ 
cessful. Certainly there is a very great difference between victory and dis¬ 
comfiture ; but Lord Palmerston seems to have sought to establish the diffe¬ 
rence, for the purpose of effacing it, and convert into the same thing the 
opposed alternatives. He says :— 

If Persia is defeated.— ) Her means of defence must be 

If Persia is successful— ) diminished. 

Defence! Had Persia anything further to defend? Where was Persia’s 
defence? Was it not on the banks of the Araxes—in the fastnesses of 
Ararat—on the shores of the Caspian—under the walls of Koe and Abas- 
sabad ? These abandoned, there was no Persia to defend ; and these were 
abandoned because England was united to her foe. While these were held, 
Persia was strong to defend her hearths—when she turned her back on the 
north she became dangerous to the hearths of other. But if “ successful ,” 
“ her means of defence will be diminished !” Oh, it must be that the mind 
of the Foreign Secretary is confused—his vision obscured by the great 
dread and apprehension of any thing that would render Persia unequal to 
cope with Russia—of any thing that would render her weak. Persia thought 
differently—she had the vanity to believe that the British power would be 
endangered by her success. 


51 


“ The British Government has been informed of Persia's projects of 
“ Eastern conquest—it has examined the various contingencies which these 
“ projects present—it considers the annexation of Ajfghanistan to Persia as 
“ a matter calling for no decision or opinion on its part, and therefore by no 
“ means liable to disturb the amicable relations subsisting between Persia and 
te Great Britain, or the union that exists between Great Britain and 
“ Pussia.” Such is the interpretation of the words “ whether suc- 
“ cessful or not.” The other fragments of the sentence are merely 
brought together to afford the occasion for their introduction. 

Whence did Lord Palmerston derive his information regarding the 
designs of Persia against the Affghans? No communication upon the sub¬ 
ject had arrived from Persia—no communication appears even from St. 
Petersburgh—the source of all Lord Palmerston’s admitted knowledge. 
Even when the warning arrives in Persia, there had been no intention 
avowed of any such design. What means, then, warning Persia, on her 
own account, not to injure England ?—what means warning a State not to 
do that which it had declared no intention to do ? Language could not 
convey a more direct incitement! 

The selection of the word 44 pushed” displays equal subtilty. It was a 
word over which, conjointly with ce warn,” the British Ambassador must have 
pored and pondered till he had lost every clear perception of language, of 
sense, of diplomatic practice. The influence of the study of this document 
is manifest in the subsequent communications from Persia to London. Lord 
Palmerston had anticipated by six months the intention of Persia to invade 
Affghanistan. No less extraordinary foreknowledge is revealed of the 
mode in which that assault was to be brought about. He knew that when 
this should occur it should not be as a voluntary movement, or as a sponta¬ 
neous impulse of Persia, but as a necessity imposed by some secret and 
irresistible agency. She was to be “ pushed.” The warning is thus 
directed against the power that was to impel. So that after all this warning, 
not implying danger—not called for by ignorance (and therefore which is 
no warning at all)—now appears, had it been a threat, incapable of having 
any application to Persia. What could this impelling power be ? Who 
could push Persia on? Was it the Turks, or the Toorkmans, or the Oos- 
begs? No, of course, none of these; and if it had been, how could Lord 


52 


Palmerston have got at their intentions? Lord Palmerston could only have 
had his foreknowledge from Russia, and she alone could push Persia on. 
Thus was Persia borne wholly harmless, and was the question brought to 
issue between the two Courts whose union had already extinguished the 
independence of the Persian state and the free will of its monarch. 

The source of the foreknowledge of Lord Palmerston is revealed in the 
use to which it is applied. This instruction is so framed as at once to 
advance the views of Russia, and to maintain that appearance of opposition 
to her which was necessary to his security as to her success. This instruc¬ 
tion, which insulted Russia in its forms, benefited her in its matter. The 
contradiction between the language and the intention proves the concert of 
Lord Palmerston and Russia in framing it—concert farther established by 
the circumstances attending its immediate use and its subsequent publica¬ 
tion ; and if such concert did exist, there was the Russian Envoy in Persia 
informed of the steps taken in London, and prepared to take advantage of 
the position in which the British Ambassador in Persia was placed. 

The English Ambassador, on receiving this despatch, must seek to 
obtain information regarding the intended projects of Persia, but he must 
feel the impossibility of asserting the opposition of England to them. It is 
clear, therefore, that the Russian Envoy, knowing the instructions of the 
English Ambassador, could draw from him the proof of every assertion 
which we have supposed him to have previously made, and was enabled to 
exhibit in his restlessness, and his anxiety to know, and his inability to 
speak, the alarm of Great Britain and the helplessness of India! This 
instruction, which Lord Palmerston leaves on record as the evidence of his 
desire, and of his attempt to resist Russia, moreover furnished Russia with 
the means, in case of Lord Palmerston’s removal from office, of assaulting 
his successor for his (Lord Palmerston’s) treachery to her. It placed in her 
hands the justification, if she required it, for breaking the compact of co¬ 
operation between the two Courts. All this is effected by a writing of four 
lines! 

Let us now turn to the reports from Persia to see how far these antici¬ 
pations are realized ; the first is dated November 13th, 1835, that is about 
a month after the receipt of Lord Palmerston’s instruction. Mr. Ellis 
writes:— 


53 


“ It is unsatisfactory to know that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the 
direction of Afghanistan, and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that the right of sove¬ 
reignty over Herat and Kandahar is as complete now as in the reign of the Suffavean dynasty. 
This pretension is much sustained by the success of his father, Abbas Meerza, in the Khorassan 
campaign, and by the suggestions of Colonel Borowski.” 


Here suddenly bursts upon us not merely the schemes of a monarch— 
the impulse of a people in the same direction. All this unexpectedly 
bursts upon the British Ambassador ; he has not seen the clouds rising or 
the storms threatening; it comes upon him all at once; and such a decision 
of a monarch placed by England on the throne, such an impulse of a whole 
people looking to England for protection and defence, he has to account 
for by the suggestions of one single being—a foreign adventurer and spy ! 
When he communicates all this, he says that “ it is unsatisfactory to know’ 
If it had been known it would not have been stated; he meant to say to 
learn; but had he used that word he could not have escaped from the neces¬ 
sity, in some degree, of accounting for the process by which it had been 
brought about. 

Lord Palmerston’s instruction had now realized the end for which it 
was calculated and intended, and the Russian Minister having been enabled 
to shew to the Shah that the English Ambassador could not speak in the 
name of England, could not deny that the English Government was aware 
of the Shah’s projects, and was unprepared to take umbrage at them, in the 
event of their entire success, did effectually prove to the Shah that England 
and Russia were in every case united, thereby making him feel the utter 
impossibility of his resistance to the will of the Emperor, backed as it was 
by the power of England. 

More than even this,—the formal concurrence of England with Persia, 
in her pretensions upon Herat and Kandahar, was conveyed to Persia. 

Lord Palmerston had anticipated Russia in announcing his disposition 
to concur with her in regard to the “ integrity of Persia.” He first 
announces Persia’s projects of conquest, and reveals his foreknowledge of 
Russia’s share in these projects. Persia then declares that Herat and 
Kandahar are integral portions of her territory, and in making this declara¬ 
tion she is pushed on by Russia, who consequently entertains the same 
opinion regarding the integrity of Persia. England (acquainted with the 


54 


suggestions of Russia to Persia) concurs with Russia in regard to the “ in- 
“ tegrity” of Persia. England must likewise concur with Persia, who concurs 
with Russia. Thus the three Powers equally admitted Herat and Kandahar 
to be integral portions of the Persian kingdom. 

It may be said that Lord Palmerston, by using the word “ warn,” 
implied opposition to the projects of Persia. That word, we have seen, 
meant nothing, and the instruction in which it was included was an incen¬ 
tive to Persia, and not a threat. Further, the declaration of the union of 
England and Persia in regard to the “ integrity of Persia,” was not with¬ 
drawn after the declared knowledge of Lord Palmerston of Russia’s pushing 
Persia on to assert these pretensions, which it must have been had Lord 
Palmerston not concurred in them. But all doubt on this head is removed 
by the fact, that the statement of Persia’s pretensions was formally made by 
the Persian Government to the English Ambassador, was officially trans¬ 
mitted by him to the British Secretary of State, and received no contra¬ 
diction. Thus was trebly established the recognition of the pretensions of 
Persia on Herat and Kandahar; first, between England and Russia, by 
previous compact respecting the “ integrity of Persiasecondly, between 
Russia and Persia, by communications known to England; thirdly, 
between England and Persia, by express communication of the latter to the 
former. 

After nearly two months’ consideration, Mr. Ellis determines on 
bringing the Persian Minister to an explanation, the result of which is that 
the Persians, pressing on as they find the British Minister retire, boldly 
assert their claims as far as Ghizni. Of course Mr. Ellis can only inquire, 
listen, thank them for their courtesy, and withdraw. To his chief he 
reports that the attack of Persia on Herat* is justifiable, but “ ventures” 
the opinion that the “ attempt to annex Kandahar and Ghizni upon preten- 

* The documents published do not afford the means of tracing this matter, or ascertaining 
whether or not Lord Palmerston had taken any steps, and what steps he had taken to lead Mr. 
Ellis to justify the Persian attack upon Herat. But Mr. Ellis could not fail to know that Lord 
Palmerston had fully justified, and most energetically supported, the attack of Russia upon Turkey 
in 1828—that he had concurred in the justice of the Russian war against Persia in 1826. The 
bias of his chiefs mind could therefore be no secret to him, whether as to associations with the 
views of Russia, or in a more abstract form, co-operations with injustice. 


55 


“ sions derived from the time of Nadir Shah,” (extending as such preten¬ 
sions must to Delhi, and all the dependencies of the Mogul empire,) 

“ could not be looked upon with indifference by the British Government.” 

After another week, he makes the important discovery that Persia, in 
all that she has been doing, is the instrument of Russia :— 

“ January 8, 1836.—I yesterday ascertained, from authority on which I could rely, that the 
Russian Minister at this Court had expressed himself in very strong terms respecting the expe¬ 
diency of the Shah losing no time in undertaking the expedition against Herat; and had assigned, 
as a reason for the immediate urgency of his doing so, the probability of the British Government 
discouraging the attempt, in pursuance of their known wish to see a restoration of the Affghan 
monarchy.” 

England pretends to desire to support the Affghans against Persia ; 
in reality she justifies and encourages the assault of the latter. In India ^ 
she openly joins the Seiks against the Affghans, driving them to look for 
support to Persia, while Persia is pushed on against them by Russia ; 
Russia, supported by England, pushes on Persia against the Affghans, and 
is simultaneously appealed to by the Affghans against England and the 
Seiks. England exhibits in Persia secret opposition to Russia, but osten¬ 
sible union with her. Russia proclaims open hostility to England, but 
proves secret understanding. Finally, England is declared by Russia to 
be preparing in India to give a new sovereign to Affghanistan! This 
project, then unknown to Great Britain, is used by Russia further to urge 
Persia against the Affghans, and of course also to arouse the Affghans 
against England. Lord Palmerston shows foreknowledge of the acts of 
Russia. Russia possesses foreknowledge of the intentions of England, and 
commences to make use of the project of the elevation of Shah Shooja, 
years before England had been brought to the commission of that crime*. 

Mr. Ellis continues (8th January, 1836) : 

“ I had hitherto confined myself to the simple expression of the pacific recommendation of his 
Majesty’s Government on the subject, hut when I found that the Russian Minister teas about to hold , 
or had actually held, very opposite language, I determined to be more explicit with the Persian 
Ministers, and I ventured to he so from the knowledge which I individually had of the general views 

* A Government print recently declared as exhibiting the perfect harmony that reigned 
between the various portions of the public administration, that the orders from England directing 
the expedition to Cabul, and the despatches from India announcing its departure, crossed half way, 
and corresponded in all the details! 


56 


of the Authorities in England, respecting Persia and Afghanistan. I accordingly had an interview 
yesterday with Hajee Meerza Aghassee and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and having recalled to 
their recollection their declaration that the sovereign rights of the Shah extended in Affghanistan to 
Ghizni, I informed them that the official situation which I had held at the India Board , enabled me 
to say to them, with confidence, that the British Government would look with great dissatisfaction 
on the prosecution of any schemes of extended conquest in Affghanistan.” 

Here the English Ambassador, avowing alarm, flatters the ambition of 
the Persian monarch revealing the want of instructions ; relieves that ambi¬ 
tion from every check by referring to having been a member of another 
“ Board,” he showed that the house was divided against itself. 

Still Mr. Ellis seems to have misgivings lest in “ venturing” even so 
far he had exceeded his chief’s intentions*. He had, in fact, departed 
entirely from the letter of his instructions. He says that he individually 
possessed the knowledge of a general opinion, language which a common 
traveller in the country could not have used without self-disrespect. Pie 
says, that the British Government would look with great dissatisfaction 
upon schemes of extended conquest. Now, his chief had told him that if 
Persia was successful against the whole body of the Affghans, her means of 
defence would be diminished, and consequently the farther she extended, 
the less would she be alarming to India ; consequently, Mr. Ellis, in 
declaring as a general opinion, or as an individual opinion, that any, the 
slightest umbrage, should be taken by England at the projects of the Shah, 
however extended or however successful, did act in opposition to the 
instructions of his chief, and must have called down upon himself the ani¬ 
madversions of his chief for such deviation from his duty, had the instruc¬ 
tions been penned with the intention of being executed in their patent 
sense. 

Let us examine the position of the British Ambassador. He had 
received (see despatch of 5th September, 1834) instructions to communicate 
confidentially with the Russian Minister, and is directed, July 25th, 1835, 
to warn the Persians against being pushed on to attack Affghanistan. He 
conceives, of course, that the Russian Minister had received similar instruc- 

* I beg to refer to my “ Exposition of the Boundary Differences’’ for an analogous instance 
of the process of confusing and paralysing an envoy by ambiguous and by contradictory in¬ 
structions. 


57 


tions, and that they are in common to resist this secret influence. He 
cannot fail to be startled at the foreknowledge of his chief, who in London 
had fathomed the intentions of Persia three months and a half before he 
had come to that knowledge in Persia; he then discovers that, as Lord 
Palmerston had prognosticated, Persia did not act of her own impulse, but 
that she actually had been pushed on. What then must be the effect on 
Mr. Ellis of the discovery that it was from the very power with which 
England acted in concert that these projects emanated, and that Persia w r as 
pushed on by the very Envoy with whom he had to co-operate ! 

Mr. Ellis thus found himself instructed to act in two senses directly 
opposed to each other. In an ordinary transaction an agent would have 
addressed his principal and said, “ Your instructions are inexecutable or 
“ unintelligible, give me other instructions.” But a diplomatic agent, 
serving under a chief whom he may suspect (independently of foreign con¬ 
nexion) of subserving disguised or unavowed interests at home, stands on 
very different grounds; his progress and position depend not on the per¬ 
formance of a service, but on the discovery of an intention. If he receives 
ambiguous instructions, he knows that that ambiguity proceeds neither 
from accident nor from neglect. By the dubious glimmerings lent to his 
official instinct, he has to grope his way and to guess his steps, under the 
additional perplexity of being fully conscious that zeal, integrity, ability, 
and success, would not suffice, unassisted, to screen him even from 
disgrace. 

What is the result? He fulfils the instruction to communicate confi¬ 
dentially with the Russian Minister, by remonstrating against his sugges¬ 
tions ; he fulfils the instruction to warn the Persians against being pushed 
on to attack the Affghans, by justifying the attack upon Herat*. The 
justification of the war, and the failure of the remonstrance, combining to 
encourage Persia in doing that which she never could have attempted had 
the British Minister remained without instructions, or declined to act on 

* Mr. Ellis goes so far as to address Prince Kamran a public letter, asserting the justice of 
the claims of the Persian King, and urging the Prince of Herat to unconditional surrender ; and 
this letter is transmitted through the Persian authorities, and that after Mr. Ellis had submitted to 
being told, as he himself communicated to his own Government, that the Persian Government 
would not otherwise suffer him to communicate with Herat. 

I 


58 


instructions which were contradictory. If, in either case, Mr. Ellis had 
not fulfilled the intentions of his chief, his act would have been reversed. 
His chief, however, adopts his acts and words, proving that this was what 
he intended. 

Mr. Ellis had next to excuse his failure (and whichever way he turns 
he must fail), and he naturally does so by representing Persia as hostile to 
England ; and he lays on that hostility the blame of the defection of Persia 
from England, which had resulted from the collusion of his chief with 
Russia, and from his own blind agency in that collusion. 

Lord Palmerston had it thus in his power to exhibit as early as 
January, 1836, the opinion of a British Minister in Persia, that Persia was 
then lost to England ; that she was “ no longer a barrier for the defence of 
“ India, but the first parallel from which an assault might be made.” The 
mind of the reader perfidiously familiarised with Persian hostility is thus 
carried away from dwelling upon or perceiving the process by which the 
control of that country has been transferred from England to Russia ; and 
he is prepared to re-echo the subsequent denunciations which Lord Pal¬ 
merston (when violence would only serve to confirm the hostility that art 
had engendered), was to launch against a State which, through his will and 
act, had joined in the enmity of a Government which he represented to 
England as her friend, and rendered predominant in Persia through 
England’s power. 

Thirteen weeks later, on the 16th of April, 1836, Mr. Ellis writes as 
follows : 

“ I called yesterday separately on Hajee Meerza Aghassee and Meerza Massood, in conse¬ 
quence of having received information that the Russian Minister had had a long audience with the 
Shah on the preceding day, at which those ministers were present, when the subject of discussion 
was the expedition against Herat, in which the Russian Minister had recommended perseverance 
this year, on the ground that what now could be effected with 10,000 men, would not next year be 
practicable with a much larger force. 

Hajee Meerza Aghassee said that the Shah would prefer submission on the part of Kamran 
Meerza, and security against a renewal of predatory incursions, to the necessity of seizing 
Herat. 

“ Meerza Massood held the same language as Hajee Meerza Aghassee. 

“ So many difficulties beset the execution of the Herat expedition this year, that it may be 
said there is no ground for thinking it will take place. I have endeavoured to throw into the 
scale of difficulties the risk of seriously disquieting the British Government, which the Shah and 


59 


his ministers cannot fail to see, must be the result of introducing the counsels or co-operation of any 
other European nation into the design. 

“ As I had heard that the Russian Minister had earnestly urged the Shah to persist in the 
Herat expedition, and would be prepared to give him, if necessary, his professional advice on the 
conduct of it, I called on Count Snnonich this day, and I now report to your Lordship the sub¬ 
stance of our conference. 

I commenced by stating that Affghanistan must be considered as frontier to our Indian 
Empiie ; that no European nation had relations, either commercial or political, with that country; 
and that accordingly I could not conceive that the British Government would view, otherwise than 
with jealousy, any interference, direct or indirect, in the affairs of Affghanistan. I trusted that the 
exposition of this principle would excuse me to the Russian Minister for inquiring from him 
whether there was any foundation for the statement that had reached me, of the Russian Govern¬ 
ment having offered a body of troops to assist the Shah in the projected expedition against Herat, 
or aid of any other description. 

“ I he Count at first said, that our respective ministers at London and St. Petersburgh would 
be best able to answer the question; he, however, afterwards distinctly declared, that the subject 
had never been mooted between him and the Persian ministers. The Count must have perceived 
from some further remarks made by me, that I was aAvare of the discussion in the presence of the 
Shah respecting Herat, and he therefore said that, on that projected expedition, as upon all other 
subjects, he gave such advice to the Shah as he deemed most conducive to his Majesty’s ad¬ 
vantage. 

“ My reply was, that in my judgment the settlement of the internal administration of the 
kingdom was the most pressing subject for the Shah’s attention; but that I did not presume to ques¬ 
tion the right of Count Simonich to give such counsel to the Shah as he might think fit.” 

On the 29th April, 1836, Mr. Ellis says:— 

“ I took occasion to allude to the declaration publicly made by Uzeez Khan, the Kandahar 
Envoy, that the Shah, with the assistance of the Barukzye Chiefs, would push his conquests to 
Delhi; and I observed that if a Mahommedan Sovereign were seated, as formerly, on the throne of 
Delhi, such language and such preparations would necessarily excite alarm and apprehension. I 
appealed to Meerza Massood, who was present, and asked whether, among the nations of Europe, 
armaments were not looked upon with great jealousy, and whether they did not give rise to very 
serious and pressing inquiry. 

“ It was impossible for the Persian ministers not to see the drift of my observations, and I feel 
assured that neither the Shah nor they are without uneasiness as to the possible effect of the British 
government of the prosecution of the favourite scheme of annexing Herat and Kandahar to Persia. 
The probability of the expedition taking place is rather augmented ; the regiments are arriving from 
Azerbijan, having received six months’ pay; and the settlement of the south-western frontier cer¬ 
tainly sets the Shah free for operations elsewhere.” 

In these extracts the parts are displayed with greater distinctness. The 
Russian Envoy is seen urging formally the expedition against Herat upon 
the King of Persia—the English Ambassador applying for information to 


60 


the Persian Ministers, who, conscious of the facility and the impunity of 
deception, make him believe that the expedition would not take place. The 
English Ambassador is then seen “ endeavouring to throw into the scale of 
“ difficulties” (in regard to an expedition for which there was “ no ground for 
“ thinking it would take place”) “ the risk of seriously disquieting the 
“ British Government.” He is then seen attempting an explanation with 
the Russian Envoy, and excusing himself for asking if Russian troops were 
to assist the Shah. The Russian Envoy, strong in “ the mutual under¬ 
standing of the two Courts /” repels Mr. Ellis’s attempt, asserting that, 
which Mr. Ellis knowdng to be false, dares not contradict, and declares that 
he will act as he thinks proper. Mr. Ellis fitly closes this remonstrance by 
recognising his right to do just as he thought fit! 

In the despatch of the 29th Mr. Ellis is seen representing England as 
destitute of the instinct of self-preservation, which would have been ex¬ 
pected in the Mogul Government: and as ignorant of the commonest habits 
of political business, as followed by the other Courts of Europe. “ It was 
“ impossible for the Persian Ministers,” says he, “ not to see the drift of my 
“ observations.” Of that there can be little doubt; and no further trouble 
was taken, nor anxiety evinced by them, in regard to the friendship or the 
hostility of the British Government. 

The last sentence of the above quoted paragraphs supplies matter for 
reflection on a great variety of important interests. “ The probability of the 
“ expedition against Herat is rather augmented.” In the last communication 
it had been said that there was no ground for thinking that the expedition 
would take place. “ The regiments are arriving from Azerbijan,” which 
they could not have quitted without a complete understanding with the 
Government of Georgia, “ having received six months pay” from money 
furnished on orders from St. Petersburgh. Finally, “ The settlement of the 
“ south-west frontier sets the Shah free for operations elsewhere,” exhibiting 
concurrence with Turkey, which Persia had recently avowed the intention 
of assaulting. 

No movement could be effected by Persia eastward, while any doubt 
existed as to the intentions of Russia. Persia, exposed in her western and 
south-western frontier to Turkey, was likewise incapable of turning her arms 
to the East while insecure in regard to Turkey. As a threat of the Per- 


61 


sians, obtained by the influence of Great Britain in 1800, had recalled the 
Affghans from the Indus, so would the slightest movement of the Turks have 
called back the Persians from Herat. It was therefore evident that the 
concurrence of Russia and Turkey were requisite to enable Persia to under¬ 
take, or even to entertain, the project of conquest “in the direction of Aff- 
“ ghanistan.” The movement against Herat, the displacement of the troops 
from the northern frontier of Persia, the advance of money of Russia for the 
design, the offer of troops for its support, and the British Ambassador’s 
ignorance of the dispositions of the parties, or of the tendency of events, are 
facts known to the British Minister, accepted by him in silence, and there¬ 
fore such as he desired. 

England had it in her power, according to the opinion of the successive 
representatives in Persia, to prevent the attack upon Herat, by “ declaring 
“ opposition to that object.” On the contrary, she urges the Prince of Herat 
to unconditional submission, and declares the war on the side of Persia to 
be just; England avoids to withdraw her officers from the Persian service 
while engaged in that expedition (the Ambassador in Persia does so without 
instructions, and Lord Palmerston reverses that decision). England thus 
takes no steps to prevent what she admitted and declared to be injurious 
and hostile, but on the contrary takes steps to censure its being done. 

Mr. Ellis, despite the silence of his chief, kept pouring in on the 
Foreign Office, during ten months, communications showing the hostility of 
Russia, her control over Persia, and her agitation throughout Central Asia. 
In the month of June, 1835, Lord Palmerston had been in possession of the 
schemes of the Shah, of the suggestions of Russia to that effect, and from 
that period till the hour of Mr. Ellis’s departure, being fourteen months, no 
notice whatever is taken by Lord Palmerston of the fact. Union between 
the two Courts, and concert in their instructions is established, and yet no 
single communication appears to have been made by either of the Courts to 
the other during the period of the establishment of this unheard of compact, 
and the only instruction now produced is one to counteract our ally. Russia 
takes no steps against Lord Palmerston’s pretended perfidy to her, and Lord 
Palmerston makes no remonstrance against Russia’s hostility to England. 
Persia is about to throw herself into a career alarming in the deepest degree 
to the British empire, by directing the warlike spirit and predatory habits 


62 


of the whole of Central Asia to the spoils of India; no step is taken to avert 
this danger at its source. The Foreign Secretary, on the contrary, sanctions 
a military movement for the enforcement of claims derived from the time of 
Nadir Shah, and undertaken with the avowed object of the ultimate conquest 
of Hindostan. 

These objects are effected by the art with which the words are selected 
and arranged in three or four short, and as the reader would suppose, com¬ 
mon-place sentences. These sentences have, moreover, conveyed to the 
Parliament and the British nation the impression that they were penned for 
the purpose of thwarting these designs. 

When the expedition to Herat is finally resolved upon, and when it is 
practically undertaken, the British Minister, as has become usual on such 
occasions, is absent from his post*. 


PART V. 

MISSION OF MR. M‘NEILL, INSTRUCTED, APPARENTLY, TO OPPOSE RUSSIA— 

IN REALITY TO CO-OPERATE WITH HER. 

The facts reported in Part IV. are received at the Foreign Office, to be 
buried there as in a tomb. England, whom we have seen so energetically 
supporting the nominee of Russia, now that she is insulted, endangered, 
allows no whisper to escape her lips—no sign of consciousness of instinct or 

* During the last ten years the most important diplomatic events for England have been :— 

The march of the new Sovereign of Persia eastward. 

The march of Ibrahim Pacha on Constantinople. 

The rejection of the award of the King of Holland by the Senate of the United States. 

The assault of France on Mexico. 

At the critical moment of all these events, there has been no British Ambassador or Envoy at 
the various Courts. Lord Palmerston is reported to have said, that “ they re-appeared afterwards 
with more grace and better effect.” 





63 


of life to agitate her frame. Putting aside all the diplomatic ties, duties, 
and interests of Great Britain, what, in the eyes of Persia and of the East, 
is her position ? Concurrence with a foe—disguised opposition to an ally— 
insidious betrayal of a dependent State—co-operation in injury—submission 
to insult; her characters to them must appear to be falsehood, faithlessness, 
cowardice, and cunning. Such, in fact, was the bearing, such the helpless¬ 
ness, such the degradation of an Embassy Extraordinary of the British 
Crown—an Embassy sent with congratulations to a Monarch whom England 
had, by her will and act, placed on the throne—after displacing a rival—after 
subduing resisting provinces—after seizing rebellious relatives and delivering 
them into his merciless hands ! Now assaulted—endangered by this puppet 
of her own creation, she stands before him trembling and inert, or only 
uttering such sounds, and assuming such attitudes, as to justify injury and 
to invite aggression. 

But a position of so much falsehood and of so much danger could not 
have been brought about in one country, if not by causes that must have 
acted equally on all the relations of Great Britain, and have placed her 
everywhere in a false and dangerous position. It was then to be expected 
that from the eyes of some Englishmen the scales should fall—that some 
indignant feelings of honesty and nationality should be aroused—that so 
much degradation and so much discomfiture should awaken reflection and 
recall energy, and that the excess of evil would bring a cure. 

Connected with the public service in Persia, there was an individual of 
distinguished ability, intimately acquainted with that country, and possessed 
of extraordinary influence over it. This gentleman had for years been the 
sole advocate of British rights and interests in Persia, and of Persia’s rights 
and claims in regard to Great Britain. He had arrived in England in the 
end of the year 1834, and had laboured to convey his knowledge, and to im¬ 
press his convictions upon the men connected with public affairs, whom he 
found disposed to enter into such investigations. The result was, as I have 
understood, the entire omission of his name in the first settlement of the 
Embassy Extraordinary to Persia. After sometime, however, Mr. M‘Neill 
was appointed the Representative of Great Britain in that country. Whence 
so extraordinary a change? The British Government saw, or assumed to 


64 


J 


have seen, its own position with different eyes. Our Eastern position had 
become the subject of minute and anxious enquiry, and the proofs of its past 
errors had been presented to it, and had been admitted. It was impossible 
to give up the old opinions without adopting the new, and the new opinions 
which had been urged were in the following sense :— 

That Russia did entertain and pursue projects hostile to Great Britain 
—that Russia was enabled to injure England solely by the ignorance of the 
individuals composing the British Government, as the British nation of those 
things which it behoved them to know; so that England’s course was like 
that of a man wandering in the dark and led by an enemy’s hand—that it 
was in England’s power at once to arrest the projects of Russia by the mere 
adoption of the decision that that was to be done. That the policy prose¬ 
cuted by Russia, and which she was enabled to prosecute solely through the 
concurrence and support of England, aimed at and tended to the subjugation 
of Turkey and of Persia. That such acquisitions must give to Russia as¬ 
cendancy over Central Europe and Central Asia, the power of disturbing, 
if not of possessing, India, the command of the Mediterranean, the command 
of the commercial interchange of Europe, Asia, and Africa, together with 
such an augmentation of naval, military, political, commercial, and financial 
power, as to overawe the policy, if not to lay prostrate the independence, of 
the remaining States of Europe. That the securing by Russia of supremacy 
over one or other of the two Mussulman States (Persia and Turkey), must 
give to her, ultimately, the entire resources of both ; for as the fall of Persia 
>/ must destroy the power of resistance in Turkey, so the control of Russia 
over Turkey would lay prostrate the independence of Persia without a blow. 
That the whole of the interests which Great Britain had ultimately in both, 
was therefore at stake in either. That the preservation against Russia of 
the integrity and the independence of each of these kingdoms, w r as the most 
important of the external duties, and not less binding than any of the obli¬ 
gations of the British Crown. That in this duty was involved the preserva¬ 
tion of our rights in those countries—of the public rights of nations—of our 
own special dominion in Asia, and that proportion of relative power in 
Europe which was requisite for the protection of our shores and our hearths 
—for the transmission unimpaired and unendangered of our dominion and 


65 


our race. And finally, that these duties required for their performance, 
that these dangers required, so that they might be averted—solely a separa¬ 
tion of the policy of England from that of Russia*. 

These opinions were directly hostile to the personal convictions of the 
Foreign Secretary; the subject here exposed has exhibited his entire con¬ 
currence with Russia in office, and in opposition he had attacked the admi¬ 
nistration to which he was opposed, for not co-operating sufficiently with 
Russia; he had given his most energetic support to the policy of Russia, and 
had concurred in the justice of her assaults on Turkey and on Persia. 
These opposite opinions were nevertheless now made public by official 
authority ; they obtained the assent of public opinion, at war upon all other 
subjects, and were known to have received the most decided and energetic 
support from the Monarch ; and that which more especially marks the pur¬ 
pose and resolution of the Government in adopting them is this—that the 
individuals by whom this policy had been urged were, in deviation from 
established practice, adopted by the Government, and placed in the situations 
best calculated to render them efficient instruments for the attainment of the 
ends they had proposed; they were the worst men the Government could 
have found, unless it had made their opinions its own. 

We are henceforward, then, to find the whole character of British 
diplomacy altered—cessation of all contest, as of ail co-operation, with 
Russia in third states, but the assumption of that tone with her that would 
bring back harmony into the relations of Europe and of Asia. 

We are to look for the visible signs of this change more immediately in 
Persia—there was the greater danger—there the more immediate influence 
upon the British possessions in Asia—and there was Mr. M‘Neill to be repre¬ 
sentative of Great Britain. 

The following words were, at the period of Mr. M‘Neill’s departure, 
published by him, under the sanction of the Foreign Secretary. They were, 
therefore, the expression of the convictions which Lord Palmerston had now 

* See “ Progress of Russia in the East,” “ England and Russia,” “ Sultan Mahmoud and 
Mehemet Ali Pacha.” Quarterly Review , No. CV. British and Foreign Review , Nos. I. II. III. 
Portfolio , first 25 Nos. 

K 


66 


admitted, and from the public avowal of which he sought to gain support for 
his policy, and strength for himself:— 

“ Persia values alliance with England as a protection against Russia. When it ceases to be 
so, it is of no political value to her. * * * * * 

“ The whole Mahommedan population of Central Asia dreads the power of Russia, and looks 
for countenance from England. 

“ It is known that our object is to defend, not to attack—to preserve, not to overturn ; but if 
Persia should be lost, then all spirit of resistance to Russia will be subdued, and the means which 
the resources of Persia would furnish, wielded with the skill and intelligence which would then 
direct them, would suffice for the final subjugation of Central Asia, from the Caspian to the Oxus 
and the Indus. 

“ While she accuses the more popular Governments of Europe of a desire to subvert existing 
institutions, Russia is herself undermining every throne within her reach; that of Poland she has 
pulled down. Since the battle of Narva she has never ceased, by intrigues and by force, to distract 
and encroach upon Sweden. Since the battle of Pultawa she has continually sought the subversion 
of Turkey. Since the peace of Neustadt, she has perseveringly pursued her conquests of Persia. 
Her intrigues in Germany, and her ambitious projects, are sources of continual alarm of Austria. 
France was threatened with invasion, in order to force upon it a Government it had rejected. 
Greece is taught to believe that its tranquillity can be secured only when it shall be a Russian 
province. Prussia purchases forbearance by acquiescence in the views, and even the caprices of the 
Emperor ; hostile restrictions are directed against the commerce of England, and her empire in the 
East is openly threatened with attack. In the wilds of Tartary, on the east and on the west of the 
Caspian, on the north and on the south of the Black Sea, in the centre of Europe, on the Baltic,— 
every where we find her a successful and persevering aggressor. With a larger extent of territory 
than ever before was subject to one crown, she thirsts insatiably for more, and studiously directs all 
her energies, not to the means of improvement, but to further acquisition. 

“ When the Sovereigns of Europe twice demanded, and twice enforced the abdication of the 
throne of France by Napoleon, on what ground did they justify the right they exercised to change 
the dynasty of France P Was it not that they considered it necessary to their own security. * * 

Were his views more grasping, his ambition more unbounded, his arts more subtle, his aggressions 
more unprovoked, or his acquisitions more extensive than those of Russia? Or would the evil have 
been diminished if it had been perpetuated in a race of monarchs, instead of being dependent on the 
life of one man ? * ****** 

e< The only Power that seeks to put down an existing Government is Russia. Russia alone 
threatens to overturn thrones, to subvert empires, and subdue nations hitherto independent. 

“ If she protests to have no views of aggrandizement in Persia—if she seeks no portion of its 
territory, no exclusive influence in its councils, let her evince her sincerity by redeeming the pledges 
of General Pitescheff, and by restoring the districts beyond the Araxes to Persia ; let her relinquish 
the command of the passage of that river at Abbas Abad, which is not necessary, or even useful for 
her defence, and can be available only for attack ;—let her abandon her right to the exclusive navi¬ 
gation of the Caspian, and permit Persia to use the waters of her own coast—to have the means of 
observation on her own frontier. 


67 


“ If Russia had never crossed the Caucasus, the intercourse of England with Persia would now 
have been purely commercial; it is the ambition of Russia that forces upon us the necessity of en¬ 
deavouring to preserve that which is obviously necessary to our own protection. If she will not give 
us security for the future, she can have no right to complain if we should take all practicable 
measures to impede and obstruct the course she has so perseveringly pursued. If she attempts to 
justify her own aggressions, on what principle can she complain of ineasures of defence , however 
extensive? The integrity and independence of Persia is necessary to the security of India and of 
Europe ; and any attempt to subvert the one is a blow struck at the other—an unequivocal act of 
hostility against England.” 

Being now in possession of the diplomatic correspondence, let us see 
what instructions were given to Mr. M 4 Neill in order to realise the objects 
here proposed, and to avert the dangers here pointed out. Those instruc¬ 
tions are as follows (June 2, 1836):— 

“ It will be your duty on all occasions to discourage any ambitious schemes of foreign conquest 
on the part of the Shah, and to impress upon his mind the advantage which must result to Persia , 
from the maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring States. 

“ With respect to the relations between the Persian Government and Affghanistan , it will be 
necessary for you to keep in mind the article of the treaty of 1814, which bears upon that subject, 
so long as the relations between Great Britain and Persia are regulated by that Treaty; but as His 
Majesty’s Government would see with regret any attack made by Persia upon Affghanistan, you 
are authorised to tender to the Shah the good offices of the British mission for the adjustment of 
any points on which differences may arise between the two nations .” 

This instruction is then only a repetition of the former instruction to 
Mr. Ellis ! a mere continuation of that policy recognised by the British 
Government as false, fatal, and declared to be abandoned. Lord Palmerston 
had thus, by appearing to change his course, converted the spirit of nation¬ 
ality, which had been aroused in England against Russia, into an element 
of strength for himself*, and thereby into a further means of securing her 
triumph. 

According even to subsisting engagements, Mr. M‘Neill ought to have 
been instructed to communicate confidentially with the Russian mission, and 
empowered to demand confidential communication in return. He receives 

* I have understood that this apparent change was not effected until his official situation was 
more than in danger—that he then turned suddenly round and adopted all the measures he had 
hitherto resisted. The reader desirous of tracing the career of Lord Palmerston, may consult with 
advantage his speech in the House of Commons, of June 1st, 1829, and the Portfolio , vol. i. p. 182, 
where there is a singular reference to that speech by the Russian Ambassador in London. 




68 


no instructions of the kind—he is, on the contrary, instructed to discourage 
schemes of conquest on the part of Persia, which schemes Mr. M‘Neill had 
proved were schemes of Russia, and which therefore could only be counter¬ 
acted at St. Petersburgh. While instructed to counteract Persia’s (so called) 
schemes, he was not allowed to speak as the representative of England, be¬ 
cause the interest of Persia, not of England, are assumed as the grounds of 
the discouragement. Being told to counteract in Persia projects of Russia, 
he is then forbidden to use any argument which can influence Persia. Mr. 
M'Neill’s position is therefore the continuation of that of his predecessor— 
but under circumstances how different! that continuation was now the over¬ 
throw of the hopes which had been awakened in Persia as elsewhere, and 
brought home to those who had the means of perceiving or of understanding 
the course now pursued—the paralysing suspicion that this sacrifice of British 
rights and interests was no longer through ignorance. 

Let us now examine the instructions in detail, to see if they reveal, as 
they must, if every previous induction has not been false, the deep dissimu¬ 
lation, the laboured vagueness, and the studied reserve apparent in every 
sentence we have hitherto analysed, and which must characterise the 
language of a man involved in so perilous a design. 

The first paragraph of the despatch is :— 

“ It will be your duty on all occasions to discourage any ambitious 
“ schemes of foreign conquest on the part of the Shah.” 

If it was a duty to discourage, it was an object to prevent; if it was an 
instruction to the Envoy to oppose, it was an obligation on the Minister to 
enable him to do so. By the selection of the term “ discourage” the intention 
of opposition is given to be inferred, but the power is not conveyed to the 
Envoy of opposing. What is it the Envoy is to discourage ? “ Any am- 

“ bitious schemes of foreign conquest?” The attack upon Herat could not 
be one of these schemes, because the justice of that attack had been recog¬ 
nised. What was just ought not to be discouraged, and could not be termed 
ambitious. Lord Palmerston requires that the conditions of “ ambition ” 
and of “ conquest ” should belong to any scheme which Mr. M‘Neill was to 
discourage. Persia had, therefore, “ on all occasions,” only to say that her 
schemes were not ambitious, and that the conquests she sought were not 
“ foreign.” If Mr. M‘Neill had disputed this position, the Persian minister 


69 


would have “ referred to the perfect union of the two nations*,” the Russian 
Envoy to the mutual understanding of the “ respective ministers at London 
“ and St. Petersburghf ” and to their common views as to the “ integrity of 
“ Persia 

Lord Palmerston further directs Mr. M‘Neill to impress upon the mind 
of the Shah the “ advantage which must result to Persia from the mainte- 
“ nance of friendly relations with neighbouring States.” Persia conceived 
even more advantage to lie in the acquisition of these States. The lesser 
was included in the greater. The recommendation being superfluous, had 
therefore no value, and could have no effect. Lord Palmerston knows, and 
even knows hefore-hand, that she is engaged in a war of aggression against 
Herat; that she advances pretensions to the sovereignty of the old Affghan 
kingdom that is as far as the Sutledge : he knows that these designs spring 
from Russia, and all he has to say is, that Mr. M‘Neill must impress on the 
Shah the love of peace ! 

This first paragraph of the Instruction is thus a continuation of the in¬ 
centives held out by England to Persia, as seen in the previous instruction 
of four lines to Mr. Ellis. 

The next paragraph, however, appears to contain references to Govern¬ 
ments and to Treaties—specification of measures and proposals for the ad¬ 
justment of differences. Here then we may expect something that does not 
elude the grasp or shun the eye. The passage is as follows :— 

“ With respect to the relations between the Persian Government and 
“ Afighanistan, it will be necessary for you to keep in mind the article of 
“ the Treaty of 1814.” 

Diplomatic relations are the bonds connecting different Governments, 
where relations exist, Governments on either side must have existence. Is 
there a nation—is there a Government—of the name of Afighanistan ? 
There is neither. 

There is a race termed “ Affghan”—supposed to descend from an 
Israelitish origin, and distinct from the three great families of Hindoos, 
Persians, and Turks, which, with the Affghans, are spread over central Asia 

* Mr. M‘NeilPs despatch of June 30, 1838. f Mr. Ellis, April 16, 1836. 

f Lord Palmerston, 5th Sept. 1835. 


70 


from the Himalaya to the Persian Gulpli, and from the Caspian Sea to the 
Indian Ocean. The principalities which the Affghans chiefly inhabit are 
Herat, Cabul, Kandahar, and Peshaur, which constituted integral portions 
of the Aflghan kingdom, established by Ahmed Shah Duranee, on the 
death of Nadir Shah. The Aflghan kingdom further included the whole of 
the territories now possessed by the Seik power. That kingdom had been 
broken up, and these four Principalities were ruled by different chiefs, and 
had neither community of internal nor external interests. And though of 
the same race, having recently constituted one kingdom, they stood as dis¬ 
tinct in a diplomatic point of view as if each spoke a different language, and 
had from time immemorial stood as distinct or hostile powers. The Affghans 
having constituted the strength of the Turkish invaders of India, and having 
themselves given many sovereigns to Delhi and to Agra, had been the chief 
stay of the Mogul Empire, and of the dynasties which preceded it, had 
passed in considerable bodies into India. Under the name of Petans and 
Rohillas, their power, as their prowess, became renowned ; and though prin¬ 
cipally attached to the military service, yet they settled a large and im¬ 
portant district in Upper India. The province of Rohilcund is as much an 
Aflghan district as Herat, or perhaps more so, as the population is there 
more exclusively Aflghan. 

“ Affghanistan” is an oriental and a poetic term—as those with a similar 
termination ; it is of nomade origin, is derived from the name of a race, and 
applies to the soil, or to the region which it occupied. Thus “ Toorkistan” 
applies to the regions of Upper Asia occupied by Turks, not to the Turkish 
nation or government. “ Frangistan” designates the regions occupied by 
European races, and includes all their governments : thus terms of this kind 
cannot apply to a constituted authority, and are capable of comprising any 
number of governments and tribes. While there did exist an Aflghan king¬ 
dom it was not termed “ Affghanistan,” but received the title of its capital 
—Cabul ; and in like manner, in remoter times, the Affghan Government, 
from the name of its then capital, was termed—Ghizni. 

To spread a political fallacy by a name—to designate a nation by a 
term not correct, has been the discovery of Russia. By taking to herself 
the improper title of “ Russia,” did she first commence the establishment of 
her pretensions upon Poland, and did she screen the nature of her objects, 


71 


and the character of her acts, from the observation of mankind. But this 
conception of introducing a term not applicable to any nation—to create, as 
it were, the phantom of a state, and to weave round that name a web of 
diplomatic deceit by the hands of the minister of another power, was a flight 
of a bolder and a loftier kind. I say Russia, because the source of the dis¬ 
covery of this term can be no more doubtful than the object for which it has 
been introduced—than the purpose to which it has been applied. This term 
therefore represents neither a nation nor a Government. It is alike inad¬ 
missible in the East, and unintelligible in the West. It is not admitted by 
geography—it is not known in diplomacy, and yet a British Minister, thirty 
years in office, remarkable for laboriousness, and capable of precision, 
introduces this term so elaborately false—introduces it as the basis of 
another creation, false in turn; and both these falsehoods being used to 
support a third, namely, that of applying a treaty having reference to the 
ancient Aflghan kingdom to other states, and, in a sense, the reverse of its 
original intention. 

But to leave no doubt as to the intention in the introduction of this 
word, I must represent the facts as they stand. There were, as we have 
said, four principalities inhabited by Aflghans. I have said that they were 
united neither by internal interest nor by foreign alliance. Let us see how 
they stood. There was— 

Candahar against Herat and Peshaur. 

Cabul do. do. 

Peshaur against Cabul and Kandahar. 

Herat do. do. 

There were— 

The Seiks and Peshaur against Cabul. 

The Persians and Candahar against Herat. 

Persia and Russia against Herat. 

England and the Seiks against Cabul. 

It is for things so dissimilar that Lord Palmerston finds a common 
term ; it is to four hostile principalities, and to four foreign influences war¬ 
ring in and around them, that Lord Palmerston applies a name which he 
calls a nation—representing them as a Government—speaking of them 
as one ! 


72 


Mr. M’Neill’s predecessor had declared Persia’s assault upon Herat to 
be just, but be bad declared her pretensions to the sovereignty of that place 
to be unjust. Herat resisted Persia’s pretensions, but Cabul and Kandahar 
volunteered to recognise her supremacy, and offered to her assistance against 
Herat. Within the question, therefore, before the British Minister the 
Affghan race presented itself in opposed and hostile characters, and Persia 
presented herself as having opposite relations with various States composed 
of Affghan people. In reply to these statements, does Lord Palmerston 
instruct Mr. M‘Neill with reference to Herat? No! To Cabul and Kan¬ 
dahar? No ! To—“ Afghanistan !” If Affghanistan means any thing, it 
must equally mean Herat and Cabul, and Kandahar and Peshaur ; by that 
word, then, are the whole of these questions connected into one, and the 
sanction of the British Government given to the assault of Persia upon 
Herat is made to apply to her pretensions to the sovereignty of that place, 
and equally to her pretensions on all the others. Thus, while Mr. M‘Neill 
is ordered to discourage schemes of foreign conquest, does the very instruc¬ 
tion compel him to admit that the territory coveted by the Shah was his own. 

But with regard to these “ relations,” which, as we have seen, cannot 
exist, Mr. M‘Neill is to be guided by the article of a Treaty. 

The Treaty here referred to of 1814 was the defence of Persia and of 
India; and so serious an obstacle was it in the path of Russia that the 
British Government, engaged in latter times in advancing the views of that 
power, violated it in its essential parts, but left its forms as a web further to 
entangle, and a net to ensnare. It would be beside the present question to 
expose this transaction, but it is necessary here so far to enter into the sub¬ 
ject as to shew what the article was, what the value of the Treaty. 

The article is— 

“ If war should be declared between the Affghans and the Persians, 
“ the English Government shall not interfere with either party, unless their 
“ mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties.” 

That is to say, Persia, by declaring war against any portion of the 
Affghan people, can forbid all communication between the British or Indian 
Governments and that people. This article surrenders to the caprice of 
Persia the relations between Great Britain and a nation to whose Govern¬ 
ment she had bound herself, by a defensive treaty, against Persia. 


73 


This article is the surrender of natural rights, which nations are not 
suffered to abrogate, and which Governments have no authority to set aside. 
If Persia, after a successful war against England, had imposed upon us this 
obligation, then would the British Government have been required, by the 
law of nations, as by its duties to its people, to break this outrageous exercise 
of authority whenever it was in a state to resist or to defy the power of 
Persia. But this is an article in a treaty of protection. The party whose 
natural rights are thus trampled upon being the strong and protecting power! 

The terms used in this article have no diplomatic value. “ Persians” 
and “ Affghans” neither designate a nation nor a government. In contracts 
between states, the authority must be specified, which, on the part of the 
nation, imposes or incurs obligations. “ Interfere” is a word with no 
diplomatic value or international meaning ; this word has confused the public 
sense of Europe since its deplorable introduction into common use—in a 
treaty it is destructive. Rendering vague and unintelligible the phrase in 
which it stands, it renders inoperative the article in which it is introduced, 
and thereby invalidates the Treaty, of which it forms a part. 

The article is informal by the reference it contains to a third state. A 
treaty must be binding as a whole—it must be reciprocal in its engagements 
—no state can share in the benefits of a treaty without incurring its obliga¬ 
tion, nor be a party interested in an article of a treaty which it has not signed. 

The Ninth Article of the Treaty of 1814 is thus null and void upon each 
of these distinct grounds; ls£, by containing a general proposition contrary 
to the rights and duties of nations ; 2ndly , by the employment of language not 
diplomatic ; 3 rdly, by the introduction of a stipulation, having reference to a 
power not a party to the treaty. But as a treaty is an instrument binding 
as a whole, and not of value unless entirely fulfilled, or capable of fulfilment, 
then is this Treaty invalidated by each of the three flaws which we have 
pointed out in the Ninth Article, and rendered void by the informality, the 
unintelligibility, and the illegality of that article. 

The Treaty had, however, on other grounds been rendered void—it had 
been violated by each of the parties by whom it had been signed—it had 
been abrogated in no less than three distinct transactions; ls£, England had 
refused to pay the subsidy to which it bound her ; 2nd , Persia had annulled 
two articles by an act not international; 3rJ, Persia had refused to conclude 

L 


74 


a treaty of commerce set down in the preamble as a condition ot the 
alliance. 

This treaty had already not been considered binding by England in its 
legal and its valuable stipulations. After the fact of violation, Lord Pal¬ 
merston goes back to it to select from it a clause which would have been 
informal and invalid, had the treaty remained intact, and applies it in a sense 
the reverse of the original intention, to a party which had no existence—in a 
manner declared to be improper, and for objects declared to be injurious, 
by two successive representatives of Great Britain in Persia*. 

Mr. M‘Neill receives this article as an instruction ; the value of it resides 
in the word “ interfere.” In the article “mediation” is understood “ inter¬ 
ference.” Therefore he is informed that the public faith of Great Britain 
prohibited “mediation.” Lord Palmerston, in the next sentence, directs 
him to deviate from the article. The only possible object in deviating from 
the article was to offer mediation. The instruction is therefore this— 

You are directed to ) ™ ,. . 

r* i • i t i oner meclicitioii. 

You are forbidden to > 

“ But the word is” it may be objected “ ‘ good offices.’ This is not me- 
“ diation ; and, moreover, he is not to offer these good services to both parties, 
“ but to one only —to the Shah.” Is not this interference ? Interference on 
one side, and therefore to promote aggression—not to mediate peacep. 

But what was the occasion of this instruction? Was it not the warlike 
movements of Persia? Were these movements not in direct opposition to 
the spirit, the letter, the object, the conditions of that treaty? Subsequently 
we have the Governor-General declaring that the possession of Herat by 
Persia would be considered an act of hostility by Great Britain. We have 
Lord Palmerston declaring the treaties with Persia brokenj, (strange mode 
of procedure) on the double ground of her assault on Herat, and of her con¬ 
nection with Russia. Were these facts not known to Lord Palmerston 
before as well as after. How then can he make use of the treaty as an excuse 
for not preventing the measures by which he declared it to be violated ? 

* In memorandum of Mr. Ellis, enclosed in his despatch of 15th Jan. 1836. See despatch of 
Mr. M‘Neill, of April 11, 1838. Enclosure 5 in despatch of May 12, 1838. Despatch 3rd Aug. 1838. 

f “ The purport of the treaty,” says Mr. M c Neill, “ is that England should mediate a peace, 
not that it should promote the subjugation of Afghanistan by Persia.” Enclosure 5, in despatch, 
June 30, 1837. 

+ Despatch, 27th July, 1838. 


75 


On this portion of the subject Mr. M‘Neill remonstrates, in the fol- 
1 owing terms, with his chief: — 

“ January 18, 1838.—I need not to repeat to your Lordship my opinion as to the effect which 
such a state of things (the fall of Herat and its consequences) would necessarily have on the internal 
tranquillity and security of British India; and I cannot conceive that any treaty can bind us to 
permit the prosecution of schemes which threaten the stability of the British Empire in the East. 

I he evidence of concert between Persia and Russia fur purposes injurious to British interests is 
unequivocal, and the magnitude of the evil with which we are threatened is in my estimation 
immense, and such as no power in alliance with Great Britain can have a right to aid in producing. 
Our connection wish Persia has for its real and avowed original object to give additional security to 
Inaia, and it has been maintained for the purpose of protecting us against designs of the only power 
which threatened to disturb us in that quarter; but if the proceedings of Persia, in concert with that 
very power, are directed to the destruction of the security and tranquillity which it was the sole object 
of the alliance with Persia to maintain, and if they obviously tend to promote and facilitate the 
designs which the alliance was intended to counteract, I confess I cannot believe that we are still 
bound to act up to the letter of a treaty, the spirit of.which has been so flagrantly violated. I do 
not hesitate to repeat my conviction, that if our only object were to preserve as long as possible the 
alliance of Persia, that object could best be effected by preventing her from taking Herat” 

The reader of the Parliamentary papers forgetting that the article here 
referred to was given by Lord Palmerston as his instruction by Mr. 
M‘JNTeill, will not perceive that these observations are directed against Lord 
Palmerston’s instructions. This and similar communications would have 
left Lord Palmerston informed had he been ignorant, and indignant had he 

O 7 O 

been honest. 

Thus it is to an article which in its very informality represents the 
Persians and the Affghans as equals, that Lord Palmerston applies for a 
pretext for preventing the British Envoy from resisting the assumption by 
the first of sovereignty over the latter. It is to a treaty for the protection 
of India that he refers for an excuse for not opposing a movement b}^ which 
it was endangered. It is to a treaty that he refers for grounds of non- 
resistance to that which when done he declared to be destructive of the 
treaty. It is to a treaty which had already been considered as not binding, 
and which had been set aside because it interfered with the objects of Eng¬ 
land that he now refers to account for the policy of England in acting in a 
sense equally hostile to the treaty—to the assumed object of his concert 
with Russia, and to every object, interest, or duty, that ought to have 
guided a minister, or could have animated the breast of an Englishman. 




76 


But at the same time that this article is given to him as his instruc¬ 
tions, he is instructed to act in a sense opposed to it. The article he is 
told to bear in mind forbids interposition, yet he is ordered to interpose— 
the interposition is practicable only in the name of England—he is told to 
interpose in the name of Persia. The project emanates from Russia—he is 
ordered to interpose with Persia—he is required to remonstrate with Persia 
on her own account against the suggestions of Russia —to whom England is 
united. 

Lord Palmerston then says, “ You are authorized to tender to the 
“ Shah the good offices of the British Mission for the adjustment of any 
“ points on which differences mag rise between the two nations ” 

The differences between Herat and Persia had already arisen, and 
were perfectly known. It was an assault ostensibly recognised by the 
British Government as injurious—$ecretly admitted to be just. Men in 
doubt do not act. If the contradictions here exhibited by Lord Palmerston 
had arisen from doubt, he Avould have said to Mr. M‘Neill, don’t interfere— 
wait till I have made up my mind—take care, above all things, not to 
encourage by inefficient opposition, not to commit England by any unsup¬ 
ported declarations, nor yourself by unsuccessful steps. He says to him, 
in these doubts and amid this confusion, be bold and resolute; interfere, 
act, but act in your own name and in the name of Persia; not on my autho¬ 
rity nor in the name of England. That is, he placed his “ good offices” at 
the disposal of the Russian Envoy. 

As to Cabul and Kandahar, there were no “ differences” that had 
arisen, or that appeared likely to arise. Lord Palmerston was in posses¬ 
sion of the fact that the Princes of these States had appealed to Persia for 
support against England. That is against the Seiks, with whose injustice 
England had allied herself on the banks of the Indus, as she had united 
herself to the ambition of Russia on the shores of the Caspian. The “ good 
“ offices” of the British Mission could in this case only be required to 
facilitate the appeal of those Princes against England, and to encourage 
Persia in accepting it. 

Observe “ two nations .” To point out the falsehood therein contained, 
or its object, would be to repeat what I have already said respecting “ Affgha- 
nistan;” but admitting that there was a “ nation” here in question, how 


77 


would the Treaty apply to it? Herat was opposed to Persia. Kandahar 
and Cabul opposed to Herat. These two rejected by England had appealed 
to Persia and to Russia. Peshaur had been treacherously assaulted and 
retained by Runjeet Singh, the ally of England. Lord Palmerston says 
that England is debarred from interference with the Affghan nation; he 
does so as a pretext for not preventing Persia’s attack upon one Alfghan 
principality, while England was supporting the assault of Runjeet Singh on 
another, and was preparing to attack herself the remaining two*. 

By the liability of every point to double interpretation, Mr. M‘Neill 
was at every moment exposed to be sacrificed by his chief, nor could a 
fitter process have been adopted entirely to unfit him for the assumption of 
that responsibility requisite for doing any thing, and for retaining, not 
influence, that was gone, but respectability. An envoy of less ability or 
integrity, might at once have resigned himself, and given no further trouble 
to himself, to his chief, or to Russia. 

Thus, as we proceed, do we find the same systematic deception, and 
not a word introduced which does not bear the impress of long labour and 
minute calculation to falsify the question, to conceal the intention, to para¬ 
lyze and mislead the Envoy, and to render the subject unintelligible to a 
successor, and to the public when put in possession of the documents. 

Lord Palmerston, upon the departure of Mr. M‘Neill, adds a second 
instruction at the interval of eleven days. 

No communication appears to have been received in the meantime from 
Persia—no event had occurred—no intelligence from any quarter—not even 
from St. Petersburgh, had arrived. Considering that the instruction we 
have just examined was all that had been sent to Persia, with the exception 
of the four lines to Mr. Ellis from the origin of these transactions; this 
additional instruction, at so short an interval, and with no visible cause, 
must have been the result of some new and important resolution in the 
Minister’s mind:— 

* Mr. M‘Naughten, on the 10th April, 1837, indeed, says, that a “ means of vseful influence 
“ in our favour” may be found in “ the circumstance of the British Government having resolved 
“ decidedly to discourage” the schemes of Shah Shooja. If this decision was to be useful, it was 
as counteracting opinions of an opposite tendency. Fifteen months before , however, the Russian 
Envoy had declared that England would invade Cabul and Kandahar, and—England has done so! 


78 


“ Foreign Office, June 13, 1836. 

“ Mr. Ellis, in his despatch of the 4th of February, reports that he has suggested to the Shah, 
that the desire of his Persian Majesty to put a stop to the expeditions undertaken by the maraud¬ 
ing tribes of the northern districts of Central Asia, lor the purpose of obtaining slaves*, might be 
more effectually accomplished by a negotiation at Bokhara, than by an attack directed against 
Khiva. 

“ Mr. Ellis was led to imagine that the Shah was not disinclined to the adoption of this sug¬ 
gestion ; and I have to instruct you to recommend that course strongly to the Shah, in preference 
to a military expedition.'’ 

The quoted despatch of Mr. Ellis, as given in these papers, contains no 
mention of Khiva or of Bokhara. 

The earliest notice by the Ambassador in Persia of the invasion of 
Khiva occurs on the very day upon which, Lord Palmerston dates this 
instruction from Downing Street. 

We have seen that each object of Russia has been first shadowed forth 
bv Lord Palmerston. His signature to the principle of the union of the 
two Courts appears before the signature to that proposition of any Russian 
functionary. He first introduces the words “ integrity and independence 
“ of Persia.” He first announces Russia’s intention of pushing Persia upon 
Affghanistan, and if he had now spoken in his own person of an attack that 
was to be made upon Khiva, we could only infer that England was taking 
anticipatory measures to give Russia that co-operation which was necessary 
for the advancement or the success of the object she had in view. But that 
in a document made public, Lord Palmerston should have put into the 
mouth of a displaced and unrecompensed Ambassador, words which he 
never used, is what I cannot comprehend. I can only refer to the docu¬ 
ments as they stand. There they are—to be consulted by those who have 
hearts to feel for their country, or eyes to see for themselves. 

The object of Lord Palmerston’s instruction of 13th June is, however, 
sufficiently clear : it was rendered impossible for Mr. M‘Neill now to coun¬ 
teract any schemes of the Shah on Toorkistan, as he was, by the former 
instruction, prevented from opposing them on Affghanistan, while he was 
ordered to act, and action was impracticable, except in concurrence with 


* Light is thrown on this proposition by the recent announcement of the assault of Russia 
upon Khiva. 


79 


Russia. By this recommendation “ strongly to urge” negotiation with 
Bokhara, he sanctioned negotiation at that place and the assault on the 
other, since the assault on the one was the alternative to the negotiation with 
the other. The object in view must have been acceptable to England, since 
the means are not opposed, and, indeed, desired by England, since one of 
the means to obtain it was strongly to be urged. 

If the British Minister, in taking ostensible steps to avert France from 
projects of conquest on the Peninsula, had written to the British Ambas¬ 
sador at Paris, “ You are strongly to urge* negotiations with Madrid in 
“ preference to an attack upon Lisbon,” would not the British Ambassador 
have understood it to be the real object of his Court to promote, in the 
largest sense, the designs of France, and to invite her to entertain and to 
encourage her to prosecute hostile projects against both Portugal and 
Spain ? So in this case was the sanction of the British Government given 
to the designs of Persia, whilst falsification was resorted to in order not to 
appear ostensibly to sanction them. These projects were urged on Persia 
by Russia, and directed against that region lying between the Eastern 
frontiers of Russia and the Affghans, so that the concurrence of England 
with Persia presented to them England as their foe-j-. Thus was opened to 
Russia a line of advance on India parallel to Persia, so as to interpose 
between her and the Affghans—to act directly on the latter, and prepare 
the way to a footing among the warlike horsemen of Transoxiana, who have 
formed the armies which have conquered India, China, Egypt, Central 
Asia, Asia Minor, and Russia herself. 

Mr. Ellis’s despatch of the 4th February, to which Mr. M‘Neill's 
attention was thus so particularly directed, must, however, in that which 
it does contain, be worthy of our attention. The subject of it is—one which 
Lord Palmerston had hitherto excluded from all notice—Herat! It details 
most extraordinary steps taken in reference to that matter. Mr. Ellis 
states that he had failed to obtain the consent of the Persian Government 

* Mark the difference between the terms when speaking directly in a Russian sense, and when 

appearing to oppose her. Contrast “ discourage” with “ urge.” 

“ The whole Mussulman population of Central Asia, says Mr. M'Neill, “ dreads the 
“ power of Russia, and looks for protection from England.” The Turkomans, as the Persians, 
s^ncr England united with Russia, cease to hope for independence, and the barriers to her pro¬ 
gress thus every where are converted into means of strength to her, and of assault upon India. 


80 


to his sending an officer to Herat—that he had written a letter* to the 
Prince of Herat, but that the Persian Minister had only “ consented” to 
his sending that letter, “ provided it were despatched through the Persian 
“ authorities 

The Ministers of Persia, consenting to communications from the repre¬ 
sentative of England to an independent prince! and making the condition 
of that consent the placing of such communication in their hands ! The 
time was that for an English representative to have submitted to such 
degradation—but it avails little to talk of what has been. 

This, then, is the statement which Lord Palmerston, by a process 
so peculiar, places before Mr. M‘Neill. Such are the facts from which 
Mr. M‘Neill has to learn how his chief estimated the prostitution of the 
character of England, and the toleration of personal indignity. This 
additional instruction, uncalled for by new intelligence, and unexplained 
by itself, has it been intended to convey to Mr. M‘Neill as the latest 
recommendation of his chief—incompetence as a model, and failure as 
an end? 


In Part IV. we have analyzed Lord Palmerston’s instructions of July 25th, 1835. In this 
part we have analyzed his two instructions of 2nd and 13th June, 1836. The first was to the 
Embassy Extraordinary to the Shah, which England had placed on the throne. The last was 
to the British Envoy, selected for the ability with which he had exposed opinions the reverse 
of those hitherto professed or acted on by Lord Palmerston. These instructions constitute 
the whole of the policy of Great Britain in Persia. They are penned under the establishment 
of a concert between Russia and England to act together and to communicate their instructions 
to each other. 

We have found these three instructions to have one common character—to convey no distinct 
idea on any subject—to present no intelligible objects or policy—to appear to be written in oppo¬ 
sition to Russia—and to be in reality conducive to her ends. 

We have now to follow the course of events in Persia and Central Asia, which such instruc¬ 
tions were calculated to open, and which the concert of a British Minister has enabled Russian 
ambition triumphantly to pursue—whilst this nation slept on. 

* In this despatch is enclosed Mr. Ellis’s letter to the Prince of Herat, which exhibits the 
English united with the Persian Government against Herat. This letter will be found in the 
Appendix. 



i 


81 


PART VI. 

SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST HERAT. — CONTRADICTORY INSTRUCTIONS 

FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO 

THE ENVOY IN PERSIA.—1836-7-8. 

Mr. M‘]N t eill quits England in June 1836, armed with the instructions 
which we have just examined. He was by them, if our interpretation has 
not been incorrect, placed in the necessity— 

1st, Of admitting the justice of the assault of Persia on Herat. 

2nd, Of recognizing the inability of England to deny the claims of 
Persia upon Affghanistan. 

3rd, Of acknowledging that it was prohibited to England to interfere in 
any way between the Persians and the Affghans. 

4th, He was to discourage schemes of Persia ineffectually, being only 
to speak in the name of Persia; and to discourage war—only in the name of 
peace. 

5th, He was not to discourage any schemes of Persia against Toorkistan. 

6th, He was to discourage to Persia the designs of Russia, while Russia 
could prove the sanction of England given to those designs. 

Thus was he, on grounds distinct from the union with Russia, to advance 
all the objects which Russia had in view, as if they were distinct objects 
of England pursued in opposition to Russia. 

It has already been made clear that the former instructions to Mr. Ellis, 
bearing on their face opposition to Russia, could not have been concealed 
from her, either during their operation, or at the period of their being deli¬ 
vered, and therefore that they were concerted with her ; so it is in the present 
instance. Thus did Mr. M‘Neill go out to Persia directed to oppose Russia, 
upon instructions concerted with Russia, and directed to advance, as objects 
of England, the measures which Russia w~as prosecuting against England. 
Presenting England allied to Russia whenever the Persian Government 
should attempt to resist the latter; while an air of opposition was worn by 
England to Russia, whenever that opposition could benefit neither Persia 
nor England, or rather wherever Persia and England could be best injured 
by that course. 


M 


82 


We must now see if these anticipations, drawn from the analysis of the 
instructions, are borne out by the subsequent events—we must see whether 
or not Mr. M‘Neill remained inactive under ostensible instructions to act 
and to oppose—whether or' not that at which Russia aimed—that which 
Lord Palmerston affected the desire of preventing, and had the power to 
prevent, has been brought about. If we find that Mr. M‘Neill, did not 
act, that Russia did succeed and England fail—then here again will be 
on distinct grounds established—concert of Lord Palmerston with Russia, 
and fraud practised on the Envoy in Persia, on his colleagues, and the 
Parliament. 

On Mr. M‘Neill’s arrival in Persia, the Shah had already quitted his 
kingdom, and commanded in person the army then encamped before Herat. 
No sooner does Mr. M‘Neill arrive than he commences to transmit news of 
the hostile movements of Russia—of her violent bearing; in Persia and her 
intrigues through Central Asia—he exposes his own alarms, and urges the 
necessity of arresting the spirit of conquest excited throughout Central Asia 
by the direct acts of Russia—to whom England is united. These communi¬ 
cations remain as all the former ones, without notice or reply. 

In the meantime the expedition against Herat fails. The whole matter 
has to be re-commenced. Russia has again to push Persia on—again to 
exhibit to her the union of England with herself, notwithstanding the full 
knowledge of her designs ; she has to re-awaken hopes in a monarch smarting 
under defeat, and lust of plunder -in a people humbled by discomfiture. All 
this she has to accomplish in the presence of a British representative—bound 
and fettered it is true, but of talent and integrity. 

Mr. M‘Neill, on the 1st of June, 1837, is to be found defending himself 
to his chief against accusations of the Minister of St. Petersburgh, so that 
early in the year, and in time to influence the military movement against 
Herat, must Lord Palmerston have addressed communications to Mr. 
M‘Neill calculated still further to damp, and so discourage him, and to 
exhibit to him not merely the union of the two Courts, but the understanding 
of the two Ministers. Mr. M‘Neill in reply shows that the representations 
made against him by the Minister of St. Petersburgh were unjust—he proves 
the hostility of the acts of the Russian Envoy at Teheran to Great Britain— 
he proves his acts to be in direct opposition to the declaredpolicy of Russia, 


83 


and consequently lays bare the double deception practised (that is, assumed 
to be practised) upon his chief. 

We naturally turn to look in Lord Palmerston’s answer for the deter¬ 
mination of the British Government no longer to co-operate in deception 
now laid bare; and what do we find ? A despatch in which is folded a 
Russian despatch —again in contradiction to the statements of Mr. M‘Neill. 
Thus is blow after blow levelled at him from the Foreign Office at St. 
Petersburgh, and the Foreign Office in London. 

Lord Palmerston’s despatch is as follows :— 

“August 4, 1837. 

‘*1 have received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 3rd of June. 

“You will perceive by the despatch from Count Simonich to Count Nesselrode, of which a copy 
is enclosed in Mr. Milbanke’s despatch sent to you herewith, that the Russian Minister has re¬ 
ported to his Government that he has already urged the Shah to abandon, for the present at 
least, his expedition against Herat.” 

Were not the Papers on record I might scarcely venture to say that 
this despatch is in reply to despatches in one of which is contained the 
formal and official declaration of the Persian Government of its decision 
to attack Herat. Mr. M‘Neill communicates this final step to his chief, 
and his chief, as heretofore, sends not a word of instruction, commits 
himself to no syllable of an opinion, but makes a despatch requested 
from the Russian Government the interpreter of his intentions, and through 
it he contradicts Mr. McNeill, and asserts that Russia had opposed that 
which Mr. McNeill had stated she had brought about, and that she had 
obtained the abandonment of that which the Persian Government had 
declared itself to be on the point of undertaking! 

The mode in which these documents are introduced is alone sufficient 
to prove the fraud. 4 

They are printed in the following order:—1. Mr. M‘Neill’s despatch 
of the 1st June, in which he establishes the accuracy of his previous state¬ 
ment regarding the conduct of the Russian Minister in Persia. 2. Lord 
Palmerston’s reply to Mr. M‘Neill’s despatches of the 3rd June, and refer¬ 
ring Mr. M‘Neill to an enclosed Russian despatch, stating that Count 
Simonich had used the most pressing solicitations in order to induce the 
Shah to content himself with the voluntary submission of the Prince of 
Herat, and that he had reason to believe that his proceeding would produce 


» 


84 


a salutary effect. 3. A despatch of Mr. M‘Neill’s of the 3rd June, stating 
that he had addressed a note to the Persian Minister to the effect that he 
had relied upon that Minister’s assurance to inform him as soon as any 
thing should be decided regarding the Shah’s movements, and that now 
finding the day of his departure proclaimed by the public crier, he begs to 
know what was really intended. Then follows the reply of the Persian 
Government, in which it affects to treat of warlike operations against Herat 
as a matter of internal administration, and says no doubt his Majesty will 
move towards Khiva, Merve, Meimuna, and Herat, and those parts. 4. 
Another despatch of Mr. M‘Neill of 3rd June, enclosing a despatch from 
the Chief Secretary of the Indian Government, conveying the alarm of the 
Indian Government with regard to the movements of Persia, and relying 
upon Mr. M‘Neill’s not having failed to communicate to the Government at 
home the conduct pursued by the Russian Envoy in Persia. 

The order of insertion is therefore this ;—1st June, 4th August, 3rd 
June, and 3rd June. The first and the two last being despatches to which 
the second is the reply. What could have been the object for placing the 
reply before the communication ? What could be the object of separating 
despatches received together, and replied to at the same time, and of 
placing the reply between them ? After perusing the statement of the 
Persian Government of its determination to attack Herat, had the reader 
come to Lord Palmerston’s observations (from St. Petersburgh) that the 
Shah had been induced to abandon the expedition, he must have been sur¬ 
prised—startled—and the spirit of inquiry might have been awakened. In 
like manner, after perusing the sentiments of the Indian Government 
regarding the danger to India of these movements in Asia—regarding the 
hostile character of the policy of Russia—the “ public notice” which it had 
conceived the British Government would have to take of the conduct of the 
Russian Envoy in that country, had the reader come immediately to Lord 
Palmerston’s despatch as a reply to this, directing Mr. M‘Neill’s attention 
to another Russian statement, he might have been again surprised and 
startled, and he might have felt interest in inquiry. But, by placing the 
reply before the despatches, the connexion is entirely broken—the reader 
cannot see his way, and not merely is he prevented from discovering what 
it was intended to conceal, but he is unable to follow that which is placed 


« 


before him. But these transactions belong to passing events, the legislator, 
whose duty it is to understand them, is not allowed to choose his time ; 
and, if unable, or unprepared at the proper moment, to expose error and 
deception, he adopts the statements, and becomes committed to them, for 
he would be reprehensible, if, being false or dishonourable, they were 
allowed to pass unquestioned and unexposed. Thus has this, as other 
diplomatic volumes, committed a nation, to a policy hostile to itself, and 
men, to opinions which they do not know; and when some party violence 
(worthy of the men and the times,) may hereafter assail, some intrigue en¬ 
danger the guilty framer of these perversions, then will he appeal for sup¬ 
port to the sound judgment and the liberal-minded members of the Senate, 
and point with confidence to the proofs of his ability, loyalty, laboriousness, 
and success, contained in this volume, stamped with the sanction of national 
oblivion. 

Mr. M‘Neill, I have stated, had been by his instructions prevented 
from interfering in the Persian attack upon Herat, although his instructions 
ostensibly required discouragement of that attack. 

We shall now see whether he did or did not oppose. 

On the 24th of February, 1837, the following words appear from Mr. 
M‘Neill :— 

“ I have continued to refrain from making the relations of Persia with 
“ Herat a subject of discussion.” 

Our inference therefore was correct, and the instructions were given 
not to be acted upon. But, perhaps, to some peculiar bias of Mr. M‘Neill’s 
mind is to be attributed his not acting on the instructions to discourage and 
to counteract. If so, he must have suffered reproof from his chief, to whom 
it was a duty to reprove that which he did not adopt. The terms which 
Mr. M‘Neill employs, leave, however, no doubt as to the sense he enter¬ 
tained of his chief’s intentions ; the words “ continuing to refrain,” exhibit 
his anxiety to act, and inability to do so. The show of opposition and dis¬ 
couragement was therefore a mask assumed by the Foreign Secretary to 
support the character of enmity to Russia, which he wore in the Cabinet ''', 
in society, and in Parliament. 

* One of Lord Palmerston’s late colleagues said to me, “ How can there be any under- 

“ standing between Lord Palmerston and Russia? We never could keep him decently civil with 
© 

the Russian Ambassador.” 


Again it may be said that although up to the month of February 1837, 
the language of Mr. M‘Neill bears out this construction of the instructions 
of Lord Palmerston, still that subsequently to that period the Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs had seen his error, and come to act in another sense, since 
Mr. M‘Neill a few months later did interfere, and offer his mediation. Of 
course here again if we find that Lord Palmerston did take steps to avert 
the consequences of his previous acts, we must discard our previous suspi¬ 
cions or conclusions—but if we find that these acts of Mr. M‘Neill were not 
undertaken through the authority of his chief, were not undertaken on in¬ 
structions which even left open to his option the taking or the not taking of 
such a course—then indeed must we revert to our former conclusions with 
greater confidence — with a confidence increasing at every step, and 
Strengthening 1 under every trial. 

Mr. M‘Neill did offer his mediation. How is it that the instructions 
upon which he must have acted are not given? What could they have 
been? From what authority could the}^ have emanated? Mr. M‘Neill 
says (30th June), “ I have been instructed by the Government of India 
“ to dissuade the Shah from undertaking another expedition against 
“ Herat/’ 

Mr. M‘Neill in taking this step, therefore, acted not upon the instruc¬ 
tions from his chief, but upon instructions from India, and by supporting 
himself in taking this line, upon his having been instructed from India to 
“ dissuade” the Shah, it is clear that he conceived he had received no in¬ 
structions from Lord Palmerston in the sense of dissuasion , and that it was 
requisite for him in dissuading, to find sojne authority to support himself 
with the Shah and against Lord Palmerston. But Mr. M‘NeiH’s attempt is 
perfectly fruitless, because in offering his mediation, he can only offer it in 
the name of the Indian Government, and not in the name of England ; and 
when he says in the name of the Governor-General, that the “ prosecution 
“ of this war might diminish the cordiality which had so long subsisted be- 
“ tween England and Persia,” the Persian Minister very naturally turns 
round, and says, what has the Governor-General of India to do between 
England and Persia ? England and Russia are united, Russia and Persia 
are agreed, England and Persia must therefore agree. Who then is this 
Governor-General of India? The Persian Minister, says Mr. M‘Neill, 


87 


“ refers to the perfect union of the two nations as an answer to this state- 
“ mentand so it was. And the Persian Minister only repeats the words 
which the Russian Envoy had previously used to Mr. Ellis, so that there 
could be no question, if we had known nothing of the antecedent steps, that 
the Persian Minister was fully aware of the character of the union of £ 00 *- 

•f o 

land and Russia, and of the valuelessness of any resistance on the part of 
the Governor-General or of Mr. M‘Neill, while Lord Palmerston was 
Minister in London. 

But most embarrassing is the position of Mr. M‘Neill. Supported 
by these vague and inconclusive expressions of the Governor-General 
alone, he attempts to act against Persia, against Russia, and against 
Lord Palmerston ; and he must act in obedience to instructions framed by 
Lord Palmerston, in an opposite sense. Let us see how he proceeds—he 
writes thus, accounting to his chief for the step he had taken (30th 
June):— 

“ In my despatch of February 24th, I expressed an opinion that the 
“ war which the Shah was prosecuting against Herat was a just war, and I 
“ ventured to question the advantage, under such circumstances, of endea- 
“ vouring, by implied threats, to dissuade him from renewing it.” 

“ But,” continues Mr. M‘Neill, “ when the Herat government offered 
“ terms so very advantageous that I felt convinced Persia could not, by 
“ conquest of the place, have gained so much in strength and security, it 
“ appeared to me that the war had from that moment become, on the part 
“ of Persia, an unjust war.” 

So that Mr. M‘Neill considered the war just in February, and unjust 
in June; that is to say, lie considered the war just before he had instructions 
from India, and unjust after he had received them. 

Now let us see upon what grounds, on the 24th February, he admitted 
its justice. On that day he said:— 

“ Putting aside the claims of Persia to the sovereignty of Llerat, and 
“ regarding the question as one between two independent sovereigns, (!) I 
“ am inclined to believe that the Government of Herat will be found to have 
“ been the aggressor.” 

This, certainly, was not an admission of the justice of the war, since the 
Shah’s pretensions were to the sovereignty of the place. Mr. M‘Neill, in 


88 


that despatch, further states, that arguments furnished him by the Governor- 
General, were not of any value, and that England ought, “ to insure suc- 
“ cess,” in preventing that war, by convincing the Persian Government that 
she was prepared to act as well as to threaten.” The object of the des¬ 
patch is therefore to urge the British Government to act. Therefore, it does 
not bear out the statement of Mr. M‘Neill either as to his own conviction of 
the justice of the war at that period, or as to his having dissuaded the Eng¬ 
lish Government from using threats to prevent it. Now, what grounds are 
assumed by Mr. M‘Neill for his change of opinion on the 30th June? Solely 
this, that Persia would gain more by sparing Herat than by conquering it. 
The measure of advantage to Persia must therefore be the measure of justice 
or injustice. Mr. M‘NeiU’s despatch of the 24th February does not, there¬ 
fore, seem to bear out his statement that he then considered the war just; 
nor does that of the 30th June assign any admissible or intelligible ground 
for his ceasing to consider it just. The occurrence, however, of the distinc¬ 
tion prevents the instructions from Downing Street and the instructions 
from India, from appearing to come into open collision, and enables Mr. 
M‘Neill to lay aside the instructions from Downing Street, and to take up 
the instructions from India. 

What must the instructions from India have been—in what spirit con¬ 
ceived. 

The Indian Government, not understanding the existence of a compact 
of co-operation between England and Russia, could have no grounds to <xo 

upon except the international relations of England and Persia_it could 

only remonstrate on the ground of the injustice of the war and of the interest 
of England, not knowing that Lord Palmerston had admitted the justice of 
the war, and had agreed with Russia to consider the interests of Russia and 
England as one. 

The policy of Indian Government was, therefore, directly hostile to 
that of Downing Street, and the ignorance of the Indian Government of 
every thing pertaining to the relations of Great Britain and Russia 
was complete because it did not possess the key. What, then, could avail 
its instructions to Mr. M‘Neill to restrain Persia, and to resist Russia—its 
voice might have been used for that purpose in Downing Street, had it seen 
its way. 


89 


Mr. M‘Neill, however, thus strengthened, offers mediation, but not in 
the name of England, and consequently, he himself could have anticipated 
nothing but failure—but he did use every means within his reach—he did 
exhaust every chance that was open to him; and, though it was put out of 
his power to render service to the state, he did his duty. 

Ten months again elapse, and on the 8th March, 1838, he takes the 
next step of importance, which is to proceed to the Camp before Herat, and 
here again he acts on instructions of the Indian Government. These instruc¬ 
tions had not indeed reached him—he merely hears of their existence through 
a circuitous channel, and at once determines upon proceeding to Herat. 
He says :— 

“ Colonel Stoddart had considered it his duty, on receiving the communication from Lieutenant 
Leech, to acquaint the Persian Minister, confidentially, that the Governor-General of India had 
instructed me to mediate between the Shah and the Government of Herat; that his Lordship 
required that the integrity of Herat should be preserved, and proposed to withdraw the Shah from 
Herat by Treaty or otherwise.” 

These facts are most remarkable—they shew how urgent it seemed to 
every Englishman connected with the public service to grasp at any instruc¬ 
tions which would warrant them in taking in this matter steps of any kind. 
They felt, therefore, at once the danger in which England stood, and the 
ease with which that danger might have been averted, little dreaming, at 
least those occupying subordinate stations, that danger was owing solely to 
an Englishman, and that Englishman the Representative of the Nation’s 
interests, and the holder of the Sovereign’s power. " ^ 

The assault on Herat was the question at issue—the event of Central 
Asia upon which hinged the future supremacy of that region—it was the 
point through which Russia had established a complete ascendancy over 
Persia—drove her upon India—alarming the Affghans, or exciting their 
cupidity, and thus preparing double means of action upon every portion of 
Central Asia—means which in so short a period have carried forward her 
influence from the Araxes and the Emba to the Indus. ^ 

On this question, Lord Palmerston had, from the origin of these 
proceedings, avoided giving any instructions whatever—it is a name which 
he never pronounces until the catastrophe is consummated. In these papers, 
though selected with so much care, and in communications from successive 

N 


90 


Ministers, who each felt that Lord Palmerston’s co-operation with Russia 
was the source of danger, there is an official chain of evidence of the constant 
conviction in their minds of its being in the power of England, at any moment 
to have prevented the expedition against Herat. 

This question, however difficult to treat or to decide upon, could not 
have been avoided by a Minister not committed to Russia. But to avoid it 
when presented as one of such facility, and not to make applicable to it 
general instructions to oppose, shows that Lord Palmerston was engaged in 
counteracting the influence, and that he had to dread the power, not of 
Russia, but of England. 

The following passages will substantiate my words :— 

Mr. Ellis to Lord Palmerston, April 10th, 1836. 

“ The Shall will not abandon the object (the attack of Herat) unless compelled to do so by the 
declared opposition of the British Government.” 

Mr. Macnaghten to Mr. M‘Neill, Nov. 26th, 1836:— 

“ The Government of India is also desirous not to incur the loss of character which must 
ensue if there should be the slightest ground for suspicion that British support had been granted to 
Persia against parties (!) icith ichom we are on terms of friendly intercourse .” 

Mr. M‘Neill to Lord Auckland, July 4th, 1837 :— 

“ I see no reason why we should conceal from Persia that the necessity of providing for our 
own security compels us to require that she should abstain from injuring our defences and weak¬ 
ening our position.” 

» 

Mr. Ellis, at the commencement of these proceedings, said, 

“ Persia will not, or dare not , place herself in a condition of close alliance with Great 
Britain.” 

'Towards their close, in May 1838, Mr. M‘Neill declares that the Shah 
dreaded to give umbrage to the Russian Government if “ he desisted until 
“ Herat should be taken.” 

In these extracts it is seen that it was the conviction of the two repre¬ 
sentatives of Great Britain, that the expedition would not have taken place 
had England opposed it; and further, there is the proof that England had 
in no manner opposed it. It is seen that the Indian Government dreaded 
loss of character through the co-operation of England with Persia. It 
further appears that Russia had adopted a course of systematic menace and 
of threat against Persia, to place her in a state of hostility with England ; 


91 


and that Russia was supported in this course by Lord Palmerston, since, 
from the origin of these proceedings, he was fully aware of them without 
taking any steps either to call her to account, or even to put an end to the 
union of the two Courts under which she acted. 

In the former parts we have seen that Lord Palmerston knew before¬ 
hand that Russia was to take this course : he had prepared the English 
Ambassador at Teheran for the projects of Persia before these were revealed 
by Persia herself. We have seen that from the commencement the concur¬ 
rence of the three Courts had been established in regard to the pretensions 
of Persia, upon the sovereignty of Herat, Cabul, Kandahar, &c. ; we 
have seen that, while a complete alteration was assumed in London to be 
effected in the relations between England and Russia, that the secret under¬ 
standing between Lord Palmerston and Russia remained unaltered; so that 
between the two alternatives then presented to him—the defence of British 
interests against Russia—the sacrifice of British interests to Russia (for 
there vras no middle course between these)—he had chosen the latter. 

In the present, as in the former parts, it will be seen that every step 
was avoided by the British Secretary of State which could embarrass the 
proceedings of Persia, invalidate the influence of Russia, or sustain that of 
England. 

In this, as in two of the former parts (Parts I. and IV.), will be 
observed displacement of documents. 

The intention of the instructions to Mr. M‘Neill, as exposed in Part V., 

namely, that he should be unable to counteract Russia, is in the present 

€/ • 

part corroborated and established by the events which followed in Persia, 
and by the statements of the British Envoy. 

The attempt of Mr. M‘Neill to interfere between Persia and Herat 
has been shewn to be in obedience to instructions from the Oovernor- 
General of India, and in direct opposition to the instructions of the Foreign 
Secretary. 

These proceedings, examined with scrupulous minuteness, exhibit no 
redeeming heedlessness or inadvertence—no carelessness, incongruity, or 
contradiction : order and system pervade the whole. The policy of Eng¬ 
land is no longer the policy of England, but has become the policy of 
Russia, and thus have the archives of England, during the last ten years, 


92 


been rendered a lie to pollute the sources of history, after perverting the 
minds of the time, and rendering the public servants of the British Crown 
its deadliest foes. 

Lord Palmerston has thus lent his authority, and employed his official 
power, to advance the designs of Russia, with the perfect knowledge of the 
hostility of that power to Great Britain, and her powerlessness to injure 
England without his concurrence. He has all the while been professing 
opinions the reverse of his deeds, and betraying to Russia the counsels of 
England at home, while sacrificing her friends and her interests abroad. 
This conspiracy has been conducted with ease, security, and success, in the 
face of a Legislative Assembly, the members of which are commissioned to 
watch over the public safety. Not one member, therefore, of that body 
possessed the intelligence required honestly to accept such a trust at the 
hands of his fellow-citizens. By the policy of a constitutional State are the 
liberties and the independence of Persia trampled in the dust. The control 
of Russia over Persia is enforced by the power of Great Britain, while 
Englishmen there are who believe that England is feeble. Had England 
been powerless, Persia had still been independent—India in security. Had 
the British Parliament been powerless, this conspiracy never would have 
been conceived, and if conceived, never could have succeeded. It has 
been conceived upon the consciousness that that body had not the capacity 
requisite to direct its power, and it has been prosecuted through the support 
yielded by its ignorance. “ What England is now,’' said Lord Palmerston, 
in 1829, “ Parliament has no means of knowing, except from vague and 
“ uncertain report.” That, indeed, was a fearful position for a nation ; but 
what is that to be compared to the state of a nation whose minister pre¬ 
sents falsified documents to Parliament, whose Parliament accepts these 
as true ? 


While the proofs of this part have been correcting, a debate of five days has been brought to a 
conclusion, to determine whether or not the Ministers deserve the confidence of the country. 
During that debate a Member having referred to insults to our flag, was stopped by cries of 
“ question.” The same Member proceeded to speak of the affairs of Persia (and he was the only 
one who did so), and the reporters were unable to follow him, from the noise which immediately 
rose in the House. The leader of the opposition in this debate assumed the responsibility of the 
Government of the country, by stating that he had the power to support it when it acted well, and 



93 


to prevent it when it attempted to act amiss. This legislative assembly, therefore, considers that 
an insult endured by the British flag, is not included within the “ question” of the conduct of 
the Ministers. The Senate of Great Britain takes no interest, therefore, in the affairs of Persia, or 
of the East, and the opposition is no longer a safeguard against the errors of the Government, 
lhe mass of the nation not having the means of judging of the character, knowledge, and motives 
of public men, suppose that Ministers attend to the affairs of the nation, that a Parliament watches 
ovei the administration, and understands something of the objects for which Government is esta¬ 
blished. They further suppose that the opposition to the Government will control it in its aberra¬ 
tions, and detect any dangerous betrayal of the public interests of which it might be guilty. But 
let any piactical man of business consider the points I have put forward, drawn from that debate, 
and it will be impossible for him not to feel that all these expectations are groundless. As the 
institutions of the land have been rendered valueless by the violence of faction, so now has even 
faction itself ceased to have any redeeming qualities, or controlling power, by the increasing value¬ 
lessness of the men. 


PART VII. 

RUPTURE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PERSIA.—1838. 


In the advance of Russia to India two great movements had to be 
made—ls£, To cross the gigantic physical barriers that stood in her way— 
the Caucasus, the Caspian, and the deserts spreading to the north-east from 
the shores of the sea;—2 ndly, To subdue the national spirit of the kingdoms 
and people lying behind these barriers, namely, Persia and the populations 
of Toorkistan and Aflghanistan. 

Persia constituted of these so large and so powerful a portion that for 
Russia to associate that State with herself was to obtain the control, and 
ultimately the dominion, of Central Asia. 

Russia has succeeded in overpassing these physical barriers. She has 
crossed the chain of the Caucasus, which, for the three thousand previous 
years, had protected Asia against the north; she has converted the Caspian 
into a lake of her own from which the flag of Persia is excluded; she has 
spread far eastward through the regions of Northern Tartary, if not 



94 


dominion, influence leading to it : she lias established her posts on the 
Indian side of the Caspian Sea. 

The first great movement of Russia towards India was thus completed 
at the opening of this Correspondence—the second remained to be effected. 

Persia, menaced by Russia, had looked throughout the world for foes 
of Russia, and for the antagonists of her power. England, fearing for India, 
looked to the East to see if there was there any people who dreaded the 
y power of Russia, and were capable of throwing impediments in her way. 
Persia thus saw in England—England in Persia, the alliance which each 
sought, and the advantages which they mutually required ; and thus did 
England secure complete ascendancy over the mind, and authority over the 
councils of the Persian people. This support of England further increased 
the desire of Persia to maintain her independence, and confirmed her spirit 
in hostility to the designs, her frame in resistance to the assaults, of the 
Russian power. This opposition of the dispositions of Persia towards Russia 
and England could only be changed by a change in the relative positions 
of England and of Russia. Confidence in England could only cease when 
Russia ceased to threaten—opposition to Russia could only cease when 
England ceased to protect. Further progress of Russia towards India became, 
therefore, practicable only in so far as she could lead England into being 
false to Persia and to herself. So long as this was not effected, political 
measures, military efforts, against Persia could only tend to strengthen more 
and more the hostility of the Persian people to Russia and their affection for 
England. It was only by exhibiting to them—England united to Russia— 
that their expectations would be blasted, and that Russia’s triumph would 
be secured. But how was this to be effected—how was such a project even 
to be contemplated ? If Persia could not be subdued by Russia, how could 
she contemplate the subjugation of England as the means of subduing Persia 
—for the subjugation of a state is practically effected when its policy is 
perverted ? 

If the triumph of Russia or the downfall of Great Britain should appear 
a mystery in after times, the papers we are at present examining will lay that 
mystery open to the eyes of men.—From these documents it appears that 
Russia has found amongst the leading men of Great Britain, one who had 
consented to make Russia’s objects his objects—who had become in the 


95 


furtherance of them Minister of England, and who then at once placed Russia 
in that position without which her further progress to India would have been 
impracticable. He declared that the interests of Russia and England were 
one , and made this union the basis of British policy, but concealed it from 
the nation, until through ten years of systematic mismanagement, decep¬ 
tion, and falsification, there remained not a man in the land that could 
see his way. 

Little does the appointment of Mr. M‘Neill appear to coincide with 
the general scheme of the Foreign Minister. The necessity, however, was 
imposed upon him for the employment of that gentleman, as already ex¬ 
posed in a former Part, and the analysis of the Instructions with which he 
left England, as the examination of his conduct in Persia and his reports 
from that country, show that he was removed from England, where his voice 
might have been heard, to be annihilated in Persia, where his opinions could 
be of no avail—while his appointment gave to Lord Palmerston the credit of 
British objects and of enlightened policy. Thus the very man who had 
been the assertor of British rights in that country—who had been the advo¬ 
cate of Persia’s connexion with Great Britain—was made the instrument for 
the overthrow of the one and for the destruction of the other. 

Mr. M‘Neill arrived in Persia in September 1836, and there appears 
from that period until the lltli July, 1837, that is, during nine months, four¬ 
teen despatches, detailing the circumstances and the opinions above referred 
to, without these communications or those of his predecessors in the same 
sense for the ten anterior months, that is to say from November 1835, having 
called forth from the Foreign Minister any declaration, any decision, or 
indeed any communication, whatever. It is not, therefore, surprising, that 
on the lltli July, 1837, after nineteen months of openly avow r ed intentions 
of aggression*, by Persia on England, with perfect impunity, that the 

* So early as the 16th April, 1836, we find the following sentence in a despatch from Mr. Ellis: 

11 Tehran, April 10, 1836. 

“Uzeez Khan held the same language to me as he had undoubtedly done to the Shall and his 
Ministers, namely, that the whole of Affghanistan was, with the exception of Herat and its depen¬ 
dencies, ready to come under feudal submission to the Shah, who in fact might, with the aid ot the 
Afighans, like Nadir Shah, push his conquests to Delhi.” 

Mr. M'Neill at a subsequent period thus speaks: 

“The Persian Government has openly expressed a belief that the possession of Herat would 


Minister of the Persian Government should declare that he conceived 
Persia no longer bound by her engagements to Great Britain, and that 
existing treaties between them were abrogated. Two days later Mr. 
M‘Neill addresses to the Persian Government a demand for immediate ex¬ 
planation; the Persian Government vouchsafes no reply; Persia takes no 
notice of the demand of the British Envoy; the English Minister takes no 
notice of the first declaration, or the subsequent silence of the Persian 
Government. This transaction is, however, screened from the observation 
of the reader of the published documents. The declaration of the Persian 
Minister (11th July, 1837), and the reply of Mr. M‘Neill (July 13th) are 
not given in their order, nor according to their date. Mr. M‘Neill, in 
detailing the rupture with Persia, refers to this transaction, and by this 
reference alone do we learn, that it occurred. To this subsequent 
despatch the two documents are appended as a note, and in small 
type—they are the only documents so introduced, or so printed. Had 
they appeared in their order, the reader must have said to himself, 
“ now or never is the moment for England to act,” and finding no steps 
taken he must have perceived the intention of encouraging Persia in her 
hostile course. 

Three months after this event was the insult offered to Mr. M‘Neill’s 
messenger—a circumstance so entirely in harmony with the previous pro¬ 
ceedings, and with the intentions of the British Minister that it is needless 
to dwell upon it*. 

On the 6th February, 1838, Lord Palmerston was in possession of 
all the events which had occurred in Persia up to the 27th November, 
1837, including the above quoted declaration of the Persian Govern¬ 
ment, the mission of Captain Vicovitch to Affghanistan, the fall of the 
fortress of Ghorian, &c., and, after a week’s consideration, writes to Mr. 
M‘Neill:— 


give such a hold upon England, that she would no longer be able to deny anything they might 
demand; for that the possession of Herat would give the power to disturb us in India, or to give a 
passage to our enemies, whenever the Persian Government should think proper to do so.”—26th 
Nov., 1837. 

* The correspondence regarding this outrage occupies a full half of the published 
documents! 


97 


“ February 1838. 

“ I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that Her Majesty’s Government entirely approve the 
course which you have taken, and the conduct which you have pursued in all the matters to which 
these despatches relate. 

“ I delay sending you further instructions with respect to the affairs treated of, until 
I hear from you what has been the answer of the Persian Government to your very proper 
demand.” 


This demand had reference to the insult offered to the English 
Minister, and had nothing to do with any of the subjects detailed or 
touched upon in this Exposition ! Thus, this despatch rendered the exist¬ 
ence of friendly relations between Great Britain and Persia contingent on 
a minor matter, which must necessarily be decided against England, by the 
fact of the sacrifice of the major question, merely because no instructions 
are given upon it. What means assigning a reason for delaying instructions 
on the question—in which was included, and in which were at stake, all 
that England had to gain or to lose in Persia and Central Asia ? It, more¬ 
over, assumes the very delay of the Persian Government in replying on 
the one point as the grounds for sending no instructions on the other ! If a 
reason, not the reason, is assigned, then were objects to be concealed—and 
what can be the motive of concealment, save that which has already so often 
appeared— viz., the working out of the ends of Russia. 

After vain efforts to obtain on the one hand reparation for the insult 
which had been offered, and to induce, on the other, the Shah to relinquish 
his enterprise againt Herat, Mr. M‘Neill, on the 10th March, 1838, had 
proceeded to the camp before Herat on instructions to that effect from the 
Governor-General of India. Had Mr. M‘Neill, on his arrival at the camp, 
been prepared to threaten Persia with interruption of diplomatic relations, 
and, consequently, with war, because of her aggressions against the 
Affghans, then would his words have been of weight, and would his menace 
have been intelligible, and then would the threat of his withdrawal from 
the camp have been a proposition to strike with alarm the Persian Govern¬ 
ment—not to fill it with derision. But the Persian Government had itself 
made its withdrawal from before Herat contingent on the reception of such 
a threat. The King went so far as to say to Mr. M‘Neill, “ that if he was 
“ at liberty to announce that England would attack him if he did not 


o 


98 


“ retire,” that he would do so*; and Mr. M‘Neill had shown that he could 
not venture to withdraw, through the dread of Russia, so that to have been 
threatened on the part of England would have strengthened them against 
Russia. Mr. M‘Neill says—“ I would, therefore, if I could venture to do 
“ so, save Herat, which would be saving all Affghanistan.” But Mr. M‘Neill 
could not venture to do so. 

He was soon in possession of the despatch of 12th February. It 
brought him, as above shown, no decision in regard to the affair of Herat, 
but did support him in his demand of personal reparation. “ Now,” says 
Mr. M‘Neill, “ that I was fortified (!) with that decision, I determined to 
<e bring the matter to an issue.”— On the wrong point! He is compelled to 
make the question of Herat depend on the issue of the question of the 
Messenger; what object could there be in so strange and laboured an invo¬ 
lution of the parts, save that of sacrificing both ? He is compelled to withdraw, 
because of the refusal of a demand which was no threat—leaving untouched 
the question of Herat, in regard to which the same act of withdrawal 
(implying in that case a threat) would have been decisive. Thus are the 
instructions of the Governor-General—the journey of Mr. M‘Neill to the 
camp—the favourable disposition of the Shah—all rendered abortive. The 
mediation is broken off at the very moment of successf by this despatch of 
12th February. 

The efforts of Mr. M‘Neill, and the intentions of the Governor-General, 
are thwarted with an ease that startles and astounds. The despatch effect¬ 
ing these purposes does not consist of half-a-dozen lines—it appears to 
approve of all that Mr. M‘Neill had done—to be quite on his side, and 
against Persia and Russia. The words in which its strength resided are, 
“ I delay sending further instructions^” It may be said that Lord 

* The Shah afterwards said to Colonel Stoddart (August 14, 1838), “ Had we known that our 
coming here might risk the loss of the friendship of the British Government, we certainly would 
not have come at all.” 

*f* Mr. M‘Neill had succeeded in concluding the preliminary arrangements for peace between 
Persia and Herat during the night. In the morning the Minister of the Court, united with Great 
Britain , arrives in the camp, the negociations are at once stopped, and the operations of the siege 
commence. 

{ Lord Palmerston, four months and ten days after this delaying of instructions, again writes, 


99 


Palmerston has erred on the weak and amiable side—he has been averse to 
the use of harsh terms or of strong measures—his great object is Peace. Let 

us see. 

After the rupture with Persia was secured—after menaces and threats 
could be of no avail, the following despatch is sent from Downing Street:— 

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. M i Neill. 

“ Foreign Office, July 27, 1838. 

“ Sir,—I have to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that, whereas the spirit and pur¬ 
port of the treaty between Persia and Great Britain, is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier 
for the British possessions in India, and that the Persian Government should co-operate with that 
of Great Britain in defending British India; it appears, on the contrary, that the Shah is occupied 
in subverting those intervening States between Persia and India, which might prove additional 
barriers of defence for the British possessions ; and in these operations he has openly connected him¬ 
self with an European power, for purposes avowedly unf riendly , if not absolutely hostile , to British 
interests ; that under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course of pro¬ 
ceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned treaty, Great Britain 
will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that treaty, such measures as a due regard 
for her own interests, and the security of her dominions may suggest.—I am, &c. 

“ Palmerston.” 

“ John M‘Neill, Esq., &c. &c. &c.” 

Years before Lord Palmerston knew what was coming—and co-operated 
to bring it about—knew that it could not be effected without his co-opera¬ 
tion, and has shown in the selection of every term the consciousness that 
the British Envoy would avert it unless sufficiently paralyzed by himself. 
On the 27th of July he was in possession of no more than he was 
acquainted with on the 12th of the previous February, on which day he had 
penned the despatch which placed Mr. M‘Neill in the necessity of a rupture 
with Persia, in regard to the affair of the Messenger, but which withheld 
from him the power of threatening that same rupture on account of the 
Herat war. 

On the other hand, the Indian Government, which, in taking the steps 
we have seen, had not commissioned Mr. M‘Neill to threaten upon its part, 
sends a hostile expedition to the shores of Persia. By the menace every 
object would have been obtained—the menace is not used—the expedition 

June 22, 1838 :—“ I wait for further information from you to see whether it will be necessary to 
give you any additional instructions besides those already sent to you”—See “ Exposition of the 
Boundary Differences,” for a remarkable instance of a parallel despatch. 


100 


is sent to render England a mockery and to be a failure. This expedition, 
from the use to which it is subsequently turned by Russia, seems no less a 
part of the concert between Russia and the Foreign Minister of Great 
Britain, than—the setting up of Shah Shooja, announced by Russia in 1835, 
as to be undertaken by England; than—the elevation of Mahmoud Meerza 
effected by England the year before ; than—the concurrence of England in the 
attack on Herat; than—the overthrow by England of the attempts of the 
Governor-General to resist that expedition; than—the rupture between Eng¬ 
land and Persia; or, than any other of the Cabinet which we are accustomed 
to call—British. 

England breaks with Persia because of her being allied w T ith her own 
ally—she thus presents an array of the joint power of England and of 
Russia to crush any state that exhibits attachment to England, and a desire 
to preserve its own independence. England quarrels with Persia because 
of her union with Russia, and remains united to Russia. Some months 
afterwards she requests to be informed of the intentions of the Russian 
Cabinet. Having quarrelled with Persia upon the ground of her union with 
Russia, she could hold no intercourse with Russia except to render her 
responsible for doing that which had placed Persia in a state of hostility 
to England. It is Russia then who proceeds to take advantage of this 
negociation—she calls upon England to renew 7 her relations of amity with 
Persia, on the footing of the happy and beneficial union of 1834! England 
is driven out of Persia, as out of Central Asia, avowing herself expelled by 
the influence of Russia, and declaring herself in a state of hostility with those 
nations, because of their connexion with Russia so as to drive them to seek 
through Russia protection against England! Russia will then re-appear in 
Asia, leading back England by the hand—exhibiting herself in the East as 
already mistress of the strongest power in Europe, presenting herself in 
Europe as the preserver of the greatest of Asiatic dominions—Great Britain. 
Presenting herself to the admiring eyes of Great Britain as the stay of her 
influence in Asia, as the protector of Delhi and of Agra, and as ready to 
march her Cossacks and her Baskirs to the defence of the Indus. 

Thus is accomplished the second movement of Russia towards India, 
which it w 7 as impossible for her to have effected except through the 
co-operation of Great Britain, namely, that of uniting Central Asia with 


101 


her in her projects against that Power on whom those nations relied for the 
support of their independence against her assault. 

The effect of this union on Persia has been the extinction of the 
national spirit, and the triumph of the Russian faction. Lord Palmerston 
then had further to involve Persia in projects of hostility against Great 
Britain, and finally to throw her into the arms of Russia, by denouncing 
her as Russian—unparalleled temerity—to declare a Government that was 
united to Russia , an enemy to the British Crown! 


[The subject of this supplementary part is too important to exclude, and it could not have been 
introduced into the former parts without breaking the connexion of the transactions. 

I omit in this place a chronological view of the information from Persia, received at the Foreign 
Office, and of the instructions given. Being intended rather for substantiation and reference, it will 
appear when these papers are printed in a collected form.] 


PART VIII. 

BRITISH OFFICERS IN PERSIA. 

A nation in ideas, in manners, in habits, in costume, so different to 
ours—professors of a faith which stands, and has stood for twelve centuries, 
with hostile front against the West—so forgets its antipathies, subdues its 
habits, obliterates its fanaticism, as to place in command over themselves 
foreigners—Europeans—officers—and Christians ! These officers henceforth 
constituted an authority in and over the nation. This foreign military 
command was connected with political influence, with financial control, and 
resting on these constituted the key-stone of an arch of diplomatic power, 
by which England shielded the Persian state. In the fall of this structure 
—not from external force that scatters it, but by secret mining within that 
pulls it down—the fragments must crush that which they were raised to 
protect. 




102 


These officers were not like questions of right, of interest, or of policy, 
which could be explained away by an ambiguous term, an insidious 
reference, or put aside by “ delaying to send instructions”—they were 
corporeal substances present, and acting, occupying a station too important 
in the eyes of Persia, too influential in the relative positions of Russia or 
of England, not to render any measures adopted with regard to them 
comprehensible to all men. If Lord Palmerston has been throughout the 
secret agent of Russia, what will his conduct prove to be in regard to these 
officers ? We shall find him through means of these Englishmen exhibiting 
to Central Asia the co-operation of England with Russia—we shall find 
him placing them at the disposal of the Shah in attacking Herat, and realizing 
that co-operation which the Russian Minister had already announced, in 
which the Shah, in his projects against Khiva, “ should receive at once the 
“ assistance of Russian troops and of British officers.” 

In these suppositions of what was likely to occur under the hypothesis 
of a traitor directing the Foreign policy of Great Britain, I have nearly 
stated that which has taken place, except that the intention of the Minister 
to place these officers at the disposal of Russia is brought, by peculiar 
circumstances, into prominence and into evidence of the most remarkable 
and conclusive kind. The British Ambassador had, without instructions, 
withdrawn these officers from the Persian service—the Governor-General 
of India had instructed the successor of that Ambassador to withdraw 
them from the expedition against Herat. These unexpected events imposed 
upon Lord Palmerston the necessity of instructions to replace the officers 
at the disposal of Russia. This has further given rise to the necessity of 
the suppression of those instructions, leaving, by that suppression alone, 
neither indistinct nor doubtful the intention and the object of these pro¬ 
ceedings. 

The only step taken by Mr. Ellis before leaving Persia, to mark the 
opposition of Great Britain to the projects of Persia, was the withdrawal 
of these officers from Herat. Nearly a year afterwards we find the Indian 
Government similarly alarmed, suggesting the same step to Mr. M‘Neill as 
the only specific measure which it can devise in order to counteract the 
policy of Russia and the arms of Persia. We see, therefore, that Mr. 
M‘Neill must have received instructions reversing the decision of Mr. Ellis, 


103 


because the Indian Government again suggested their withdrawal, although 
no instructions to that effect from Lord Palmerston appear. We also 
see afterwards that Mr. M‘Neill did act on the suggestions of the Indian 
Government—if so, he must have detailed to his chiefs the steps he had 
taken, and his reasons for taking them—but these are not published. 

It appears from a passage in a despatch from the Secretary-General 
of India, that the British officers had been driven by the Shah with ignominy 
from his camp; and we learn that this was because they had been forbidden 
to accompany the expedition against Herat, and. thus we ascertain that Mr. 
M‘Neill had followed the instructions of the Indian Government. 

I have selected, and I subjoin the various passages having reference 
to this subject. Strange to say there is not a word from Mr. M‘Neill 
respecting the British officers admitted into these published papers. 

The two first extracts are a peculiar illustration of the system that 
pervades British Diplomacy. The last extract, the instruction of Lord 
Palmerston to Mr. M‘Neill, will show that a second time had he counteracted 
the act of the envoy in Persia—that he had insured the employment of British 
officers against Herat up to the last moment of the positive rupture between 
England and Persia, and left even then the door open to their continuance in 
the Persian service ! 

The following are the passages :— 

Mr. Riach to Mr. Ellis. 

(Extract.) “ Teheran, June 16, 1836. 

“ We all (the Russian mission and the British officers) went to the royal presence together. 
His Majesty, having inquired after Count Simonich’s health, immediately turned to me and said 
* the officers are to attend me on my journey,’ to which I replied, ( of course, whenever his Majesty 
was pleased to order them.’ He seemed gratified, and replied ‘ certainly,’ and then praised the 
officers and the British Government for all the acts of friendship he had received from the latter 
during a long course of years. He did not allude to where he was going; and it was only during a 
conversation he held with the Russian Ambassador about the rivers'running into the Caspian, west of 
Asterabad, Khorassan, &c., that Herat was mentioned. 

Mr. Ellis to Mr. Riach. 

“ Tabray , June 14, 1836. 

“ Should the Shah inquire whether the British officers would accompany an expedition against 
Herat, your answer should be, that on a former and similar occasion, during the lifetime of the 
Shah’s illustrious father, the detachment had been withdrawn; that the withdrawal had been 


104 


approved of by the British Government; and therefore, until orders to a different effect were issued, 
the officers must consider the orders then given to be in force.” 

The Governor-General to Mr. M‘Neill. 

« Nov. 21, 1836. 

“ In order to prevent any appearance of the expedition being sanctioned by the British 
Government, it will be matter for consideration with you whether you should not direct them to 
withdraw.”—(Nov. 21, 1836.) 


Mr. M i Naghten to Mr. M i Neill. 

« April 10, 1837. 

“ We do not make ground of complaint of the circumstances attending the dismissal of the 
British officers from the camp of the Shah, because, as those officers could not take part in the 
attempt upon Herat, the King had a fair right to remove them from the army, which was proceeding 
in its march upon that city.”—(April 16, 1837.) 

* 

Lord Palmerston to Mr. MNeill. 

“ 10^ March , 1838. 

“ If you should deem it necessary to withdraw from the Persian territory into Turkey, I 
authorize you to use your discretion as to calling upon Sir Henry Bethune, Colonel Stoddart, and 
all the British officers, and non-commissioned officers, to do so likewise, or to permit them provi¬ 
sionally to remain. But as long as you think it expedient to continue within the Persian territory, 
it would not be advisable to require any of those persons to retire from the Persian service*.” 

I conceive this point so important that I recapitulate. 

Mr. Ellis withdraws the British officers, according to an established 
precedent—Lord Palmerston reverses that decision ; the Indian Govern- 

* The only other passage in which there is reference to the employment of these officers is in 
the subjoined extract from Mr. M‘Neill, which shows that the dismissal of the British officers from 
the camp has been intended as an insult from Persia to England, and accepted as such by 
England. 

Mr. M 6 Neill to Persian Minister. 

30 th June , 1837. 

“ From the time that his Majesty, by the succour and assistance of the British Government, 
became possessor of the crown and throne of Persia, and that your Excellency became Prime 
Minister, I put it to your Excellency’s candour to declare what circumstances have occurred to give 
satisfaction to the British Government, or give it assurance that nothing contrary to the rules of 
friendship has proceeded from the Court of Persia. Is it the respect shown to its Ambassador 
Extraordinary, or the removal of its officers from camp, or the conclusion of a treaty of com¬ 
merce, or the sanctioning the establishment of its Consuls, that can inspire the British Government 
with confidence ?” 


105 


instructs Mr. M‘Neill to withdraw the English Officers—Lord Palmerston 
then reverses that decision. The only specific measure proposed by India 
—the only step of any kind adopted by the successive missions in Persia, 
is the -withdrawal of these officers—the withdrawal of these officers was 
the only step taken to exhibit—and it could go no further—the noncon¬ 
currence of England in the projects of Persia, and having been taken, the 
reversion of it by express authority of the Foreign Office in London, 
became an additional proof of the concurrence of England in the projects 
of Russia. The instructions upon which Lord Palmerston reverses the 
decision of Mr. Ellis is suppressed, and the communication of Mr. M‘Neill, 
as there must have been, respecting the grounds upon which he had acted 
in opposition to those suppressed instructions, is also suppressed. 

Words cannot add weight to such facts. 

This betrayal of the national interests is of course not confined to one 
region—and the process by which injury is inflicted on us in one state is 
available in others. This will of course at once be admitted to be true, but 
the value of the truth will depend on knowledge of the variety of the 
facts, and the extent of the injury. It therefore may not be without 
interest to glance at the steps taken at the same period regarding military 
instruction in Turkey. 

In the course of the year 1836, the Turkish Government was induced 
to apply to Great Britain for officers both for its fleet and army. This 
request was formally made to his late Majesty, and immediately complied 
with, and officers were sent out to Constantinople. After several months 
delay their services were rejected.—This was effected by Russia—not how¬ 
ever through her direct influence but through means of the individuals 
employed in the British service. The Turks were however anxious to 
have at least European officers—it became therefore advisable to furnish 
them with such officers as Russia could count upon. They were furnished 
by Prussia. 

The diplomatic service of Prussia has, since the treaty of Vienna, 
been entirely at the disposal of Russia, and far more useful to her than if 
ostensibly her own. So now these Prussian officers, while they effected 
her purposes, appeared to the eyes of Europeans to be distinct from her, 
and they obtained confidence in the Turks because they were Germans. 

p 


106 


■i- 


It is by these officers that the Dardanelles have been fortified !—it is 
through them that the defeat of Nezib has been secured! 

These circumstances will illustrate the recorded proposal of the Persian 
Minister of sending away the British officers, and of employing officers from 
some other European nation, which occurred so early as 1835. Prussia has 
been made a party interested in the decomposition of the northern portions 
of the Ottoman empire,—France in the southern. France has prepared 
the schism in the empire by disciplining the troops, encouraging the pre¬ 
tensions, and advocating the designs of Mehemet Ali. 

The next step was to bring back France to Teheran—reviving at once 
all our old Indian recollections, and all her European rivalry with Great 
Britain. French officers, it is said, have recently proceeded to occupy the 
place of those of Great Britain. The way being prepared, after 30 years of 
non-intercourse, by a brilliant Embassy to a Government recognised in 
Europe and Asia as the bulwark of India, and at whose Court there is no 
representative of Great Britain ! 


[Having concluded the 1st portion of the Exposition of our relations with Central Asia, it may 
be here advantageous to lay before the reader an outline of the subjects into which we shall now 
have to enter. The present and four subsequent Parts will be devoted to the relations of India 
with the Sikhs, with the Affghans, with China, and with Central Asia; we shall then revert to the 
Diplomatic explanations which took place between the British Government and the Court of 
St. Petersburgh, in regard to the policy pursued by the latter in Asia. 

In the eight parts that have appeared, having had to show that the British Secretary of State 
had intentionally yielded to Russia the power of Great Britain for the furtherance of her projects 
against England, it was imperative upon me to enter into a minute examination of the Diplomatic 
documents through which these objects were effected, and in which, proof of his guilt was to be 
found. I conceive that the case has been made out and proved. No attempt has been made to 
refute any one statement,—to controvert the accuracy of any one conclusion: henceforward 
therefore, it will be superfluous to dwell with the same minuteness upon the documents, or to 
extract so largely from them. 

In the examination of the transactions in Asia, in which the Indian Government is the acting 
party, the agency of the British Secretary of State does not appear, but having proved in the former 
part his collusion with Russia, it is evident that the British Government associated, through that 
Minister, with Russia, must have acted upon the Indian Government so as to lead it into false 
positions, and to induce or to require it to take that line which it was desirable for Russia that it 
should take. The line it has taken has been, as we shall see, in every instance precisely such as to 
justify this supposition, and its policy is intelligible upon no other hypothesis. 




107 


The leading- event of our Indian policy has been the setting up of Shall Shoojah at Cabul, and 
the motive assigned for that measure lias been, opposition to Russia. We shall see of what im¬ 
mense advantage that step lias been to her. It will be in the recollection of the reader of these 
papers, that so far back as the year 1835 the Russian Minister announced that England would 
undertake that expedition, and made the announcement for the purpose of advancing thereby the 
designs of Russia. 

By a double process we thus arrive at the conclusion, that the setting up of Shah Shoojah was 
the project of Russia, and if so the measures leading to that event must equally be considered as 
emanating from her. The first and most important of these is the unnatural alliance of the Indian 
Government with Runjeet Singh, which forms the subject of the part which follows.] 


PART IX. 

RELATIONS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WITH RUNJEET SINGH. 

For more than ten years after the peace of 1815, Russia had not visibly 
directed her attention towards India, and neither there nor in England was 
alarm felt for her progress, and scarcely any suspicions entertained of her 
designs. During this period of apparent repose for the East, Russia was 
preparing far more powerful means for assailing it than she had ever possessed 
before, and that was by establishing her ascendancy over the Governments, 
policy, and opinions of Europe. The Holy Alliance and the struggle of 
principles, legitimate and liberal—the convulsions of the Peninsula—and the 
association of France in her ambitious designs—were the results obtained 
by her within the first seven years of peace. These led to the dismemberment 
of the Ottoman Empire—to the binding of England to her in that object by 
the protocol of St. Petersburgh of 1826. Having committed all parties, and 
every state in Europe against Turkey, she was prepared to venture on the 
Persian war, for which she had kept open the occasion and the pretext for 
the twelve previous years. 

During the same interval she was gradually levelling the barriers that 
practically opposed her passage Eastward, by continuous assaults and murderous 
expeditions against the independent tribes of the Caucasus, and more 
particularly those on the borders of the Caspian Sea. In the year 1826 she 



108 


was thus prepared by the ascendancy secured in Europe, by the paralyzing of 
the Ottoman Empire, by the distraction of the Persian state, and by the 
amount of military means accumulated within her own frontier, where she 
was enabled to concentrate all her attention and her strength—to attack and 
to triumph over Persia. 

This event first awakened uneasiness in England and alarm in the Indian 
Government. 

In the course of the following year, the Governor-General of India, then 
resident in the Upper Provinces, sought to open communications, and to 
establish relations of friendship, with the States intervening between the 
British and the Persian territory. The nearest of these was Lahore. The 
Indian Government inquired no farther—neither recognised in itself the 
ignorance which would have led it to gather in extensive information before 
adopting any plan whatever—nor admitted in its policy a specific object, 
which would have imposed upon it the necessity of order, system, and of the 
study of the means by which men have become great, and nations made to 
prosper and to flourish. The Indian Government, suddenly alarmed, because 
it had not anticipated events, suddenly rushes into the arms of a foe, because 
that foe had measured its mind so well as to speak to it of friendship. 

From the year 1828, the alliance of the British Government with 
Runjeet Singh commenced, and this bandit chieftain has stealthily proceeded 
to render the British power at once his dupe and his instrument, until finally 
it came (as the Government at home in respect to Russia) to identify itself 
with him against justice, right, and honour—against its friends, its allies 
and itself. 

On the year in which the diplomatic correspondence commences (1834), 
the Secretary of the Indian Government, in a work which issued from the 
Calcutta press, informs us that the Government in India anticipated, as a 
consequence of the successes of the war of 1826-7 of Russia against Persia, 
and as the result of a new succession to the Crown, that Persia should 
virtually become Russian, and that it was the idea of danger to India flowing 
from this change that led to the union with the Chief of Lahore, and to 
the other measures of exploration or of policy adopted by the Indian 
Government. 

Thus while the Government at home admitted a union of interests 


109 


between Great Britain and Russia—while it admitted a concert of policy— 
while it established unreserved communication of its own views to the 
Russian Government, and commanded confidential communication on the part 
of the British Envoy at Teheran, to the Envoy of Russia,—was the English 
Administration in India feeling alarm, and taking measures to avert the 
consequences of this concerted policy. While Lord Palmerston, in Downing 
Street, declares that the interests of England and Russia are one —the 
official announcement is made on the borders of the Ganges of the measures 
taken to avert from India the storm of Russian invasion—the menace of which 
had already been officially proclaimed on the banks of the Neva ! 

The Indian Government thus assumed a line of opposition to the policy 
of the Government at home—that is to say to the designs of Russia, not 
indeed understanding the concert that existed. We are, consequently, to 
expect that in the measures it will adopt, it will be misled, and that the steps 
it will take and the efforts it will make, will be conducive to these designs. 

What could the Indian Government do, it may be asked, to serve 
the interests of Russia more than it had done ? It had violated the laws and 
customs, the financial and administrative habits, and the etiquette of the 
natives. It had neither preserved, as the Moguls, the native administration— 
nor introduced a system of law or administration of its own—consequently it 
had, and could have, no hold on the affections of India: and India, as 
heretofore, was—there, to be accepted by the invader that could touch its 
soil. In regard to the external defences of India, what, it may be asked, 
could the Government do more for Russia than it had done ? Had it not 
remained wholly inert, wholly ignorant of every interest, population, or state 
intervening between the territories of Russia and of British India ? There 
was a further service for the Indian Government to render to Russia. 
Successful as might be her intrigues with these populations through the 
neglect of Great Britain—widely different were the results to be attained by 
unjust acts and ineffectual attempts on the part of Great Britain. Not to be 
right in acting was far more dangerous than to have been wholly inert; and 
England passed from inertness which was injurious, to actions which, unless 
arrested and reversed, will bring the downfall of the British Dominion. 

The policy which the Indian Government adopted, under the apprehension 
of Russia, and of course under the indirect influence of the Foreign Secretary 


110 


in London, was strict alliance with the chief of the Sikhs. This, I conceive, 
to have been the root of all the evil, and the source of all the danger. 

The Sikhs, unlike the Rohillas, the AfFghans, the Persians and Turkmen, 
the Rajpoots, are no race of date and name—they boast no ancient splendour, 
no traditional dignity: as a race or a Government, they are mean and 
contemptible in the eyes of all Asia. They are of yesterday—they have 
risen as bandits, nor has a single tombstone yet effaced the freshness of their 
usurpation. They are detested alike by Mussulman and Hindoo—feared 
alike (that is, feared as plunderers) by the subject and the neighbour of the 
British power. Such is the people with which England binds itself—such the 
race whose ruler the Governor-General of India exhibits to the eyes of the 
Indian world as the equal of the Representative of the Majesty of England— 
as the peer of the Depository of the authority of the Mogul! 

Had our alliance with Runjeet Singh been just and judicious in its 
intention, still would it have degraded the British character, and thereby 
injured the British power. It would have taken from us our character of 
religious toleration in India, and exhibited us through Central Asia as the 
enemy of the Mussulman; but when that alliance is unjust in its object as 
regards others, and injurious as regards the necessary hostility to England of 
the Sikh power, which we have elevated not only by our strength but by our 
degradation—then indeed does such an alliance reveal a degree of imbecility, 
or rather an amount of madness in the system from which it emanated which 
appears as the prelude to a nation’s fall, and such as never could exist without 
entailing ruin. 

We have to consider, therefore, the position of the Sikhs in respect to the 
AfFghans, and their own interest in regard to Great Britain. 

The Sikhs, who from a race of bandits and outlaws had for a century 
and a half been gradually increasing in strength, number, and importance, 
had been subject to the Mogul empire, and were included in the Affghan 
kingdom which Shah Ahmed had raised on the death of Nadir Shah. The 
AfFghans thus looked on the Sikhs as their subjects, and between the two 
races existed mutual hate and religious antipathy. 

After making himself master of the Sikh associations of freebooters, 
Runjeet Singh immediately applied himself to extend by conquest the limits 
of the Sikh principality, at the expense of the AfFghans. 


Ill 


In 1810 the expulsion of Shah Shooja from the throne of Cabool, and the 
consequent distraction of that state, emboldened him to attack its possessions 
in the Punjaub. He invested Multaum, and, strange to say, pretended to 
justify his assault, by declaring that he demanded it in the name of Shah 
Shooja. Three years after he succeeded, though with great difficulty, in 
inducing his Sikh followers to break through the old traditional horror of 
passing the limits of the Hindoo world. He led them across the Indus, and 
by bribing the Affghan Governor got possession of Atock* which has in all 
times been considered as the key of India. 

The next year he attempted, but in vain, the reduction of Cashmere, but 
it was not till 1819 that he obtained possession of that celebrated region, 
driving hence the Affghan commander and troops. In 1818, taking advantage 
of the troubles of Affghanistan produced again by the ill-starred Shah Shooja, 
he overran a portion of the Affghan territory, and occupied Pashawur, but 
was unable to retain it. In 1823 he repeated his visit, and again drove the 
garrison from Pashawur, but saw next day the elite of his forces cut down by 
four thousand Mussulman peasants. The possession of Pashawur proved so 
onerous, and in its pretensions so precarious, that Runjeet Singh, while 
asserting his claims of sovereignty over it, entrusted it to the keeping of an 
Affghan chief, and to one of the family of the Barukzyes, thus smoothing the 
way to eventual possession, and sowing dissensions through the Affghans and 
their rulers. 

Again, on the attempt of Shah Shooja to recover his throne in 1833, did 
Runjeet Singh overrun a portion of Affghanistan, and occupy Pashawur—he 
penetrated even to the Kayber Pass, and in 1836 received a memorable check, 
fifteen thousand of his troops having been defeated by two thousand Affghans*. 
His aggressions, it is needless to observe, were conducted without any of the 
formalities of war—without any of the forms that regulate intercourse with 
states, or without provocation on one side, or the shadow of justification on the 
other. 

Shah Shooja, after his discomfiture, was confined—tortured—plundered- 
by Runjeet Singh—and was suffered to make his escape, in the night, into the 

* It is in reference to this event that the Governor-General, in his proclamation of the first 
October, says, that Dost 'Mahomed had made a sudden and unprovoked attack upon our ancient 
ally . 



112 


British dominion, only because he had nothing more to give, and having signed 
a secret contract for the dismemberment of the Affghan territory*; but Runjeet 
Singh, wisely deeming that the support of such a pretender was not worth the 
cost, preferred allowing his claims to slumber till more powerful dupes could 
be used for their defence, and contented himself with the plunder he had 
extorted from the weak and deluded monarch, and with the possession of 
another Shah and another Pretender in the person of his brother Eyub. 

Thus the two important nations lying between the British possessions and 
Persia were in a state of mutual hostility, animated with strong national 
animosity, the one unjustly the aggressor, and aiming at the subjugation of the 
other. 

There was here, however, offered to England the high and beneficial 
position of arbitrator, by which peace and tranquillity might be established in 
Central Asia—the Affghan people attached to us, and the Sikhs rendered 
dependent upon us. For England to ally herself with either was to lose that 
station—to ally herself with the unjust was to do what an enemy alone could 
desire or devise; it was to make her the tool of the designing, and to drive 
the injured party to look throughout the world for patrons and defenders, and 
for that support which the hostility of England must bring, in that friendship 
which was to be found wherever there were foes of Great Britain. 

The topographic position of Affghanistan rendered it the first and the most 
important barrier against that danger which the Government of India 
apprehended. When on a former occasion Persia had joined Russia and 
France in a combined assault upon the dominions of Great Britain, England 
turned its eyes to Affghanistan as the barrier which it had to consolidate and 
elevate, and upon the strength and consistency of which it had to rely for the 
defence of India. Such was the policy to have been pursued upon the present 
occasion—such was the simple, the natural course to be adopted. The Indian 
Government had but to replace its foot in the same foot-print it had left—to 
revisit Cabool as a friend and as an ally, and that measure would have been 
the one by which, while securing the Affghans by protection, the Sikhs would 
have been equally secured by the curb placed on their injustice. 


* This is the Treaty which the British Government has subsequently revived, made its own—and 
taken as the basis of policy and its wars in Central Asia. 


113 


Now, let us examine the position of the Sikhs in regard to the British 
power in India. 

If India is to be defended from foreign aggression, it must be so defended 
in advance of the Indus. The occupation of the Punjaub and the whole Sikh 
territory, and consequently the downfall of the Sikh power, must precede any 
contest. The Sikh power is, therefore, the most inveterate and implacable 
foe of Great Britain. Runjeet Singh’s whole mind—the entire policy and 
power of the Sikh State—must be exerted to prevent you from being able 
to defend yourselves against an external foe. From this position we may 
deduce— 

First , That he has understood who is the foe whom you have to fear 
—that he has sought by every means to enlighten himself on that subject. 

Second , That Runjeet Singh having formed the estimate of our weak¬ 
ness, which was requisite for the belief that we would be attacked, must have 
considered the question of our expulsion from India. 

Third , Our blindness to his motives and to our own interests, and the 
extreme facility with which he has made us his dupe, must have taken away 
from him all respect for us, and consequently all belief in the permanence 
of our power, and thence immediately in his mind are evoked the vastest 
visions of ambition and the determined purpose of preparing alike to accom¬ 
plish our downfall, and to profit by the catastrophe. 

Let us see if his attitude and his acts justify this representation of his 
thoughts. Let us see if the attitude and the acts of the Indian Government. 
justify his estimate of its incapacity ? 

Runjeet Singh is menaced by no one—hut his military establishment is 
on a scale of attack—exceeding twice the amount of that of Tippoo Saib. For 
what purpose has it been created ? Was it a fact worthy of the attention, or 
calculated to awaken the suspicion, to call forth a decision on the part of the 
Indian Government ? Has it done so ? 

A former Indian Government had shaken with war the Peninsula, for 
the purpose of expelling French officers. The present Government saw no 
cause for apprehension in the placing of the Sikh troops under the direction 
of French officers. 

When Runjeet Singh made it a condition of introduction to his service 

Q 


114 


that the officers so introduced should not be British *, was the Indian Govern¬ 
ment led to conclude that he had objects hostile to Great Britain ? 

The Indian Government had accidentally discovered, in 1824, the exist¬ 
ence of communications between St. Petersburgh and Lahore. During the 
siege of Burtpoor, it became publicly known that Runjeet Singh had declared 
the moment was come for the expulsion of British power from India. Was 
the Indian Government led by such facts to consider the interests, the objects, 
or the character of the Sikh principality ? It considered nothing ; it perceived 
nothing. Every consideration which could have influenced a Government was 
cast aside, and every fact calculated to bring reflection to the unthinking— 
perception to the blind—passed by them unheeded, or rather seem to have 
confirmed in their minds convictions the very reverse of those which any 
reasoning being could have thence derived. 

Thus, without any conceivable object, without any intelligible motive, 
have you broken through every restraint of honour, of policy, of self-respect, 
and of justice, to strengthen a state in interest diametrically opposed to you— 
to ally yourselves to a Power directly hostile to you—to unite yourselves to a 
Government which must fall in the event of your defending yourselves against 
assault, and which has therefore a vital interest in preventing you from ever 
having the chance of defence. Thus have you allied yourselves with a people 
the natural enemies of your necessary bulwark—the Affghans, and the 
religious foe of the Mussulman defenders from without, and the Hindoo 
occupiers of India from within; and by this alliance have you driven the 
Affghans to seek open protection from St. Petersburgh, while you afford to the 
Sikhs the secret opportunity of concerting measures with that Power, render¬ 
ing them important in its eyes by your alliance. The Sikhs would be rendered 
Russian by the false policy of the Indian Government—they are rendered 
Russian by the Russian policy of Great Britain—they are Russian by their 
essential hostility to British interests, and by the mutual sympathies of races 


* “ It was only after many cautionary inquiries that they (Allard and Ventura) were allowed to 
enter the Punjaub, for Runjeet Singh had shown suspicion that they were English , nor was he in any 
way satisfied until a Vakeel (agent) employed by our Government at Lahore, had been sent to examine 
and report on the national character of the strangers/' 1 


115 


(the Sikh and the Muscovite) in whom resides a common character of religious 
and political aggression. 

In reviewing such transactions, it is difficult to exclude the hope that some 
Englishmen may be brought to feel that knowledge is necessary to national 
prosperity and existence—that it is impossible to understand the position of 
England in any portion of the globe without understanding its interests every 
where, and that the action of any separate part of the Government is value¬ 
less, even if good, unless the whole acts as one system. This cannot be 
effected unless you have men instructed in those matters which pertain to 
public rights and duties; and if this be not so, sooner or later, national 
downfall must ensue, from a neglect of the means of acquiring this knowledge. 
For my own part, I am convinced that nothing now which England can do, 
can prolong her national existence, unless she devotes a few young men to 
that apprenticeship of diplomacy requisite to unravel the web she has wove 
around her, and so as to render her public servants a match for those with 
whom they have to deal. How has Russia risen from what she was—how has 
England sunk to what she is ? The first has studied, the second has neglected 
to study, men, laws, and nations. Why has the Government of India hurried 
us into this alarming position in central Asia ? Because it had no knowledge 
of the relations in which Russia and England stood. Had it known that 
Russia and England were in strict and concerted alliance at the very moment 
that it was taking these steps to oppose her—if it had known that England 
was sacrificing her political rights and interests—the property of her subjects, 
and the independence of foreign states, to further the views of Russia—if it 
had been aware that the English Minister was doing this knowingly and 
systematically, and while he was collusively disguising from the British public 
and Parliament the acts which he was performing—if it had known that the 
English Minister was lending this collusive, secret, and effective support to 
Russia in every transaction in which the two Cabinets were involved, and in 
every interest in which Russia directly or indirectly came into opposition with 
Great Britain,—if, I say, the Indian Government had known this, it would 
certainly not have thought of any other means for counteracting the action of 
Russia than by coming to an explanation with the Foreign Office, and 
meeting the evil there at its source. Had it understood the power of 
diplomacy, a knowledge of which was a duty imposed upon its fortunes and 
its station, it would have comprehended that proximity and distance weigh 


116 


relatively little in the secret influences that command the world, and that a 
state that holds the existence of others in her hand—that a power that can 
influence the motives of Statesmen and of Governments, can effect without 
the appearance of action, and can advance without putting herself in motion. 
It was not, therefore, by an alliance with Lahore, or by conquest of 
Affghanistan—it was not by any policy in Persia—it was not by explora¬ 
tions of the Indus, or expeditions in Transoxiana, that the power of 
Russia was to be curbed, or the integrity of the British power and character 
to be maintained. It was by the direct action of Great Britain upon Russia 
—it was by the estimate in the Russian Cabinet of the knowledge, integrity, 
and capacity of that of Great Britain, that Russia could desist from an 
endeavour which then she would feel to be hopeless. If India therefore 
required to be protected against Russia by England, how was India to be pro¬ 
tected by Lahore or Affghanistan against England and Russia united ? 

It may appear foreign to the subject with which we are at present occupied 
thus to refer to the mental character of Great Britain—but the position of all 
the interests with which we have to deal is comprehensible only through the 
knowledge of the character of England—a subject less understood in this 
country even than India. 

[“ Here I omit an analysis of the documents in which each of the foregoing conclusions is 
established ; it will appear when these papers are printed collectively. The documents examined in 
this excluded Part refer to the expedition of Shah Shooja in 1833-4, put forth by the Government as 
explanatory of the objects of the late expedition to set that pretender on the throne of Cabool. 
The summary is as follows :— 

“ Thus did the result of this struggle prove in every respect the erroneousness of the estimate of 
Captain Wade (whose bias in favour of Runjeet Singh seems to have been the spring of our Indian 
policy), of the characters of men and the tendency of events. It showed the absence of any strength 
in the party supporting Shah Shooja, of any capacity in that Prince—it proved a determined spirit 
in the Affghans against him—exhibited great ability in Dost Mahommed—and raised the man whom it 
was the particular object of the expedition to overthrow, as of Captain Wade to vilify, to a position 
of decided pre-eminence. It exhibited Runjeet Singh as the mover of the enterprise for objects 
concealed from the British Government—it revealed his unjust designs against the Affghan—it 
brought to light the treaty of partition arranged between himself and Shah Shooja—it exhibited the 
strong political and religious animosities subsisting between the two nations, and the madness of any 
Power that should seek to gain influence in Affghanistan by allying itself with the Sikhs. Yet this 
experience was without fruits, and these results without value on the Indian Government; and the 
subsequent conduct of that Government would lead one to suppose that conclusions, the very reverse 
of the truth, were drawn by it from this experience, and that, despite these lamentable failures, it con¬ 
sidered the views of its agent, not injudicious, the capacity of Shah Shooja not contemptible, and the 
policy of Runjeet Singh not hostile to Great Britain.”] 


117 


PART X. 

RELATIONS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WITH DOST MAHOMMED. 

1836—1838. 


In the last Part I have shown that the Sikh power (occupying the 
Punjaub of which Lahore is the capital, and whose ruler was Runjeet Singh) 
was by its character and position essentially hostile to the British dominion in 
India. I have shown that the British Government was perfectly unconscious 
of the interests of the Sikhs, and of the objects of Runjeet Singh—that it had 
become the dupe of that Chief, and had lent to him the means of becoming 
important in the eyes of India and of Asia, and formidable to others and 
to us. 

I have shown that the Sikhs had risen by usurpation upon the Affghans 
—that they were religious foes to the Mussulman—that their hostility was 
lawless robbery, unsanctioned by any form, and unveiled by any pretext. 
That the Sikhs had been supported by the alliance of the British Government, 
and that the Affghans consequently had been compelled to consider England 
their foe, and had turned round and looked to Saint Petersburgh for protec¬ 
tion. I have further said that this procedure of the Indian Government must 
be attributed to the influence exercised over it by the Foreign Secretary in 
London, in pursuance of the secret concert of that Minister with Russia. 

We have now to see if the conduct of the Indian Government in its direct 
relations with the Affghans, justifies the above conclusion. If there, also, it 
has taken steps which were just, prudent, or politic—if it has even taken 
steps which were simple, natural, and intelligible, we will have grounds to 
doubt the justice of the inference we have drawn from those parts of its con¬ 
duct hitherto examined. But if we find the steps which it takes directly with 
the Affghans also to be unjust, inexpedient, and injurious ; and if, moreover, 
we find these steps to have been neither simple nor natural, nor in themselves 
intelligible—then of course, will the previous inference be strengthened and 
confirmed, and, indeed, the supposition of a secret and hostile influence will 
be requisite to render its policy comprehensible. 


118 


Before proceeding to the question immediately before us, it may be 
advisable briefly to sketch the general position of the Affghan people. 

The Affghans, it has been already observed, are of a race supposed to be 
Jewish. They have been considered, and they not uncommonly consider 
themselves the lost tribes of Israel ; they are Mahommedans of the Sooni 
sect (to which the Turks belong), which is hostile to the Shea sect, which is 
composed of Persians. They inhabit a region extending from East to West 
about six hundred miles: that is from Herat to the banks of the Indus, and 
four to five hundred miles from North to South from the Parapamisan range 
to the deserts that border the Arabian sea. They amount to about six 
millions of souls; they are warlike, enduring, enterprising, and faithful to 
their blood and leaders. They appear first of importance in the history of the 
East, and of the world, in the eleventh century, when the Ghisnivide dynasty 
arose, and made Hindostan for years the field of its forays, until it became 
subject to lines of Emperors of Affghan origin. The Moguls or Tartars then 
appeared upon the scene of Central Asia, the power of the Affghans was 
broken in their own territory, but their stock, transplanted to India, enabled 
Hindostan successfully to withstand, during two centuries, the assaults of the 
northern warriors, and to repel, from the year 1202 to 1305, twelve attempted 
invasions of India, which constitute the only successful attempts at resistance 
made by India from the time of Alexander; though five and forty times have 
hostile banners crossed the Indus. Humayoun, the son of Baber, in the 
sixteenth century yielded, though but for a short time, the imperial diadem of 
Hindostan to an Affghan. From the period of the restoration of Humayoun 
the Affghans in India became the prop of the Mogul dominion, and the 
Affghans in their own territory fell under the influence, and finally the dominion 
of Persia. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, encouraged by the 
aggressions as by the policy of Peter, they revolted against the Shah of Persia, 
Tamsab, and allied themselves with the Russians, at once for the destruction 
of Persia and for the invasion of India. Nadir Shah thwarted their projects, 
restoring the Persian power, reduced the Affghans to submission, and rendered 
them subservient to his conquest of India. On the death of Nadir Shah the 
Affghan kingdom was again reconstructed by Ahmed Shah. Ahmed Shah 
invaded India eight or nine times. In 1752 he added the Punjaub to the 
Affghan kingdom. In the year 1752 he occupied Delhi, and contracted a 


119 


blood alliance with the Mogul Emperor. In 1760 he entered India to defend, 
in conjunction with his AfFghan brethren in India, the Mogul empire against 
the Sikhs and Marattas. 

In the first year of the present century, the AfFghan Shah, Zuman, crossed 
the Indus, advanced to Lahore, and then it was that the English Government 
allied itself with Persia for the purpose of saving India from AfFghan invasion. 

When, after the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia and France concerted the inva¬ 
sion of India, and brought Persia into alliance with themselves for that purpose, 
the Indian Government fell back upon the AfFghans as the only defence for 
India, and Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone was sent in 1809 to form a defensive 
alliance with Shah Shooja, then on the throne of that state. Immediately 
afterwards, Shah Shooja was expelled from his dominions by an internal revo¬ 
lution. A period of great disorder followed, during which Runjeet Singh raised 
himself upon the ruins of the AfFghans, and made himself master of the whole 
of the Punjaub and of Cashmere, and, crossing the Indus, occupied Pesliawur, 
one of the principalities of the AfFghan kingdom. The remaining principalities 
were Cabool, Kandahar, and Herat. Herat remained under the dominion of 
one of the Suddoyzees, a nephew of Shah Shooja, and son of Shah Mahmoud. 
Cabool, under Dost Mahommed, brother to the distinguished Futteh Khan, 
formerly the Vizir of more than one of the AfFghan kings, Kandahar was 
under the dominion of three other brothers of the same minister, and Pesha- 
wur was placed by Runjeet Singh under the governorship of one of the same 
family of the Barukzyes, who had become his dependent. 

From this sketch it will be at once perceived what enormous influence has 
been exercised over the fortunes of India by the AfFghan people in ancient as 
in recent times; it will be seen that from internal and external causes, the 
conciliation of their good-will is the first duty, and the first object of the 
policy of the Indian Government. It will be seen by a glance at the map, 
that in respect to any action of Russia upon India, the dispositions of this 
people are more immediately important than that of any other; and the facts 
recorded regarding the former alliance of the AfFghans with Peter show the 
view that Russia takes of this question. 

The India Board, as explanatory of its recent transactions with AfFghan- 
istan, and before making public the correspondence which had taken place with 
the mission in that country, had published (Indian papers, No. 3) extracts rela- 


120 


tive to the expedition of Shah Shooja, for the recovery of his throne in 1833 and 
1834. The Indian Government professed to take no ostensible part in this 
expedition; but the pension of Shah Shooja, as on his previous attempt in 
1818, was paid in advance to enable him to depart; and the reports made by 
Captain Wade, the resident of the Bengal Government, are entirely in favour 
of the projects of Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh. The expedition was 
undertaken in consequence of a treaty entered into between Shah Shooja and 
Runjeet Singh, which we shall have at a subsequent period more particularly 
to examine, which constituted Shah Shooja, if he recovered his throne, a mere 
vassal of Runjeet Singh, and cedes to him territory still possessed by the 
Alfghans, or over which the Affghan kingdom still possessed rights equal in 
extent to Great Britain. Runjeet Singh may therefore be considered as the 
party chiefly interested in the expedition of Shah Shooja, and the Secretary 
of the English Government, on the 5th March, 1833, declared that the interests 
of the British Government and of Runjeet Singh, “ are considered as iden- 
“ tical.” Although, by a letter of the same date, the same functionary instructs 
Captain Wade as follows : 

“ Should an impression exist in any quarter that the British Government feel otherwise than 
indifferent as to the movements of the Shah, you will do your utmost to remove it.” 

And Lord William Bentinck, on the 30th of April of the same year, 
writes thus to Runjeet Singh : 

“ Your Highness states that Shah Shooja intends to make another attempt for the recovery of 
his throne. This is a matter with which the British Government has no concern, and has therefore 
taken no pains to inquire into it. The Shah’s success, or otherwise, depends upon the will of Provi¬ 
dence, and the favourable disposition, or otherwise, of the inhabitants of that quarter.” 

The Indian Government on the one hand, identifying itself with Runjeet 
Singh, and on the other affording a real countenance to Shah Shooja, pretended, 
it is true, to be no otherwise than indifferent, and asserted with greater truth 
that it had taken no pains to inquire into that to which it had become a party. 

<£ Captain Wade states, on the 17th of June, 1834, that he had been £ endeavouring to obtain a 
copy of the Treaty concluded between Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh, but without success, neither 
party being inclined to show it to me. On expressing a wish to see it, I was referred from one to the 
other, without obtaining a sight of it from either.’ ” 

Yet, on the 21st of November, 1831, he had transmitted the proposition 
for that Treaty by Runjeet Singh, and the reply on the partof Shah Shooja, 


121 


stating the articles which he agreed to, and the articles to which he objected. 
The projects of Runjeet Singh and of Shah Shooja were, however, discomfitted, 
and the last communication from Captain Wade contained this expression : 

“ Dost Mahommed, in point of fact, may now be considered to have asserted his right to the 
throne of Cabool, and is acknowledged by the people as their leader.” 

This was in the beginning of the year 1835. A despatch of the Court of 
Directors of 20th of September, 1837, and having reference to communications 
from the Governor-General, from the date of July 2, 1832, up to the 17th of 
March, 1836, and having therefore reference to the whole of the proceedings 
connected with this expedition, says : 

“ With respect to the states West of the Indus, you have uniformly observed the proper course, 
which is to have no political connection with any state or party in those regions—to take no part in 
their quarrels.” 

In the meantime, the aggressions of Runjeet Singh against the A Afghans 
continued, as also the identification of the British power with Runjeet Singh. 

The Indian Government, nevertheless, is convinced that the Affghan people 
is the most important barrier for India, and the only remaining one since 
Persia has been lost; it has the proof before it that Dost Mahommed is the 
only man of action and of value in that region—he has raised himself, in the 
midst of most difficult circumstances, to a station of pre-eminence, and almost 
to one of royalty. The ablest servant of the British Crown represents him 
as the man on whom England has to rely. Mr. M c Neill had so emphatically 
declared it to be his conviction that the Affghan people and government were 
entirely at your disposal, that in recommending the sending of an expeditionary 
force to Herat, far from contemplating the opposition of the Affghans to the 
passage of those troops, he suggests that the assistance and the services of the 
Affghans should be refused. Every thing, therefore, was within your reach 
which it could be an object to desire. 

But it would appear that the Indian Government, when first it took steps 
with regard to Affghanistan, had admitted that the grounds of its interference 
was to give security to Dost Mahommed—knowing that Dost Mahommed 
would be compelled to appeal to Russia against the violence of the Sikhs, 
unless England did afford him that support. Yet, strange to say, taking these 
grounds of judgment, and these motives of action, it ended in conclusions and 
in results exactly the reverse. It added, by its interference, to the insecurity 

R 


122 


of Dost Mahommed, which its own strict alliance with the Sikhs had created, 
and which it was the object of its interference to avert. That the Indian 
Government did so enter into this negotiation is proved by the following 
passage which has appeared in the 127th number of the Quarterly Review, 
in an able and elaborate article, which constitutes the only defence which has 
appeared of the policy of the Government in this transaction, and which is 
generally attributed to Sir John M‘Neill: 

“ When the Government of India felt itself called upon by the proceedings of Persia, in concert 
with Russia, to deviate from the rule which it had hitherto prescribed to itself of not interfering in the 
political affairs of Affghanistan, it appears to have contemplated the adjustment of the differences 
between Dost Mahommed and the Sikhs, in such a manner as would afford security to the Affghan 
chief, as the first step to be taken for promoting the tranquillity of Affghanistan and the prosperity 
of commerce, as well as with the view of defeating the intrigues of Persia and Russia in those 
parts. And as the only object of Dost Mahommed Khan, in seeking alliances with foreign courts, 
appeared to be protection against the Sikhs, it was not unreasonable to presume, that any 
arrangement which should ensure to him that protection, would meet the difficulties which had 
led him to court a foreign alliance, and would therefore remove the only inducement which he 
appeared to have to form connections which might ultimately prove to be injurious to our interests. 
The Government of India, therefore, authorised Captain Burnes to tender its good offices, with a 
view to the adjustment, on equitable terms, of the differences between Dost Mahommed and the 
Sikhs; but coupled with this proposal was a condition that the chief of Cabool, in consideration 
of the friendly intervention of the British Government to effect this object, should renounce all 
connection with the Governments to the westward—that is, with Persia and Russia,—except with the 
concurrence of England. 1 ’ 


The Government of India then felt that the aggression of the Sikhs was 
the cause of the dread of the Affghans for England—and it considered 
alliance with Russia as the consequence of misunderstanding with England. 
We have on record on the one hand the conviction of the Indian Govern¬ 
ment that Dost Mahommed was driven into the arms of Russia by the 
aggressions of the Sikhs, and you see on the other that the means which that 
Government has taken to counteract that alliance was by making itself a party 
to the secret compact of partition of Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh ! 

We have the Indian Government declaring the hostility of Russia to it, 
and its hostility to Russia, and you have the Foreign Minister in London, 
declaring that the interests of Great Britain and Russia are one. The 
Indian Government shows that it has to afford security to Dost Mahommed 
against Runjeet Singh, and then declares that its “ interests are identified” 


123 


with those of Runjeet Singh. Such a Government, even if not placed in this 
position by previous collusion, must be the mere dupe and instrument of any 
and every power with which it comes in contact. 

Mr. Macnaghten, on April 10th, 1837, says:— 

“ The circumstance of the British Government having resolved decidedly to discourage the 
prosecution by Shah Shooja of further schemes against Cabool and Kandahar, may be found the 
means of useful influence in our favour.” 

Take this single passage alone—look at its terms—compare its statement 
with subsequent facts: —was ever such an exhibition of weakness, vacillation, 
and dishonesty made voluntarily public by a Government ? And yet there 
is no public denunciation of such proceedings, no arrestation of transactions 
so fatal and so anomalous. There is carelessness alike for the mismanage¬ 
ment that precedes, and for the catastrophes that follow. To live from day 
to day seems the only thought of the state, and disasters and misfortunes 
seem rather coveted than deplored, because to one party they afford the 
means of factious triumph—to the general frivolity of the nation the interest 
of novelty and the excitement of news. 

The Government proposes to arrest the dangers of the connection of 
Russia with Affghanistan by imposing upon Affghanistan the condition of 
renouncing all intercourse with Russia. If the Indian Government had 
prevented the cause of the evil, there was no necessity to stipulate that the 
evil should not exist; and if it did not, the stipulation was worse than useless, 
because it was a declaration of failure ; it was, farther, an exhibition of its 
fears as a Government, and of its incapacity as men. But it is of more 
worth than this in the examination of the subject; it shows that the Indian 
Government did not honestly enter into the line which it assumed; and 
contaminated and debased by its alliance with Runjeet Singh, how could it 
have confidence in its policy, or honesty in its professions ? The stipulation 
was, further, in itself monstrous. It was a stipulation which, had it been 
entered into by the party to whom it was proposed, could, with the utmost 
impunity, have been violated; it was a stipulation which any state was 
justified in violating, from its being in contravention to the duties of indepen¬ 
dent powers, to the rights of sovereignty, and the law of nations*. While 


* See in Part IV. the Treaty between Persia and England, respecting the Aftghans. 


124 


the Indian Government attempts to impose on the Affghans an obligation to 
hold no intercourse with Persia—Lord Palmerston instructs the British 
Envoy at Teheran that England was prohibited by her public faith from 
interfering in any way between the Persians and the Affghans ! 

The following letter* from Dost Mahommed to the Emperor of Russia, 
about the beginning of 1836, is the first communication between St. Peters- 
burgh and Cabul. 

44 There have been great differences and quarrels between myself and the Royal House of the 
Suddozyes. The English Government is inclined to support Shooja-ool-Moolk. The whole of 
India is governed by them, and they are on friendly terms with Runjeet Singh , the Lord of the 
Punjaub, which lies in their neighbourhood. The British Government exhibit no favourable 
opinions towards me. 

44 I, with all my power, have been always fighting with the Sikhs. 

44 Your Imperial Government has made friendship with the Persians; and if your Majesty will 
graciously be pleased to arrange matters in the Affghan country, and assist this nation (which 
amounts to twenty lacs of families), you will place me under obligations. 

44 I hope your Imperial Majesty will do me the favour by allowing me to be received, like the 
Persians, under the protection of the Government of Russia, under your Royal protection. I can 
perform, along with my Affghans, various praiseworthy services. 

44 That will be highly proper, whatever your Imperial Majesty may be pleased to do.” 

The arrival of a new Governor-General then awakened the expectation 
of a change of policy, and Dost Mahommed addresses a letter to Lord 
Auckland, of which the following is an extract (March 31st, 1836):— 

44 The late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and misguided Sikhs, and their 
breach of treaty, are well known to your Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest 
itself to your wisdom, for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for 
my guidance. 

44 I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your own, and favour me often by 
the receipt of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to issue for 
the administration of this country, I will act accordingly.” 

On the 22nd August, Lord Auckland replies, and writes :— 

44 I have learned with deep regret that dissensions exist between yourself and Maharajah Runjeet 
Singh. My friend, you are av r are that it is not the practice of the British Government to interfere 

* The documents we are now proceeding to analyse, although they constitute one and the same 
correspondence, are separated into two parts , so that, without much labour, it is impossible to under¬ 
stand even that which is apparently made public. 


125 


with the affairs of other independent states; and indeed it does not immediately occur to me how the 
interference of my Government could be exercised for your benefit. I shall be happy, however, to 
learn from you by what means you think that I can be of any assistance; and, in the meantime, 
I have only to hope that you will be able to devise some mode of effecting a reconciliation with the 
Sikhs; it being not only for your own advantage, but for the advantage of all the countries in the 
vicinity, that two nations so situated should ever preserve unimpaired the relations of amity and 
concord. 

“ Begging that you will accept my renewed assurance of friendship and regard.” 

The Governor-General then determines on sending Captain Burnes to 
Cabool, for the objects already explained; namely, that of affording Dost 
Mahommed that protection against the Sikhs which he had sought from 
St. Petersburgh. He, consequently, writes to him a letter (May 15, 1837), in 
which he says :— 

“ To your enlightened mind it cannot fail to be obvious that it is commerce alone which enables 
the people of one country to exchange its superfluous commodities with those of another.” 

In September 1837, Captain Burnes arrived at Cabool, and on the 24th 
of that month thus describes his reception by Dost Mahommed :— 

“ We were conducted into the city by Sirdar Mahommed Akbar Khan, with great demonstration 
of respect and joy, and, immediately on our arrival, presented to the Ameer, whose reception was of 
the most gratifying nature. 

“ On the following day I had the honour to deliver my letter of credentials, which the Ameer 
received in a very flattering manner, with many expressions of his high sense of the great honour 
which had been conferred on him, in his at last having had the means of communication with an 
officer of the British Government, for which he felt deeply grateful to the Governor-General. 

“ I have good reason to believe Dost Mahommed Khan will set forth no extravagant pretensions, 
and act in such a manner as will enable the British Government to show its interest in his behalf, and 
at the same time preserve for us the valued friendship of the Sikh Chief.'” 

On the 4th of October he writes : 

“ That an agent from Persia had been sent with robes and presents in return for the previous 
application made by Dost Mahommed to the Shah of Persia, and is now at Candahar; but he has 
appeared at a time most unfavourable to his master, when the attention of the British Government 
is directed to Affghanistan, and which goes far to discredit him with all parties, and even to damp 
the hopes of the Kuzzilbashes. It is even doubtful if he will advance to Cabool; and it is certain if 
he does so, that any offers which he may make will never be placed in the balance against those of 
the British Government.” 

Next day (5th October) he reports an interview with Dost Mahommed, 
of which the following are extracts :— 

“ ‘ But,’ said the Ameer, ‘ I am involved in difficulties which are very prejudicial to commerce; 
my hostilities with the Sikhs narrow my resources, compel me to take up money from merchants, and 


126 


to even increase the duties to support the expenses of war. These are the shifts to which I am 
driven, for seeking to preserve my honour. While we were engaged in resisting Shooja-ool-Moolk at 
Candahar, the city of Peshawur was seized from our family, and I had the mortification to discover, 
among the papers of the ex-king, after his defeat, a treaty that made Peshawur the reward of the 
Sikhs, and to hurl me and mine from authority. I was yet left; but when Runjeet Singh’s officers 
planted a fort near the Khyber Pass, my existence was endangered ; I resisted, and here also with 
success.’ *********** 

“ I strongly urged him to reflect on the uselessness of seeking to contend with so potent a 
Prince as Maharajah Runjeet Singh (!) I stated the revenue of that chief, the great abilities 
which he possessed, the riches at his command, the fine army which he could bring into the field, the 
hopelessness of warring with him, and the injuries which he inflicted on himself and his people, 
by allowing himself to be drawn into hostilities, and, though the fortune of war had, of late, granted 
success to his arms, and his formidable opponent Huree Singh was no more, I could assure him, as a 
well-wisher, that he was contending with a Power which he could not resist, and that it would be 
prudent to seek for such an adjustment of differences as would preserve his own reputation, and that 
of his countrymen. ********* 

“ Dost Mahommed ran over the history of the Dooraunee kingdom, expatiating on its powers, 
which extended from Meshid to Cashmere, and pointing to the house in which he sat, said, that this 
is the whole share of that vast empire that has fallen to me, and I cannot therefore be indifferent to 
the honour of having communication with an agent of the British Government, nor to seeking, by 
every means I can, to interest it in my behalf. ****** 

“ I pointed out that Peshawur was an undoubted conquest of the Sikhs, made bv the sword, 
preserved by it; and to interfere with which would be a, violation of justice, and the integrity* of 
Runjeet Singh's dominions. I continued, however, that there was a rumour very current in Peshawur, 
and which has also reached me, that the Maharajah intended to make some change in the management 
of Peshawur, but that it sprung from himself, and not the British Government. 

“ He also asked of me the relations between the British Government and Russia ; the influence 
of Russia over the dominions of Turkey; and spoke of the control which Russia exercised over the 
trade in Toorkistan ." 1 


Dost Mahommed thus saw that the British were entirely the dupes of 
Runjeet Singh, that they were unconscious of all that was preparing in Central 
Asia. 

Lord Auckland, on the 21st January, had despatched a letter to Dost 
Mahommed by which all the hopes of protection against the Sikhs were cut off. 

The following are extracts :— 

“ In regard to Peshawur, truth compels me to urge strongly on you to relinquish the idea of 
obtaining the government of that territory. From the generosity of his nature, and his regard for 
his old alliance with the British Government, Maharajah Runjeet Singh has acceded to my wish for the 


* Nevertheless in the subsequent Treaty between the English Government and Runjeet Singh 
and Shah Shooja, the latter is made to cede Peshawur to Runjeet Singh. 


cessation of strife and the promotion of tranquillity, if you should behave in a less mistaken manner 
towards him. It becomes you to think earnestly on the mode in which you may effect a reconciliation 
with that powerful prince to whom my nation is united by the direct bonds of friendship, and to 
abandon hopes which cannot be realised. 

“ Should you be dissatisfied with the aid I have mentioned from this Government, which is all 
that I think can in justice be granted, or should you seek connexion with other Powers, without my 
approbation, Captain Burnes, and the gentlemen accompanying him, will retire from Cabool, where 
his further stay cannot be advantageous; and I shall have to regret my inability to continue my 
influence in your favour with the Maharajah.” 

On the 13th March, 1838, Captain Burnes reports the result of this 
communication :— 

“ In the forenoon of the 5th I had a visit from the Nawab Jubber Khan, who came over from the 
Durbar, by the Ameer’s request, with a string of propositions, which were to be agreed to by me, as 
the terms on which the Ameer consented to what was asked of him. These consisted of a promise to 
protect Cabool and Candahar from Persia ; of the surrender of Peshawur by Runjeet Singh; of the 
interference of our Government to protect, at that city, those who might return to it from Cabool, 
supposing it to be restored to Sultan Mahommed Khan ; with several other proposals. 

“ I at once informed the Nawab that I would agree to none of the terms proposed ; that I was 
astonished to hear a race so illustrious as the Dooraunees, who had carried their sword to Ispahan and 
Delhi, imploring protection against Persia —(The British Agent is astonished that the Affghans 
should apply to England for support—he is indignant at such a thing, reproaches and denounces them 
for it) “ that as for Peshawur, it belonged to our ancient ally, the ruler of Lahore, and he alone could 
surrender it, and that as for protecting those who returned from Cabool, supposing the Maharajah to 
make a settlement, it was an after concern, which it was now useless to discuss, as well as the other 
matters stated, since the Ameer seemed so little disposed to attend to the views of the British 
Government, and, what was of more importance, his own interests. 

“ I abridged the interview by stating that, as I saw no hope of adjustment in the present tone 
held, I should request my dismissal and proceed to Hindostan, where they might solicit, but probably 
in vain, another listening to their grievances. The Nawab left me in sorrow.” 

Captain Burnes then formally asks leave to withdraw, saying, “ to remain 
“ longer here fetters the Ameer.” 

Another conference takes place, he describes Dost Mahommed as more 
gracious and more friendly than ever—he states that Dost Mahommed 
declares to him that he “ could not stand for a month against the British, and 
“ the thought of their displeasure filled him with terror.” 

“ ‘ He knew,’ he says, ‘ that the Maharajah was our friend, and that we would not attack him ; 
but we had it in our power to rescue Peshawur, as we had rescued Shikarpore, not by arms, but by 
a single hint to the ruler of Lahore; that, on the contrary, we had avowed our being more than ever 
friendly to him; had preferred him to the Affghans, who were willing to do us service.” 


128 


In the meantime the Emperor of Russia acknowledges the previous 
communications of Dost Mahommed, and sends not only letters but an agent 
—not only proffers of sympathy but of money. 

Dost Mahommed, however, declined this overture, in the expectation of 
a change in the policy of England. The chiefs of Kandahar, likewise, were 
far from grasping at the Russian and Persian proposals ; but as to the line 
which they would ultimately adopt, there could be from the origin no doubt 
whatever, England having associated on the one hand with the Sikhs, and on 
the other with Russia ; while she gave to Russia’s hostility a dangerous effect 
by every where revealing apprehension of her. The chiefs of Cabool and 
Candahar saw Persia connected with Russia advancing upon Herat. They 
saw in that expedition an open defiance of British power. They therefore had 
only to obtain similar support to be able to meOt her with similar defiance. 
Russia and Persia meanwhile could both threaten and promise. Russia 
required not to threaten in words, since within a few months they had seen her 
overleap a thousand miles, and directing the siege operations before Herat. 
She could also promise all that the weakness or the avarice, that the ambition 
and the credulity of these rulers or populations might desire or accept. Then, 
as regards the Sikhs and the Persians, she could offer protection against both. 
It is under such circumstances that the initiatory step is taken by Russia. A 
Polish Lieutenant, who had been degraded and sent to Siberia, was released 
for this service, and with hope held out to him of restoration in case of 
success. This officer proceeded as the aide-de-camp of the Governor of 
Orenburg to visit Central Asia, charged at once with letters from the Russian 
Minister at Teheran, and from the Persian Government; and, moreover, the 
bearer of letters from the Minister of Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburgli, and 
from the Emperor himself! “ The object of the Russian Envoy,” as explained 
by Dost Mahommed’s agent at Teheran, “ is to have a road for the Russians 
“ to the English, for which they are anxious.” This mission came to assert 
to Dost Mahommed that the great European power of Russia was interested 
in his welfare—that it was disposed to assist him against the Sikhs. What 
impression could Dost Mahommed, or any Asiatic, draw from this assertion 
except this—that Russia had the power of defying the vengeance of England ? 
Lieutenant Vickovitch had, further, to proffer pecuniary assistance to Dost 
Mahommed, to urge him to renounce all connection with England, and to 


129 


induce him to connect himself in alliance with Persia and Russia, whom he 
represented as one. Captain Burnes thus announces to the Indian Govern ¬ 
ment this extraordinary and startling intelligence :— 

(Extract.) “ Cabool, 20th December, 1837. 

“ I have the honour to report, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General 
of India in Council, a very extraordinary piece of intelligence of the arrival in this city yesterday of 
an agent direct from Russia. 

“ On the 11th instant, I received a notification of his approach. A circumstance of so unusual a 
nature prevented my sending off an express to you till I could be better informed.” 

A few days later, Sir A. Burnes details the offers to Dost Mahommed of 
the Russian agent, and gives utterance to his alarms at the altered state of 
affairs, and at such a step as this taken by Russia. 

To this communication of Sir Alexander Burnes, the reply of the 
Government of India is—“ His Lordship” (the Governor-General) “ attaches 
little immediate importance to this mission of the Russian agent to the 
“ westward . r ' 

The Governor-General “attaches little immediate importance” to a circum¬ 
stance which within the same letter is stated to involve the contingency of the 
expulsion of the British mission from an independent state ! The Governor- 
General then directs that this mission should be assumed to have been a 
commercial one. There was no necessity for such an assumption if it had 
been real, and no possibility of its being so assumed if it were not so. The 
Governor-General proceeds then to threaten in case the Ameer does not 
dismiss the mission to which he attaches no importance, and his threat is— 
cessation of our good offices with the Sikhs; that is to say, that he threatened 
to withdraw that which had no existence, and this again was tantamount to a 
threat of letting loose the Sikhs upon the Affghans, while by the avowal of the 
Government itself it was the alarm of the Affghans for the Sikhs which had 
led Dost Mahommed to open intercourse with Russia. It suffices hut to take 
up any single document connected with the British Government in India to 
perceive in the confusion of its sentences, as in the contradiction of its state¬ 
ments, mental characters which never yet have been associated with success 
—to feel alarm for the prosperity, or the existence of whatever interests are 
.confided to such men. 

Captain Burnes of course cannot excute the orders of the Governor- 
General—he cannot represent Lieutenant Vickovitch’s Mission as commercial ,* 

s 


130 


he can only continue to revolve in a vicious circle of fallacies, halting between 
the desire, and the impossibility of perceiving and acting—now leading Dost 
Mahommed to hope, now driving him to despair—now soothing his irritation 
against the Sikhs, and by the excitement and betrayal of delusive hopes, 
destroying the reverence and awe for British character and power—relics, 
alas ! of better times. 

Three months and twenty days after the former interview, Captain Burnes 
reports another interview with Dost Mahommed (January 26, 1838), who says, 
in reference to the former conversation :— 

“ I think, therefore, that I see in the contemplated plans for altering the arrangement for 
governing Peshawur, that his (Runjeet Singh’s) designs are sinister, and his object to draw the 
British Government unawares into them. 

“ In the friendly expression of the feeling entertained towards the Affghans by the British Govern¬ 
ment, I see clearly that it would not permit itself to be made a party to my destruction. If you are 
not disposed to strengthen my hands, and raise me above the rank which I at present enjoy, it cannot 
be your intention with offers of sympathy to bring about my ruin. On that point I am at ease; 
but in separating us all one from another ; in seeking to keep the chiefs from being dependent on one 
another; you are certainly neutralizing the power of the Affghan nation, and sowing the seeds of 
future dissension.” 

Sir A. Burnes’ ultimatum is as follows :— 

“ You must never receive agents from other Powers, or have ought to do with them, without our 
sanction, you must dismiss Lieutenant Vickovitch with courtesy ; you must surrender all claim on 
Peshawur on your own account, as that chiefship belongs to Maharajah Runjeet Singh ; you must live 
on friendly terms with that potentate; you must also respect the independence of Kandahar, and of 
Peshawur, and co-operate in arrangements to unite your family.” 

Dost Mahommed, apparently in a state of despair, says he will submit 
upon the adjustment of conditions, and on their being reduced to writing. 

Captain Burnes declares, in reporting these circumstances to the Governor- 
General, his opinion, that after nearly a six months’ residence, he considered 
the reconciliation of the Sikhs and the Affghans as impracticable, and that it 
was “ only out of regard for his Lordship and our feelings generally, that the 
“ Affghans have been taught to name Maharajah Runjeet Singh with becoming 
“ respect.” 

A meeting is arranged for the final adjustment, which is interrupted 
by the arrival of letters from Kandahar, conveying communications from 
Mr. Goutte, the Russian agent. It is needless to add that this timely 
interposition, as that of Count Simonich, at the moment when Mr. M‘Neill 


131 


had brought to an adjustment the differences between Persia and Herat, led 
to a similar result—the arrangement was broken off, and Captain Burnes 
retired from Cabool! 

The previous explanations which 1 have given of the position of the 
parties, renders comment upon these extracts superfluous. Complete 
identification of the British Government with Runjeet Singh—the entire 
dependence of Dost Mahommed upon us—his extreme reluctance to associate 
himself with Russia or with Persia, are clearly established. It is also clearly 
established that the Indian Government converted its own motives for 
interfering to prevent the alliance of Dost Mahommed with Russia into 
means for bringing that alliance into existence. 

We have seen in a former part that the Russian Envoy at Teheran had 
announced, in 1835, that it would be the intention of the English Govern¬ 
ment to set up Shah Shooja—we have seen, by a subsequent communication 
of Mr. M‘Naghten, that the Indian Government had decided to discountenance 
that project. We have, therefore, the secret of the mission of Lieutenant 
\ ickovitch—namely, that of furnishing a pretext for leading the Indian 
Government into that expedition. 

I have, in concluding my observations upon the relations of Dost 
Mahommed with the Indian Government previous to the rupture, but to 
direct the reader’s attention to this final consideration—that the Governor- 
General of India had placed before Dost Mahommed certain consequences as 
flowing from his rejection of such proposals as had been made—that these 
consequences were the withdrawal of the mission, and the cessation of the 
employment of his good offices to effect a reconciliation with Runjeet Singh. 
By the statement of these consequences he excluded all other steps, and, 
consequently, if there were no rights of nations—if there were no human 
sympathies in the breasts of men—if he had had, on other grounds, just 
reason for war with Cabool, he had, by this specification of consequences, 
excluded himself from taking steps which he had not specified; he had 
rendered it impossible for him to proceed to physical means of coercion, far 
less to aim at the destruction of the Prince himself, and to introduce, in the 
midst of the distractions of the Affghan race, the pretensions of a dethroned 
monarch as the colouring for invasion by his own troops, and for the assault 
upon them of their implacable religious and political foe. 


132 


But Mr. M‘Neill has told you that the whole Mussulman population of 
Central Asia looked to Russia with dread, and to England with confidence— 
looked to Russia with dread, because she was known to be desirous to pull 
down—looked to England with confidence, because she was known to be 
desirous to maintain that which did exist. What relative position do those 
two nations now occupy ? Is it not England that seeks to pull down ?— 
Russia that appears anxious to maintain ? Must not, then, the effects be 
reversed, and England and Russia have changed places in Central Asia ? 

If the human mind recoils from violence and injustice, even with an 
object—if it revolts against fraud, even when gilded by genius, or produced 
with power, with ingenuity, or plausibility ? With wdiat feelings must any 
one who still preserves some consciousness of honesty, or some love or respect 
for his country, close these documents put forward by the India Board as the 
explanation of its views and the justification of its acts ? 


PART XI. 

TREATY BETWEEN RUNJEET SINGH, SHAH SHOOJA, AND THE 

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA. 

It will be recollected, that when the news first reached this country of 
the invasion of the Affghan territory by the British force, that all parties con¬ 
curred in approving of that measure. Those who, the day before the arrival 
of the intelligence, scoffed at the idea of the march of Russian troops from 
Asterabad to Kandahar, now conceived that triumph was to crown the 
attempt of British troops to march from Calcutta to the same place. Those 
who had resisted every attempt to show them the danger of their position and 
the valuelessness of that which they call “ peace,’’ instantly concurred in the 
expediency of war. Those who had termed British subserviency to Russian 
aggression laudable prudence, now exulted in the “ display of commendable 
“ vigour.” 



133 


When this war was announced, it was hailed with univeral applause; not 
one individual, or one public paper, questioned either its expediency or its 
justice; and no Englishman whom I had at that time the opportunity of 
seeing, had so much as the idea of associating the merits of this question with 
the justice of the act. This was not all. To the leading organ of the Oppo¬ 
sition was confided the task of advocating the policy of the Government, and 
the Quarterly Review put forth an able, elaborate, argumentative, and docu¬ 
mentary article, to prove how energetically the Government had asserted the 
honour of the Crown, and how ably it had maintained the interests of the 
empire. 

Soon after, news was received of the triumphs of the British arms, and of 
the conquest of AfFghan territories and cities, sounds of exultation arose, and 
were re-echoed from shore to shore! Unworthy Britons, soul-less men! 
Triumphs where there was no foe ? Conquest where there was no resistance ? 
Having so exulted, all England pleased itself with believing that its power and 
dignity were restored in Asia, and that the tranquil possession of India was 
secured. Your triumph in Cabool is followed by war with China—your 
rupture with China opens Pekin to a Russian embassy. Your conquest over 
the A Afghans throws Herat into the arms of Persia. Your expedition to 
Kandahar brings thirty thousand Russians to Kiva, and—infatuated nation! 
your policy has nevertheless been successful , for that policy has been to yield 
your strength to an enemy, and to impose upon yourselves a lie ! 

Having in the two previous Parts shown that the interests of the Sikhs 
w T ere hostile to Great Britain, and that the Indian Government had become 
the dupe of the Sikhs—that the dispositions of Dost Mahommed were most 
friendly to England, and that the Indian Government, being at once the dupe 
of the Sikhs and the instrument of Lord Palmerston, had strengthened the 
hands of its Sikh foe, and driven its AfFghan ally to appeal to Russia (to 
whom England was united) for protection against the Sikhs (to whom the 
Indian Government was united), I now come to the grounds put forward by 
the Indian Government for its invasion of Cabool and Kandahar. I must 
first observe, that that invasion, if the object of it was to subdue the country, 
was quite superfluous, as Dost Mahommed had declared his readiness to do 
whatever was required in regard to its administration, and avowed himself 
equally unable to resist the force of England, and zealous to obtain its protec- 


134 


tion. If the expedition was intended to relieve Herat, and to resist the pro¬ 
gress of Persian or Russian arms, or influence—again, was it superfluous, as 
Sir John M‘Neill when before Herat had told you, that not only would the 
Affghans give passage to your troops for that purpose, but that they would 
furnish auxiliary forces, which Sir John M‘Neill considers useless, as detracting 
from the moral character of a British expedition ? Let us see what the reasons 
are for this expedition. They are a Treaty —not signed by, or binding on, 
the Indian Government, hut a Treaty between Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja, 
while the latter was an exile. This secret compact of partition, which had lain 
unexecuted for fourteen years, and which had been concealed from the Indian 
Government, is now adopted by the Indian Government. The Indian 
Government proceeds to execute it, and assigns as a reason for doing so, that 
that compact (viz. between Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh) did exist! This 
treaty is put forth in explanation of, and as the motive for, the invasion of the 
Affghans. No other explanation is given, no other motive assigned. Never 
before has a Government assumed the existence of a compact, even if made 
by itself, as the motive for entering into it, or given a measure it has adopted 
as the explanation of the end it has in view. I may be permitted, in an event 
so grave, in a case so unprecedented, to dwell with greater minuteness and 
at more length on this treaty, than otherwise this document might seem 
to warrant. I do so, conceiving that the character or position of the 
Government of India can be comprehended only by a thorough apprecia¬ 
tion of its past conduct, and dreading great and near disasters, which will 
he without value for instruction, unless their causes are understood. 

The Preamble to this treaty is as follows:— 

“ Whereas a treaty was formerly concluded between Maharajah Runjeet Singh and Shah 
Shooja-ool-Moolk, consisting of fourteen articles, exclusive of the preamble and the conclusion : and 
whereas the execution of the provisions of the said treaty was suspended for certain reasons : and 
whereas at this time Mr. W. H. M'Naghten having been deputed by the Right Hon. George 
Lord Auckland, G.C.B., Governor-General of India, to the presence of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and 
vested with full powers to form a treaty in a manner consistent with the friendly engagements 
subsisting between the two states, the treaty aforesaid is arrived (sic) and concluded, with certain 
modifications; and four new articles have been added thereto, with the approbation and in concert 
with the British Government, the provisions whereof, as contained in the following eighteen articles, 
will be duly and faithfully observed.” 

A preamble is the statement of the parties to a treaty, and of the object 
for which it is concluded. The preamble in this case does not designate the 


135 


parties between whom the treaty is contracted. The preamble to this British 
treaty refers to a foreign treaty—a secret compact never executed—one of the 
parties to which was a private individual, and which contained references to 
three other states, from each of which it was kept secret. 

The preamble contains a specification of four new articles, but none of 
the old were known. It states that these articles had been added with the 
approbation of, and in concert with the British Government, as if to show that 
the British Government had nothing to do with the treaty itself. It further 
adds, “ that the provisions whereof, as contained in the following eighteen 
“ articles, will be duly and faithfully observed.” The provisions of the 
treaty could only be found in the articles—whatever the number of which it 
is composed; and if the parts of the treaty were not binding, because they 
were treaty stipulations, the introduction of so strange a declaration could not 
make them so. Thus this preamble does not consist of those parts which are 
requisite to constitute a preamble. There is no declaration of the contracting 
Powers, no statement of proposed objects, no specification of plenipotentiaries, 
no mutual verification of full powers. Yet in these statements does a preamble 
alone consist, and without these preliminaries no treaty could be adjusted. 

Mr. W. H. M‘Naghten “ is vested with full powers to form a treaty in a 
“ manner consistent with the friendly engagements subsisting ” between the 
two states. Powers are vested in a man. Alliances are formed —but treaties 
are negociated. Every thing not hostile is consistent with friendly relations, 
and there is nothing inconsistent with these except that which is hostile. 
The formation of a treaty, therefore, in a manner which should not be hostile, 
is the amount of the statement. But this statement neither explains how or 
why the present treaty comes into existence, or how “ the treaty aforesaid is 
“ arrived (revived) and concluded with certain modifications.” The three 
passages following the thrice repeated word “ whereas ” appear to stand as 
grounds assigned for the treaty. As no other reasons are assigned for this 
treaty, these must be assumed to be the only pretexts which it was possible 
to put forward. 

The first statement is, “ Whereas*, a treaty was formerly concluded 
“ between Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja!” 

* This word alone reveals the absence, in the men by whom these transactions have been 
conducted, of the commonest acquaintance with the business of diplomacy. 


136 


The second, “ Whereas, the execution of that treaty was suspended 
“ for certain reasons” !! 

The third, “ Whereas, Mr. W. H. M‘Naghten had been deputed to 
“ the presence of Runjeet Singh” !! ! 

What would be said of a treaty signed between Prince Louis Bonaparte, 
Spain, and England, for the purpose of a dismemberment of France, and that 
the reason assigned should be that a certain individual was vested with full 
powers, and deputed to the presence of the chief of Madrid to form a treaty 
in a manner consistent with the friendly engagements of the two states ? If 
friendship existed between the states, all the objects of a treaty as regarded 
them were already secured; but if the action of the treaty regarded other 
parties, what ground is there for referring to the friendly relations of the states 
themselves ? Men do not confuse themselves, and men do not use superfluous 
expressions, and still less superfluous, confused, and unintelligible phraseology, 
especially in the solemn wording of a public treaty, except when there is some 
strange consciousness of disgrace attached to their acts, or of dishonesty to 
their intentions. 

By turning to the original treaty, framed in March 1834, between Runjeet 
Singh and Shah Shooja—between a bandit chief and a de-nationalized and 
expelled pretender—how different the tone, character, and expression, from 
those of this diplomatic document which has degraded the very tongue of 
Great Britain ! 

The preamble of that treaty is as follows :— 

“ Preamble.— Relations of friendship having been firmly established between Maharajah 
Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, so that there neither is, nor ever shall be, any alienation, 
or difference of interest existing between them, they agree to adopt the following articles, in 
consideration of the terms of good-will and friendship by which they are reciprocally actuated.” 

The document is a good and proper instrument, which establishes, in 
a decided and straightforward manner, the partition of the Cabool kingdom 
between a prince who assumes to have a right, and a robber who has none. 
The support of Runjeet Singh affords to Shah Shooja the only chance of 
recovering his throne, and Runjeet Singh extorts, as the price of his 
co-operation, a formal cession of territory, amounting to one half in 
extent, and to more than one half in importance, of his actually acquired 
territories—territories acquired by violation of international right, sanctioned 


137 


by no compact, and regarded by his own subjects as an insecure possession — 
by the Affghans as property of their own, held for a while, and to be 
retaken whenever they are able. 

Let us now examine the articles of the Treaty as it originally stood. 

The First, Second, and Third articles have reference to the cession of 
territory to Runjeet Singh—extending seven hundred miles in one direction, 
and four hundred in another, and to the settlement of the frontier. 

The Fourth article is the indication of a scheme upon the Sinde territory, 
in which the name of England is artfully introduced as being a party to the 
projects of Runjeet Singh, and in which, more artfully still, is introduced the 
name of Captain Wade—whom it was advantageous to Runjeet Singh to render 
authoritative and important in the eyes of the Indian Government. Captain 
Wade himself, when he comes to a knowledge of the treaty, remonstrates* 
against this article, which nevertheless appears in all its informality in the 
subsequent treaty with England. 

The Fifth article fixes the tribute in the form of presents which the 
Shah shall pay to Runjeet Singh. 

The Tenth forbids the slaughter of kine when the armies are united— 
consequently rendering the Mussulman habits subservient to the Sikh religious 
prejudices. 

The Eleventh establishes an equal partition of the booty of the Barukzyes, 
should the Maharajah lend an auxiliary force to the Shah ; but in any case if 
the Shah should succeed in getting possession of that property without 
Runjeet Singh’s assistance, still a portion of it is to come into the coffers of the 
Sikh. 

Article Thirteenth stipulates that the Shah is, on the requisition of 
Runjeet Singh, to send him an auxiliary force, and, in like manner, the Maha¬ 
rajah will furnish the Shah, when required, an auxiliary force. Now, as this 
document was drawn up in consequence of anegociation opened by Shah Shooja 
with Runjeet Singh, by a request made from the former to the latter that he 
would “ confer a throne,” the non-stipulation of success as the contingency 

* The remonstrance, however, is a very mild one. He says, 17th June, 1834, in addressing 
Mr. M‘Naghten—“ I know not with what sentiments his Lordship may view the manner in which 
the namt of the English Government has here been introduced'”—(phraseology not without analogy 
with the preamble of the treaty, and the declaration of the Governor-General.) 

T 


138 


upon which the advantages secured to Runjeet Singh were to be obtained, and 
the non-specification of the military and other means to be devoted to that 
purpose by Runjeet Singh, prove that Runjeet Singh had no intention whatever 
of carrying the treaty into effect—and that he merely took advantage of the 
necessities and the baseness of Shah Shooja to encourage an insurrectionary 
movement in Affghanistan, by which, whatever its issue, he was sure to profit. 
That this article was incompatible with the general proposed ends of the 
treaty seems even to have been felt by the English negociators, for they have 
endeavoured to render it less ambiguous by an addition which has only 
rendered it more so. To the words, “ should the Maharajah require the aid 
“ of any of the Shah’s troops,” they have added this passage, “ in furtherance 
“ of the objects contemplated by this treaty .” How the Maharajah should 
require the troops of a private individual then resident at his Court, for any 
object, it is difficult to conceive, and how Runjeet Singh should require the 
troops of Shah Shooja for any of the purposes connected with the objects 
contemplated by this Treaty is still a greater enigma. But to speak of objects 
contemplated by a treaty—to bring together such ideas—to set down such 
words—to make such emendations, is worthy of the men who have pursued 
such a policy. The one as the other defying alike criticism and reproach. 

The Fourteenth article says : “ The friends and enemies of the one shall 
“ be the friends and enemies of the other,” to which the English negociators 
add, “ of each of the three high Powers .” 

This is the first time that the number of the parties to the treaty is 
specified. 

These articles, composing the original treaty of 1834, having exclusive 
reference to the advantages which Runjeet Singh shall obtain when Shah Shooja 
is sovereign; but which contain no obligation imposed upon Runjeet Singh to 
place him on the throne, constitute no treaty at all. There are no counter¬ 
stipulations. None of the stipulations were capable of execution. The parties 
did not possess the power to execute them. No measures were stipulated for 
their execution. The treaty did remain a dead letter*. 


* Yet in reference to this treaty we find Captain Wade writing: 

“ By that article of the treaty that relates to Peshawur, it will be seen that Shah Sh^oja-ool- 
Moolk has really transferred the sovereignty of that territory to the Maharajah, and that his High- 


139 


No wonder that so infamous a transaction should have been concealed 
from the British Government, and even from Captain Wade; and this 
identical compact is now revived by the British Government! No wonder 
that the preamble is such as we have seen, and that no better reason could be 
assigned for adopting this compact than that which the preamble assigns, 
namely, that it had been already proved incapable of receiving execution, 

But the insanity of the Indian Government does not stop even here. It 
adds four articles, the first as follows : 

“ Shah Sliooja engages to pay the sum of two lacs of rupees to Runjeet Singh, calculated from 
the date on which the Sikh troops may be dispatched for the purpose of reinstating His Majesty in 
Cabool, in consideration of the Maharajah stationing a force of not less than five thousand men within 
the limits of the Peishwa’s territory for the support of the Shah.” 

Here is a further contribution of money to Runjeet Singh. Is this a 
single sum ? No; for that would require no calculation of time. The con¬ 
ditions of the calculation are not intelligible—its object is not specified. The 
term is to be calculated from the period of the march of certain troops, but 
the march of these troops is not fixed by definite or intelligible stipulations. 
It is a body of troops that is to be put in motion within the possessions of 
Runjeet Singh—at least such is the best interpretation which I can give, and 
only that by venturing to correct errors of grammar and topography. For, 

“ In consideration of the Maharajah stationing a force of not less than 
“ 5000 men within the limits of the Peishwa’s territory for the support of 
“ the Shah,”—I propose to read, 

“ In consideration of the stationing of a force of 5000 men by the 
“ Maharajah, within the limits of the territory of Peshawur.” 

If I am right in these corrections—the first, that it is in consideration of 
the specific act of the Maharajah, and not in consideration of the Maharajah; 
the second, that the act is the stationing of troops in the territory of Peshawur, 
and not in the territory of Sattarah*;—then is the event specified from which the 


ness has not taken it in opposition to the Shah , as those who are ignorant of the real merits of the 
transaction infer; a motive for the capture of the place, which, however unjust to its former 
possessors, accounts for the congratulatory tone of the letter which his Highness has written to the 
Weffa Begum.” 

* The Peishwa was the title of the Maires du Palais of the Marattah dynasty—the Rajahs of 
Sattarah. 


140 


calculation for the payment is to commence. The next points to be ascer¬ 
tained are the rate of payment and the terms. Neither the one nor the other 
is given ! Two lacs of rupees are to be paid to llunjeet Singh—that is at all 
events clear, and it is to be a continuous payment, since it is to begin from a 
certain period ; but whether this sum is to be paid by the lustre, the year, the 
month, or the day, in no ways appears. Further, the English Government 
makes itself responsible for the payment, and this, again, is done in a peculiar 
manner ; it makes itself “ annually” responsible. The adverb “ annually,” it 
has probably been the intention of the Government to apply to the two lacs 
of rupees ; but as the treaty stands, it applies not to the payment of the money, 
but to the responsibility of the Indian Government. 

The article continues : 

“ These troops are to be sent to the aid of His Majesty whenever the British Government, in 
council and concert with the Maharajah, shall deem their aid necessary; and when any matter of great 
importance may arise to the westward, such measures will be adopted with regard to it as may seem 
expedient and proper at the time to the British and Sikh Governments.” 

It is sufficient humiliation to have to extract such passages, and I may 
spare the reader and myself any comment upon them. 

The second of the additional articles, is to the effect that Shah Shooja 
relinquishes all claims of supremacy and arrears of tribute over the country 
now held by the Ameers of Sinde—and to this annunciation is appended the 
condition of another payment to Runjeet Singh—an indefinite sum of money 
is to be so paid, to be determined under the mediation of the British Govern¬ 
ment ; and further, a specific sum of 1,500,000R. This article (the sixteenth) 
further declares the fourth article of the same treaty to be annulled; or, to 

use its own words, “ will be considered cancelled!” 

% 

The third additional article (the seventeenth) stipulates that when Shah 
Shooja shall succeed in establishing himself in Affghanistan, he shall not attack 
his nephew, Kamran, in the possession of the territories now subject to his 
government. He has the liberty of attacking him, therefore, until that period ; 
and so long as he asserts that his authority is not established in Affghanistan, 
the stipulation could be of no protection. It is curious that this is the only 
stipulation, clogged with the condition of the elevation of Shah Shooja to the 
Royal dignity. 

This article, however, shows that the English Government had considered 


141 


the danger to Kamram, arising from the elevation of Shah Shooja to the throne 
of Cabool. 

The fourth additional article (the eighteenth) is, however, the climax of 
the whole. It stipulates that Shah Shooja “ shall refrain from entering into 
“ negociations with any foreign state, without the knowledge and consent of 
the British and Sikh Governments.” 

To impose upon a state an obligation not to do that which it is not con¬ 
tingent on its will or power to prevent, would be an act of destruction were it 
not an act of folly. Negociation is a term applicable to all transactions 
between independent states, which spring out of the relationships of neigh¬ 
bourhood, and are inseparable from the possession of subjects, property, 
rights, and frontiers. But the proposed object of the monarchy to be created 
in Affghanistan, was to give there to England an exclusive influence, and 
England stipulates that another Government shall be possessed of this power 
over the Affghan kingdom. But by the same words it constitutes that other 
Government the arbiter of its own measures and policy in Cabool—and places 
at its disposal our whole policy in Central Asia, by the mere faculty it has 
acquired of arresting negociations by withholding its consent. 

The treaty, in conclusion, states that “ the parties cordially agree to the 
foregoing articles.” This is not true, because Shah Shooja, before the 
introduction of the four additional articles, and before there was any mention 
of money contribution, had protested against the extortions of Runjeet Singh, 
even when he had nothing to hope and nothing to lose, and before the British 
Government had adopted the championship of his pretended rights. If the 
English Government cordially agreed, it was an avowal which any other 
Government would blush to make, even had there been a necessity for the 
avowal, or had such been a customary phrase in the wording of treaties. 

It continues, “ There shall be no deviation from them.” If they 
were not prepared to enforce them, the treaty was superfluous : and it 
continues—“ in that case the present treaty shall be considered binding 
“ for ever.” It would be binding for ever if there were no deviations 
from it — but that is an inference and not a stipulation. It continues 
again, “ this treaty shall come into operation from and after the date 
“ on which the seals and signatures of the three contracting parties 
“ shall have been affixed.” It is the exchange of ratifications which con- 


142 


eludes the negociation of a treaty, and not its signature. The signatures to 
a treaty are those of the plenipotentiary, not of the parties—its action 
proceeds according to the conditions laid down, not “ after the date ” of 
signature*. All the stipulations of the treaty had their execution contingent 
on the acquisition of royalty by one of the parties. No portion of it, 
therefore, could come into operation until a future period. The execution, 
therefore, of the whole treaty could not take effect from the date on which 
(the day on which) the seals and signatures of the constructing parties were 
affixed to it. 

The treaty is dated Lahore, 16th day of June, 1838, corresponding to 
the I5tli of the month of Assam, 1895, era of the Sikhs. The Mussulman 
date is not given. One of the parties being a Mussulman, the treaty was of 
no value without it. To the signature of Shooja is added the designation 
“ King ”—there is no designation attached to the signature of the Governor- 
General of India, nor to that of the ruler of the Punjaub! 

The preamble to the treaty declared that Mr. M‘Naghten was deputed 
to the presence of Runjeet Singh to “ form a treaty.’' His signature does not 
appear, and in lieu of it appears the signature of the Chief of the State. 
The treaty is dated Lahore, June 26, 1838, and signed “ Auckland.” If 
this is not the Governor-General, the treaty is invalid, because not signed 
by the plenipotentiary specified in the preamble. If this is put for the 
signature of the Governor-General, the document would, in a civil case, 
be treated as a forgery. 

It is superfluous, perhaps, to say that this monument of unexampled 
fatuity is wholly worthless as a diplomatic instrument. 

It has been already shown that there was no object in invading the 
Affghans, since they had appealed to you for protection, and offered you 
troops against the Persians or Russians. But supposing that England deter¬ 
mines to use brute force against that people, why ally herself with Runjeet 
Singh? Allying herself with Runjeet Singh—why revive this infamous 
compact, and impose it on herself? 

Shah Shooja at the outset of the negociations used these words to 


* These elaborately absurd expressions are not in any way terms of office or routine—thev are 
all new. 


143 


Runjeet Singh —“ What use is there in enumerating concessions which I am 
to make, or presents which I am to bestow, since I am wholly identified 
with you.” The Governor-General of India in like manner proclaims to 
the world that England is identified with Runjeet Singh, and exults in the 
joint aggrandizement of the tw'o nations. 

The perusal of this treaty will prove what without such testimony would 
be incredible. That the English Government, in identifying itself with the 
robberies of Runjeet Singh, was not to be a sharer in his plunder—that the 
English Government, not even content with enabling Runjeet Singh to 
plunder, was content to constitute itself his prey. 

We shall now proceed to the Declaration of War under this treaty. 


PART XII. 

DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, AGAINST DOST 

MAHOMMED.—OCTOBER 1, 1838. 


After the treaty which we have examined, we must come to this docu¬ 
ment, prepared for ignorance, mis-statement, fallacy—injustice in every 
intention avowed, inexpediency in every measure proposed. These expecta¬ 
tions are more than realized:—The Indian Government, already false to its 
trust, treacherous to its friends, subservient to its foes, ends in this gratuitous 
“ declaration,” by being merciless to itself! 

“ The Governor-General,” says the first paragraph, “ having determined 
“ upon the assemblage of a British force for service across (beyond) the Indus, 
“ deems it proper” to publish an exposition of his reasons for doing so. The 
assemblage of a body of troops for service is then that which he undertakes 
to account for. What was required was a statement of facts—announcement 



144 


of the decision, justification of that decision, and finally the declaration of 
war* :—There is nothing of the kind. 

Suppose a case of justifiable war, that is of injury or of aggression perpe¬ 
trated, what step does the injured and the just party take ? Is it not to declare, 
to prove, to substantiate the act of aggression ? Here the subject is intro¬ 
duced, not as a matter between two countries, but as a movement of British 
troops. It is by general orders that are made known, facts or opinions 
requiring publicity connected with the movement of troops ; it is by a declara¬ 
tion of war, by manifesto and by proclamation, that hostilities are declared, 
and the causes of them made known. But this anomalous “ Declaration’ 
assumes to be a justification not of hostilities between two states, but of a 
movement of troops,—not venturing to declare that these troops were intended 
for warlike purposes; though their services are to be required in a region not 
British, and where, therefore, they could only appear as foes. 

This document, therefore, in its first paragraph establishes this movement 
across the Indus as a buccaneer expedition, justified by no necessity — 
unscreened by forms as unauthorised by law, and worthy alike of the contempt 
and abhorrence of mankind. 

“ It then states, “ that it is a matter of notoriety that commercial 
“ treaties have been formed for the navigation of the Indus, with a view to 
“ obtaining that legitimate influence which an exchange of benefits would 
“ naturally produce and that with a view to invite the aid of the de facto 
rulers of Alfghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those 
treaties, Captain Burnes was sent to Cabool. If measures dependent on the 
will of the chief of Cabool were necessary for giving their due effect to these 
treaties, they were objects of negociation, and such negociation ought to have 
been conducted successfully to a close before the treaties were signed. But 
here it appears treaties had been signed for the execution of which other 
measures were necessary—to which the aid of third parties was requisite— 
with whom other negociations were to be undertaken, and with a view to which 
only was this mission deputed. And what has this to do with “ the assem- 

* As a means of awakening some degree of self-examination, if that be practicable, in English¬ 
men s breasts, I may mention, that the Sultan of Turkey has not the right of declaring war,—matters 
of war and peace, affecting the honour and the faith of each individual , are placed under the guidance 
of law and religion—so it was in ancient Rome. 


145 


“ hlage of troops for service across the Indus ?” If this is meant as justification 
of the attack upon Afghanistan, the offer of such a reason on the part 
of the aggressor would be the most triumphant vindication of the assailed 
against their powerful and ungenerous foe. 

It then states “ that the original objects of that officer’s commission were 
“ purely of a commercial nature.” Is that word “ purely” introduced to 
rivet the mind on the dishonesty of the statement ? The statement about 
the treaties for the navigation of the Indus was broken off in the middle, 
leaving us to inquire w T hy it was not finished, or why it was commenced. 
Again, the original purely commercial objects of the mission are as suddenly 
dropped as they had been unaccountably taken up, and the “ Declaration” 
continues :—“ whilst Captain Burnes however was on his journey to Cabul, 
“ information was received by the Governor-General that the troops of Dost 
“ Mahommed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attach on those of 
“ our ancient ally Maha Raja Runjeet Singh.” What relationship has this 
statement either to the treaties for the navigation of the Indus, or to the 
original objects of this mission ? 

The statement respecting the treaties for the navigation of the Indus 
it may be superfluous to remark is false—is perfidiously false. That of the 
original objects of the mission of Colonel Burnes being merely commercial is 
also false. 

Let us now consider this new operation. Dost Mahommed (while 
Captain Burnes w r as on his journey) does attack some other Prince. Such an 
attack being a political question, could have nothing to do with the commercial 
objects of Captain Burnes, and was a matter which could not interest the 
Indian Government, as it was its avowed policy not to interfere in any such 
affairs; and it was declared to Dost Mahommed by Lord Auckland, “ that 
“ it was not the practice of the British Government to interfere in the 
“ concerns of other independent states.” This statement therefore is as 
irrelevant as each of the previous sentences of the “ Declaration :”—let us see 
if it is equally false. 

Dost Mahommed makes an attack on Runjeet Singh—of course he must 
have entered the territory of the Sikh chieftain. He has done so in a “ sudden 
“ manner,” therefore Runjeet Singh must have been taken unawares in a period 
of peace ; it was “ unprovoked,” therefore Runjeet Sing had never inflicted on 

u 


146 


him injury, nor been guilty of aggression. This attack took place, however, 
not in the Sikh territory, but in the Affghan. It was an action fought near 
the Kyber Pass, in which Dost Mahommed repulsed an unprovoked and 
sudden invasion ofRunjeet Singh! The concurrent characters of falsehood 
and irrelevancy are thus so far maintained. 

Having converted the unprovoked assault of Runjeet Singh into an assault 
of Dost Mahommed upon him, the “ Declaration” goes on to assert that— 

“ The Governor-General consequently resolved on authorising Captain Burnes to intimate to 
Dost Mahommed Khan, that if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with 
the Maharajah, his Lordship would exert his good offices with his Highness for the restoration of an 
amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maharajah, with the characteristic confidence 
which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the 
proposition of the Governor-General, to the effect that, in the meantime, hostilities on his part should 
be suspended.” 

Thus the Governor-General, after asserting that the sole objects of the 
mission were commercial—after asserting that the sole objects of the mission 
to Cabool had reference to the navigation of the Indus, which was preposterous 
—after evincing, by the statement and its untruth, his alarm for fear of 
his being supposed to have any political objects in view, then asserts that he 
gave to that mission a political character, because Runjeet Singh had been 
defeated, and exhibits himself as interfering, while dreading to take any steps 
for the political interests of Great Britain, for the sole purpose of advancing 
the interests of Runjeet Singh. Prostituting the tongue of freedom—he calls 
that which is unjust—just, and he designates as unjust that which is just; he 
calls heroic defence—unprovoked violence; he considers violent aggression— 
assaulted innocence. After this monstrous perversion of fact and truth—after 
this fearful misuse of power and authority, he publishes this statement on the 
very theatre of these events ! 

Leaving again this subject, the “ Declaration” addresses itself to Herat, 
and states :— 

“ It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor-General, that a Persian army was 
besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Affghanistan, for the purpose of 
extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the 
Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her Majesty’s 
mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at 
variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.” 


147 


The statement is worthless for any purpose; but, however vague, 
unmeaning and contradictory, it could only have place in a declaration of war 
against Persia. But is it not here Russia that is meant ? If so, the act is no 
less cowardly than unjust. 

The “ Declaration,” dropping again unconcluded this sixth subject, 
reverts to Cabool, and states that Dost Mahommed persisted, as respecting 
his misintelligence with the Sikhs, “ in urging the most unreasonable 
pretensions, such as his Lordship could not be the channel of submitting to 
the consideration of his Highness.” If the Governor-General did not 
choose to be the channel of the communications he had invited, even 
supposing that it was true as here stated that they were “ unreasonable,” the 
offer of mediation rested there. It is then the quarrel of the Sikhs which you 
espouse—if so, why not avow your partnership; take your share in the 
plunder, but take only your share in the infamy and the guilt ! The 
Governor-General the channel of communication to his Highness ! Has the 
Governor-General then been shut up in Salsette, or reduced to the old 
fortress of St. David, and even were he so, could he have constituted himself a 
channel of communication to Runjeet Singh ?—the representative of British 
majesty in the eastern world—the head of a hundred and thirty millions 
of our fellow-subjects, the commander of 200,000 men—the successor to the 
authority of Acbar and Arungzebe, the chief of Maharattas and Moguls, and 
the individual possessed of the largest share of power and authority throughout 
the world—regrets that the unreasonableness of the demands of the chief 
of Cabool, rendered it impossible for him to become the channel of such 
demands to his Highness—the robber chief of Lahore. This dignitary then 
alleges the unreasonableness of the demands, which he had invited, as a 
motive for sending an expedition to dethrone that chief to whom he had 
offered his mediation ! 

The “ Declaration” proceeds, “ that he (Dost Mahommed) avowed 
“ schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security and 
“ peace of the frontiers of India.” Indignation overpowered gives way 
before such baseness. You “ identify” yourself with Runjeet Singh—you 
rejoice in his aggrandizement—you designate the heroic resistance of the 
Affghans to his violence an “ unprovoked attack,”—your envoy at Cabool 
scoffs at his entreaties for support, taunts him with the old glories of the 


148 


Douranee dynasty, and marvels how their successors should condescend to 
ask for British protection. You then denounce him for schemes of aggran¬ 
dizement—schemes of aggrandizement of Dost Mahommed against Great 
Britain ! Is the Governor-General of India addressing a world of madmen ? 

He continues,— 

“ He (Dost Mahommed) gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, 
of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was 
well apprised, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, 
compelled Captain Burnes to leave Cabul without having effected any of the objects of his 
mission.” 

Dost Mahommed shewed to the Governor-General that the line of 
policy pursued by Great Britain must compel him to fall under the influence 
not of Persia but of Russia, from which he entreated to be saved ; he did 
not compel Captain Burnes to withdraw from Cabul—the Governor-General 
himself ordered him to retire if Dost Mahommed held any political intercourse 
with the agent of a power with which England was at peace, and to whom he 
made him an unwilling sacrifice. 

“ It was now evident,” says the “ Declaration,” “ that no further interference could be exercised 
by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh ruler and Dost 
Mahommed Khan.” 

Was it by designating the defence of his country on the part of Dost 
Mahommed against a robber-like invasion—an “ unjustifiable attack”—was 
it by designating the appeal of Dost Mahommed to the English Government 
for protection against the Sikhs, as an “ inadmissible pretension,” that the 
Governor-General had “ exercised any interference” to bring about a good 
understanding between the two—was it possible for him to have exercised any 
interference more calculated to augment the violence and the injustice of the 
Sikhs, or to increase the exasperation and alarms of the Affghans ? Having 
done this, the Indian Government declares Dost Mahommed hostile, and his 
views ambitious—and further falsifies truth and fact by declaring that the 
individual disposition of the Government of Cabool, whatever it was, 
endangered the power of Great Britain. 

After this, the “ Declaration” goes back to Herat, and 

“ Deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege and the conduct of the Persian nation. 
The attack was a most unjustifiable aggression, perpetrated (!) and continued notwithstanding the 
solemn (!) and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy.” 


149 


The besieged, it continues, had behaved with a gallantry and fortitude 
worthy of the justice of their cause—and the Governor-General would 
indulge a hope that they might defend themselves till succoured. In the 
meantime the ulterior designs of Persia have been more and more openly mani¬ 
fested—diplomatic intercourse has ceased between the two governments, and 
the necessity of regarding the acts of Persia as acts of hostility against Great 
Britain, have been officially communicated to the Shah. The Chiefs of 
Kandahar have also adhered to Persian policy. After this enumeration 
of events and assemblage of opinions, the Governor-General declares that he 
felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the progress 
of intrigue and aggression. 

“ His attention was naturally drawn , at this conjuncture, to the position and claims of Shah 
Shooja-ool-Moolk, a monarch, who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of 
united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British 
Government, and who, on his empire being usurped by its present rulers , had found an honourable 
asylum in the British dominions.” 

What Shah Shooja had thought or proposed in 1809 was immaterial, as 
he never had the power of execution. His empire was not usurped by its 
present rulers, for it passed into the hands of his brother, and the asylum 
which he found in the British dominions was after his escape from the bonds 
of Runjeet Sing. 

But these statements, if they had been true, do not render the drawing 
of the Governor-General’s attention to the subject the more “ natural and 
if his attention had been drawn to the subject, the statement of that fact 
was of no value. It was the conclusions at which he had arrived which were 
to be considered; and the statement, that his attention was drawn to the 
subject, cannot stand in lieu of the grounds of his conclusions, or could not 
render those conclusions just, if they were unjust. If the conclusions 
had been just—if they had been felt by the w T riter of this composition to 
have been just—if they had been felt by him to have been intelligible, they 
would have been stated as the easiest mode of explanation. 

The next paragraph is a mass of vague generalities, of false antecedents, 
of disconnected consequences, of anticipations, and congratulations. In the 
sense of the Treaty which we have analyzed in Part XI., it is asserted that 
policy and justice warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shooja, 


150 


“ whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved to his 
“ Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities” 
—that “ it was just and proper that Runjeet Singh should have an offer 
“ of becoming a party to the contemplated operations”—that “ the identity 
“ of the interests of Runjeet Singh with those of the Indian Government 
“ had been made apparent.” But what could identity of interest of Runjeet 
Sing and the Indian Government have to do with the specific measures 
before us; how could it sanction an act that was impolitic, or a policy that 
was unjust ? But identity is not established—it is only said that identity 
is rendered “ apparent.” You have convinced no one that your interests 
were identical with those of Runjeet Singh ; but you have, indeed, shewn that 
you had identified yourselves with his intentions. 

The “ Declaration” proceeds to state that :—The general freedom and 
security of commerce would be promoted, and a lasting barrier would be 
raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment—that Shah Shooja would 
enter Affghanistan at the head of his own troops—that the British army 
would only have to act against foreign interference, that the Governor- 
General confidently hoped that the Shah would be placed upon the throne 
by his own subjects, and that the British army would be withdrawn. That 
the object of these measures was “ the substitution of a friendly for a hostile 
“ power, in the Eastern provinces of Affghanistan That the Governor- 
General was led to these measures by his duty, but that he also rejoiced in 
being able to assist in restoring unity and prosperity to the Afghans, and 
concludes with stating—that the chiefs, whose resistance has given offence 
to the British Government, would receive liberal and honourable treatment 
on ceasing from opposition to that course of measures which may be judged 
the most suitable for the general advantage of the country. 

The principal statement of this pseudo-manifesto is, that a mission had 
been sent to Dost Mahommed to settle the differences between him and 
Runjeet Singh, and that the pretensions of Dost Mahommed were such as not to 
be capable of transmission by the Governor-General to his Highness; and, 
therefore, the Governor-General naturally thought of Shah Shooja. Now, 
the fact stated by the Indian Government, of its having sent a mission to 
Dost Mahommed, was a complete bar to the claims of Shah Shooja. The 
British Government has recognised by a mission stated originally to be 


151 


commercial, and thereby avowed to have been subsequently political, the 
rights of the de facto ruler of Cabul, and has offered (however perfidiously) 
its mediation between him and another sovereign prince. 

However unjust wars may hitherto have been—however groundless the 
pretexts, or violent the aggression—never has there been recorded on the 
page of history such an exhibition of weakness, rashness, injustice, cunning 
and falsehood. I fear that it is not upon an individual, even though 
Governor-General of India, that can rest the responsibility of such a deed*. 
I fear that it is not to any peculiar mental perversion in the administrators of 
India that these measures are to be attributed. The universal approval of 
them in England on the arrival of the news in this country—the gratification 
of the public at what they called the “ energy of the Indian Government,” 
shew that such acts are in accordance with the morality of the times, and that 
such publications are no misrepresentation of its capacity. Each citizen sinks 
with the dishonour of his country—he is, in his own person, responsible for its 
acts, as in his person he is involved in the consequences. Each year, there¬ 
fore—I may almost say each day—lowers the value of each man by the 
disgrace to which he submits, by the accumulation of facts which it is his duty 
to understand, and which he neglects. 

I have heard this “ Declaration” compared to a Russian document—but 
those who drew such a comparison had recollected only that Russia was 
perfidious—they forgot that she was able. Russian documents are intelligible 
and grammatical: observe the forms of diplomatic intercourse: confine them¬ 
selves to the subject of which they treat, and are effective for the end which 
they propose—when they falsify facts it is for an object, and when they 
misrepresent the truth it is with an intention. 

Yet in one sense this document is Russian—that is, it is just the document 
which it suits Russia that England should put forth, and this is the manifesto 
put forth by the British Government in marching an army into Central Asia, 

* Lord Auckland is, personally, I am convinced, a sincere well-wisher to his country. All who 
know him must recognise and appreciate his simplicity of mind and integrity of character; but he 
has to be considered here as the chief of a system; and no worse features can any system present than 
that the possession of power should lead to subserviency, and that good men should be made 
instruments of evil. 


152 


and it marches that army because a Captain of Cossacks had arrived at 
Cabul ! 

But is it of the acts of England that we must thus think and speak ? are 
we content that she should be merely blameless—or would it not be a subject 
of grief and shame that her conduct should be doubtful—that her motives 
should be ambiguous—that she should not be recognised by all men as a model 
to the good and an example to the brave ? Have we not been taught to look 
upon our Island as Ocean’s Queen and freedom’s sanctuary ? Is it not upon 
our fields that have risen the wonders of industry under the guardianship of 
equal laws ? Is it not upon our purified altars that has blazed forth the 
renewed lamp of faith and charity ? Have the circling waters of the Northern 
Ocean not enclosed in Albion a region of refuge consecrated by a people’s 
hostility to the unfortunate of the world ? Have not our freemen arms and 
sea-born battlements in every zone and land, afforded strength to right— 
triumph to weakness ? Are not these reflections the endearing associations 
of our land, race, language, and name ? Are they not a portion of ourselves? 
Can these associations belong to her race, or be transmitted to her children, if 
England—the dupe of craft, the tool of ambition—becomes the violator of 
right, and the spoiler of all that it was her pride and honour to revere, 
to love, to protect, and to preserve ? And yet could such acts, as those 
which it is now our sorrow and our duty to examine, take place, unless we had 
been shorn of all those characters which have hitherto rendered us noble as a 
nation and dignified as men ? And while transactions of so black a dye, and 
so alarming a character, take place,—not a single voice is raised to protest 
against injustice, to evoke any lingering remnants of the sense of honour, or 
the instinct of preservation—not a single tone of reproach is mingled with the 
chorus of public jubilation, to arrest the rapid scorn of present men, or to 
mitigate the reproach of the sage and the free, who in after times may inquire 
into the causes of our fall. 


t 



153 


Although by these documents alone can the value of my conclusions be 
tested, still I am desirous of recording here the first impression made upon me 
by the fact itself, and when no documents were within my reach. I subjoin an 
extract from the report of a speech, delivered in the town of Hull, on the very 
day on which I read the “ Declaration ’ of the Governor-General. 

“ Mr. Urquhart then alluded to the proclamation of the Governor-General of India (brought 
by the last London papers), enumerating his reasons for attacking Affghanistan ; he pointed out that, 
by mismanagement, we had allowed those states who were willing to become our allies to fall into the 
hands of our antagonists, thereby not only weakening that barrier to our Indian possessions, but 
also depriving the British merchant of the trade with Central Asia. Error in peace, must end in 
error in war; in short, whenever we allow our rights to be infringed, although at the time it may 
appear unimportant, yet, when the moment of action comes, then that power which would have been of 
service, is turned into an engine of hostility. He then explained the position of Runjeet Singh, 
the ruler of the Punjab, and his necessary hostility to Great Britain, and the fatal error of our 
alliance with him. Every act of this country seemed as if dictated by an enemy. By stepping out 
of our way, gratuitously, to espouse the cause of Runjeet Singh, we ally ourselves to the violence 
of that ambitious ruler against the generous people of Affghanistan. And whilst the Maharajah 
makes use of us for the futherance of his projects against the Affghans, we appear allied to the 
Sikhs against a people who have armed in defence of their religion. England henceforward appears 
in Central Asia as the foe of the Mussulman and the enemy of Islamism. She changes places , 
therefore , with Russia. The Mussulmans looked to her for support and protection against Russia; 
now they will look to Russia for protection against those who publish their intention (Russia is 
guilty of no such publications) to espouse an unjust, and, as there understood, religious quarrel 
against Mussulmans, to overthrow constituted authorities, and to violate national independence. This 
course persevered in, and you may write down India ‘ lost . 1 Strange to say, these who have been 
crying out peace, peace, when every insult and wrong that one nation could inflict upon another 
were perpetrated against us, now applaud and commend this act of madness, and smilingly term this 
infamous transaction a measure of ‘ commendable energy . 1 The Governor-General of India ascribed 
the movements in Cabul, &c., to the influence of Persia, not daring to name Russia, and thus ex¬ 
hibiting England throughout the East as quaking before that Power, and having recourse to what 
they must deem falsehood, to avert her wrath. Persia had over and over again stretched her suppliant 
hands towards England for support; her statesmen pointed out the danger of India, if Persia was 
abandoned to Russian ambition ; her priesthood, by a solemn act, anathematised the friends of 
Russia; her Minister declared the impossibility of maintaining her independence, if England aban¬ 
doned them ! England replied, ‘ You Persians are mistaken—you are not threatened ; India is 
not endangered.—Russia is our ally !—Russia and England take counsel together; they unite to 
preserve the peace of Europe and the world !’ Is it then to be wondered at that Persia should ally 
herself with the ally of England; cease to hope for national independence, and concur with that ally 
in the invasion of Hindostan ? * * * * It was a question (India) on which he conceived the 

very existence of this country to depend, and fortunately it was not a party question; for the Tory 
and the Radical press were equally loud with the Government press in commendation of the unhappy 
policy which the recent proclamation revealed . 11 


X 


154 


PART XIII. 

CHANGE IN THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 

IN CENTRAL ASIA, FROM 1834 TO 1839. 

Central Asia was secured against invasion from Russia by gigantic 
defences. It was protected from disorganization by Russia by strong national 
feelings. The Caucasus and the steppes of the Oxus, were the physical 
obstacles in her path. The love of freedom in the simple breasts of Circas¬ 
sians and Tartars opposed to the stealthy steps of her diplomacy a stronger 
barrier, and afforded to Southern Asia a surer defence, than the mountains 
and the wilds that restrained her armies. 

Peter the Great did, indeed, establish himself in Persia by crossing the 
Caspian, and thence he was enabled to form with the Affghans an alliance 
menacing at once to Persia and to India. But he was only able to reach 
this advanced position by the internal disorder of the Persian state. When 
that disorder ceased, Russia was instantly constrained to withdraw behind the 
same barriers that, in 1834, still limited her power and arrested her progress. 
Russia, after a century and a quarter of continuous efforts and of enormous 
sacrifices, had made no sensible impression, either upon the populations that 
occupy the Caucasus, or upon the populations that inhabit the steppes of 
Tartary. She has never crossed the Caucasus by open force. She has never 
been able to execute a campaign, or even to send an army to the south of the 
Ural. 

In 1834, Russia exercised no influence whatever in Central Asia. The 
highest authorities in India and England, treated as visionary the idea of 
danger from her designs. They narrowed danger to the march of an army ; 
they considered such a march as impossible, because of the resistance it would 
arouse throughout all Middle Asia. One or two individuals foresaw danger, 
but that was because they considered her silent action on the cabinets of 
Europe, not the physical means to be employed on the plains of Asia. But 
they could not induce their fellow-countrymen even to think upon the subject. 


155 


because Persia, Tartary, and the A Afghans were all her enemies. Danger to 
India could only arise as the dispositions of the intervening regions ceased to 
be hostile to Russia. That danger commenced only with the transactions we 
are now examining. 

In the middle of the last century, Russia was threatened by a simul¬ 
taneous invasion of an extent of frontier, of not less than twenty degrees, by 
a portion of the Tartar or Turkish tribes of Middle Asia. She was unable 
to collect any force that could afford hope of efficient resistance. China, 
however, was equally menaced; and it was uncertain whether the storm 
would burst on her, or on Russia—it was the Chinese Government that 
averted the storm from both. 

The Chinese, after their conquest of the Zungars, and the extension 
of the frontiers of the Celestial Empire to the West, formed schemes for 
the conquest of Upper Asia, which filled with alarm the whole of these 
populations—an alarm which extended to the Governments to the west of 
the plains watered by the Oxus and the Jaxartes. Russia was then engaged 
in the seven years’ war, in which she had been enabled to appear against 
England, in consequence of the relief afforded her by the vigorous and 
successful measures of China against their common foe; now, again, 
must we look to some other Government’s intervention to avert the new 
danger with which she was threatened. A Mussulman coalition was formed 
to protect Middle Asia; but it was not till the Affghan monarch had marched 
a powerful army from Cabul to the confines of China, that tranquillity 
was restored. The march of this army was suspended by negociation, near 
the same spot where death arrested Timour in the invasion of China. 

A Calmuck tribe had been transported and planted by Russia in the 
midst of her Sclavonic population. There, it learnt to estimate Russian 
dominion ; it rose up again from the soil, and fought its way back through the 
Russian armies across the Volga, the Jaik, the Ural, lined by her hordes of 
Baskirs and Cossacks,—across the desert and the mountains of Tartary, where 
their native foes of the “ three hordes’’ were assembled to arrest their flight, 
—finally to seek refuge within the limits of the Chinese empire. 

I mention these three facts, as likely to lead the reader to perceive the 
real importance of regions which we speak of, as of the domain of fiction, 
having no practical bearing on our past or present existence. I mention 


156 


them further as showing the connection of the position of China with the 
affairs of Europe, and the mutual influence of China, Russia, and India, on 
the dispositions of that central region, which must give, as it has ever given, 
the command of the world to whoever controls it. 

We have recently seen with what strength the hate of Russia has inspired 
the inhabitants of the Caucasus. A similar spirit animated the Toorkmans, 
the Usbecks, the Khivans, and Bockharans. All Central Asia was thus sealed 
against her, with one exception. Persia. There she had, by conquest, esta¬ 
blished a footing ; but she was detested ; and as the British Government con¬ 
sidered it of vital importance to support Persia, the power of England, it 
could not be doubted, would shut this single gap, by which Russian influence 
could penetrate to the East and South. That England had the power to do 
so, who could doubt ? She declared it to be her intention to use this power— 
what was there, after such a declaration, to require or to apprehend ? 

No wonder, then, that, up to 1834, those most familiar with the subject 
and with the East, treated the idea of Russian invasion of India as the 
dream of alarmists.—England applied herself energetically to the cultivation 
of authoritative relations with Persia, and placed its sceptre in the hands 
of a monarch of her choice. Thus was completed the picture of our security, 
and rivetted every link of our defence. 

And even this is not all. Russia renounced her projects, and joined herself 
to England. Made perfect abnegation of every design, and conferred on 
England the right of controlling her policy, and of dictating her despatches. 

Such was the apparent position of affairs in the early part of the year 1835. 
One half of the same year had not rolled by when the British Government 
was startled to learn that Persia refused to sign a treaty of commerce with 
England, or to admit the establishment of British consuls in her territory; 
England then learns that the King she had made, announced the design of 
invading India. Then the British Government discovers that Russia was 
lost to it, and that it was owing to her suggestions that the King of Persia 
had turned against England ! 

Thus concludes a year, 1835, opening with promise so auspicious, 
and promised long and beneficial repose. 

In the early part of 1836, the British Government receive information 
that the Shah intends to march an army to attack the AfFghan territory, 


157 


as preparatory to his Indian invasion. In May of the same year, it learns 
that overtures have been made by sundry A Afghan Princes for the purpose of 
co-operating in the designs of the Shah. Five months later it learns that 
the Persian army is assembled, and has received its pay in advance from the 
Russian treasury. At the close of the year, it, however, receives intelligence 
that the expedition, notwithstanding all the efforts of Russia, had failed, or 
at all events had been postponed for that season. 

Thus concludes the year 1836, during which the Affghans, on one side, 
are menaced with Persian invasion, and, on the other, open communications 
with Persia, the grounds of such negociations being to open to the Russians 
the road to attack the English, “ for which they are most desirous.” 

In the course of the following year, the Persian army marches on Herat— 
the British envoy is insulted. 

In the year that follows (1838) the British envoy, who had followed the 
Shah to Herat, comes to a rupture with Persia, because of the insult offered 
him the year before. The expedition is, however, unsuccessful—Herat, 
unsupported, holds out, and the Shah is forced to retire. Herat is saved, but 
a positive rupture is established between England and Persia, the British 
envoy is driven away, and the Indian Government commits fruitless acts of 
hostility on the Persian coast. 

In the mean time, the arrival of a new Governor-General had awakened 
hopes at Cabul of a change of sentiments and policy in India. The Prince 
of that state had made overtures to the Indian Government, and it had replied 
thereto by a mission. That mission was soon driven thence, “ because a 
“ Captain of Cossacks, without pomp or retinue, had ridden up to Cabul.” 

The Indian Government then determined to invade Aflfghanistan, because 
it saw Persia lost to England, Aflfghanistan lost to India, and both ready to 
join with Russia. Yet these, with Russia, had been unable to cause the 
fall of the unsupported fortunes of Herat! 

Had England been inert all this while ?—No ! England has been active 
beyond any previous example during peace ; she has placed a monarch upon 
the throne of Nadir Shah ; she had bound to herself by enormous sacrifices of 
interest and of character, another sovereign, the ruler of Lahore ; she had 
opened the Indus to her navigation; she had formed treaties with all the 
principalities upon its banks ; she had taken these measures as parts of a 


158 


grand system for repelling the designs and excluding from Central Asia the 
influence of Russia. 

Let us now examine the position of Russia. 

In 1834, having completed an important phase in her relations with 
Turkey and with Europe by the occupation of the Bosphorus, by the Treaty 
of Unkiar Skelessi, she was prepared to revert to Persia, and to bring to bear 
upon it the means which she now possessed in her command over Turkey and 
over England. 

Russia then proceeded to impel Persia forward (simultaneously inviting 
her through England) into measures hostile to Great Britain. England then 
breaks with Persia, because she was the friend of Russia. The menaces of 
England throw Persia under Russia’s protection. England then abstains from 
executing her menaces. Thus is Persia convinced that the union of England 
and Russia had for its object the advancement of the designs of the latter 
Power. 

The same semblances which deceived—the same motives which influenced 
the minds of the Persian people and government—told on every other popula¬ 
tion spread between the Indus and the Caucasus. Has not the shock given 
to the power of England spread with electrical rapidity ? Has it not every 
where, and instantaneously, produced the same effects ? And could such 
effects be produced by any thing which Russia could do ? Must they not have 
arisen from that which England did ? And what is it that Great Britain has 
done ? She has shown to the nations of Central Asia that she has transferred 
her power to Russia for the accomplishment of Russia’s designs against herself. 

The Indian Government is now alarmed. Persia, the barrier on which 
it first relied, is subverted, and becomes, in the language of the British 
Ambassador, “ the first parallel from which an assault is to be made.” 
Affghanistan, the second barrier, has also fallen, or is about to fall, and thus 
become the second parallel of the assailing power ; next, the Indian Govern¬ 
ment avows that even the third line, the Indus, has been reached and 
gained by the hostile influence of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg!], and, in 
the words of the Governor-General, “ Danger is brought to the threshold of 
“ Hindostan.” 

By using the word “ harrier ,” we grant :— First , Hostility in Russia. 
Secondly , Power in Russia to assail India. Thirdly , Restriction of inquiry 


159 


to details of measures of defence. Here are three involuntary admissions in 
one word, each being false. Russia is the ally of India because of England. 
Russia is unable to endanger India. India could only be assaulted by Russia 
when she was at war with England ; the defences of India are not therefore 
to be found in Asia. India and England are one, the navy of England is the 
bulwark of India, and the assailant of India has to be arrested, not on the 
Caspian or the Indus, but in the Baltic and the Black Sea; assault in peace 
could not be, as that involved rupture between Great Britain and Russia. 
England is the ally of the Porte. England is the guardian of the Caucasus. 
The Porte and the Circassians, supported against Russia, there could be no 
danger for Asia. England is the ally of France, equally endangered by the 
designs of Russia. England and France united by these designs, what danger 
could there exist for India, for Asia, or for Europe ? But England and France 
being united to maintain Turkey, to support the Caucasus, to support Persia, 
&c., there could be no Russian ambition. England had been negligent; 
threatened now in India, her supineness must cease ; she is compelled to 
take a decision ; she looks around, and gathers together these elements of 
neglected strength. 

The Indian Government, as obeying the directions of the Government at 
home, can also largely contribute to fortifying the security of British power 
and possessions against Russia. Supposing, however, the English Govern¬ 
ment to remain inert, the Indian Government would in vain bestir itself. 
Supposing the English Government not only to neglect the defence of its 
interests, but (if the case is supposable) that it should ally itself with its enemy 
—then all action of India against Russia must be useless, and even dangerous, 
because either, unsuspecting, it is made a tool of by the secret and hostile 
influence at home, or it must place itself in a state of direct insubordination to 
the authority of the mother state, by acting against England’s ally. 

England does remain inert, and the Indian Government acts. It acts in 
opposition to the ally of the British Government, and therefore places itself 
in a state of insubordination without being conscious that it does so. It 
assumes to itself sovereign attributes—it places itself in opposition to the 
policy of a European power. The responsibility is therefore imposed upon it 
of acting as a sovereign power, and of meeting a danger arising in Europe 
according to the means by which such danger can be met. If the Indian 


160 


Government, assuming to interfere in the policy of Europe, neglects to act 
upon the Government of England, it at once rebels against England, and it 
betrays the Indian interests which lead it to interfere in Europe, and which 
impose upon it the obligation of finding alliances in Europe to meet European 
hostility. 

Let us suppose India still subject to the sway of the Mogul dynasty. 
That Government discovers that the design for its overthrow had been 
framed in the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and that extensive combinations 
and dark intrigues are prosecuting by that Cabinet among its neighbours and 
its subjects. Its first impulse must be to seek to avert the danger in Europe. 
It would perceive in England a power endangered by such designs, and capable 
of arresting them; disposed, by its traditional character, to resist anti¬ 
social dispositions in governments, and to maintain rights between nations ; 
interested in justice, because largely commercial, and pre-eminently powerful 
to prevent it by the maritime character of its strength. The Mogul 
Government would observe that the possession of India, and, perhaps, 
even more, the possession of Central Asia, must be most alarming to England, 
as giving to Russia a dominion no less paramount in Europe than in Asia ; 
that the very direction of the policy of the Cabinet of Russia to such 
projects, and the prosecution of such enterprises, must necessarily divert 
the whole resources and mind of that powerful state from commercial and 
peaceable ends to warlike designs ; that to allow Russia to entertain such 
hopes , would he to bend her whole mind to the creation of military means 
dangerous to the peace of the world , and to the creation of diplomatic system 
and power , in order secretly and silently to prepare other states for 
concurrence in her projects , or for submission to her triumph. Such a 
prospect was what no European power could view without alarm, or suffer 
without criminality. 

India would therefore appeal to England for protection; she would 
be led to that step by the same state necessity, the same popular instinct 
and impulse that had led Greece, Poland, Turkey, Persia, Circassia, to 
make the same appeal. She would represent the subjugation of Persia 
and Central Asia as the consequence of the designs of Russia upon India; 
she would represent the fall of Constantinople as a consequence of the 
supremacy secured in Persia; and she would show that the supremacy 


161 


secured over Persia was effected solely by the prospect of Indian plunder 
held out to its ambition. She would say to England, “ Unless you arrest 
“ the designs of Russia upon India, Persia, Central Asia, and Turkey, 
“ will fall under her control; her dominion will then spread over the Medi- 
“ terranean, over Austria, and the independence of Europe will be lost by 
“ the establishment of her power in Asia. But if you ally yourself with 
“ India, if you give support to each of the states that are undermined 
“ and threatened, then will the designs of Russia turn to your glory 
“ and your greatness.” 

Supposing that the English Government had replied to the Mogul 
Ambassadors, “ You are perfectly mistaken in supposing that Russia has 
“ designs upon India; Russia is our ally, our hosom friend; she consults us 
“ in all things, and we direct her in all things ; she never desires anything 
“ that is not just, and never aims at anything that is impossible.” The 
Indian Envoys would reply, “ Here are the proofs of what we assert; here 
“ is evidence upon evidence, fact upon fact, deeds under her own hand, 
“ w r ords from her own mouth, presented in a thousand forms—asserted 
“ by a thousand tongues. You tell us that Russia is your ally—that she 
“ tells you all—that you direct her in all she does ! We thought you were 
“ her dupe, but we now find you are her partner.” These men would 
return to their country, and say “ England and Russia are united— 
“ England is stained by the same vices, engaged in the same projects. To 
“ the danger of Russian enmity let us not add that of English friendship.” 

The Mogul Government, repulsed in England, would then apply to 
France, to Austria, to Turkey, to induce these states to unite in resisting 
the coalition of England and Russia, now become equally alarming to Europe 
as to Asia. 

If the Mogul Government did not make these efforts to avert the danger 
with which it was threatened, it would have been unworthy of its station, and 
dead to every instinct of self preservation. 

Is the union of England and Russia less beneficial to Russia, and less 
dangerous to India, because there is no Mogul Government ? Is the neglect 
of the necessary measures of defence less culpable in an English Governor- 
General of India than it would have been in a Mogul Emperor ? 

But it may be said that the Government of India had emancipated itself 

Y 


162 


from the control of the English Government, and that it has taken a line of 
opposition to Russia. Vain semblances that increase the peril! The Indian 
Government has not even dreamt of moving England to oppose Russia; it 
has had no conception of what the means were by which Russia could have 
been opposed. It has not said so much to the English Government as 
“ use your influence with Russia to prevent her from assaulting Persia, 
“ and threatening India.” The Indian Government has not even thought 
of calling on England to break her union with Russia—her union with 
the Power against which India was called on to make war ! The measures 
of the Indian Government have thus not been directed to the proper ends— 
have not been directed to the most simple and necessary ends. The Indian 
Government had therefore no conception of its position—its movements there¬ 
fore could only he conducive to the progress of Russia. They have been so. 

The dissidence between the British and the Indian Governments (and 
what dissidence can be greater than hostile alliances ?) has further served to 
exhibit to the world a house divided against itself. Thus is India en¬ 
dangered because it is possessed by England, and is England endangered 
because of the possession of India. 

Plad England been simply just, her policy would have been judicious, and 
her position secure. It sufficed to have abstained from allying herself with 
the violence of Runjeet Singh, to have prevented the introduction of Russian 
influence at Cabul. It sufficed to have required from Russia the perform¬ 
ance of engagements volunteered by herself, to have prevented Persia from 
becoming the foe of England. Without England, neither the dishonesty of 
the one, nor of the other, could have had existence, and their dishonesty has 
triumphed through her support. 

The march unopposed of a British army through Central Asia exhibits 
the power of the English name. That power, England is actively destroying; 
first, by the injustice that led to that march, and then by the very position in 
which she is placed by her success. It will be no longer Russia seeking to 
obtain influence in Affghanistan, but its spirit of independence that will appeal 
to Russia for deliverance from foreign domination. Persia and Tartary, hitherto 
restrained in ambition by the barrier of the Affghans, now see Affghanistan, 
the enemy of Great Britain, appealing conjointly to them and to Russia. 
They see the military force of England brought to their own frontiers, so that 


163 


while invited to invade India, they are compelled to fall back on Russia for 
protection. The elements of thought, and therefore of power, are changed, 
and the alarms of England have made Russia known to the Eastern world, 
and have heralded her advent. The hordes encamped on the Oxus and the 
Jaxartes, no less than the Ministers of Persia, will be taught that the collision 
of Russia with England is not distant, and that the result is not doubtful, and 
they will be invited to follow across the Indus the retreating remnants of the 
British troops so lately advancing in triumph, and which we are told will soon 
retire in peace. 

England, unless by a complete revision of the past, and by an entire 
repudiation of the acts committed falsely in her name, is fixed in Affghanistan 
until driven from it by defeat. We have occupied there a position whence 
we cannot retreat, beyond which we cannot advance, where we cannot fix 
ourselves on the soil—where our connexions with India are difficult, dangerous, 
and exhausting—and where every day of our sojourn will augment dissatis¬ 
faction, increase the number and strengthen the hostility of foes. By the 
pretender whom we have selected to sit upon the throne, we have further 
charged our fortunes with his incapacity; we unite the interests of the various 
displaced chiefs of Cabul and Kandahar—we unite these to the chief of 
Herat, whose pretensions are barred by this selection*, and whose right to 
Herat itself is thereby also endangered; the power of England henceforward 
becomes associated in Central Asia with the supremacy of Shah Shooja; 
revolt against that prince, success of Dost Mahommed, alliance of the Affghans 
with the Persians, are all blows directly levelled against Great Britain, and all 
these must come in the natural course of events. 

Thus does this invasion unite Affghanistan and Persia against England, 
does it tend to the union of Dost Mahommed and Kamran Shah? Does it tend 
to the union of Shah Kamran with Dost Mahommed on one side, and the 
Shah of Persia on the other ? Does it tend to the union of these with the 
only maritime prince of Asia, the Imaum of Muscat, whom we have taken care 
to insult and to injure, and who no more than any other Asiatic potentate, 
can view our expeditionary movements without alarm ? The whole spirit of 
Central Asia is thus raised against us. The local antipathies, the religious 

* In Persia, we assert the rights of the nephew against the uncle; in Affghanistan, systematic in 
our confusion, we assert the rights of the uncle against the nephew. 


164 


animosities, the family feuds that draw lines of such strong antipathies across 
that region, paralysing its own power of action, and rendering it impervious 
hitherto to all the bootless efforts of our enemy, are softened down by our 
act, and over all, the fear of Great Britain casts a common shade, and supplies 
a common motive for alliance with our foe. 

Away with the idle and worse than idle dream of honour, strength, 
glory, or security to be derived from your invasion of Cabul. If the act is 
unjust it is defeat, not triumph, that is honourable; and if the measure is 
injudicious, it is success that we have to deplore. The justice of the enterprise 
there is no Englishman that will assert; its expediency is alone advanced— 
expediency of war against the influence of Russia, while England and 
Russia are united—while Russia was able only to influence Asia by 
England's support*! The “expediency” is Russian, its guilt alone is 
English. But you say, “ Russian influence had reached the Indus—she 
“ was intriguing in Central Asia—we had proof of her secret action all over 
“ India—we were menaced by hostile movements and dispositions in Scinde, in 
“ Nepaul, in Birmah. The Indian Government could not wait to see or to 
“ consider what the relations were between the Foreign Office and St. Peters- 
“ burgh—they had only the choice of difficulties, and the necessity of immediate 
“ action to avert impending danger. The Indian Government did act, and by 
“ striking a blow so sudden, so distant, and with such entire success, it inspired 
“ subjects and neighbours with respect for its councils and terror for its arms.” 
Such is the reasoning of men called statesmen—such is the apology made by 
the Opponents of the Administration, for a war which they admit to be 
unjust. 

* “ England has come to a rupture with Persia—England has sent an army to overthrow 
the Government of Cabul, and the justification of the English Minister for the rupture and the 
war, has been, that these two countries were subject to the influence of Russia, and, at the very 
time that he makes the influence of Russia a case of war with a third state, he allies England to 
Russia for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and stipulates the occupation of Constantinople 
by Russians ! Is it possible to imagine treason rendered more manifest by the contradiction of 
words and of acts—by the contradiction of avowed intentions and realised results ? 

“ If the alliance with Russia had been the cause of the war with Cabul, would Russia unite 
herself to England? If the object of the Treaty of the 15th July was to maintain the Ottoman 
Empire, would Russia be one of the allies? The pretext of hostility against Russia in Central 
Asia, as of friendship for her in Turkey, is equally false, but equally serves, through opposite 
means, to assure the domination of Russia in one country as in the other. 1 ’— The Crisis. 


165 


\ ou make war on the influence of Russia ! Say, then, you make war to 
create the influence of Russia. You dread the fall of Herat. Do you do any 
thing to support Herat ? Do you require Russia not to push Persia on ? 
Does the Indian Government send, as recommended by the envoy in Persia, 
a body of troops through friendly Affghanistan to support Herat ? No. But 
you attack Affghanistan to exclude this “ Russian influence.” Was this Russian 
influence the single Captain of Cossacks that had carried the imperial letters 
to the Prince of Cabul, who received them only after you had declared 
yourself his enemy ? “ But then it was necessary to strike a blow to overawe 

“ the imbecile Prince of Nepaul—the vain-glorious Birmans, the ambitious relic 
“ of the House of Sattara, the turbulent Rohillaand Rajpoot.” What had India 
to dread from the disordered movements of subdued antagonists, and disunited 
if unwilling dependents, already broken, actually subdued, and incapable of 
action as of union ? England had to dread not their dispositions, but their 
concert—there could be no concert till Russia was brought forward to the 
position where she could unite them. Your blow has retarded their de¬ 
sultory movements, while it extends the field of that combination ; and 
affords her the means of advancing to occupy it. This deed places you in 
your own minds on a level with Russia, familiarises you with injustice, and lulls 
you into security. 

But the effect of this robber invasion of Affghanistan is not confined 
even to the wide area of our operations. It traverses the Paropamisus, it 
crosses the Taurus, it penetrates beyond the Himalaya, and spreads over 
the wildernesses of Bootan and Tibet. Bokhara, Khyva, Kokan, and 
Samarcand, resound with indignant denunciation of British aggression, and 
to England are transferred that hatred and those epithets which hitherto had 
been reserved for Muscovy. 

But if Central and Northern Asia—if Affghanistan and Tartary—if the 
fishermen of the Gulph of Arabia, and the shepherds of the hills of Cashmere, 
are led to censure the acts and to dread the objects of the British Govern¬ 
ment, and to see in them danger and injustice—if the whole population 
inhabiting the vast territory that stretches from the Indus to the foot of the 
Caucasus, see that England is no longer the power that protects, but the 
power that pulls down, what is the effect on the relative power of England 
and of Russia ? If that enormous mass of men is led to consider the strength 


166 


of England as only matched by that of Russia, is not Russian power extended 
by this thought all over Asia ? 

Must not the same considerations as the effects of these come to tell 
upon the whole population of India—come to fan into flame each latent 
discontent—to give energy and power to each ambitious thought—to rewaken 
old grievances—renew lost expectations ? 

Must not the accumulated effects of this mighty change equally come to 
tell separately on each of the nations and powers bordering upon our domi¬ 
nions, and lead them to rate lower and lower, day by day, the dignity of 
Great Britain—to be alarmed for acts of violence on her part—to become 
familiarized with the idea of her antagonism with Russia, and to wait until 
Russia can effect her overthrow, by a concert and combination of the hostile 
elements existing throughout the extent of Asia* ? 

Not even the Celestial Empire has remained a stranger to the excitement 
which this assault has created, or indifferent to those convulsions with 
which the Indian Government has alarmed the East. Threatened by 
these demonstrations, exposed upon the whole coast to the assault of 
the British Navy—exposed as she would be by the triumph of England 
in Central Asia—it was not for China to have injured England, unless she 
had been taught to conclude that the power of England was about to be 
broken. The recent acts of the Indian Government would have sufficed 
to have brought China into concert with Russia, if she had never been so 
before; and the late acts of the Chinese Government are corroborative 
evidence of that connexion. But we have seen everywhere, in every 
portion of the globe, secret preparation, made long before the results 
appeared for placing England in enmity or hostility with other powersf- 

* The first practical advance of Russia will be to 'protect English interests. 

*f* The process for the abrogation of the adjustment of the North American frontier, commenced 
in February 1831; for the sacrifice of the independence of Circassia, preparation was made in 
October 1831; for the transfer in Greece of British rights to Russia, preparation was made in 
1832; for the treaty of July 1840, preparation has been made by incitement offered to Mehemet Ali 
to declare his independence from 1830, and by simultaneous encouragement to France to ally herself 
to that Pasha, and to place herself in opposition to England ; for rupture with China, preparation 
was made February 1834; for the rupture with Persia in July 1838, preparation was made in February 
1834.—See “ Exposition of Boundary Differences, - ”—“ Affair of the Vixen,”—“ Diplomatic History 
of Greece,”—“ Mehemet Ali and Lord Palmerston,”—“ Chinese Papers,”—and the present volume. 


1(37 


It so, must not the same system have been brought to bear in 
China? When Lord Palmerston became Foreign Minister, the relations of 
Great Britain with China were still under the direction of the Indian Board; 
but the act of 1833, unhappily brought our relations with China under the 
control of that Minister, who, from the early part of 1834, commenced the 
application, to that empire, of the same insidious process of exasperation, 
and of invitation to aggression, which we have seen so remarkably illustrated 
in the affairs of Persia. 

The relations of Russia with the Celestial Empire, influence materially, 
at this moment, and have materially influenced of past, the power of Russia, 
and her faculty of action upon Europe, as well as upon the East. When Russia 
first emancipated herself from the Tartar yoke, her mind was instantaneously 
carried to Pekin, because there reigned the population that she had expelled 
from her soil*. India, China, and Russia, equally stand exposed, and have 
all equally been conquered by the nomade inhabitants of Transoxiana and 
Upper Tartary. Upon that region, China and Russia have exercised in 
common a powerful influence ; and, during the last century, the relations of 
each of these empires with that region (wholly excluded from the observation 
of Europe), have been second in importance to no other interest of either state. 

Hitherto the arms, as the diplomacy of China, have been far more 
successful than those of Russia, in acting upon that important regionf, 
which gives to whoever can discipline or control it, the power of sub¬ 
duing the three great empires which touch its frontier—Russia, China, 
and India. There has been no conqueror of the world, but he who has 
gained a supremacy over that people, and whoever does obtain such a 
supremacy, must be master of the EasCj!. They have hitherto been paralyzed 


* The Tartars were expelled after Russia had, by intermarriage with the heiress of the Eastern 
Empire, admitted the thought of possessing a right to the ancient dominions of Rome, actually 
constituting the various kingdoms of Europe ! 

*J* Included within the following limits, the Caspian Sea on the West, Chinese frontiers on the 
East, the Emba on the North, the Paropamisus on the South, inhabited by the “ three hordes," 
(4,000,000,) the Tartar, Turkish, and Usbeg populations of Khiva, Bockhara, Samarcand, &c. 

| Alexander subdued and strengthened himself amongst these people before he invaded India, 
Zengis Khan, Timour Beg, Malek Shah, Alp Arslan, Mahmoud of Ghuzni, Baber, Nadir Shah, drew 
their whole or their chief strength from this region. These populations have subdued Russia—twice 


I 


168 

because divided; but Russia has now fairly entered into a struggle for their 
supremacy, and if she succeeds in establishing it, she will have China and 
India at her mercy. The dread of China for England, and the consequent 
connexion which will be established, and authority that will be given to 
Russia in that empire, immensely facilitate this result; and on the other 
side, it is facilitated by the movement of England upon AfFghanistan, by 
which the Tartars are alarmed—by which they are exasperated against 
England—by which they are led no longer to dread subjugation from Russia, 
but from England—by which they have the opportunity brought near to 
them of opening the gates of India through an insurrection of AfFghanistan, 
the temptation to which removes many impediments in the way of their 
associating themselves with the designs of Russia. 

England, in 1834, with the western limit of her Indian territory lying 
still in the rear of the Indus, to the East touching only the Hindo-Chinese 
regions, was defended against any state that could threaten, by a neutral 
space of two thousand miles, was protected by an impenetrable belt of 
rocks on the North, and by ten thousand miles of ocean to the South. Seeing 
within her own Indian world, no rival and no enemy—she chose to consider 
her position insecure because of the designs of a Cabinet seated on the 
Baltic, and undertook to make great efforts to defend herself against that 
power, though it had not moved a single soldier, and though it professed the 
strongest attachment for Great Britain, and was entirely at the mercy of 
Great Britain. England in India has made gigantic efforts; she has extended 
herself over half the distance that separates her from Russia; she has 
involved herself in differences, which, ultimately, will be a struggle with the 
Empire to the North-East, that numbers nearly half the population of 
the globe; she has given herself a frontier many fold more extensive than 
the single line of the Suttlege, which alone she had previously to defend. 
If there was danger from without and insecurity within before, what is 
there now ? If her means were insufficient for securing her these com- 

conquered China—they subdued the Caliphate of Bagdad—four times subdued Asia Minor (one of 
the waves flowed over to Europe, and constitutes actually the Ottoman Empire). They have thirty 
times invaded India. The strength of Persia, in its grandeur, before the invasion of Alexander, lay on 
that region—so also subsequently, under Nushirvan and Nadir Shah. These populations were the 
strength of the Bactrian dynasty, which also asserted a supremacy over India. 


169 


paratively compact and tranquil possessions, what are they now ? If an 
enemy at two thousand miles was dangerous, what is he at half that distance ? 
If she created envy or inspired mistrust while tranquilly occupying the 
station, and confining herself to the frontiers, which had become hers by practice 
and by admission, what alarm will she not inspire, and what envy will she 
not create, when revealing, at once, such consciousness of weakness and 
such colossal designs of injustice and ambition ? 

Supposing that the Cabinet of Russia had hitherto entertained no 
designs, what would be the effect upon it—what the obligations of self 
preservation imposed by the projects of Great Britain in Asia ? 

Supposing that France could be the ally of England, who has ceased to be 
a friend to herself, what must be the effect upon the Cabinet of the Tuilleries, 
of this exhibition of grasping policy on her part, and of the hostility to her 
of that Eastern world, where, recently, she has been considered secure and 
supreme ? Upon the rest of Europe, and upon her cognate races across the 
Atlantic, involved with us in a difference which also tends to war, must not 
the same facts produce similar impressions; and must not, every where, the 
insecurity impending over us in Asia, tend to strengthen projects of hostility*? 

But is it the United States, or France, Persia, Turkey, Cabul, or China, 
that is to profit by that decay of England, which each is taught to desire ? 
No! Russia alone is to gather in the inheritance of their hatred and of our 
crimes. Weak in her frame, and powerful in mind alone, she must act by 
the strength of others ; she must contaminate before she can controul— 
she must desolate before she can possess. She sows deception to reap 
ruin. 

Russia, within a lustre, has made greater progress than in the preceding 

* A United States’ paper says, “ We now understand the outcry that has been making in 
England about Russia. England is just quietly preparing the way for the conquest of the whole 
of Asia, and expecting that we would believe her to be moderate and just, because she had been 
telling us for the last three or four years that Russia was ambitious.” A Canadian paper replies, 
“ Can any man in his senses suppose that England invents, when she speaks about the designs 
of Russia? It cannot be ignorance, it is sheer malevolence, to represent England, assailed by Russia, 
as seeking a pretext for an expedition into which she is driven in self defence.” There is no 
alternative in the eyes of mankind between the supposition that England menaces the world by her 
ambition, or that she is threatened in her very existence by Russia. 

Z 


170 


century and a half. A British Minister has given to her the power of 
threatening India : she has thereby made a bloodless conquest of Great 
Britain. 


Paris , 

20 th October , 1840. 

I have this day to revise for the press the foregoing chapter, written on 
the same day last year. I add, as a commentary upon it, an extract from an 
article which has this day appeared in this city in the Journal des Debats , 
from the pen of M. Philarete Chasles :— 

After exhibiting the vastness of the fields upon which Russia acts, the insignificance of the 
power which suffices for her to obtain success—after endeavouring to establish that there is a British 
system of resistance carried on against her by private individuals, he continues:— 

« This struggle of the Sclavonic genius, and the Saxon genius,—of Russia and of England, has 
not turned hitherto in favour of England ; she has ever been the dupe; wherever she has obtained 
any partial success, it has been by accident; she has put in motion great armaments to produce 
trifling results, and treaties full of art employed in vain ; ending, consequently, in weakening her, 
and endangering her, prove little in favour of her ability. Russia, on the contrary, hiding her game, 
concealing her losses, swelling her victories, increasing her territory, and profiting by all, even by her 
own weakness, has conquered in Asia, alongside of the British possessions, a rank and authority all 
fictitious, but which are as powerful as if they were realities, because she inspires fear. That is all 
that Russia seeks at present; she will do better at a future day. 

“ The relations of the travellers whom I quote, and of many others whom I could name, present 
the most curious incidents, and display the progress of that Russian fraud which is a power, and 
the establishment of this Muscovite credit, founded on deceit, which menaces to-day at once the 
Bosphorus and the Ganges. ‘ As for the Persians,’ says one of these travellers, ‘ the Muscovite has 
become the arbiter of peace and war. The Shah of Persia swears by the Russians, and regards them as 
the masters of the world, and constitutes himself their humble instrument. In Central Asia,’ says 
Captain Conolly, 6 the Czar is believed to be the King of the European kings, and they so translate 
the word ‘ autocrat’ (iniperator azoum). I have heard relations made to the inhabitants of Herat of 
the pretended prowess of the Orouss (Russians), who are for them giants and man-eaters, giving law 
to all the people of Europe, and being destined to possess the East.’ *******< q'fog 
generals of the Orouss,’ said one of these Heratees, named Choumsondine Khan, to some of his com¬ 
patriots that surrounded him, ‘ fill up the ditches of the fortresses they besiege, with the bodies of 
their living soldiers; when they are in want of provisions, they kill some thousands of men, whose 
flesh is distributed as rations to their comrades. Thus are the Orouss invincible; nothing can resist 
them ; neither citadels, nor kingdoms.’ Such absurd reports, so useful to the Muscovite power, 
spread far beyond Affghanistan and Nepaul. The fright of the Russians has penetrated into 
Bengal, whose timid inhabitants share in the veneration of the Heratees for the Russians, and the 
word Russia lowers already over half Hindostan 



171 


“ By means of such manoeuvres does Russia cast her shadow over China and Persia, Armenia, 
Hindo-China, and Asia Minor. Everywhere the extravagant opinion of her grandeur prepares the 
reality of her power. In China, the only foreign caravan that crosses the gates of Pekin is Muscovite. 
In Persia, the Russians command. We have seen what estimate the populations ol Central Asia, 
and the merchants of Bengal, have formed of Russia. An enormous chimera, impalpable and 
invincible, surrounds and undermines, on every side its enemy, offering itself no vulnerable point. 
If a question of military power arises, the advantage is on the side of the British. But if a 
question arises of dexterity, then Russians reap all the benefits. They have been beaten in Cir¬ 
cassia, but that will not prevent the stratagem, by the accomplishment of which, they will one 
day be in possession of that country. The English have beaten the King of Persia before Herat, 
and have imposed their laws upon Affghanistan, but that will not help them much. In continuing 
to darken and to destroy the British preponderance in India, Russia hazards nothing; to preserve 
and to maintain itself, England expends millions, and moves armies, but cannot make the colossus 
retire a step, because the colossus is a phantom. It is in such circumstances, and between a war in 
China, and the difficult defence of her Indian possessions, that England has opened to Russia, in 
a possible hypothesis, the gates of Constantinople! an error such , that it is impossible to believe it 
even with the facts before us." 

Such is the aspect of danger presented by England to the world; such is 
the picture of Great Britain, drawn by an able and a friendly hand ! 




172 


PART XIV. 

OPPOSITION AND UNION OF BRITISH AND RUSSIAN POLICY IN REGARD 
TO PERSIA, CONCURRENTLY AND PERMANENTLY MAINTAINED. IN¬ 
DUCTION THEREFROM OF TREASONABLE CONCERT. CHARACTERS OF 
EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR THE PROOF, AND PRESENTED BY THE 
SUBJECT. 

The diplomatic correspondence between the Governments of Great 
Britain and Russia has opened with : 

A mutual admission (secret at the time) of the similarity of their interests 
in Persia. 

A compact to draw up in concert their instructions to their represen¬ 
tatives. 

This correspondence details continuous conflict between the representa¬ 
tives of the two governments in Persia! 

Has either, or have both governments instructed their agents in this 
course ? No ! on the contrary, the conflict is asserted to have arisen out 
of disobedience of instructions. 

Has one, or have both governments, been cognizant of the proceedings 
of their agents ?—They have. 

Have no means been adopted to arrest such conduct ?—None have been 
adopted. 

Have they admitted such conduct as fitting and proper ?—They have not 
admitted such conduct as fitting and proper. 

But such a state of things is incredible. That two governments should 
agree to act in concert , and then act in opposition, that that opposition 
should be disavowed and still continued, is what can only be believed when it 
is admitted that the two governments are composed of madmen. 

During three years this concert and hostility have, nevertheless, been 
concurrently maintained. We have the facts, we have the instructions, we 
have the results; and further, we have language exchanged upon the subject 
between the two governments themselves. 


173 


The governments then have come to an explanation. What has been its 
character ? What its effect ? 

Twice have these explanations occurred—in the midst of the proceedings 
and at their close: the first only increasing the intensity of the struggle, 
and the last concluding with the expression of reciprocal satisfaction at the 
result ! 

The facts are as follows : — 

On the 5th of September, 1834, a concert of corresponding instructions 
from the two governments to their agents in Persia, and of confidential 
communication between the two missions in Persia, was established. 

On the 7th of April, 1836, the British Foreign Secretary was in possession 
of a series of communications from the British Ambassador of Persia, 
detailing acts of the Envoy of Russia in direct violation of the con¬ 
certed policy of the two governments, and constituting a portion of 
a project of warlike assault upon the British possessions in India. 

On the 16th of January, 1837, that is to say, after an interval of nine 
months and ten days, the British Foreign Secretary addressed a re¬ 
monstrance to the Court of St. Petersburgh. 

On the 27th July, 1838, the British Foreign Secretary came to a rupture 
with Persia, because of her connexion with Russia—but made no com¬ 
munication on the subject to St. Petersburgh. 

On the 26th October, 1838, that is, twenty-one months and ten days 
after the first remonstrance, and thirty-nine months after knowledge of 
the intentions of Russia, the British Foreign Secretary addresses a 
second remonstrance to St. Petersburgh. 

On the 20th December, 1834, the British Foreign Secretary declares 
Her Majesty’s Government to be entirely satisfied. 

The rupture with Persia continues—is continued to the present hour. 

The grounds for remonstrance that existed in January 1837, were 
equally in existence in April 1836. 

The right of remonstrance that existed in April 1836, had, by acqui¬ 
escence, ceased to exist in January 1837- 


174 


By the delay, the measures remonstrated against, because they were 
hostile, are suffered to be brought to completion, and the policy, of which 
they constituted a part, to become consolidated. 

The measures of the two governments being pre concerted, acts imposing 
on one government the necessity of remonstrance, implied fraud on the part 
of the other. 

The two governments being bound to mutual communication, to defer 
remonstrance was to suppress information. The delay, therefore, implied 
fraud on the part of the government making the remonstrance. 

The information suppressed by the British Government was, first, disobe¬ 
dience of the Russian Envoy in Persia to the patent orders of his government. 
Secondly, it was hostility of the Russian Envoy in Persia to the Envoy of 
Great Britain, and to her avowed policy in that country. In either case, such 
information could not be suppressed unless through collusion between the 
British Secretary of State and the Russian Envoy in Persia. 

The Russian Envoy must have been acting with the British Secretary of 
State either to deceive his own Court, or to deceive the English Government. 

Either the Russian Envoy, or the English Foreign Secretary, was a traitor 
to his own Government. 

Either the English Government had suborned the Russian Envoy to 
deceive the Russian Government, or the Russian Government had suborned 
the British Foreign Secretary to deceive England. 

This treasonable conspiracy between London, St. Petersburgh, and 
Teheran, was either directed by the Russian Government against England, or 
by the English Government against Russia. 

But the anterior compact of co-operation being suffered by both govern¬ 
ments to be broken, the collusion must have been between the governments 
themselves; that is, between the Foreign Minister of England, and the Go¬ 
vernment of Russia. 

Momentous as is the question—atrocious as is the crime, the proof is 
here sufficient and complete. On this concurrent attitude of concert and of 
opposition of the two cabinets, can alone be established the reality of this 
mighty betrayal for any one who approaches the subject with that previous 
knowledge, without which, such a subject cannot honestly or usefully be ap¬ 
proached. 


175 


I add the following considerations to prove, if any doubt can remain, 
that this double position was impossible without dishonesty, and in such a 
matter dishonesty is high treason. I further feel it to be incumbent on me to 
show how it was possible for such fraud to escape detection by the other 
members of the cabinet, and by the leaders of the other parties in the state. 

A single instance of hostility of agents of cabinets acting in concert, 
involves the instantaneous punishment of the agent that has transgressed, or 
the demand for his punishment from the other government. But a compact 
for the mutual communication of instructions renders it impossible for the 
agents to act in opposition. Each is in possession of the common instructions, 
any deviation from them by the one would, although the case is insupposable, 
compel the other immediately to expose to the government to which both are 
accredited, the insubordination, and, consequently, the valuelessness of the act. 

Here the instructions are concerted,—the agents permanently opposed ! 
The instructions were then concerted with the view of producing this dis¬ 
union. But how could concert produce opposition ? How, without the con¬ 
cert, can you account for the hostility ? There are two distinct concerts, the 
one of false policy, the other of criminal collusion; the one patent* between 
the governments, the other between one government and a single member of 
the other. This is the solution of the problem. Does this solve it ? What 
else can ? 

To render intelligible this double concert, we must trace it back to its 
origin. Lord Palmerston had persuaded his colleagues that it was desirable 
that England should make a selection amongst the many candidates for the 
Persian throne. He then makes it appear (having put forward Russias can¬ 
didate) that Russia has come to concur with England in this selection. The 
cabinet concurs in a Russian object, taking it to be an English object. This 
was the point where resistance was to be made, and where, if not made, sub¬ 
jugation was entailed. Resistance was not made, and England applied itself to 
the pursuit of a Russian object as its own. It is proposed that a concert shall 
be established by the two governments to advance their common policy. To 

* Patent to the cabinet only. Concealed from the public and even from the representatives of 
the British crown. It was a fraud the most cruel practised upon them. I am convinced that ii 
Mr. M c Neill had been aware of this concert, he would never have gone to Persia, because then there 
was before him the necessary sacrifice either of his integrity or of his position. 


176 


this end, it is necessary to declare that the interests of both are the same. 
Henceforward a patent concert for objects not understood cloaks the con¬ 
sciously criminal concert. Russia’s next step is to compel the monarch she has 
raised, to attack the Affghans. Here the English Minister cannot persuade 
his colleagues to concur. He sends out, he tells them, “ secret ” instructions 
to oppose Russia. This satisfies his colleagues, and prevents them from 
breaking the compact of co-operation between the two governments, while the 
existence of that compact frustrates the instructions he had sent to Persia*. 
Thus the opposition in Persia grows out of the union at home, and is made 
the means of preserving it. 

The colleagues of the acting minister see one portion of the scheme to¬ 
day, another to-morrow. As they have been deceived respecting the tendency 
of measures, so are they deceived with respect to the character of effects. 
Involved in a continuous circle of fallacy, they can neither stand still nor 
advance ; unable to control measures for which they are responsible, they must 
pretend to understand them. To escape from the reproach of being led 
without knowledge, their self-love takes refuge in the defence of what they are 
conscious they have not understood. They have to shut light out, to silence 
conscience, and then is brought about that state of the mind which Russia 
understands so well, and which she has so well described ; where men fear 
knowledge, and repel examination into their own position. Say that some 
mind active and more conscientious than the rest should still retain doubts 
or admit difficulties—will that bring him nearer to the solution, when the only 
solution—the truth—is what he dares not look upon ? 

But it may be said this act was committed by the Foreign Secretary without 
the concurrence of his colleagues ? If without their concurrence, it is needless 

* When Mr. Ellis attempted to remonstrate with Count Simonich, he referred him at once “ to 
their respective Ministers in London and St. Petershurgh.” When Mr. M c Neill attempted to threaten 
the Persian Government, because it yielded to Russia, it repelled the threat by a simple reference to 
“ the perfect understanding between the two nations.” Moreover, the double position is used at 
pleasure by the Russian Minister. Now displaying the joint power of the allies to commit Persia, 
then threatening her with England’s resistance or vengeance, when already engaged to a plan, or 
committed by an act. Speaking of the expedition to Herat, Sir J. M*Neill says, “ Count Simonich 
adduced the certainty of England’s opposition as one of the strongest arguments to accelerate the 
execution of the scheme.” Yet the English Ambassador had not one word to say on the part of 
the English Government. 


177 


to trace tlie steps by which his ascendancy has been secured, since he 
must have been their master from the very origin. Then would it be 
superfluous to speak of “ Cabinet,” of “ Government,” of “ Policy,” or of 
England,”—these would have become vain and empty sounds*. The 
Foreign Secretary, we must therefore assume, did obtain (sooner or later) 
the concurrence of his colleagues, and this gives us the measure of their 
minds morally and intellectually. The cabinet dreaded Russia ; desired to 
oppose Russia; was ignorant of the means by which she could be opposed; 
and had no repugnance to act with dishonesty and with perfidy. Lord 
Palmerston had their apprehensions of Russia, and their dishonesty, at 
once to use ; by these he led them to perfidious oppositionf, so as at once to 
render them the instruments of her policy abroad, and of his power at home. 
If the objects of England are honest objects, she must sacrifice those objects 
from the moment that she has recourse to fraud, for honesty can only honestly 
resist. England is powerless, unless opposed as much in character as in 
intention to the government that obtains by fraudulent means, unjust ends. 
To oppose her, you give her your hand, and you give that hand dishonestly! 
The cabinet of England has, first, been brought to concert its policy with 
Russia. The cabinet of England has, secondly, been led to be guilty of perfidy 
to its ally. The cabinet of England has, lastly, been led to believe itself guilty 
of perfidy that was not real! What more can he said—what further imagined ? 
Here is illustrated the double power of evil, swaying by its intelligence, while 
corrupting by its touch. 

The man who has concerted such a scheme must be so superior to his 


* Lord Palmerston acted, and subsequently compromised his colleagues, by giving them 
knowledge of his acts—in proportion as they became confused, and the government committed, so 
as to render it impossible for them to understand, or understanding, to resist. In the debate in the 
French Chamber on the Treaty of 15th July, the command of Lord Palmerston over his colleagues 
was completely exposed. M. Guizot, in a despatch of June 24th, represents Lord Palmerston’s 
colleagues and the Ministers of Austria and Prussia as weighing upon him at once and in vain. 

*f* In regard to the Treaty of 15th July, when Lord Palmerston was reproached in the House of 
Commons for having furthered the objects of Russia, he declared that that treaty counteracted the 
objects of Russia. The treaty was not then ratified. Lord Palmerston had no hesitation in making 
this declaration, nor Russia in ratifying the treaty after it. Englishmen either did not think of this 
fact, or, thinking about it, said to themselves,—Oh ! Russia uses this man as a dupe. So that the 
Englishmen who did think, would have done better to let thinking alone. 


A A 


178 


colleagues*, and to the other parliamentary men of the nation to which he 
belongs, as to be wholly incomprehensible to them. Constituting for all 
practical purposes the cabinet, he joins with a Foreign Power, transcendent in 
ability as in ambition, yields to that power the means of commanding the 
world through England, and of assuring his position and her domination 
over England by the results obtained against herself within and without. 
The road to these ends, is the complication of affairs, that is the confu¬ 
sion of the thoughts and the corruption of the mind of the English nation. 
To these ends the whole power, at their joint command, must be intently 
devoted. 

But it may be supposed that the very success of the system will 
bring its fall; that the disasters which will ensue must arouse the nation 
—that the contradictions which will appear, must break the spell which 
fascinates the cabinet. But the collusion of the Minister of so great a 
power as England, with so powerful a government as Russia, establishes 
an extra-national dominionf, which will dispose events so as to prolong 
the slumbers of a factious people and the fascination of a heedless cabinet, 
until there will be nothing to dread from that cabinet’s knowledge, or from 
that nation’s power. Here then, as in every case of treason, the blindness of the 
nation is necessary to its success and to its existence, and it must triumph so long 
as ignorance of its existence is allowed to stand as proof that it does not exist. 

Thus, from the mutual positions of the two cabinets have we arrived at 

* It is in reference to knowledge that talents are of use. If talent and success in political affairs 
were synonimous, we should not see nations sinking in one age and rising in another, unless the 
natural powers of different ages varied. It is the knowledge of ages, that is their wisdom, that varies, 
thence progress and decline. The man associated with the system of Russia assumes, in reference to 
his compatriots, the position of Russia with respect to other powers, powerful over them, because 
understanding them without being understood. 

1* This union commands at once all the resources of aggression wielded by Russia, and all the 
moral power of resistance which the aggressions of Russia have placed at the disposal of Great 
Britain. They are the two great military and naval powers, the commercial and diplomatic powers, 
commanding two hundred millions of men, inhabiting Europe, Asia, and America. While this concert 
remains secret, every government or people that opposes the one falls back upon the assumed 
opposition of the other ; and when they can openly avow their union, all hope disappears for Russia's 
victim—all chance of effectual resistance on the part of the greatest of remaining powers disappears. 
Russia will, so long as it is necessary, therefore, render events throughout the world subservient to 
the maintenance of the British Minister, through whom this position has first been secured. 


179 


the conclusion of the traitorous intelligence of one member of the British 
Government with the Russian Government. We have seen that it is 
impossible to come to any other conclusion, or to resist this. 

We have been brought to the very same point by examining the instruc¬ 
tions sent to Persia. 

We are now about to examine a third body of evidence—the explana¬ 
tions between the two cabinets. 

The conclusions drawn from these separate data stand by themselves. 
With these data we have to proceed by mental processes, which furnish 
each its own result, distinctly and separately. Thus each result, derived from 
one process, becomes a test alike of the other processes, and of their results. 

It has been by analysis that we have treated the instructions sent out 
to Persia. It is by induction that we have just arrived at our conclu¬ 
sions respecting the reciprocal attitudes of the two governments. In turning 
now to the exposition by the governments themselves of their own acts, 
we must proceed by synthesis, because their exposition must include the whole 
case. Hitherto we have scarcely had other assistance to guide our steps than 
the glimmerings which involuntarily escape from the very intricacy of the 
process of deception. Every sentence addressed by government to govern¬ 
ment must be clear and steady light, that will expose the falsehood of 
the pretexts assumed by them to veil intentions, or the errors committed by 
us in attempting to explain them. 

Here then are elements of judgment worthy of our subject—worthy of a 
subject unparalleled in inherent difficulties—unparalleled in the depth of the 
crime that is involved, or in the magnitude of the interests that are at stake. 

But the power of the proof rises not only in proportion to the extent of 
evidence, and the variety of the processes which separately are employed, and 
which mutually concur—it rises also in proportion as the circumstances of the 
parties enable them to exclude, or the disposition of the inquirer to 
circumscribe, testimony. These difficulties present themselves here to a 
degree perhaps without example. No judicial tribunal—no political authority 
—no public opinion investigates or compels the production of evidence*. The 

* “ This inquiry will produce no great information, if those whose conduct is examined are 
allowed to select the evidence. What will they produce but accounts, obscure, fallacious, imperfect, 
and confused, from which nothing can be learned ?”•—Chatham on Impeachment of Walpole. 


180 


parties are two Governments, and the evidence that we have, is not produced 
for the purpose of meeting inquiry, or even doubts, but spontaneously for an 
advantage ; that is, to mislead opinion, to misrepresent facts, and to commit 
parties and public men by the mere fact of publication. 

Conscious of all these obstacles cast in our path, will a conscientious man 
the more lightly weigh objections, or the more readily admit proof? Far 
from it. To such a man it will not be necessary to bring home the proof of 
guilt in order to lead him to demand, and to seek by every means to obtain, 
public investigation. For him it will be enough that failure should have oc¬ 
curred—that doubts respecting the honour of the state should exist—that 
suspicions regarding the motives of individuals should be abroad—that infor¬ 
mation respecting the transactions themselves should be withheld; any one of 
these would be perfectly sufficient for any upright man, or any good citizen, 
to require that such investigation should take place as should dispel doubt, 
as should destroy suspicion, or as should convert suspicion into knowledge, 
and thereby prevent danger and punish crime. Such a man will, of course, 
not come to conclusions of guilt, except on positive knowledge of ascertained 
facts, and therefore it is that he will urge inquiry. But, alas! there is no 
reason here for the absence of conclusions respecting guilt; there is no scan¬ 
tiness of facts, no deficiency of information. Would to God that it were so, 
for one might then hope. Whatever the incredulity of the nation, I know of 
no instance in which a man, who has applied himself to investigate this charge, 
has not come to the admission of its truth—each of course moved, in entering 
upon the inquiry, by the desire to detect fallacy in the alleged proof. But 
those who did apply themselves to investigate, had first been changed men. 
From their minds the idols of faction had been displaced. Without such 
change how could they take interest in that which belonged to England ? 
How could they comprehend that which constituted citizenship ? 

In former instances of treason you have had a man overreached in some 
particular transaction—overreached by an antagonist nearly his own match, 
and brought into subserviency to some foreign power much on a level in 
intelligence and in objects with his own. You have seen that minister con¬ 
tinuing subsequently a series of deceptions, to conceal his weakness or his 
crime; but that which we have here, and that which I assert is betrayal 
premeditated—is betrayal by compact—betrayal complete and entire, every 


181 


word a lie, every act a crime—betrayal to a power so superior in mind, and so 
entire in ambition, that if the betrayal was not complete, it could have no 
existence. 

To substantiate this assertion, it does not suffice that we should have 
evidence of falsification of language, of misrepresentation of facts—it does 
not suffice that we should have Russian ends thereby obtained—it does not 
suffice that no other solution or result can be found save the advancement 
of the ends of Russia. But we must have the total absence of any fact or 
any incident which does not present the same characters, and give the same 
results. The British Minister, who intentionally obeyed but once that 
Government, must he, from that hour, no more than a portion of its system. 
If, therefore, I saw in the present Foreign Secretary of England any instance 
of weakness, caprice, indifference, or neglect, in matters of importance to 
Russia (that is, in all important matters), I should reject my conclusions 
respecting him, because I know that that system is everywhere and at all 
times self coherent, presenting the only coeval example by which an idea can 
be gained of judgment applied to the conduct of human affairs. 


PART XV. 

REMONSTRANCES ADDRESSED IN 1837, BY THE BRITISH CABINET TO THAT 
OF RUSSIA, RESPECTING THE CONDUCT OF THE LATTER IN CENTRAL 
ASIA. 

Nine months are allowed to elapse before any remonstrance is made by 
the British Government, after official communication of the hostile acts of 
the Russian Government in Persia. During eleven months the Foreign Se¬ 
cretary had been aware of the intentions of Persia, to which the acts of Russia 
had reference. During eighteen months, had he been aware that it was the 
intention of Russia to push Persia to the performance of these acts. 



182 


After eighteen months of silence, a remonstrance is made against a go¬ 
vernment whose acts were hostile, and whose intentions were fore known. 
It is needless to go further in search of the motive for such conduct; here 
again is it clear, as in every preceding act or sentence. But again, let us set 
the past aside, and placing our previous conclusions in abeyance, suppose 
that the Foreign Secretary now, for the first time, learns what Russia has 
been about; or suddenly recovering from a state of torpor, determines at last 
to act. He makes a remonstrance : a remonstrance neither placid in spirit, 
nor measured in terms. This, in a minister so enduring, so circumspect, so 
exact, reveals, at least, a decision taken. A remonstrance is made ; St. Pe¬ 
tersburg]! is spoken to. The face of things is now to ba changed, and we are 
about to be relieved from the long and heavy burthen of humiliation and 
suspicion. But stop :—What is a remonstrance ?—Is it a statement of 
grievances ? Is it proof of the facts stated ? Is it demand of reparation for 
injury done, and of cessation of that injury for the future ?—Yes. Supposing 
that the party asserting that it has suffered injury, avoided to specify it, and 
possessing the proof of such injury, withheld it; and that while speaking in 
an insulting tone, it made no intelligible demand: would that be called a 
remonstrance ?—No. What, then, would it be called ?—That which has never 
occurred in the conduct of private or public affairs can have received no 
designation. A transaction such as this can have the designation only of the 
characters of the folly or of the guilt to which it belongs. 

Such is the incident before us ; the British Foreign Secretary, addressing 
himself to St. Petersburgh, remonstrates, but states no case—asserts various 
things, proves none—argues, but does not specify; and insulting much the 
Russian Government, from that Government demands nothing. 

The remonstrance excludes from view the whole of the communications 
transmitted from Persia during the previous eleven months. A despatch from 
Mr. M c Neill, written shortly after his arrival in Persia, and before he had 
seen either the Shah or the Russian Minister, narrates incidentally and on 
rumour, that:— 

“ The Russian Minister still continued to urge the Shah to undertake a 
“ winter campaign against Herat.” 

The despatch containing this passage is immediately enclosed to the 
British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, and constitutes the whole case that is 


183 


sent to substantiate the remonstrance of England against the policy which 
(under the cloak of concert with England) had evoked the shade of Nadir 
Shah, and pointed out Delhi and Calcutta to the ambition of Central Asia. 

Even this expression is too explicit and robust for the purposes of the 
Foreign Secretary, and he restates it, so as to be enabled to alter its grammatical 
structure. He tells Lord Durham that Mr. M c Neill “ reports that Count 
“ Simonich had urged the Shah to undertake a winter * campaign against 
“ Herat.” The Foreign Secretary does not inform the Ambassador of the 
value of the facts—he does not refer him to the compact of the two Govern¬ 
ments—he does not enlighten him as to the opinions or policy of the British 
Government. Lord Durham is thrown back in bringing this weighty matter 
before the Russian Government, on the comparison of the expression of Mr. 
M c Neill with the version of it bv his chief, and must infer that the statement 
is valueless, and that the proceeding, now reported, is novel—if true. On such 
grounds is Lord Durham left to proceed with the aid of that judgment, and 
under the guidance of those predilections, which led to his selection for the 
post which he occupied. 

The Foreign Secretary then proceeds to instruct Lord Durham upon the 
case thus placed before him 

“ I have to instruct your Excellency to ask Count Nesselrode whether Count Simonich is acting 
according to his instructions. 1 ’ 

According to all the knowledge here avowed, what grounds were there to 
assume that Count Simonich had acted ? Mr. M c Neill’s expression would not 
have been changed by his chief, except on the conviction of its worthlessness. 
How then does he assume upon it, in face of a great ally, that its minister had 
done a thing, which thing he, in the subsequent phrase, characterizes as so 
monstrous ? There was here, then, no patent ground for the assumption 
that Count Simonich had done any thing ? Other grounds existed. Why 
are they not produced ? Why, having them, is the authority of Mr. M c Neill’s 
statement invalidated ? 

Could a bona fide remonstrance be, without establishing the facts ? Could 
it proceed on an assumption ? Having established the facts, would it proceed 
by asking a Foreign Power whether its envoy was, or was not, in a state 


* As placed in the extract, the value of the passage seems to turn on the word “ winter.” 


184 


of insubordination ? And supposing such to be diplomatic practice, could that 
question be put to a Government by the man who was aware of its intention 
three months before that intention was revealed by the envoy’s act ? 

In this transaction do you perceive weakness, or ignorance, or reckless¬ 
ness ? Or do you find evidence of knowledge, of firmness, of system ? No, 
these are simple, common-place expressions, which you construe too harshly. 
He who digs a pit and places in it a snare, will he not cover it over ? 

The despatch continues :—- 

“ If your Excellency should learn that Count Simonich is acting in obedience to his instruc¬ 
tions, Your Excellency will represent to the Russian Government that-” 

Now what are we to expect ? The British Minister, at length driven 
beyond the verge of endurance, demands a categorical reply. He has, however, 
opened to Russia a door of escape by the sacrifice of her agent. If she 
sacrifices her agent, Lord Durham will, of course, then be instructed further 
to require such public declaration in Asia as shall completely counteract 
the consequences of the policy he has urged. If Russia refuses or delays, 
of course Lord Durham will be instructed to demand his passports. 

The reader ought not to proceed till he has weighed whether it was, or 
was not, possible to adopt any course saving one of these alternatives, after 
the question which Lord Durham was instructed to put. When he has 
satisfied his mind on this point, he will be prepared to peruse the following 
passage :— 

“ If your Excellency should learn from Count Nesselrode that Count Simonich is acting in 
obedience to his instructions, your Excellency will represent to the Russian Government, that these 
military expeditions of the Shah are, in the highest degree, unwise and injurious; that they lead 
him, &c.! and that they cause him to waste, &c.!” 

In the first paragraph the assumption of the act of Count Simonich 
as unquestionable, gives an appearance of energy, and casts a shade of me¬ 
nace over the transaction ; no sooner is this effect produced, than the as¬ 
sumption is withdrawn ; to Count Nesselrode is not left the hazard even of 
denving it. 

“ It would,” Lord Palmerston continues, “ be so contrary to all the professed principles and 
declared system of the Russian Government to have instructed Count Simonich to urge the Shah 
in the manner in which he is reported to have done so, that it must he assumed that the Count 
has been acting without instructions; and if that he the case, His Majesty’s Government cannot 



185 


doubt that the Russian Cabinet will put a stop to a course of conduct so much at variance with 
its own declared (!) policy, and so adverse to the best interests of an ally, for whom the Russian 
Government professes friendship and good-will.” 

The British Foreign Secretary has to call on Russia to explain what 
might be ambiguous (supposing there were any thing ambiguous) in her 
conduct: instead of that, he applies himself to making assumptions respecting 
her conduct, and addresses to herself explanations of these assumptions. He 
insinuates suspicions of her good faith, doubts of the subordination of her 
service ; he places these assumptions as alternatives, and alternately admits 
and rejects both—so that he asserts and denies good faith in her po¬ 
licy and subordination in her service. In the first paragraph the charge 
against Count Simonich is laid down as positive; in the second paragraph, 
it is assumed to be untrue. On the assertion of this truth no demand is 
made, and on the assumption of its falsehood a reply is suggested*. How 
is the reader not to lose himself in this maze ; but these snares are set 
only for the dishonest mind. Coming from Russia, the idea of Count Simonich 
disobeying his instructions w ould have been too preposterous ; advanced on 
the part of England, the dishonest reader admits it, because he knows that 
no one ever doubted that Count Simonich acted according to instructions. 
Leaving the subject, he passes on to admire the ingenuity of the insult; his 

* The following parallel instance of suggestion of a reply is from a despatch from Lord Palmer¬ 
ston to Mr. Fox, in the United States, dated July 22, 1837:—“ With reference to your despatch 
of the 25th of January last, relative to the outrage that was committed in October 1835, within the 
Canadian frontier, by certain citizens of the state of New Hampshire, I have to instruct you to 
point out to the American Secretary of State, the unjustifiable violation of territory, indisputably 
British, which was committed on the occasion referred to; to express a conviction that such an act 
must incur the disapprobation of the President; and to say that, if it has not been punished, its 
IMPUNITY MUST HAVE ARISEN FROM SOME INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
action.” On this passage, I have made the following comment in “ Exposition of the North-East 
Boundary Differences.'”—“ It is a novel procedure in diplomacy, to suggest an excuse as the means by 
which redress is to be obtained ! To advance an hypothesis in an irrelevant matter, and to cast an 
imputation on the constitutional character of an independent state, has, I believe, been hitherto 
unheard of in international correspondence. So complete a displacement of the question at issue—so 
entire a departure from the forms of the subject and the style of the office—so artful a leading away 
of the mind of the reader from the intention of the writer, and from the effect of the communication 
—could not have fortuitously presented themselves to the writer's mind ; nor could ideas so disjointed, 
and propositions so unnatural, have been brought together in a single phrase, except by an ominous 
concert of ability and design.” 


B B 


186 


indignation not having been aroused by the dishonesty, his eyes are closed 
to the treason against England, concealed behind the assumed insult to 
Russia. 

<c England cannot doubt that Russia will put a stop to such a course of conduct.” 

The British Minister had not ascertained whether “ such a course of 
“ conduct” had, or had not*, been according to instructions, yet he argues 
with her to show that it has not, while he insinuates that it is by instruction 
that Count Simonich has acted, in every term which he uses in arguing the 
reverse. If the question was to be argued, why was the question put ? Why 
diminish the chances of this conduct being stopped by the insult insinuated ? 
But no demand is made, as no assertion had been made, because both are 
put forward only to be destroyed. This despatch, alleging hostility in an 
Ambassador, and insinuating, as the explanation of his acts, either insubordi¬ 
nation in the service, or fraud in the Government, concludes with no more than 
the hope that this course of conduct should receive a check from the Russian 
Government, in the case only in which the Russian Government had been 
already unable to check it! 

Here, again, is our case complete. 

Now let us see how the effects produced on Lord Durham correspond 
with what we have here anticipated. 

Lord Durham writes, on the 24th February :— 

“ In conformity with your Lordship’s instructions I spoke to Count Nesselrode on the subject of 
the conduct of the Russian Minister in Persia.” 

His instructions were :— 

“ I have to instruct your Excellency to ask Count Nesselrode whether Count Simonich is acting 
according to his instructions ?” 

“ If your Excellency should learn from Count Nesselrode that Count Simonich is acting 
according to his instructions, your Excellency will represent,” &c. 

The instructions then were, first to make and record a formal demand ; 
and secondly, on an affirmative reply, to make certain statements. Could 
Lord Durham put such a question ? Could an instruction be obeyed which 
required insult to a Foreign power in the first paragraph, and supplication to 

* Lord Palmerston does not instruct Lord Durham to ask “ whether Count Simonich is or is 
not acting according to his instructions;” or “ whether or not Count Simonich ?” &c. he says, 
“ whether Count Simonich is acting according to his instructions ?” 


187 


it in the last. Lord Durham was, at the time, playing the part of mediator 
between the Foreign Secretary and Russia. Lord Durham, therefore, dis¬ 
obeys his instructions; that disobedience is submitted to—therefore it was 
intended* *. While the bold demand stands on record in the Foreignf Office in 
London, the supplication alone drops from the lips of the Ambassador at 
St. Petersburgh—consequently Lord Durham writes :— 

“ I spoke\ to Count Nesselrode upon the subject of the conduct of the Russian Minister in 
Persia.” 


* Parallel case from the negociations through which Lord Palmerston has effected the abrogation 
of the award of the King of Holland, on the disputed boundary in North America:— 

“ Mr. Bankhead (the British Charge d 1 Affaires at Washington) in his despatch of June the 
13th, as in his previous despatches, has expressed his conviction that the decision of the Senate would 
be favourable to the adoption of the award. It is upon this ground that he justifies, it is this fact that 
he assigns as his motive for his communication of what he terms ‘ the ulterior views of His Majesty’s 
Government.’ As Lord Palmerston, in confiding to him the secret proposal of negociation, had, by 
the peculiar construction of the language he had used, thrown upon him the entire responsibility of its 
employment, and directed him to be particularly cautious in making any communication of this 
nature, to guard against the possibility of being (mis) understood as inviting negociation as a sub¬ 
stitute for the adoption of the award; and as Mr. Bankhead himself had stated ‘ that the slightest 
intimation, on his part, as to the possibility of future negociation, might endanger the favourable 
decision of the Senate,’ it is clear that he had contravened the positive instructions of his chief, 
and had acted in opposition to his own emphatically expressed conviction of duty. If, therefore, 
Lord Palmerston, with the whole facts before him, with the rejection of the award coming after the 
dangerous intimation of negociation as a substitute for adoption, did not visit, with his severest 
censure, the functionary by whom that intimation had been so unfortunately made, it follows, that 
he had placed him in that position of embarrassment with a purpose, and that the unfortunate step, so 
taken, was that which Lord Palmerston desired.” —North East Boundary Differences , p. 50-51 
quarto edition. 

*f* Another parallel case:— 

“ Looking upon this state of things, no less unwonted than unaccountable, it cannot fail to 
strike and to startle the inquirer, that there is recorded in the Foreign Office, as dated, and, 
therefore, dispatched on the 14th October (and, therefore, one month and twenty-two days before 
the opening of the Session), a despatch calling upon the American Government to accept the award ; 
and, at the same time, dealing in a most conclusive and authoritative manner with the objections 
raised against it by the State of Maine. This despatch arrives at Washington two months and four 
days after its date—that is after the message is delivered. When it does arrive, it is accompanied 
with a secret instruction in an opposite sense !” —Boundary Differences , p. 45. 

+ How was this not the subject of a formal note? What record is there in the Russian archives 
of any remonstrance having been made? There is nothing that can enlighten a future minister of 
Russia—nothing to which England can appeal even of the character represented in Lord Durham’s 



188 


4 


Thus do we see gradually softened down the demands and complaints of 
England as they are transferred from despatch to despatch, and from agent to 
agent. You commence with a loud and lofty tone—it gradually sinks to 
a whisper. A large and imposing body is before you—your eyes, and 
watchfulness are called here and there by some dexterous movements, and 
when you look again there is a shrunken shadow in its place, growing less and 
less, till nothing is to be found*. 

Lord Durham continues :— 

“ His Excellency (Count Nesselrode) said that he was convinced that our minister had been 
misinformed, and that Count Simonich had never given any such advice to the Shah as that which 
had been attributed to him.” 

Now again, is it not in the power of the British Minister to restore the 
whole position ? Can he not, in reply, transmit the proofs of his allegation ? 
These proofs, has he not subsequently given them to the world ? It was 
then if ever that they had to be produced. This, if not his duty, his self-love 
required. Nevertheless, he remains silent. What common explanation can 
be found for the silence as to the proof, and the remonstrance as to the facts ? 
One only, and the same one, and the only one which explains, or can explain, 
each and all of these enigmas. 

After this explanation with Count Nesselrode, Lord Durham tells his 
chief, in apparently a private letter (a passage from which is introduced as an 
“ extract” from a despatch;, that he had “ had an oj^ortnnity of talking with 
“ M. Rodofinikin, on the subject of the conduct of Count Simonich.” 

“ In answer to my complaint (?) he said he would bring me the 
“ original book, in which were entered all the despatches and instructions 
“ to the Russian Ambassador, which would prove to me how little the Count 
“ had attended to them if he had acted in the manner stated by me. 

despatch. Compare this with the proposals to France to force the Dardanelles against Russia. 
This was a thing not to set down and record till both parties were agreed; without such concurrence 
it is set down—it was to be recorded, not performed. 

* First, —The whole case from Persia dwindles down to the report from Mr. McNeill that Count 
Simonich “ still continued to urge.” 

Secondly, —Lord Palmerston reports this report as “ had urged.” Instructs therefore to make 
demands. 

Thirdly, —Lord Durham speaks on the subject. 

Fourthly ,—Lord Palmerston replies-?-! 




189 


r 


“ I SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT OF THE FACT; it had beeil 

“ mentioned so often and by so many persons , that it was, I feared, indis- 
“ putable ; and I pointed out to him the inconvenience of the Russian 
“ Government being represented by a person, who either would not or could 
“ not act according to his instructions,” 

Here is the British Ambassador making complaints regarding Count 
Simonich, which are not listened to, refusing to see the instructions that are 
offered him, persisting in asserting, without being permitted to prove the facts 
that are denied, lamenting over the insubordination of a Russian functionary, 
without either having instructions or spirit to suggest so much as his re¬ 
moval. After disobeying the instructions that required him to insult, he is 
compelled now to sit down under the rejection of what he was commissioned 
to supplicate. 

The Book of Instructions is offered to Lord Durham for perusal! Had 
not the instructions been drawn up in common* ? Why then is the offer 
made ? Again, if the instructions have been concealed, why is not the offer 
accepted ? Knowledge is therefore rejected, while information is pretended 
to be sought. It was desirable then to remain ignorant, and inconvenient to 
accept so patently the position of dupe. 

But where are the despatches from Persia ? Count Simonich’s des¬ 
patches were the reply to the despatches of the English Envoy. 

Either Count Simonich had, or had not, obeyed his instructions; but in 
both cases his report must have been equally available for the purposes of 
the Russian Government. If he had obeyed his instructions, he must have 
narrated that obedience. If he had disobeyed his instructions, he must 
have specially guarded himself by misrepresentations against the statements 
of the English Envoy. Simulated instructions had, therefore, been prepared 
for this occasion, but simulated despatches had not been thought of. 

This is the first instance in which I have found Russia unprovided. The 
neglect, however, was soon repaired. 

The explanation takes place in the end of January; it is reported 


* See Despatch of Count Nesselrode, 20th October, 1838, par. 41. 


190 


* 


in London on the 14th March, and two months and fifteen days from that 
period we find Mr. M c Neill writing from Persia in reply to a despatch which 
is not given, and defending himself against the Russian Minister. On 
the other hand, within the time barely requisite for communication from 
St. Petersburgh, Count Simonich writes a despatch*, which is immediately 
submitted to the representative of England at St. Petersburgh. It was then 
desirable to communicate despatches from Persia ! But how is this the first 
occasion in which such communication is made ? Were there no despatches 
from Persia at the time of the explanations ? Did none arrive from Persia, 
until precisely there was time to send for one ? Count Simonich states that he 
had “ used the most pressing representations ,” to stop the expedition against 
Herat, and that “ if His Majesty shall decide to set out this summer he will 
“ not go too far” ( trop loinJf. Lord Palmerston immediately sends off this 
despatch to Mr. M c Neill, adding a single passage by which (as in reporting to 
St. Petersburgh, Mr. M c Neill’s expression,) he vitiates the sense and the struc¬ 
ture of the phrase ; he says the Russian Minister reports to his Government 
that “he had already urged the Shah to abandon the expedition.” Must not 
then his former letter (suppressed) have conveyed to Mr. M c Neill, as the result 
of the remonstrance, that henceforth Count Simonich was to be instructed to 
urge the Shah not to proceed with the expedition ? Mr. M c Neill in the mean¬ 
time has sent home a despatch, stating that Count Simonich had admitted that 
he had disobeyed his instructions, and justified that disobedience, and further 
stated his instructions not to be to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the 
war, but merely not to urge the Shah to undertake it. Thus have Lord 
Palmerston and the Russian Government concurrently substantiated the 
deception ; Lord Palmerston intimidating Mr. M c Neill into the admission 


* Mr. M c NeiH’s despatch is of the 1st June, Count Simonich's of the 28th May. As the latter 
must have had communication at least a fortnight before the former, it appears as if he did not imme¬ 
diately write. But the despatch of Count Simonich bears only one date ; I have never seen any other 
Russian despatch with a single date. The date given, is it the new or the old style ? The difference 
is twelve days. These contradictions I have collated with a succinctness, which, I fear will only be 
intelligible to those who trace the facts the volume in hand, and refer from document to document 
and letter to letter. 

*f* The Parliamentary papers suppress the sarcasm, and translate “ very far.' 1 


t 


191 


of the Russian case, and misrepresenting to him the result of the remon¬ 
strance ; Count Nesselrode instructing Count Simonich to affirm the mon¬ 
strous charge suggested by the British Foreign Secretary, that he (Count 
Simonich) has disobeyed instructions. Here is the complement to the 
explanations at St. Petersburgh; the absurdities the most incredible, 
repeated from side to side, till the reader loses all sense, not of truth only, 
but of reality. 

But passing a sponge over the proofs we have examined, and forgetting 
the conclusions we have formed, and recommencing the investigation afresh :— 
Here we have the official admission of disobedience of the Envoy, and of 
instructions from the Russian Government, at variance with the statements 
made by that Government; Lord Palmerston receives the communication of 
these facts, and he neither requires the removal of the Envoy nor the com¬ 
munication of the instructions ! 

No one can undergo the labour of collating the documents (and with¬ 
out it all attention given to this subject is useless, and worse than useless) 
without wondering that so much more trouble has been bestowed on every 
branch and on every detail of these transactions, than appeared necessary 
for the purposes of deception. It must, however, be borne in mind, that as at 
any hour a change of men, or the accidents of human life, might have 
interrupted the proceedings before their termination, it was necessary to 
have a veil carried on in advance of facts, so as to prevent the light of day 
from penetrating, whatever contingencies might have occurred*. 

The remonstrance appeared to expire with the fruitless expostulations of 


* Before I put pen to paper regarding the contents of this volume of diplomatic correspondence, 
which we are actually examining, it had cost me six weeks of uninterrupted labour, having several 
copies cut out, so as to put the despatches in their order, and to collate passages naturally illustrating 
each other. It is now a year since, at intervals, I have been studying the same volume, which I 
scarcely ever open without detecting some new instance of art—and of the art of concealing art. It is 
a mine of fraud, requiring time, labour, and perseverance, to work it. 

The weaving of this web was, however, an easy matter, compared with the unravelling of it. 
The work went on from day to day; each transaction led to that which followed, and the difficulty 
suggested the expedient; and then two governments were at work, not merely disguising from all 
others what they were doing, but falsifying the documents which they left behind, and then these 
papers, when published, are only published so far as they have been deemed advantageous for the 
perversion of opinion, no necessity compelling them to make any thing known, and no eye being open 
upon that which was published. 


192 


Lord Durham; but we find Lord Palmerston, in the final explanation with 
the Russian Government (20 months later) rehearsing the occurrence we are 
now examining, in the following words :— 

“ On the 1st May, 1837, Count Nesselrode said to Lord Durham that 
“ Count Simonich ‘ would not long remain in Persia.’ That Ambassador, 
“ nevertheless, has continued to remain in Persia , pursuing with increased 
“ activity , and in the,most open manner , the conduct of which his Government 
“ had expressed such a decided disapprobation .” 

The most material fact connected with the explanations which took place 
in January 1837, has thus been wholly suppressed in the published documents. 
Why was this fact suppressed at the time ? Was it not to prevent the 
reader from being struck with the evident solution of the difficulty—the 
removal of Count Simonich ? Why is it subsequently brought forth ? The 
events having occurred, it only affords the opportunity to the Foreign Secretary 
of appearing to deal with Russia roughly. The conduct of the agent, the 
object of “ decided disapprobation !” The conduct of that agent was, by the 
Russian Government, entirely adopted. Had the case been as stated, would 
the triumph not be the greater for Russia to maintain him—the crime the 
greater in the British Minister to endure him ? The British Minister takes 
the severest reprobation that could he directed against himself, and by using 
it against Russia, convinces his countrymen that he is blameless ! 

Count Simonich is a wonderful creation. He arrives in Persia, sent by 
Russia as her representative. From that hour we hear of him as her anta¬ 
gonist. On his reaching Persia, England was there all powerful. He pros¬ 
trates at once her power; he drives Persia, notwithstanding the joint resistance 
of Russia and England, to assault Herat. He draws to himself the Affghans, 
causing them to break with the Indian Government. Acting at once against 
England and against Russia—against the Persians and against the Affghans— 
he carries out his own ends in despite of them all. Upon such an assumption 
as this, is every single word of these negociations based! This fiction* is 

* Who, in reading the passage, “ You will ask Count Nesselrode if Count Simonich is acting 
according to his instructions,'” could have dreamt of the crop of fallacies that were to be reaped from 
such a shoot as this ? Since that period, all disquisitions on Russia are suspended between the horns 
of this dilemma. I extract, as a specimen, the following passage from a Bombay paper, re-echoing 
an English review. 

“ The intrigues in the East, which are certainly in contradiction to the individual views of the 


193 


called into account on the one hand, for the inability of England to protect 
herself, and presents on the other the occasion for exhibiting the energy with 
which the British Foreign Secretary can denounce the Russian Government! 

Our subject having now, for the first time, carried us to St. Petersburgh, 
and having fixed our attention upon the individual, at the time charged with 
the representation of England at that capital, it may be beneficial, and indeed 
is necessary, to devote a moment’s consideration to the part that has been 
there played by that ambassador. Lord Durham’s predilections for Russia 
are well known ; it is also felt that his opinions have exercised a very material 
influence upon the policy of this country, and upon the general impressions 
of the public at large in respect to Russia. To those who have examined 
these matters, there is no name which probably excites more painful sensation 
than the name of Lord Durham. His mission excited, and was calculated to 
excite, expectations respecting Turkey and Poland which were utterly be¬ 
trayed : the event, which more than any other has hastened the triumph of 
Russia in the East—the capture of the Vixen, has, by excess of infamy, 
given lustre to that mission*. An English vessel was captured by a Rus- 

Emperor, were then, in any thing like their extent, probably unknown to him, and to him alone, in 
the whole empire. The powers which would have been requisite to sustain them effectually, could 
not be obtained without his consent; this appears to have been withheld; and the intrigues them¬ 
selves, though carried on with the full concurrence of the ministers and the nobles, whose course is 
more hidden, though unchanged from that of former times, failed, and fell away at the first breath of 
approaching contact. 

“ Such is the clue to the recent explicit disavowal made by the Emperor Nicholas of the acts of 
his ministry, in answer to the spirited requisition of the British Foreign Minister; and this likewise 
explains the previous declaration of Lord Palmerston in Parliament, that there were governments 
that attempted every thing and disavowed every thing. The Emperor can but work with the means 
in his power; and from the general bias of the nation, it must be confessed that if aggrandizement is 
no longer the principle of Russian policy, it is still its tendency.” 

* The following passage is from the pen of the Representative of England in Persia during these 
transactions:— 

“ Still the distance which separated her frontier (Russia’s) from ours was so considerable; the 
protestations of the absence of all ambitious views were so solemn, * * * and Lord Durham was so 

fully satisfied of the perfect sincerity of all her professions, that this country was lulled into a feeling of 
security, from which the voice of the few who did not participate in these sentiments was unable to 
rouse it. Russia saw publication after publication, exposing her past and denouncing her present 
policy, issue from the press of England without awakening the nation; she saw every attempt which 


C C 


194 


sian cruizer on a foreign coast, and confiscated by the act of the Government, 
without legal procedure, on the ground of the infraction of quarantine 
regulations, and of custom laws which had no existence. The act of Russia 
was admitted, confirmed upon a despatch of three lines from Lord Durham, 
stating, in his own name, that the bay in which that vessel was captured, was 
occupied by Russia—a statement which was false. 

This occurred when Lord Palmerston was Foreign Minister, and when 
Lord Durham was Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 

At the same period, and during the exercise of the responsible functions 
of government by the same men, have those transactions taken place re¬ 
specting Persia, which we are perusing with wonder, shame, and indignation. 

Lord Durham was selected by the Emperor of Russia to fill the post of 
British Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburgh. The Sovereign of Eng¬ 
land had the grief and shame to learn, by an accident, that this appointment 
had been settled between his Minister and that Sovereign before the intention 
of it was communicated to himself. 

The selection of Lord Durham for this service gave to Lord Palmerston 
daily occasions for exhibiting opposition to Russia, and contempt for the man 
(the ambassador appointed by himself) who could so easily be made the dupe 
of the Emperor. He was relieved from the necessity of having to propose 
measures in the interest of Russia, and appeared to ijielcl to the opinion or 
importunities of Lord Durham, or to the weight of his family connexions. 
Lord Durham was further strengthened in this course by the appearance of 
leading the Government at home into a line of policy of his suggesting. 

Lord Londonderry, in his “ Recollections of a Tour in the North of 
“ Europe,” throws valuable light on this position. 


was made to direct the attention of the House of Commons to her designs fail. She saw the British 
nation so exclusively occupied with domestic feuds that no question of foreign policy seemed to be at 
all thought of. She heard a party in the nation even questioning the value of India ; and having, as 
she imagined, tried the temper and the spirit of England by the seizure and condemnation of the Vixen, 
and thinking she had discovered that the one was docile and the other dormant—her government and 
her agents cast aside all apprehension of the only danger which would have deterred them. Yet 
it was not until civil war in Canada promised to direct the disposable military resources of England 
to the opposite extremity of her empire, that the intrigues of the Russian agents in the direction of India 
took such a shape, that it was impossible to doubt either the nature of their plans, or the tendency 
of their proceedings.”— Quarterly Review , No. CXXVIR, p. 146. 


195 


“ Lord Durham,” he says, “ conversed with frankness upon his own 
“ position in the country, and congratulated himself on having kept our ca- 
“ binet in strict amity with the Emperor, of whose high honour, integrity, 
“ ability, and straightforward conduct, he did not entertain a doubt. 

“ He had also obtained access to information, superior, he believed, to any 
“ that had been gained before. 

“ His Lordship’s policy (as to Russia) seemed to me to be to establish trust 
“ and confidence in our cabinet, and to discourage suspicion and doubt. The 
“ Emperor’s character inspired an unbounded reliance on all he said. Com- 
“ billing the statements and opinions I now heard, with what afterwards came 
“ to my knowledge, I am inclined to think that there was much reason and 
“ justice in all the Ambassador said. There was, of course, a great deal more 
“ stated and communicated, but I feel in no degree justified in reporting pri- 
“ vate conversations and anecdotes, although the general complexion of the 
“ sentiments of a high British functionary may be fairly brought forward as 
“ interesting and historical*.” 

At this time the ostensible policy of England was resistance to Russian 
aggression. That it was so, is proved by this, that Lord Durham was avowedly 
labouring (and was allowed to believe with effect) in opposition to the existing 
opinions of the British Cabinet, to establish “ confidence and trust.” 

The selection of a British Ambassador by a Foreign Power, is, however, 
not a fact standing alone; it followed the rejection of a British Ambassador 
by a Foreign Power. Russia, after having refused Sir Stratford Canning, 
chose Lord Durhamf. 

An ambassador is named by Great Britain to the court of Russia, he is 

* On his return to England Lord Durham said “ My mission would have been successful if only 
on this account, that I have convinced the Emperor that all his efforts to break the English and 
French alliance are vain.” 

f The process of decomposition applied to England, is illustrated in the relative positions of 
the two Ambassadors above named, Lords Durham and Londonderry—two leaders of ultra faction, 
brought to unite on the common grounds of devotion to their country’s foe. Lord Durham was soon 
« covered with all the honours of Russia,” and returned to his native land rejoicing in the success of 
his mission, proclaiming the friendliness of the Emperor for England, extolling the excellence of the 
institutions of the Russian Empire. Lord Londonderry returns to England equally magnifying the 
Emperor and the institutions of Russia, bespeaking public favour for his Radical coadjutor, and 
announcing that the “ impurities of Glasgow Green had been washed out by the Conservative waters 
of the Neva.” 


196 


rejected by the court of Russia; another ambassador is selected by the Em¬ 
peror of Russia—that ambassador is rewarded with Russian honours. 

The practice or regulations of the English service admit of no predilections 
in a foreign sovereign, as the grounds of the choice of a diplomatic agent, but 
exactly the reverse. They admit of no foreign orders or decorations for any 
subject of the British crown, except for patent service in the field of battle. 
As Lord Durham was selected without the knowledge of his sovereign, in the 
same manner was the rejection of Sir Stratford Canning settled. Months 
before intimation of such an intention to the sovereign of England, or to the 
ambassador himself, was that rejection announced by the diplomatic servants 
of Russia. Ten years before, that ambassador had successfully resisted a de¬ 
sign of Russia, and was immediately threatened in a public despatch by a 
Russian envoy. The ambassador rejected had occupied the highest and the 
most important public trusts. But the Emperor disliked him. Russia’s 
affections are they not her ends ? And had Lord Palmerston not the means 
of first ascertaining whether Sir Stratford Canning was, or was not, agreeable 
to the Emperor ? Do the documents before us reveal any practice of 
preconcert ? Sir Stratford Canning was named to afford to Russia the 
opportunity of dealing the double blow at him and at England*! 

The sovereign of a foreign state can make and unmake the ministers 
and representatives of Great Britain—and you are startled at the sound of 
the word Treason ! Could Russia succeed without instruments ? 


PART XVI. 

RUPTURE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PERSIA, BECAUSE OF THE 
PREPONDERANCE OF RUSSIA IN PERSIAf. 

In the last Part we came to the conclusion that the remonstrance of the 
British Foreign Secretary against the policy of Russia in Persia, was a scheme 

* The proposition of the appointment was to the men with whom Lord Palmerston has to deal— 
another proof of his enmity against Russia. 

■f This rupture has already been exposed in Part VI. It was there introduced in connexion 
with transactions in Persia. Here it is introduced in connexion with the negociations between the 
Courts of London and St. Petersburgh. 



197 


concerted with the very Government against which the measure was directed. 
This judgment we must now submit to the test of facts and of results. 

We turn to the official Reports from Persia, and we find that the policy 
which gave rise to this remonstrance, was not discontinued in consequence of 
it; but, on the contrary, that it w r as continued more openly and with greater 
effect. The whole resources of the Persian State are directed against Herat, 
which it was the assumed object of England, and therefore of Russia, to pro¬ 
tect, since their policy was concerted. The Persian Government exhibits 
deference and subserviency towards Russia, and assumes towards England a 
position at once of insult and of menace. It is known throughout Persia, 
throughout Asia, as throughout Europe, that such are the objects of the 
policy of Russia, and it is not doubtful that these are the results of the 
influence which she has exercised. Indeed, she herself seeks no conceal¬ 
ment, and makes a public boast of the bribes which she employs to seduce, 
and the menaces' which she uses to overawe, the Persian Government. Eng¬ 
land, meanwhile, remains silent; takes no measure to arrest in Persia these 
hostile acts, or to break in Russia this perfidious coalition; she stands by in 
the attitude and with the demeanour of one who approves, applauds, and 
assists. But when these measures come to be consolidated, and this policy 
to be triumphant—when all threats have become superfluous, and the 
threats, as the words of England, have become contemptible—then does 
England burst forth into a violence as extravagant as her previous subser¬ 
viency had been mysterious, and by a sudden rupture confirms the hostility 
which her long procrastination had admitted, invited, and ensured. 

Such is the outline of the facts by which our judgment respecting the 
remonstrance in 1837 is to be tested—such are the proofs by which it is 
confirmed. 

That remonstrance is assumed to have led to a renewed declaration of a 
conjoint policy of England and Russia in regard to Persia. During eighteen 
months the events we have shadowed forth, progress unopposed, unquestioned, 
and unnoticed; and at the close of that period, and four years after giving 
a monarch to Persia, England and Persia stand as follows :— 

Rupture, because of Persia’s refusal to give satisfaction for an insult to a 
British messenger! 

Rupture, because of an attack upon Herat by the Persian Government, 


198 


as threatening India, and as violating treaties between Great Britain and 
Persia! 

Rupture, because of the connexion of Russia in Persia’s attack upon 
Herat! 

Wonderful and mysterious situation ! 

The rupture with Persia is the most important of the events that have 
occurred in Asia; it contains proof the most decisive of the objects which 
the English Minister pursued, illustration the most valuable of the means 
he employed. It constitutes the chief link between the practical results 
obtained in the East, and the secret adjustments prepared in Downing Street. 
This transaction has been specially shrouded by ambiguity of language and 
by intricacy of management. Therefore it is essential that it should not be 
left obscure, and that the reader should not pass it by with a doubting mind. 
I venture to request from him some little time and consideration to this 
matter; nor will that be refused by whoever has felt that a whole nation has 
been negligent of every interest touching its present honour and welfare, and 
its future existence—that this heedlessness has been continued for long years. 
To the reader of this volume, I trust that the negligence of others will be 
a spur to energy and action. Whoever perceives that there has been 
neglect of the duties of citizens and of men, will enter on the field of inquiry 
not merely urged by a sense of duty. Where so many are heedless, and 
where all are ignorant, he will feel that even one citizen’s thoughts, and one 
man’s labour, may become of importance to his country, and of benefit to his 
times. 

The following observations on the process through which the rupture 
with Persia has been effected, is offered only as an assistance to those who 
examine the official documents in the volume itself. No one can enter upon 
this question honestly or usefully except with that volume in his hand. 

The question at issue between England and Persia was the attack upon 
Herat. The question at issue between England and Russia was the assault 
of Persia upon Herat. The grounds of remonstrance of England to St. 
Petersburgh was the share which the Russian Ambassador had had in pushing 
Persia on Herat. The ostensible result of that remonstrance had been, that 
henceforward Russia should concur with England in preventing the assault 
upon Herat. A representative of England had been, after Russia’s intentions 


199 


had been fully developed and had become alarmingly successful, sent out to 
Persia. He is above all others the uncompromising and strenuous advocate 
of the Persian alliance, and the exposer and denouncer of Russian perfidy 
and ambition. He is on this account selected to occupy this important post. 
What were his instructions respecting Herat ? His instructions were, that 
England has nothing to say between Persia and Herat*! He is instructed 
(constructively) that the faith of treaties debars England from interfering in 
any way in the matter. And, after the remonstrance with Russia, he is 
furnished with no instructions even to guard against the repetition by her 
of the acts with which the English Government had charged her. He is not 
commissioned even to watch and to report her acts. 

The British Representative remains in Persia, acting upon these instruc¬ 
tions ; that is, doing nothing. But at the end of five months he receives 
instructions to offer his mediation between Persia and Herat. Whence this 
change, or whence these instructions ? These instructions do not come from 
Downing Street; they come from India ! Mr. M c Neill decides to act upon 
them, and on the 24th of February reports the decision which on his own 
responsibility he had taken. His report of this decided step is received in 
Downing Street on the 20th of April, 1837, and remains unnoticed in any 
way by the Foreign Secretary for five weeks. He then acknowledges the 
receipt of the despatches, and says no more ! 

Nine weeks elapse, and (on the 7th of September) the Foreign Secretary 
again addresses Mr. M c Neill. For the first time he uses the word “ Herat,” 
The despatch conveys the naked approval of the step which had been taken. 
The mediation undertaken by Mr. M c Neill must remain without possible 
effect, since he receives no power to speak in the name of the English 

* He was to be guided by the 9th Article of the Treaty of 1814, which article stated, that in 
case of war between the Affghans and the Persians, the British Government was not to interfere, 
except their mediation to effect a peace, was requested by both parties. That is, that in case of the 
assault of Persia upon Herat, the English Minister was to take no part, and was bound, by treaty, 
to take no part, except on the joint demand of the parties, and on the joint demand of the parties 
he could only undertake the part of mediator ; but as no instructions were given him respecting that 
mediation, and as he was simply told to be guided by the Article of the Treaty, his instructions 
amounted simply to inaction. But he is, in addition, told to render his good offices to the Shah, 
because “ the British Government would see with regret any attack made on Affghanistan. 1 ’ This 
was no instruction to act in any way, but only a cloak to cover the absence of instruction—a cloak 
proving the intention of giving none. Besides, the former Representative of Great Britain had 
admitted that the war against Herat was a just war. 


200 


Government. The instructions from India had been of course rather the 
expression of an expectation, than the transmission of an authority. If it 
was wrong to offer mediation, why was the step approved ?—If it was right, 
why were the requisite instructions not forwarded ? If, on the 7th of 
September, 1837, the offer of mediation was acceptable to the British 
Secretary, why were instructions not given to that effect on the 2nd of June, 
1836, when Mr. M c Neill received his first instructions in an opposite sense ? 
What was known on the 7th of September, 1837, that was not known on 
the 2nd of June, 1836 ? Thus was the failure of the mediation ensured, 
even after it had been undertaken, in opposition to the evident intentions 
of the Foreign Secretary, through circumstances beyond his controul. 

It would have been dangerous, if not impracticable, to proceed to a 
rupture with Persia because of that assault upon Herat, which he had treated 
of directly with the Court of St. Petersburgh, and which he had directly 
sanctioned in Persia. It was, therefore, necessary first to confuse the question, 
and to exasperate men’s minds. A quarrel on distinct grounds was requisite 
for this purpose, and that, considering the position of Russia now in Persia, 
and the position of England, was no difficult matter to obtain. 

On the 6th February, 1838, the Foreign Secretary receives information 
that an outrage had been committed on a servant of Mr. M c Neilfs, for which 
he had demanded, but for which he had not received reparation. 

Eight months had now elapsed from the period of the sanction given to 
the mediation without any step having been taken respecting Herat. 

What information has now the Foreign Secretary before him—what ends 
has he to desire —with what influences has he to contend ? First, there is the 
assault upon Herat, undertaken by Persia at the suggestion of Russia—there¬ 
fore there is complete ascendancy over Persia, secured by Russia. Here, 
then, is the whole question. Russia does command Persia—Russia is hostile 
to England, and uses Persia against England. But Russia is bound to 
concerted policy with England. Is not then here an abstruse question, 
but it is one plain and easy ? It is not optional to call Russia to account 
—it is obligatory. In addition to the Herat question, an insult is offered 
by the Persian Government to England at the direct instigation of a 
Russian agent. No reparation on the part of Persia is possible, until she is 
emancipated from the power of Russia, which has been brought about under 
the system of united policy. The Foreign Secretary has, therefore, to take 


201 


steps at St. Petersburgh. There he has to commence with the principal 
question. He has to deal with it, not as a Persian, but as a Russian matter. 
If any subsidiary and simultaneous steps are taken in Persia, these must 
first be directed to the arresting of the expedition against Herat, which 
expedition (constituting Russia the protector, England the foe) renders 
England utterly powerless. What does the British Foreign Secretary do ? 
He addresses not one line to St. Petersburgh; he speaks to Persia! In 
speaking to Persia, he says not a word about Herat or Russia; he confines 
himself to confirming Mr. M c Neilfs demand for reparation for the insult! 
This he does immediately . For weeks, months, and years, the affair of Herat 
had been suffered to drag on unheeded; but on the announcement of the insult, 
not a single week is allowed to intervene—a decision is at once taken, at once 
dispatched—Mr. M c Neill’s demand is confirmed, and these words are added, 
“ I delay sending you further instructions with respect to the affairs treated 
“ of, until I hear from you what has been the answer of the Persian Govern- 
“ ment to your very proper demand.” Who would suspect that these “affairs” 
were not those to which the “ demand” had reference ? Who would suspect 
that this phrase separated into distinct parts one question, and sacrificed the 
whole by the separation ? 

Thus is Mr. M c Neill compelled to restrict himself to demand repara¬ 
tion for the insult, and to stand on this alone. Thus were the real matters 
at issue between Great Britain and Persia rendered contingent on the incident 
of the insult, to fail in its failure, while, by being separated from the rest, the 
failure of that question was insured. 

One month and four days later (on the 16th March) the British Foreign 
Secretary addresses another despatch to Mr. M c Neill upon the subject of the 
insult to the messenger, but still not one word upon the affair of Herat, or 
upon the influence of Russia. 

In the meantime the mediation of Mr. M c Neill has failed; the army has 
marched; the Shah is before Herat, pushing the siege. The Indian Govern¬ 
ment, becoming more and more alarmed, writes to Mr. M c Neill, suggesting to 
him to proceed to Herat, and, by any possible means, to withdraw the Shah 
from before that place. 

On the 8th March, Mr. M c Neill writes to his chief, that, finding that the 
Indian Government entertained the opinion that the preservation of its inte- 


D D 


202 


grity was of vital importance, he had determined on proceeding to Herat, in 
the hope of being able to effect “ what appeared to be the Governor- Generals 
“ wishes .” He had not then received the instructions from the Governor- 
General ; but by an indirect channel he had learnt their nature, and he 
conceives the necessity so urgent, and the moment so pressing, that he 
determines forthwith to proceed. He arrives at the camp before Herat, in 
the beginning of April. 

On the 21st May, Lord Palmerston replies to Mr. M c Neill’s despatch of 
the 8 th March, approving, as before, of the step that had already been taken, 
and declaring that the enterprise is considered by the British Government 
“ as undertaken in a spirit of hostility , and as wholly incompatible with the 
“ spirit and intention of the alliance between Persia and Great Britain /” 

But the despatch in which this decision is conveyed, does not quit the shores 
of England until the matter which it regards has already been decided* in 
the centre of Asia! It says, “ If when you receive this despatch you shall 
“ have succeeded in inducing the Shah to retire from Herat, you will only 
“ have to express to the Shah the lively satisfaction,” &c. “ But it is 

“ possible that you may have failed in the object of your journey,” &c. 
So that either the end for which the menace was intended had been realized 
without it, or the evil had been accomplished, according to the judgment of 
the British Foreign Secretary, before the first step was taken to prevent it. 

This despatch could not reach Mr. M c Neill till four months after his 
arrival in camp; and three months after the despatch of the 12th February. 
On arriving at camp, he would have at once to enter on the question of the 
mediation, with such powers as he possessed, which were nothing . If he had 
not failed at once, he would soon after receive the despatch of February 12th, 
which was calculated to ensure rupture with Persia on other grounds. 
The despatch of 21st May, expressing the first opinion, and at once convey¬ 
ing a final threat on the affairs of Herat, is thus reserved until the Foreign 
Secretary is certain that the question has already been decided, until he has 
exhausted every means to ensure its failure, and has the strongest grounds for 
believing that he has been completely successful. 

* In a despatch, dated April 14th, there occurs this passage—“ If you should be still in Persia 
when you receive this despatch.’ 1 ’’ Thus was the rupture with Persia anticipated—thus was the 
British representative prepared for it. 


203 


Now let us see, if the facts realize this judgment upon the instructions. 
What does happen on the arrival of Mr. M c Neill in the camp ? 

Mr. M c Neill’s first attempts are crowned with complete success ; he arrests 
the assault, and both parties empower him to conclude a peace. At the very 
moment when that adjustment is about to be completed. Count Simonich, who 
had hastened after him from Teheran, arrives, and breaks up the adjustment. 
A struggle is for some time maintained, by Mr. M c Neilfs personal influence and 
the difficulties of the siege, on the one hand; by the urgency, and the threats 
of the Russian Minister, on the other. But, during this time, Mr. M c Neill is 
unable to speak in the name of England. The Shaii declares that 

HE CANNOT WITHDRAW FROM BEFORE HERAT, UNLESS HE IS THREATENED 

by England. Mr. M c Neill is unable to do so. In this juncture arrives 
the despatch of the 12th of February, which empowers him to insist upon 
satisfaction on the affair of the messenger, but in which not a single word 
is said respecting Herat; and which tells him that he is not to have instruc¬ 
tions respecting Herat until the affair of the messenger is settled ! He can 
now neither give support to Herat nor impose moderation upon Persia, nor, 
indeed, maintain for himself a position, not of influence—that was gone—but 
of common respectability. And whilst he is unable upon this question, 
touching the most vital interests of England, and, in the eyes of every Per¬ 
sian, involving her character alike for sense and for power, to use a single 
definite expression, he is compelled to quarrel with Persia about an affront 
that had happened seven or eight months before. Such is Mr. M c Neilfs 
helplessness, that he considers himself strengthened by this despatch: 
he says, “ strengthened now, I determined to bring the matter to an 
“ issue that is to say, that, being unable to bring the matter of Herat to 
issue, he brings the affair of the messenger to issue, and fails. Involved, 
however, in the mediation, he still lingers on in the camp, exposed to every 
species of contumely and insult, until unable further to endure, he with¬ 
draws. Mr. M c Neill retiring, thus reports his failure, while he announces the 
suspension of official intercourse with the Persian Government. 

“ Meshed , June 25, 1838. 

“ After having exhausted all the means I could devise to induce the Persian Government to grant 
me reparation and satisfaction for the violence offered to the messenger; and finding that I could 
obtain nothing, I felt compelled * * * to quit the Court. * * * * Some public act of 

reparation which will prove to the people of Persia and of Central Asia that we are not with impunity 


204 


to be insulted, is, in my opinion, indispensably necessary—I will not say to restore us to our former 
position, but to enable us to retain one of any credit or respectability. Both the Persians and the 
Affghans in the Shah’s camp saw, with amazement, the Persian Government treating a British Mission 
as a proscribed body, and punishing persons who ventured to hold even a casual intercourse with it; 
while some of the members of the Russian Mission took to task, and threatened to get punished for 
that offence, persons who occasionally visited at my tent, taking some precautions to prevent their 
being discovered*.” 


Soon after he receives the despatch of 21st May, announcing the deter¬ 
mination of the English Government to consider the assault on Herat as an 
act of hostility against Great Britain. A hostile expedition, sent by the 
Indian Government, also arrives on the coast of Persia, and takes possession 
of the Island of Karrack. Upon this, Mr. M c Neill sends Lieut.-Colonel 
Stoddart back to the camp with a message to the Shah, threatening him now 
at lengthy in the name of Englandf. 

“ But before this message had been delivered to the Shah, the Treaty 
“ of Kandahar had been concluded (I use the words of Sir John M c Neill), 
“ and the Russian Minister had formally guaranteed the performance of the 
“ engagements contracted by both parties. A treaty of nearly similar import 
“ was in progress with Cabul; and Captain Vicovich having visited the Shah’s 
“ camp at Herat, had returned to Cabul and Kandahar, provided with funds 
“ to a large amount, to complete the arrangements he had so successfully 
“ commenced for the establishment of Persian dominion and Russian supre- 
“ macy in all the Affghan States * * * The whole of the countries, from 

“ the frontiers of Russia on the Araxis to the banks of the Indus, had been 
“ successfully tampered with, and had been instigated by accredited Russian 
“ agents—some openly, and some secretly sent—to unite in one great league, 
“ for the purpose, not only of opposing the views and the interests of Eng- 
“ land, but of disturbing and threatening her Empire in Asia.” Thus :— 

* “ At a time when the Governor of Ghilan is ordered to be sent in chains to the capital, and there 
placed at the disposal of the Russian Minister, for the purpose of being punished by His Excellency, 
for having carried into effect the sentence of the law against a Mahommedan subject of Russia in 
Ghilan, I fear what I have demanded may not, here at least, be thought a sufficiently ample repara¬ 
tion for the affront.”—Mr. M c Neill to Lord Palmerston, November 25th, 1837. 

-f- The language which Mr. M c Neill had already used to the Persian Government and Monarch, 
and which had fallen so far short of a threat, was still such as he conceives himself called on to 
account for, and to justify to his Chief. 



205 


Before this message had been delivered, time had been allowed for 
Russia to triumph—the threats of England, delayed until they were useless, 
are now uttered with the double intent of further exasperating Persia against 
England, and of leaving on record such documents as should suffice to prove 
that the interests of England had been defended, and her honour vindicated. 

But the task of the British Foreign Secretary is not yet complete; it is 
not enough that there should be a rupture : there must be a rupture of such 
a kind as to compel Persia to seek protection from Russia against England. 

On the 21st May, the Foreign Secretary had threatened Persia because 
she had invaded Herat. 

On the 22nd June, he replies to the first despatches from the camp, 
approves of Mr. M c Neill’s proceedings, but waits for further information before 
sending instructions. No further information is received up to the 27th July, 
and yet upon that day he repeats the rupture with Persia, adding to the 
previous cause a new one —Persia s connexion with Russia ! 

This despatch, though quoted in another part, is too remarkable not to 
be again presented to the reader :— 

“ Sir, —I have to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that whereas the spirit and purport 
of the Treaty between Persia and Great Britain, is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier to the 
British Possessions in India, and that the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great 
Britain in defending British India*; it appears, on the contrary, that the Shah is occupied in 
subverting those intervening States between Persia and India, that might prove additional barriers of 
defence for the British Possessions; and that in these operations he has openly connected 
himself with an European Power, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, 
to British interests; that, under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course 
of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned Treaty, Great 
Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that Treaty, such measures as a due 
regard to her own interests, and the security f of her dominions, may suggest. 

“ Signed, PALMERSTON.” 

This despatch reaches its destination after the siege of Herat has been 


* The two articles of the Treaty of 1814, that stipulated defensive measures, had been expunged 
by Persia on the demand of Great Britain.— See Part V. of this Exposition. 

f Those words “ defensive,” “ defending,” “ defence,” and “ security,” tend to impress the 
reader’s mind with a vague sense of danger. In the Russian counter statement, the countcrpait will 
be found in a vague shadowing forth of the power to injure, of the position and attitude of assault, so 
that the Englishman may sink to that state so fixedly the aim of Russia, where men feai to examine 

their own position. 


206 


raised, and (so admirably adjusted is the mechanism of the drama) reconstitutes 
the quarrel after the grounds of it had ceased to exist*. 

The spirit and intent of the Treaty between Persia and Great Britain! 
Did not that Treaty spring from a sense of mutual danger, and did it not 
impose upon England the obligation to defend Persia ? It was here, there¬ 
fore, a question of the power of England to protect, not of the will of Persia 
to be protected. Persia is endangered, because she lies between Russia and 
India; England is endangered, because Persia is unable to resist Russia; 
England looks to Persia as a means of defence, Persia to England as a source 
of protection. Hence has arisen an alliance of protection and a compact of 
mutual defence, the object of which is, not that Persia should be friendly to 
England, but that her independence should he supported, so that that friend¬ 
ship may endure. But England allows Persia to cope single-handed with her 
enemy, suffers her to he beaten, refuses to fulfil the treaty, and then bribes her 
to expunge the articles that stipulated means and measures for her defence. 
England then joins with the common foe of both nationsf, declares their 
interests to be one—imposes upon Persia, Russia’s will, and then, after three 
years concurrence in this control of Russia and this obedience of Persia— 
suddenly declares that Persia has been violating the treaty! Was not this 
to make Persia a sacrifice for England’s crime, while converting her into an 
instrument for England’s punishment ? 

We must now for a moment turn our attention to a remarkable incident 
in this drama. This period of rupture is selected by Russia for sending an 
embassy from Persia to England, and for having that embassy rejected by 
England. I say Russia, because, since the union of England to Russia, the 
acts of Persia may be regarded as acts of Russia, and since the accession of 
the present Foreign Secretary, the acts of England are neither more nor less 

* See parallel case, in “ The Sulphur Question.” 

+ The Persian Government says, “ In consequence of this (the Defensive Treaty between Great 
Britain and Persia), other powerful states which had no friendly feelings towards the British Govern¬ 
ment inflicted on Persia all the injury they could, and reduced the state to such a condition, that it 
had no longer power to resist, or strength to endure.” 

Upon this passage Mr. M c Neill makes this remark :—June 25th, 1838. 

“ The assertion, that Russia sought quarrel with Persia because Persia was in intimate alliance 
with England, would seem to imply that that intimacy cannot be renewed, without incurring the 
hazard of similar consequences.” 



207 


than the acts of Russia. On receiving intimation of the approach of this 
congratulatory mission, the Foreign Secretary writes a despatch to the British 
Ambassadors at Paris and Vienna, announcing to them the probable arrival 
of the Persian Ambassador, and requiring them to declare to him that he 
could not be received in England. Thus is formally announced to Europe 
that rupture with Persia, with which the British Parliament was unacquainted. 
This opportunity is further used to announce that the rupture is owing to 
the personally hostile dispositions of the Shah to Great Britain*. If the state¬ 
ment was true, was it in any way called for ? Why could such an assertion 
be made ? The reader has seen enough to understand its object. In Persia, 
the line pursued by Russia was that of exhibiting the Shah as English, while 
driving him into hostility against England. She urges and seduces that 
unhappy Prince into acts that injure the interests, or that wound the feelings 
of his subjects, and gathering thence odium and hatred, she directs these 
not only against the Government of Persia, but against England, by pointing 
out the “ English Shah ” to the disaffection of his subjects ; and at the same 
time, as we have just seen, she loses no opportunity, however remote, to 
impress upon the mind of the Persian Monarch the hostility of England, and, 
consequently, his necessary dependence upon herself alike against internal 
faction and external enmity. 

This Persian Ambassador is now paraded throughout the Courts of 
Europe, rejected by England and the client of Russia, exhibiting thus 
her newly acquired command of that chief state of Central Asia, where 
England had hitherto been considered paramount and secure. The mission 
then returns to Persia to confirm at once the most exaggerated estimate of the 
power of Russia, and to justify the contempt and the hostility engendered by 
the conduct of England. 

But this ambassador had propositions to make in reference to the rupture. 
We are not informed of their nature. It is by an accident that we learn their 
existence; but, whatever they are, they are alike excluded from the docu- 


* “ Certain Persian authorities acting there is too much reason to suppose under the immediate 
orders of the Shah .”—Lord Palmerston to Earl Granville and Sir F. Lamb , March 20, 
1838. 


208 


ments voluntarily presented, and they are refused to Parliament when they 
are asked for*. 

Thus the rupture with Persia is complete. But is a rupture an object— 
an end ? Is it a task which, after being performed, allows the performer 
to sit down in tranquillity and contentment ? to repose from his labour and 
to enjoy its fruits ? You proclaim the insult offered you, and parade the 
disgrace you have incurred all over Asia and Europe, but you take no steps 
whatever to obtain that reparation which you pretend to require. But you 
have squared, you say, accounts with Persia, and the rejection of the Ambas¬ 
sador of Persia is equivalent to the expulsion of your Minister. It is, then, 
an object with you to produce animosity, and you have an especial department 
for that purpose. 

Here, then, was the end ; this was the task ; and this having been effected, 
the Foreign Secretary could repose from his labours. 

But if the official correspondence is not satisfactory, and not complete, 
there is at least the House of Commons to refer to and to rely upon : and if 
there is in the published documents concealment or insufficiency, that alone 
must insure thorough investigation by that assembly. It must so apply itself to 
this high international question as to place in evidence the facts. Its w r isdom 
and knowledge directed to this subject must relieve the public mind from un¬ 
certainty and doubt, dispel unfounded confidence, or repress unjust suspicion. 
Such is the duty, such the business of the House of Commons; but 
unhappily, the Senate of England is not qualified for such a task, and has in 
no ways realized such an expectation. Sometimes, for the space of five or 
ten minutes, the business of the State forms the subject of conversation; and 
even these fleeting moments are occupied by the Foreign Secretary himself to 
confuse and to bewilder men, whom indeed, it is scarcely worth his trouble 
further to mislead. On the 21st of June, 1889, such an incident occurred. 
Persia was spoken of in the House of Commons. A Member, seeing the Noble 

* The only document connected with the affairs of Persia which was published at length in the 
continental journals, was an exposition of the griefs of Persia against England, addressed to Mr. 
M c Neill by the Chief Priest of that country. This document is not given in the official correspond¬ 
ence, and there was not a single English journal that thought it worth while to copy it from the 
Continental press! 


209 


Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in his place, takes that opportunity to 
state that it appears that Sir John M c Neill is in England; that the Secretary of 
Embassy is at Erzeroum ; that some substantial differences have taken place 
between this country and Persia, and that the government of this country 
has refused to receive the Envoy of Persia. He therefore desires to know 
whether the mission is terminated, and—how the money allotted for the 
expenses of the mission is now expended. On this the Foreign Secretary 
observes, that he might answer the Honourable Gentleman in a very few 
words, but that he conceived it proper to set him right in some of the facts 
which he had stated. He continues :— 

“ We must all know that when differences arise between two governments, it often happens that 
the envoy of one of them is withdrawn—* 

It is a British Minister announcing a rupture with a Foreign Power—the 
abrogation of treaties with a protected and dependent State, who, fifteen 
months after the catastrophe, addresses these words to a British Senate! 
W ould it not seem as if he were speaking of the laws of nature that regulate 
the times and the seasons ? 

“ We must all know that when differences arise between two governments, it often happens that 
the envoy of one of them is withdrawn, without putting an end to any amicable communications 
which may have been opened. In the present instance, the difference which exists is very far short of 
an absolute rupture, and a temporary retirement of the mission has taken place. That is the state in 
which we stand with regard to Persia. Sir John M c Neill is at home on leave of absence, which was 
granted to him before the occurrence that gave rise to the retirement of his successor; and although 
he has had an audience of Her Majesty, this must not be supposed to have been granted on the con¬ 
clusion of this mission, but only on his return from leave of absence. The Charge d’Affaires has 
withdrawn from the territories of Persia on account of difficulties which have intervened in our rela¬ 
tions with the Shah; but he was ordered to remain at Erzeroum, the nearest point to the Persian 
frontier, for the express purpose of being at hand to receive any communication which might be 
made. On the other hand, the Persian Government has sent an ambassador to this country, but he 
has been told that he cannot be received until the differences between the two countries shall have been 
arranged. The ambassador is now in London, and I have had some private communications with 
him.” 

Another member of the Senate says: 

“ As we are not at war with Persia, I beg to ask whether sufficient reparation has been made by 
the Shah for the insult offered to the messenger of Sir John M c Neill ? I desire to ask also whether 
the noble Viscount is satisfied with the explanation which has been given by Count Nesselrode of the 
conduct of Count Simonich and Lieutenant Vicovitch, in certain proceedings of theirs, in connection 
with the negociations with Persia ?” 


E E 


210 


“ Viscount Palmerston. —Sir,—With regard to the first question of the Honourable Member, 
I beg to state that no sufficient reparation has yet been made by the Shah for the outrage upon the 
messenger of Sir J. M c Neill. As to the explanation of the Russian Government, in reference to the 
conduct of Count Simonich, I can only refer the Hon. Gent, to the papers which have been laid upon 
the table of the House, which contain matter from which he may infer an answer to his question. We 
are certainly not at war with Persia, though there has occurred a serious interruption in our relations 
with that power.” 

“ Sir S. Canning. —Before the discussion terminates, I should be glad to be informed by the 
Noble Lord whether the confidential communications which he has stated to be going on between him 
and the Persian Ambassador have ceased ?” 

“ Viscount Palmerston. —I have recently seen the Ambassador, and shall most likely see him 
again before he leaves England. The plan which he has submitted to me, is of a nature to prevent 
its being received here officially.” 

Thus, after a triple rupture with Persia—after a declaration that all 
treaties ceased to be binding, and after the violation of its territories by 
warlike operations—war, not of men, hut of bandits and outlaws—after 
alleging against Persia all the motives that ever were alleged by one State 
against another, namely, violation of treaty, preparation for assault, alliance 
with an enemy, positive insult and outrage; after combining all these motives, 
and at once launching them against that State, the Minister of England tells 
the Parliament, who had known nothing of the event beforehand, who know 
nothing of it when it occurs, and who hear of it accidentally a long time 
afterwards, that the differences are “far short of an absolute rupture ;” that 
they are not even such as to put an end to “amicable communications.” 
Can there be a doubt, then, that he is addressing men whom he has to blind 
and to bewilder, and that he only speaks to them for that purpose ? Con¬ 
tradictions the most patent, ideas the most incongruous, and propositions the 
most wild, can be placed before them with perfect impunity and entire success ? 
Is not, then, this body dangerous to the constitution and to the nation ? 
Amid such reflexions, we may, perhaps, partly comprehend the words of 
England’s first diplomatist—“ Parliaments may ruin, but never save a State.” 

Now let us endeavour to reduce the pretexts for the rupture with Persia 
to their simplest expression. 

The affair of the Messenger we have found to be a subordinate question, 
solvable only through the solution of the major questions. The major questions 
are the assault of Persia upon Herat, as established by the despatch of 21st 
May, and the connection of Persia with Russia as established by the despatch of 


211 


27th July. The intention of Persia to assault Herat is known, during nearly 
three years, and is not resisted. The only instruction from the Foreign 
Secretary to the British Envoy in Persia upon the subject, declared England 
to be debarred from interfering. At the end of the third year this assault is 
taken as the grounds of rupture; thus the British Foreign Secretary, after 
encouraging Persia, during three years in the execution of this design, declares, 
when it is executed, that treaties are thereby violated! 

In regard to the second motive—the alliance with Russia—England had 
herself united herself to Russia, and she breaks with Persia, upon the ground 
of union with the state to which she was herself united. The assault upon 
Herat was Russia’s, not Persia’s act; the danger of it arose from Russia, not 
from Persia. England breaks, not with Russia, but with Persia, confirming 
thereby the act, rendering it in reality dangerous. 

England in acting against Persia, does not specify demands and threaten 
their enforcement, but contents herself with abrogating the treaty by which she 
was bound to defend Persia against Russia. This is the punishment she 
inflicts on Persia for submitting to Russia! 

There was, therefore, no grounds for a rupture with Persia—the pretexts 
assumed for it were preposterous and outrageous. Rupture with Persia was 
not the way to counteract any of the effects which the Foreign Secretary 
affected to dread, or to realize any of the ends which he pretended to desire. 

But between England and Russia existed the concert of mutual com¬ 
munication. No communication takes place upon this subject on the part of 
England; no demand for communication is made by Russia. What is the 
character of such silence on the part of England, of such forbearance on 
the part of Russia ? Would Russia have failed to use her right to know, had 
she had any thing to learn ? As, therefore, we have found that the Instruc¬ 
tions sent out to Persia to oppose Russia, in 1835, were concerted with 
herself—as we have found that the remonstrance to St. Petersburgh against 
her, in 1837, was concerted with herself—so also do we find that England’s 
rupture with Persia, because of her union with Russia, was concerted with 
Russia. 

If such a scheme has been formed, it is based upon the calculation made 
by the parties to it of their power to beguile the confidence, and to overreach 
the penetration of the nations who are its victims. Such a scheme necessi- 


212 


tates the employment of every means of deception, and the adoption of every 
variety of disguise. And what is it we have before us ? Is there not pre¬ 
sented to us at one moment an act which, not understanding the intention, we 
can only attribute to cowardice—at another, one which rashness alone will 
explain ? Here we find indications of negligence, there of industry; we must 
call in folly to account for what is done to-day, and transcendant ability is 
revealed in the effort of the morrow. Then are the parts so disconnected, 
causes so concealed, results so misrepresented, that events present them¬ 
selves as accidents, the products of long calculation come forth as natural 
phenomena, which men may wonder at, but which they are not to compre¬ 
hend. But the intention once suspected, what assistance do we not receive 
from this incongruity, and from these contradictions ? Could cowardice and 
rashness, could industry and negligence, could ability and folly, be parts of 
the same mind, and constitute one man ? Could accidents in the same trans¬ 
action coherently present the successive steps which bring it to a conclusion ? 
Could these separate results, and disjointed accidents, without any human 
will, be the adjusted parts of a great design, and the co-ordinate means for the 
accomplishment of a mighty purpose ? 

I entreat the reader here to reflect and to decide, whether or not England 
has broken faith with a Foreign State. I put aside every question of injury 
in the transaction, or of motive in the actor. I restrict myself here to the 
simple question of public faith broken. If he sees that the faith of England 
has been broken in this transaction with Persia, what will his estimate be of 
the judgment and integrity of a nation, which has not taken the slightest 
interest in this matter ? What of the value of a Senate that has not inquired 
into it ? Must it not be that that nation is deficient in judgment, and that 
that Senate is of no value? If so, is not the conclusion inevitable, that there 
is danger in every step we take—that there is uncertainty in every opinion we 
entertain, and that there is no prudent course, save that of seeking to obtain 
the suspension of all foreign relations—(that is of all public business, for that 
alone touches the Nation which you call by the name “ Foreign,") until, by a 
thorough examination, we come to an exact knowledge of our position ? 

The line has been avowedly effaced which separates Europe from Asia, as 
every European transaction is now evidently connected on the one hand with 
the interests of Asiatic countries, and on the other with their practical exist- 


213 


ence. Knowledge, therefore, of the East is requisite to the comprehension 
of every European transaction. Is there any man that will not admit that 
the public men of Europe, as the nations of Europe, know nothing of the 
East ? What, then, can they know of the diplomatic transactions in which 
Russia has succeeded in involving them, and which hinge on Eastern affairs ? 
Have we not a recent and deplorable example before us ? Has not the alli¬ 
ance between France and England, regarded hitherto by both nations as the 
safeguard of the peace of the world, been sacrificed, without the intention of 
either, and in opposition to the interests, the intentions, and the sympathies 
of both ? Has not this been effected, by involving them in transactions 
connected with the East, which put them both in Russia’s power ? Thus, 
then, does every Eastern question become of an importance not to be 
estimated by its own specific value ;—the East is the breach, in our know¬ 
ledge, through which the enemy enters and possesses us. 

Stop then in time ! Call for the suspension of negociations—demand 
inquiry. There is no other course in reason. There are no other means of 
safety. Such a conviction I do not entertain alone, nor is it singly that I 
proclaim it. What expression of alarm more intense—what words of reproach 
more severe in these pages—than the following ? 

“ In reflecting on the details of these transactions, and observing their immense results, one is 
struck with the comparative insignificance of the means by which Russia has been able to effect, in 
the face of Europe, a series of aggressions and encroachments which the leading cabinets of Europe 
had at all times professed a desire to oppose. * * * We have seen her whom we regard as still 

barbarous , handling the more enlighened cabinets of Europe as if they were the tools with which 
she worked , and converting, what one of our most distinguished Statesmen considered a master-stroke 
of policy *—what all his adherents and the whole liberal press of Europe applauded as such—into an 
instrument for her own aggrandizement, more effectual than all the means that her unaided resources 
could have supplied. * * * We were never able to appreciate the value of what they (Russia’s 

Eastern neighbours) lost, or what Russia gained. We were incapable of profiting by their strength, 
or guarding against their weakness. Though we have acknowledged a community of interest, we 
have made no attempt to establish a concert of design. We have been walking in the dark, and we 
need not wonder that we have lost our wayf*. vi 

# The treaty of 6th July, 1827 (for the dismemberment of Turkey by the separation of 
Greece). This treaty was designated—“ The Treaty for the Pacification of the East.’’' 1 The treaty 
of July 15th, 1840 (for the dismemberment of Turkey by the separation of Egypt), is termed— 
“ A Treaty for the Maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.' 1 ' 1 By these two treaties has the object 
of Catherine been effected to the letter: the crescent has been shorn of its two horns, Greece and 
Egypt. 

*f- Quarterly Review , No. CV., p. 241. 


F F 


214 


PART XVII. 

EXPOSURE BY THE CABINET OF ST. JAMES’S OF THE PERFIDY OF THAT 

OF ST. PETERSBURGH. 

The Persian territory having been invaded by the forces of Great 
Britain because the Persian Government had suffered itself to be influenced 
by Russia, the British Government has now to call Russia to account for the 
measures into which she had led Persia. 

To this end a Note, the first that appears to have passed between the 
two governments on Asiatic affairs, since the last war, is addressed by 
the Cabinet of St. James’s to that of St. Petersburgh. After having been 
made the object of aggression so alarming, and of deception so perfidious— 
it is as follows, that the British Government speaks :— 

44 Events which have lately occurred in Persia and A Afghanistan, render it necessary for the 
British Government to request from that of Russia, explanations with respect to certain circumstances 
which are connected with those events, and which have an important bearing upon the relations 
between Russia and Great Britain. 

44 It is unnecessary for the undersigned to remind Count Nesselrode that the British and Russian 
Governments have, for a long time past, and from similar motives, taken a deep interest in the 
affairs of Persia. 

44 To Russia, Persia is an immediate neighbour; the frontiers of the two countries touch ; and it 
is a legitimate object of solicitude to Russia that her neighbour should be friendly and tranquil; so 
that the Russian territory should be secure from attack, and the Russian population should be free 
from the uneasiness which civil commotions in an adjoining country have a tendency to create. 
Russia, therefore, must naturally desire that the Persian nation should be prosperous and contented, 
and that the Persian Government should abstain from all external aggression; should direct its 
attention exclusively to internal improvement, and should occupy itself in the pursuits of peace. 

44 Great Britain has regarded Persia as a barrier for the security of British India against attack 
from any European power. With this defensive view, Great Britain has contracted alliance with 
Persia, and the object of that alliance has been, that Persia should be friendly to Great Britain, 
independent of foreign control, and at peace with all her neighbours. 

44 The interests, therefore, of Great Britain and Russia, with regard to Persia, are not merely 
compatible, but almost the same; and hence the two governments have felt, that having common 
objects to attain in Persia, they would find it for their mutual advantage to consult together upon 
matters connected with Persian affairs, and to endeavour to pursue , with respect to those affairs, a 
common course.” 


215 


The British Government has just punished connexion with Russia as a 
crime. It has alleged, as the last reproach it can address to Persia, that she 
had openly connected herself with Russia. It then addresses to Russia a 
formal note on this subject, and has not one word to say respecting this 
charge ! Let us consider what ought to have been said, and what ought to 
have been demanded. 

i 

“ You have betrayed us,” the British Government would say, “ into 
“ a compact of co-operation, and you have, under the mask of that compact, 

“ aroused Persia against England, and formed a coalition throughout 
“ Central Asia for her dismemberment. England now requires reparation 
“ for the injury inflicted on Persia, and for the hostile acts directed against 
“ Great Britain. She requires the complete revision of the relations between 
“ Russia and Persia. To Persia must be restored the means of independent 
“ existence ; from her shoulders must be taken the chains which, with the 
“ hitherto unconscious assistance of England, Russia has laden her. The 
“ British Government is now aware that Russia is able to injure England 
“ and others, solely by the use which she has been allowed to make of 
“ union with England. That union now ceases. In its cessation, England 
“ has ample guarantees for the moderation of Russia. The British Govern- 
“ ment, therefore, contents itself with demanding the disgrace of that 
“ minister of the Imperial Crown, through whose word falsely pledged, 
“ these events have been brought about.” 

If such was the spirit, when was the time for such a note ? Was it 
not before coming to a rupture with Persia ? But after quarrelling with 
the subordinate, the British Foreign Secretary remains, month after month, 
on the most friendly terms with the principal, and then pretends to call 
her to account. It is after he has rendered, by delay alone, every proceeding 
against Russia impracticable (while his acts are not disavowed),—that he 
makes the show of remonstrating against her! The assumed remonstrance 
cannot, therefore, be a denunciation of Russia, but must be a justifi¬ 
cation of Russia and of himself. He cannot say that she has not done 
the deeds; therefore, he applies himself to confound the reader, by 
arguing that she could not, or ought not, to have committed them. He 
commences by insinuating that the motives of Russia and England are similar. 


216 


This insinuation is introduced as a thing of which it is unnecessary to remind the 
Russian Government, yet a large proportion of this solemn note is occupied 
in establishing it, by proof of a character such as might be employed in 
demonstrating a theorem. The interests of Russia in Persia, are defined: 
then those of Great Britain : these are shown to coincide. This proposition 
was adopted from Russia herself—and it was adopted without any inquiry 
whatever. Why then these arguments ? How are they addressed to 
Russia ? Supposing the proposition not to have emanated from Russia, how 
could Russia’s motives be asserted to the Russian Government ? and in 
calling Russia to account, how could the British Minister speak to her of the 
motives of Britain. Had it been Russia that called England to account for 
having led her into a compact of co-operation, with the view of first deceiving 
and then injuring her, England might then have spoken of her motives. 
England calling Russia to account for hostile and perfidious acts, thus 
presents against herself the defence which it was natural for Russia to 
attempt. But indeed what defence could be required where the statement 
of the case commences with an argumentation against the probability of the 
facts ? 

Surely this is a dream! You assert that you are assailed by two 
governments united; you constitute yourself the open enemy of the one, 
and then declare and undertake to prove that the other is your friend. 
If you are reasonable in breaking with Persia, your bearing towards Russia 
is madness; if you are reasonable in your union with Russia, your bearing 
towards Persia is madness. One or the other must be an act of insanity, or 
both are worse. What, then, is the position and the character of the nation 
that entrusts its existence to a minister, who, if not a traitor, must be an 
idiot ? This is now no deed in darkness, it has been laid bare to the winds 
of heaven ; the facts are known, and each man has accounted for them, or 
submitted to them unaccounted for; he has then either found a reason for 
madness, or has renounced the rights of freemen. The publication of this 
document divides England into two classes; the names of which I leave to 
be applied by those who have courage to utter the epithets they have 
merited. 

I know not which to consider the most daring and most marvellous 


217 


in this document, the revelations or the suppressions; I know not which is 
most bewildering, the thoughts or the language. There can be here required 
no analysis to detect and no argument to prove the intention of this com¬ 
position, and but slender experience in Russian diction to recognise its source. 
This note was drawn up at St. Petersburgh ! 

Diplomatic success, and profit in peace, at the expense of other nations, 
is merely the over-reaching of an inferior by a superior intellect. Such 
success is practicable solely through errors. Great or fortunate is the state 
which can profit by the errors of those around it; but very differently dan¬ 
gerous to its neighbours would be a system that possessed the idea of 
producing error. Still is there conceivable a higher grade in the hierarchy of 
spiritual despotism, which is the power of implanting fallacious methods of 
reasoning, which not only produce error, but which render men and nations 
incapable of being right. Occupied in the decomposition of states, Russia 
has penetrated to the sources of their life, and touched the fibres of their 
strength. She has given to diplomacy a scientific and transcendental character, 
by constituting it a part of its duty to possess all knowledge, and by 
proposing to it for an end the attainment of all things possible. All things 
are possible for her, through the blindness of her opponents, and her 
victims; they are blinded through error, and she spreads error through 
fallacy. She does not assault the body ; but mentally soaring, she 
descends, vulture-like, on the head, assailing the senses at their seat : 
whatever she rises above, that becomes her prey* ; to that end and by these 
means she labours, and with this hope, that when she shall have succeeded 
in rendering fallacy universal,—universal dominion will be within her reach, 
or already in her possession. 

The future historian, in narrating how the existing governments shall have 
been subverted, and how the nations of Europe and of Asia shall have been 
reduced to obedience to a common master, will not have to detail the progress 
of the invasion of empires : it is the invasion of the human mind that he 
will have to expose. It will not be the march of armies that he will have to 

* “ Eruditionem haud quaquam aviculae, qualis est alauda, similem esse, quae in sublime ferri et 
cantilando sese oblectari soleat, ut nihil aliud quinimmo ex accipitris potius genere esse; ut qui in 
alto volare et subinde, cum visum fuerit, descendere et proedam rapere novit.”— Bacon, de Augmentis. 


218 


follow: it is the flight of a pestilence which he will have to trace—a pestilence 
of the reason and not of the flesh—a contagion spreading not by the touch, 
but through the brain. 

The note which we have before us is a wonderful instance of the power 
of this mental contamination. In these few sentences which we have quoted, 
are assembled the means by which the mind of England has been led to reason 
to a false conclusion. It is therefore necessary to dwell upon it, not less 
for the comprehension of the specific interests which we have before us, than 
for that of the intellectual character of Britain ; which, as it is the most 
important knowledge for every Briton, so is it knowledge of most difficult 
attainment. The thoughts which constitute the common mind of England 
can be visible to no Englishman, as he has nothing dissimilar with which to 
compare them, or by which to detect their presence. By the perception of 
the mode of proceeding of a race differing from his own, and of the objects of 
a system obtaining results for which he is unprepared, alone can he acquire 
the power of thinking of the character of a nation, and of turning his mind 
so as to look upon his own. 

The Englishman who takes up this document, knows that a struggle 
has long existed between England and Russia in regard to Persia; that 
that was a point between the two Governments of permanent and intent 
opposition; that a formal treaty binds England to defend Persia against 
Russia, and that England had just come to a rupture with Persia, because she 
had suffered herself to be influenced by the counsels of Russia, dictated in a 
spirit of hostility to England. 

In this document, he meets at once the declaration, that the interests of 
the two countries are the same. This is exactly the reverse of all his know¬ 
ledge. If he accepts the proposition, he must abandon all that he possesses 
of knowledge or conviction, and he must accept it, or admit suspicion of the 
motives for presenting it; that suspicion is too large for him to grasp. He 
thus passes on, not too anxiously inquiring : carrying with him the thread 
thus tangled, every subsequent step will ravel it the more. He then comes 
to the fact, that both Governments have recognised this identity, and that 
they have acted upon it. This is placed before him in a business-like manner, 
and as from authority. It is conveyed with so much gentleness of thought, 


219 


in such an easy flow of language—there is so perfect an exclusion of the 
whole of his previous ideas, and he is involved in such a multiplicity of 
irrelevant thoughts, that he hurries on from point to point, seeking only for 
explanation. Unless by previous knowledge he at once detects—he is har¬ 
nessed and laden, he has yielded to the yoke, he has bowed to the burthen. 
He is carried away to consider the geographical position of Russia and of 
Persia; he is set to investigate the legitimacy of certain objects, the expe¬ 
diency of certain others ; he is made to share in Russia’s solicitude to prevent 
danger, to sympathise in the uneasiness which results from her neighbourhood 
to Persia. Persia threatening Russia at once by designs of aggression and by 
projects of convulsion, he will discover to be a very powerful and a very dan¬ 
gerous state : this is startling, but it is an inevitable inference from propositions 
established between the Cabinets of Great Britain and Russia. But Russia 
must be inoffensive and weak before the intentions of Persia could be 
aggressive, or her means alarming. He admits, then, the power of Persia 
because of the weakness of Russia, and the weakness of Russia because of 
the power of Persia; thus he revolves in a circle around his errors. The 
admission that the danger is to Russia, and not from Russia—that it is 
from Persia, and not to Persia, once nestled in his breast, all its functions 
are disordered—truth and falsehood have changed places, things and reasons 
are reversed ; for him, the order of the universe is broken, the ocean is 
poured out upon the sky, and the clouds are rolled into the deep. And 
must not nature around, or the spirit within be changed, when a reasoning 
being could believe, or a freeman not believing could admit—that the interests 
of Great Britain and Russia were the same ? 

He has been conscious that India is endangered through Persia, the 
attack proceeding from Russia; but having admitted that Russia is endangered 
by Persia, the danger to India must be from Persia , not from Russia. The 
danger to England was from Persia’s weakness, now it must be from Persia’s 
strength. Thus has he at once floating in his mind weakness and strength 
in Persia, and danger to England, alike from her weakness and from her 
strength. He has also weakness and strength in Russia, since he must 
mix together the original knowledge of which he was possessed with the 


220 


false conclusions which he draws*. The ideas, therefore, of strength, and 
weakness of danger and ambition, are severally and conjointly applied to each 
state, until he has lost the power of withholding or of yielding any convic¬ 
tion ; he seeks only to escape from suspense and bewilderment, and is ready 
to admit whatever inference are placed within his reach, accepting it as the 
explanation of whatever motives is placed beyond it. He admits, then, danger 
to England from Persia, and by that danger explains the union of England 
with Russia; and he concludes that there must be danger to Russia from 
Persia, because Russia is united to England. Thus proceeding in either 
direction round this circle of fallacy, he returns to the identity of the 
interests of England and of Russia. 

The common object for which their policy has been assumed to be 
concerted, must, therefore, be to diminish the power and thwart the projects 

* The reader is led through a series of equations and conversions labouring to bring out results 

from the false admissions he has made, and the true impressions he has preserved, thus:— 

(True.) England alarmed for ) -r, • „ ( England ) , , , „ 

' y ® . t Persia. 1 herefore J ° t alarmed by Persia. 

(False.) Russia alarmed at j (Russia j 

Persia threatening f England. 

( Russia. 

England’s interests in Persia have reference to danger. 

Russia’s interests in Persia have reference to danger. 

England + Danger = Russia + Danger. 

England rz Russia. 

To seek gain is ambition , to apprehend loss is to be exposed to danger. 

( True.) Russia’s interest in Persia is ambition. 

(False.) England’s and Russia’s interests are the same. 

The interest of J . 1 in Persia is ambition. 

1 Russia J 


The interest of England in Persia is danger. 

England’s and Russia’s interests are the same. 

The interest of | j{ u ^ s j a } in P ers ia danger. 


Danger + Russia — Ambition -f England. 
Ambition -f Russia = Danger + England. 


England = Russia, Ambition = Danger. 


221 


of Persia. England and Russia are therefore united, to produce weakness 
in Persia. The reasoner has started from the knowledge, that the weakness 
of Persia was dangerous to England, and he is brought to the conclusion, 
that England is justified in joining with Russia, to augment that weakness. 
He must now accept the consequences of the proposition he has admitted. 
Danger to Russia means the invasion of Russia by Persia; danger to 
India likewise means the invasion of India by Persia. But community 
between England and Russia being recognised, the invasion of India by Persia 
would be dangerous to Russia, and the invasion of Russia by Persia would 
be dangerous to England. Therefore, the attack of India by Persia would 
increase the necessity of England for alliance with Russia, and justify the 
policy which has united England to Russia, so as to render Russia pre¬ 
dominant in Persia. 

This is preposterous !—the reader will exclaim. It is the consequence 
of a proposition which he has admitted;—a proposition emanating from 
the chief authority of the State—acted upon internationally,—being the basis 
of an alliance,—and standing the accepted explanation of a policy that has 
been disastrous. Such is the character of a proposition which no one can 
look upon without exclaiming—“ It is preposterous.” Such is the practical 
importance, such the lofty station of that proposition, which when presented 
before the eye of any individual in the nation will call forth the expression— 
“ It is incredible.” How, then, could it have been admitted or acted upon ? 
There must either have been a mental effort of the British nation, ending in 
error, or there has been no effort. There has either been a fruitless attempt 
at being right, or there has been abject submission to another’s will. 

The brain of a nation is that portion of it, however minute, which thinks, 
and the body of a nation is that portion, however vast, which does not com¬ 
prehend. The brain of this nation must therefore produce error by its labour, 
or work ruin by its intention. If so, then are the institutions of the State 
inadequate to the due performance of the functions of independent existence, 
and for the retention of sovereign power. Institutions ! Are not the institu¬ 
tions the thoughts, are not the laws the mind, is not the State the men ? 
Whatever a nation comprehends, that will its government do. Institutions 
may discipline the character, and, in their continuous action through centuries, 
may mould the mind ; but where judgment is given, or action is requi- 


G G 


222 


site, it is not the institutions that judge or act. Cast not, then, upon institu¬ 
tions the responsibility, since it will not be upon institutions that will fall the 
consequences of your ignorance and folly. In the year 1838 England was 
unable to detect the preposterousness of the proposition of the similarity of 
the interests of England and of Russia. Therefore, throughout that country, 
in that year, we have the means of knowing that no one could detect a very 
simple falsehood, or that none could resist a very dangerous crime—that no 
one could reason to an evident conclusion, or that no one took interest in the 
gravest interests of the state. There is, therefore, nothing in this proposition 
preposterous; but what belongs to each subject of the British Crown, and 
whatever in the transaction is criminal, rests now on the shoulders of each 
individual member of the state. 

Russia looks to profit by assaulting Persia—England has looked to prevent 
loss by defending Persia. Russia is led by ambition, England influenced by 
alarm. Russia’s interests are positive, England’s interests are negative. This 
note mixes all these together—it finds similar interests for England and 
for Russia—it finds a common denomination for ambition and for danger 
—a common value in profit and in loss ! But it stops not here. After giving 
a common term to dissimilar things, it supplies double images to the same 
name. There are two Russias, two Persias, two Englands. There is a Russia 
of ambition, there is a Russia of feebleness. There is a Persia threatening 
England and Russia by its strength; there is a Persia, by its weakness, afford¬ 
ing to Russia the means of assaulting India. There is a shadowy England 
of sense and justice motioning as if to defend herself and to support her ally ; 
and there is an England, the instrument of Russia’s ambition, using to that 
unhallowed end the other England’s shadow and name. Thus, to the per¬ 
plexities of false equations confounding syllogisms, bewildering expressions, 
and contradictory propositions, is added the further confusion of these double 
identities, of false masks placed on every person, of lying names given to every 
thing. 

But no sooner has the reader been brought to admit the expediency of 
this concert of the two powers, than he discovers that this concert too is a 
mask. Nor is it even a mask—it is but the shadow of one ; for it is not said 
we concerted, we formed a compact —but—the two governments would “ find 
it for their mutual advantage to concert ,” it would be for “ their benefit 


223 


to endeavour to pursue a common course." By these words the idea of 
a concert, but not the fact of its existence is conveyed, and thus the 
obligations imposed upon Russia by that concert are excluded from view. 
No sooner has he admitted that concert would be expedient, than the 
existence of that concert fades upon his sight; no sooner has he doubted the 
existence ol concert, than he learns the total subjection to Russia of the 
nation, to maintain which against Russia, was the sole object in establishing 
that concert. Does this lead him to trace back effects to their causes ? No, 
he has admitted the expediency of concert, the barbed shaft of fallacy is 
in his breast, shocks will not extract it. Misfortune may teach to the simple 
wisdom—the fallacious reasoner drains poison from his own thoughts—for 
him experience is no teacher—for it disaster is no antidote. First bewildered, 
he is now alarmed, he seeks to escape from inquiry, and to shut out the sight 
of danger, by clinging to the cause of his confusion as of these disasters—the 
alliance of England with Russia against Persia—by which the independence 
of the Persian State has been laid low, and by which Central Asia is levelled 
for the car of Russia triumphantly to roll on. 

A whole people has passed under this yoke. Britain has admitted that 
concert with Russia was good—Britain then admits (what is it she will not 
admit ?) Russia’s violation of that compact as valid. Each man, if not 
in his own person, in the persons of the leaders in whom he trusts, 
has accepted the consequence of the error—has undergone the con¬ 
tamination of the process. The few leading men who have been the channels 
through which this bewilderment has been poured out upon the land, have 
unconsciously yielded themselves up for this purpose. It is not by conviction 
that they have been gained, it is by fascination that they have been subdued; 
the eye is caught, and is fixed by varying images and indistinct forms, and 
their convictions are taken by surprise, while they are endeavouring to 
understand the thoughts presented to them, and which are only not rejected 
because incomprehensible. While too preposterous for conscious admis¬ 
sion, they are also too insidious for unconscious rejection ; and so artfully are 
they linked together, that all find entrance if one is admitted, and no one 
is safe against them but he who grasps them as a whole, and detects them at 
a glance. 

These statements are made public long after the facts have occurred, and 


224 


a few hours at best are given to examine transactions which years have been 
employed to arrange and to disguise. They are presented to men who only 
seek to be informed how things have happened ; who have no knowledge of 
Persia or of diplomacy—no interest in the one, and no conception of the 
other ; who are doubly hopeless by the ignorance that admits falsehood, and 
the diffidence that excludes judgment; who now, unconscious of ignorance, 
accept every statement, and now quell suspicion or doubts, attributing these 
to their own ignorance of policy or of facts; who have no idea of an 
international crime, and if such is forced upon them—who have so much 
honesty and courage as to make up their minds to avoid the responsibility 
of having convictions. The few men, moreover, who control Great Britain, 
and in whose individual thoughts lie her political destinies as her moral 
character, occupy stations of responsibility. They are not spectators 
merely—they are actors. If they do not expose that which is reprehensible, 
they yield to it their support, and how can they expose what they do not 
comprehend ? When that occurs which they do not comprehend, they array 
themselves against inquiry, joining from opposite sides in an arch to cavern 
darkness and to shelter crime. A small transgression which can be explained 
by a motive within their reach, they will seize and convert into a brand 
of party warfare; but if there he found in the state a bad man who 
understands them, he will subdue them, and use them by doing what they cannot 
conceive. He has but to commit a great crime, to convert the antagonist 
of his party, and the judges of his acts, into advocates and partisans. Then 
will faction subside, antagonism disappears, and the traitor, because he is 
a traitor, and by that alone, stands surrounded by the united power of 
people, among whom the very traditions of sense and custom have been 
effaced, though unhappily for mankind and for itself, a tongue is in its 
brainless head, and arms are in its cruel hands. 

The note continues :— 

“ The expediency of such concert between Great Britain and Russia upon Persian affairs, has 
frequently been urged by the Russian Government, and acknowledged by that of Great Britain. 

This expediency, as above observed, had not been discussed or explained 
when that concert was established : now that the question is the fulfilment of 
the engagement, is mooted the expediency of the proposal! 

Observe the epithets used and the thoughts presented—here is frequency 


and urgency superadded to the proposal of concert—here is the acknow¬ 
ledgment of its expediency substituted for acceptance . A concert being 
accepted, every question arising out of it is one of obligation and of right. 
Here is not a word of acceptance, of obligation, or of right; and while the 
realities are withheld, shadows are offered. Here, as every where, the reader 
is conducted through an accomplished scene of semblances so true to 
deception that the false vision extinguishes consciousness. If deception is 
not complete, exposure is entire:—but if exposure is not complete, deception 
is so. In this lies the strength of that fascination of the minds of men 
against which we have to struggle :—but in this too lies our hope, for without 
hands may that power be broken, and the meanest and the weakest of the 
honest may aid in the task of a world’s salvation. He surely had had a 
foretaste of the present days who first pictured palaces and halls of enchant¬ 
ment, created by a word , while there was another word which the art of evil 
dared not use, and by pronouncing which its power was broken and its 
work destroyed. Fallacy is the magician’s spell,—truth is the talisman that 
sets his victims free. 

The note continues :— 

“ Upon this principle it was, that in 1833 the two governments came to an understanding (!) 
with respect to the succession to the Persian throne, and that they agreed together to give their support 
to the present Shah, whom the then reigning Monarch named as his successor. It is well known to 
the Russian Government how instrumental British influence was in carrying that decision of the late 
Shah (!) promptly into effect.” 

The two governments had concerted to select for the Shah a successor. 
This falsehood then, could not be of use for the Russian Government. It 
was not requisite to tell Russia how serviceable England had been to her, 
or how serviceable she could be again. It was not for the Russian Govern¬ 
ment that the British Foreign Secretary pretended to hesitate to yield those 
services, nor for it that he furnished arguments himself for overcoming that 

reluctance. 

The note continues : 

“ The two Governments continued for some time afterwards to maintain the same similarity in 
their respective courses of policy towards Persia; and the influence of both, as exerted by their 
missions at Teheran, appeared to be directed towards the same end, namely, to secure to Persia 
internal tranquillity and external peaceT 


226 


What means similarity ? Let the strange term be granted:— are there 
various kinds of similarities—is similarity a term by which an established 
concert could be designated—does similarity describe the concealed hostility 
that did exist ? And it is after the expulsion of the British Missions from the 
whole of Central Asia,—the assault upon Herat, by Persia and Russia united, 
during three years—of alliance with Cabool and Kandahar—of threats against 
Bokhara and Khiva, conjointly by Russia and Persia—it is after an invasion 
undertaken by England to resist Persia and Russia—that the Minister of 
England speaks of the apparent union of these governments, of the joint 
efforts of the two great powers of Europe and of Asia to bring about a state 
of tranquillity and peace ! 

Thus concludes the exordium of the note, which then proceeds to unrol 
a long and startling detail of the frauds perpetrated by Russia, and of the 
wrongs endured by England. I find it impossible to dwell upon this 
document in detail, for the difficulty of the task of exposing, increases with 
every step we take, from the accumulating load of falsehood which we have to 
bear along with us. The document must be studied in itself, and I trust that 
the reader who has followed thus far this analysis, will peruse it for his 
enlightenment, and not for his deception. Avoiding all allusion to the 
events which occurred in the course of the year 1835, and all the commu¬ 
nications from Persia down to November 1836, it rehearses from that period 
the conduct of Count Simonich in Persia and before Herat, and the measures 
adopted by Russia in Central Asia to combine these principalities in a 
general league against England. This statement of facts is not made upon 
report; it is not made as of things heard, but as of things known. It rests 
not upon the testimony of an Envoy ; it is asserted, and authoritatively, in the 
name and on the behalf of the British Government. No door is left open for 
evasion ; no opportunity is given for contradiction. It is absolute in its tone, 
and final in its manner, so as to render it impossible for Russia to disavow her 
acts, or for England to retract her assertions. 

But every specific indication of acts, of intention, or of opinion on the 
part of the British Government itself is carefully avoided. The Foreign 
Secretary speaks of the British Envoy being “ known to disapprove he 
speaks of the objects which the “ British Envoy proposed to accomplish.” 


227 


No where is it said that the British Government had instructed any one 
to do any thing, or that it proposed itself to accomplish any thing; yet 
the attempts made by Mr. M c Neill on the suggestions of the Governor- 
General of India, and which we have seen were so effectually counteracted 
by the Foreign Secretary, are used to exhibit the British Government as if it 
had proposed and as if it had acted. Thence, the reader must infer that 
Russia was powerful in herself: powerful to effect her objects alone, and had 
done so, in opposition to the efforts of Great Britain. 

I select a single paragraph, as it bears upon a subject not hitherto dwelt 
upon in this analysis. 

“ The British Government possesses a copy of a Treaty which has been concluded between 
Persia and the Affghan ruler of Kandahar, the execution of which has been guaranteed by Count 
Simonicli , and the stipulations of which are injurious and offensive to Great Britain.” 

* * * “ In the original draft of this treaty , specific allusion has been made to England as 

one of the powers against whom assistance teas to be given by Russia to the rulers of Kandahar 

This deed, the rupture of every bond and the violation of every right; 
this deed—which shows that no obligations are sacred and no faith binding 
for the government by which it is perpetrated, for the men of which that 
government is composed—is conveyed to the hands of the government against 
which it is directed, while both are bound together by a bond of reciprocal 
communication and concerted policy. The case is flagrant beyond all parallel, 
in the hostility of its intentions, in the perfidy of its means, in the faithless¬ 
ness of its character, and in the clearness of proof. Here no interval is left 
between right and wrong; no middle course between the path of Russia and 
the path of England. Now at last a decision is inevitable. No doubt 
England has decided ; for this deed has been discovered in the remote regions 
of Asia by the scrutinizing vigilance of the agents of the British Government; 
it is now produced by that government and publicly declared to the Cabinet of 
St. Petersburgh itself. Delay, indeed, has occurred in taking this step, but 

* It is against the Sikhs, Shah Shooja and the British that protection is to be afforded. 
Russia informed the Princes of Central Asia of the intention of England to restore Shah Shooja. 
This belief is used to induce them to accept her proffered protection against England. Then the 
evidence of Russia’s influence in those regions affords Lord Palmerston the pretext for urging the 
Indian Government into the expedition against the Affghans, as a means of overthrowing the influence 
of Russia ! 


228 


in that delay there must be judgment, seeing that in its past conduct there is 
evidence of vigilance, and that in its present act there is proof of hardihood. 

Let us read on :—this treaty is censured. No decision is conveyed—no 
redress is demanded! 

What then, here again, can we conclude, except that we have an addi¬ 
tional fact to confirm that conclusion, which—the oftener presented, is but 
the more appalling. 

The winding up of the statement of facts is as follows : 

“ Whereas, Russia has of late years invariably professed a desire to concert with Great Britain 
the course of policy which the two governments should pursue with regard to Persia, so that the 
identity of their measures in that quarter might he a manifest proof of their friendship and union. 
Russia’s agents in Persia and Afghanistan have lately been engaged in measures studiously concealed 
from the British Government, and planned in a spirit unfriendly to Great Britain, and for objects 
hostile to her interests.” 


Can these words have reference to the facts which have been rehearsed ? 
Are these the words of a friend or of a foe ? Is this a denunciation that bursts 
forth, or is it an excuse that is insinuated ? And while the grand features 
of the case are screened from the view, mark the industry with which each 
crevice is crowded with deceptive images— “ Russia .professed a desire of 
“ concert .” Was there a doubt in her profession. Was there insincerity 
in her desire ? Was the fact of concert not established ? Was that concert 
not established at her suggestion ? Was it not violated by her act ? “ That 

“ the identity of their interests in that quarter should be a manifest proof 
“ of their friendship and union.” As if it w^ere the most desirable of things 
for England to unite with Russia—as if that union could be spoken of after 
that which had occurred—as if union could be of use in its exhibition and 
not in its existence—and as if the friendship of states might continue in its 
course undisturbed by the acts or the measures of the governments which 
professed it. “ Russia engaged in measures studiously concealed from the 
“ English Government ?” Climax of audacity! As if he had been kept in 
ignorance of the task which he had to perform—as if those measures were 
concealed from him which his voice was used as the first to announce. Russia 
acting against the British Government! What act is there of that 
Government that she has not dictated ? 


229 


Supposing that some stranger to passing events had perused this docu¬ 
ment, and perused it with a free mind, looking merely to that which was 
before him, and not supposing things different from what they appeared,— 
would not his mind he roused to anxious anticipation of the conclusions atwhich 
the English Government must have arrived ? Would he not feel himself upon 
the very verge of its decision on an occasion the most momentous—a decision 
between the two great governments of the Asiatic, American, and European 
Worlds, hitherto allies and co-operators, and suddenly brought into flagrant 
hostility ? A gigantic process of concealed attack, had been concocted against 
England from the banks of the Emba to those of the Indus—her influence had 
been uprooted, and her power supplanted by Russia throughout those illus¬ 
trious regions which have been the arena of the greatest of human events, 
because they are the sources of the power which has been required to 
obtain supreme dominion. This vast conspiracy has been conducted by 
Russia while associated with England, and England is at once startled 
by the knowledge of its existence, and overwhelmed by the catastrophes to 
which it has given birth. Further, the stranger would behold before him the 
Sclavonic race and the Anglo-Saxon people, reaching from opposite sides to 
that point where was to he decided the contest between them for the dominion 
of the Eastern World—therefore, for the supremacy of the one over the other 
—therefore, for universal empire! Hanging over the expressions used to 
convey from Albion to Muscovy her mighty indignation,—watching the steps 
which were to bring to triumph or to failure this fearful conflict—with what 
sensations would he read the following passage :— 

“ The British Government readily admits that Russia is FREE 

TO PURSUE, WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTERS IN QUESTION, WHATEVER COURSE 
MAY APPEAR TO THE CABINET OF St. PeTERSBURGII MOST CONDUCIVE TO 
THE INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.” 

Indignation, as it bursts, is quelled by sudden bewilderment! Free ? 
— what can the word — what can the sentence mean ? A person that 
is free is one who is relieved from an obligation or emancipated from a 
restraint, and he only can say that another is free who has the faculty of 
dissolving the obligation, or of releasing from the constraint. But the word 
has received another sense, that of power or right; hut this vulgar and 
improper sense is only to be found in this term when it is ungrammatically 

h h 


230 


used,—as “ free, to perform ”—“ free, to pursue.’’ Has it, in the present 
instance, crept incidentally into some immaterial passage, through the inad¬ 
vertence of one unacquainted with the value of terms ? No ; it is used by a 
man master of the power of words, and versed in their use. The passage 
into which it is introduced is the important passage of the most important 
document which has ever passed between the two Cabinets. The passage 
hinges on this term, and, therefore, in this little word, must we find the value 
of the document and the intention of the transaction. This word conveys to 
Russia the right to perform that which is spoken of; he who reads the docu¬ 
ment will have no more knowledge of this concession than if it were written 
in an unknown tongue, and therefore it is England that does this. 

And what is it that Russia thus obtains the right to do ? Any thing— 
everything ! Russia is free to maintain concert of policy with England ; free 
under its shade to form offensive alliances against her; free, at once, to 
use England’s strength as a terror, and to hold up her possessions as a 
plunder; free, in fine, to do all that this note charges upon her. Can 
words effect more than this ? Could wider bounds be set to power, or ampler 
licence be conferred on freedom ? 

What right, has England then to remonstrate— ivhat object could there he 
in remonstrating ? 

Was this that “ important bearing on the relations between Great 
“ Britain and Russia,” that “ rendered it necessary for the British Government 
“ to request explanations from that of Russia ?” The necessity was then 
one which Russia imposed,—that England should herself detail, and then 
sanction the injuries she had suffered. 

But the reader will exclaim —“ England has not done this !” Who is 
England ? Is she not that which she is made by words that are spoken for 
her ? Are you not all bound by these words ? And can you escape from 
their binding until you can unravel them ? 

For the right thus conceded, a reason is given as follows: 

“-and Great Britain is too conscious of her own strength, and too sensible of the extent and 

sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, 
to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates/’ 

England denounces Russia, her own associate, for acts which arouse the 
whole mind to uncontrollable detestation, and the Foreign Secretary speaks 



231 


of England’s strength ; tells her that England has strength—is conscious of 
it—is not uneasy, or—not seriously so. Could the weakest of states, in 
addressing the strongest government by which it could be assailed, speak of 
strength ? The state the most powerful in the pursuit, and of ends the most 
criminal, unless baser than ever baseness has been exhibited, would seek 
and find some pretext of right to cover its injustice. And here in the 
mouth of England, as addressing Russia, is placed a boast of strength, 
hut—not a word of justice ! Yet that thought of justice is introduced to be 
associated with—Russia! First, Russia receives freedom, to perform that 
which a moment afterwards it becomes a question for England to use her 
strength to resist. It is not Russia that assumes this right, it is you that 
grant it. You detail her acts, and then say, that she is justified in perform¬ 
ing them, and the might which you have attributed to England, is the reason 
you assign for placing this right on the side of Russia. You are confident 
that Russia cannot harm you, because you are possessed of power; but when 
did the possession, without the use of power, justify the confidence of men ? 
Here, where your power is to be exerted, it is not used, and the occasion 
which demands its employment is seized foi the purpose of making renuncia¬ 
tion of its use. But, at all events, Russia is here threatened ; she is told that 
account is kept with her, and that a day of retribution may come. That 
threat is for you, not for Russia to believe. If it were for Russia, would it 
be a threat ? It would be to urge the performance of that for which a term 
of immunity was granted. It would be to say to her, “ that which you do, 
“ do quickly.” 

Observe now the terms selected to produce these effects—“ Uneasiness ! ” 
What connexion is there between the uneasiness of England and the acts 
of Russia, after the right to perform them has been recognised ? What con¬ 
nexion between the uneasiness of England and her power, since uneasiness 
could not justify its use ? Yet the sequence of fallacy is held together by 
the mere ambiguity of this term, chaining the mind, because it eludes the 
grasp. It is in such words that the destinies of England lie—such sentences 
are the bonds in which she is bound. 

Here the matter was concluded and the discussion closed—England had 
alleged against Russia all that could be alleged, and declared herself satisfied. 


232 


But still the note is not yet concluded; it contains other paragraphs. It 
says :— 

“ But the British Government considers itself entitled to ask of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg!], 
whether the intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia and towards Great Britain, are to be 
deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofinikin to the Earl of Durham, or 
from the acts of Count Simonich and M. Vicovitch ?” 

You have granted to Russia the right to do every thing she pleased. 
No sooner has this proof been given of unbounded devotion—no sooner 
has this faculty been conferred of illimitable power, than you proceed to insult 
her; telling her that you don’t believe what she says ; and that you do not 
know from what officer of the imperial crown her intentions are to be learnt; 
and it is to the Foreign Secretary himself that you make the declaration! Your 
remonstrance in 1837, at St. Petersburgh, amounted to nothing more than a 
suggestion from the British Foreign Secretary to Russia, that her agent in 
Persia must be in a state of insubordination. Count Nesselrode accepted the 
suggestion, and Count Simonich, as soon as he could receive instructions to 
that effect, confirmed the assertion of the British Government that he had 
been acting in disobedience to his instructions. Upon this, neither are 
remonstrances addressed to St. Petersburgh, nor is the continuance of the 
same agent in Persia, as the executor of the joint policy of the two Govern¬ 
ments objected to. England then believed the contradictory assertions of the 
Russian Foreign Secretary, and of the Russian Ambassador; and was per¬ 
fectly satisfied with the discrepancy between them. After admitting both as 
true, during eighteen months, England declares she believes neither. After 
eighteen months of distinct avowal by the Russian Government, and by its 
ambassadors, of habitual opposition between them, England asks Russia which 
of the two is to be taken as the criterion of her intentions ? 

At the commencement of this note, the Foreign Secretary declares him¬ 
self to be fully acquainted with the motives of Russia; at the end of it he 
declares himself ignorant of her intentions. At the commencement of the 
note, he explains the interests of Russia from which her motives spring, and 
concludes an exposition of her acts, by demanding how her policy could be 
comprehended, and whei£ it was to be discerned. 

Throughout England, it is believed that Russia had been preparing, 


233 


either covertly or openly, to attack India ; but that in consequence of the steps 
taken by the Foreign Secretary, she had disavowed her acts, and sacrificed her 
agents. In the communications which have passed between the two Govern¬ 
ments upon the subject of Central Asia, we find, as we shall presently see, 
no retractation on the part of Russia, no sacrifice of an agent, no disavowal of 
an act. How is it, then, that this belief has been accredited ? It has, prin- 
cipally, if not entirely, to be referred to the passage above quoted—a passage 
which has been selected and reproduced as containing the very marrow of 
these transactions, and read by almost every individual in this land. From 
this passage the reader must infer that Russia is treated with insult and 
spoken to with sarcasm, and no one could doubt that the position of England 
was secure, when the British Minister could so treat Russia*, and when she 
submitted to such treatment. 

But, after all, the question spoken of is not put. The British Govern¬ 
ment only considers itself entitled to put it. The British Foreign Secretary, 
without ascertaining those intentions which he had not discovered, and knew 
not where to seek, continues : — 

“ And the British Government thinks itself also justified in observing , that if from any cause what¬ 
ever, the Russian Government has, subsequently to the months of February and May 1837, altered the 
opinions which were then expressed to the Earl of Durham; and if that Government has, in con¬ 
sequence, thought fit to give to its Ambassador in Persia instructions diametrically opposite to those which 
were then described by Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofinikin, and which M. Rodofinikin offered to 
exhibit to the Earl of Durham (!) then, and in such case, the system of unreserved reciprocal 
communication upon Persian affairs, which of late years has been established between the two govern¬ 
ments, gave to the British Cabinet a good right to expect , that so entire a change of policy on the part of 
Russia, together with the reasons on which it was founded, would have been made known to Her 
Majesty’s Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, instead of being left to be inferred from 
the acts of Russian agents in Persia and Affghanistan.” 

Let us re-state this passage, taking out parenthetical expressions— 

“ If the Russian Government has altered the opinions it entertained in 
“ 1837, then the system of unreserved reciprocal communication established 
“ between the two governments, gave to England the right to be informed of 
“ this change.” 

* To which must be added, the enigmatical insinuation of the Foreign Secretary in the House of 
Commons, that there were Governments that attempted every thing, and disavowed every thing. 


234 


Governments do not communicate upon abstract questions. A system 
established between two governments must be based on an intention of both, 
and must impose reciprocal duties, obligations, and confer equivalent rights. 
In this expression, therefore, we have clearly a compact to co-operate; why, 
then, is the simple word not used ? We have before seen that that compact 
was, in fact, established—we have also seen that the British Foreign Secretary 
never uses a term that simply expresses compact. Here then is another 
instance of the anxiety to avoid the use of the term, and yet of the necessity 
of keeping the idea vaguely in presence. Let us, then, restore the proper 
words to the sentence — 

“ If Russia has altered the opinions she entertained in 1837, then the 
“ compact to act together, gave to Great Britain the right to he informed of 
“ this change of policy.” 

If comment were here required, it would be vain to offer it! 

Now let us take the expression so dexterously adjusted to confuse the 
rest of the sentence. 

System of unreserved reciprocal communication. 

In this sentence the idea of compact must reside. It can mean nothing 
else. Yet it may appear to mean something else. It may then mean at 
once compact and no compact; that is, it confuses the idea of compact. 
The phrase is therefore adjusted to furnish grounds for making a complaint 
while excluding the idea of violation of compact. Had the word compact 
been used, confusion could not have been introduced, for it was the thing 
itself, and the idea of violation of engagement would have at once presented 
itself to the reader. Bewildered in this maze, it is himself that he will 
reproach—he will not suspect the intention to mislead, since he will feel the 
inability to comprehend; failing to comprehend, he must assume to approve ; 
and to show that he has comprehended, he will labour to justify:—thus, is 
the character debased, when the intelligence is obscured. 

If there was reciprocal communication the acts of Russia were known, and 
there was no ground for the demand. If the acts of Russia were not known, 
there was no reciprocal communication, and (according to the phrase) there 
was no right to make the demand. The occasion for making the demand 
could only be the violation of the compact, and the existence of that compact 
gave England the right to require its execution, not the right to be informed 


235 


of any change of the policy of Russia. England’s right being in the fulfilment 
of the compact, not in the knowledge of its violation, to reproach Russia for not 
communicating the intention, was to sanction the acts by which it was violated. 

The Foreign Secretary asserts ignorance and communication; asserts 
reciprocity, and denies existence of communication—he asserts and denies the 
same thing—making the assertion as the ground of complaint, that it did not 
exist—taking the complaint that it did not exist, as the occasion for asserting 
that it had existence; this is not arguing to show the absurdity of the state¬ 
ment, but it is exposing the process laboriously adjusted, successfully employed 
to confound the reader—that is, the British nation. 

The words that must have poured from the lips of a minister, who uncon¬ 
sciously had thus bound his government, could only be words of indignation 
at the perfidy used against himself, of bitterness at the results obtained for his 
country. But here is not even so much as a declaration that England had 
been injured; and the height to which his indignation ascends is to insinuate, 
that Russia had done wrong*. 

Let us take a parallel case, and suppose a judge addressing a convicted 
assassin, and saying to him :—“ the social system of reciprocal forbearance, 
“ established between the different members of the community, gave to your 
“ unhappy victim a good right to expect that so entire a change of sentiment 
“ upon your part, together with the reasons upon which it is founded, should 
“ have been made known to him in words issuing from your mouth, and not 
“ by the act of your arm, levelling a fatal and unexpected thrust at him in the 
“ dark.” Would you not say that such language, though spoken on the 
bench, proceeded from the mouth of an accomplice, and that such a scene 
could only have occurred in the presence of an assemblage of idiots ? 

Here a minister of state declares, in a formal note, the acts of a foreign 
government to be hostile to his own, and complains that that government had 
not communicated to him such intention of hostility; and there are colleagues 
of that minister, and there is a senate, and there is a free people, to whom 


* When pressed in the House of Commons respecting the interference of Russia in Sweden to 
prevent Slito from being made a free port, the Foreign Secretary indignantly retorted upon the 
speakers, that if the case was as they asserted, that if Russia had interfered in the affairs of an inde¬ 
pendent state, she had done that which was very improper. God forbid that England should do any 
thing of the kind. 


these words are exposed, and who accept them as bona fide transactions— 
Good heaven ! in what times, in what nation, among what men do we live ! 

Now let us resume. What does this note contain, what propose ? The 
crimes are charged upon the Russian Government by England in such a strain 
as to render it impossible for the one to offer an explanation, for the other to 
retract a single assertion, and upon this there is no proposal made ! No 
displacement of a functionary nor disgrace of a minister demanded ; no public 
declaration in Europe or in Asia is proposed or required. The gravamen of 
the charge, the bathos of the complaint, the climax of the peroration is, that 
the British Minister is left to discover in Persia the intentions of Russia— 
intentions which he himself had been the first to announce to Persia, and 
which he had announced nine and thirty months before! 

This note causes England and Russia to change places, and places in the 
hands of Russia the power against England which England had possessed 
through the injustice of Russia. It says, we have concerted to act in common. 
We have been for years pretending to do so, but now, in the fourth year, 
I tell you, that I have known all the while that you were acting against me; 
and what is more, I was the first to act against you, and to take measures in 
opposition to you before you commenced. I now publish to the world that 1 
have done so, and I give you the documents which prove it. Was not this to 
place in the hands of the Russian Government the advantage and the right of 
remonstrance, and the power of denouncing the prior perfidy to her of the 
British Minister. But this advantage has been superfluous, and this power 
has been unnecessary, because Russia has been uninterruptedly in possession 
of the Foreign Office of Great Britain. 

Now let the reader examine whether or not every object which Lord 
Palmerston pretends to seek, is not frustrated, whether every statement 
which he assumes to make is not destroyed by his own act or word ? If not, 
every conclusion here drawn is false, and the reader is under the obligation 
of denouncing that falsehood, and of destroying the doubts and suspicions 
regarding the conduct of public affairs which a dishonest or a misguided man 
is casting into the public mind. But if, on the other hand, he finds that 
Lord Palmerston has himself destroyed each position he has advanced, that 
by himself is thwarted each object he assumes to seek, then —Why this labour ? 
There is the labour to build up, the labour to pull down, the labour to expose. 


237 


the labour to conceal. This labour, for whose profit was it ? Who could 
profit by it ? Where was there a man, or a system, with means equal to 
obtaining, or to extorting such co-operation, or in a position to benefit by its 
consequences ? The monarch of England, the factions of England, the nation 
itself could have no motive to require, or no interest to obtain, such labour 
as this. They have shown themselves all equally heedless and equally care¬ 
less, either to advance or to counteract it. We must, therefore, look abroad 
for those for whom such labour could be beneficial, or by whom such services 
could be compelled or repaid. There is a Power to whom such deeds are 
familiar; there is a Power to whom such labour might be profitable ; there 
is a Power who has profited by it. Russia has here obtained what might be 
the well-earned conquest of a successful war, carried on under favourable 
circumstances of position and alliance, and which had cost hundreds of millions 
of treasure, and hundreds of thousands of lives. 

The conclusion of this wonderful document baffles the power of language 
to analyze, and of indignation to denounce :— 

“ The undersigned, in conclusion, is instructed to say, ‘ that Her Majesty’s Government is 
persuaded that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg!! will see in this communication, a fresh proof of the 
anxious desire of the British Government to maintain, unimpaired, the friendly relations which so 
happily subsist between the two countries; and to which the British Government justly attaches so 
great a value: because explanations sought for with frankness, and in a friendly spirit, tend to 
remove misunderstandings, and to preserve harmony between nations.’ ” 

Friendly relations ! Yes, indeed, friendly ; fraud and injury, wrong and 
insult, are friendly things—for England is the foe of England—for England 
is the foe of truth, of justice, and of men. These explanations are sought for 
with a spirit of friendship and of frankness—a spirit, alas ! too bitterly frank, 
and too treacherously friendly ! “ Friendship,” “ frankness,” “ peace,” and 

“ harmony,” now have become sounds that ought to cause the just man's 
heart to sink, and the patriot’s spirit to fail. But have these been real things 
that we have been perusing ? Is not this some distempered vision, some 
delirious dream ? These are facts, and no visions; this is truth, and no 
phantom. In the minutest details, in the mightiest results under the darkest 
concealments, on the widest fields, we have found and traced, and proved one 
and the same conspiracy for the murder of an Empire, and that our own. 
The proof and facts, the will and the results, are there before you : but if 

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238 


these are results, how are they not seen; if there are proofs, how are they 
not believed; if there be crime, how is it not punished ? The facts teach 
not, for they appal; the proof fails, for it overwhelms ; the crime triumphs, 
not because proof is wanting, but because not understanding, who can believe ? 
You see, but believe not; posterity seeing the end, will wonder and believe. 
These are not prophesies, they are conclusions, from evidence which lies 
around, arrived at by steps within your reach. Proof in one case is sufficient 
for all—that proof lies even in the volume within your hands. 

‘ But you speak against the highest head in the realm, whom all men 
respect, whose conduct all parties approve, who labours to secure to us 
peace, and who gives to us the assurance of security. It is impossible that 
he can do that which is not honest, or say that which is not true. 

Yes, he 

-“ speaks of peace, while covert enmity, 

Under the smile of safety, wounds the world.” 

He speaks of that which he has destroyed. With the smile of safety he 
beguiles; the wound is in his words, and he is wounded who believes. 

‘ But if we believe, it is not in his words alone that we trust. Do we not 
see with our eyes ? And do we not know 7 with our knowledge? And have 
we not proof in our whole being, that there is peace within, that there is 

security around ? Know we not the might that resides in the arm of 

* 

England ? See we not the terrors that are scattered by her frown ? Does 
not confusion fall on her foes ? Are not honour and strength the portion 
of her partners ? Look around the globe in its wide expanse, and behold 
the splendid markets that are open for our riches, and the unbounded 
harvests that are yielded to our industry. Look again within this land 

which an ocean guards, and see after long years of internal broils, and 

long years of external heedlessness, now at length intelligence and energy 
swaying her councils, success attending her arms, concord and unity living 
in the breasts of men the smile of security brightening into the glow of 
triumph—as they listen to the sounds of almost bloodless victory, which 
messengers treading on each other’s heels, encircling the globe in their 
course, announce to us now from the rising, now from the setting sun 
These are the deeds of the man of whom you speak such things. These 
are the glories of the times you deplore, and of the people you reproach!' 



239 


It is in this midnight of your intoxication, that I declare to you an 
awakening of bitterness,—it is at this spring-tide of your joy, that I tell you 
that an ebb of troubles is at hand. A voice of warning and of sorrow I raise, 
although it be alone ; and if its sounds cannot disturb your slumber, and if 
its sense cannot pierce your breasts, its tone will be preserved, and will sink 
upon your spirits when they are softened by misfortune. 

In five short years has the power of Russia spread from the Caspian Gates 
to the banks of the Hyphasis. Her name has arisen suddenly as the simoon, 
sweeping all around the confines of Asia. The giant phantom spans the 
ancient realm of Cosroes and of the Arsases. It broods with sudden joy over 
the tombs of the Persian, the Macedonian, the Backtrian, the Ghiznevide, the 
Choaresmian, the Tartar conquerors of Hindostan. Resting now at length on 
those mighty barriers that hitherto restrained—it leans over India, scanning 
it with its eye, shaking it with its sound, and withering it with its breath. 
Who has raised the phantom ? Who has built up this power ? Whence the 
terrors of the one—or the pillars of the other ? Has she sent forth myriads 
to conquer ? Has she brought forth a Nadir, a Hannibal, or a Timour ? 
No—not a legion has been moved, not a weapon has been drawn, not a soldier 
has stepped across her confines. Without effort, without danger, without 
blood, without numbers expended, or heroes produced, has she won more 
than Alexander conquered, and in a shorter space of time. She has won this 
by the single aid of one man, and he neither born of her race nor numbered 
amidst her servants. But this man had England to give away; England, 
when she was drunk with folly, and knew not what she did. No wonder 
then, at this simultaneous explosion over Europe and over Asia, because at 
once the harries that opposed were cast down, and the weight that com¬ 
pressed, has been added to her impulse. Coolly, deliberately, laboriously has 
he applied himself to this task. He has accomplished it by the poising of 
sentences, the adjusting of phrases—culling vices, and scattering error. He 
has had neither competitor nor antagonist; alone has he done this, taking 
counsel with evil in the icy caverns of his own dark mind. The highest 
functionary of his native land—his task has been that people’s ruin ; the 
minister of England—her power has been directed to the destruction of all 
that is noble, worthy, just in man. Not amid fields of the dying and the 
dead—not in time of fear and trouble ; it is not within embattled fastnesses, 


240 


or amidst partisans, conspirators, or resolved men with passions aroused, and 
consciousness awake, that is performed this appalling task of diurnal crime. 
It is in the unconscious metropolis of an Empire, in the calm centre of 
dominion, among a powerful and confiding people, that this conspiracy against 
the human race is adjusted, and advanced with long and patient labour, 
interrupted only by friendly and familiar intercourse with the dupes whom he 
uses, and the victims he has doomed. 


END OF PART XVII. 


LONDON 

TRINTED BY T. BRETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET. 






























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